Democratic Resilience vs. Democratic Backsliding: A Tale of Two Nations in Times of Political Instability and Insecurity

Abstract

Democracy in West Africa is shaped by the intersection of historical legacies, institutional capacity, and evolving security threats. This thesis investigates the relationship between political instability and democratic quality through a comparative study of Nigeria and Senegal, two countries that share similar regional and security threats but differ sharply in their responses to insecurity. The central research question asks: Under what conditions does the quality of democracy improve or deteriorate in politically insecure regions?

The study focuses on the period from 2000 to 2023, as it reflects a significant democratic transition and institutional reform across West Africa. The year 2010 serves as a key inflection point, marking the escalation of Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria and rise of insurgent groups across the Sahel. Using a mixed-methods approach that combines a difference-in-differences regression model, historical text analysis, and semi-structured expert interviews, the study evaluates how internal and external security pressures affect institutional integrity, civil society strength, and rule of law. Quantitative findings reveal that while Nigeria consistently scores lower than Senegal on my composite Democratic Resilience Index (DRI), political instability did not produce a statistically significant decline post-2010, challenging the hypothesis that insecurity directly erodes democratic quality. However, qualitative analysis exposes a disconnect between measured resilience and lived experience, with both states deploying different but equally consequential strategies of control: overt securitization in Nigeria and legalistic repression in Senegal.

The research demonstrates that democratic backsliding is not always dramatic or easily captured through aggregated indicators. Instead, it often unfolds through incremental institutional distortions that reflect broader struggles over legitimacy, dissent, and state authority. Based on these findings, the study offers targeted policy recommendations for institutional reform, civic engagement, and regional cooperation. It concludes that democratic resilience requires more than electoral continuity; it demands adaptable, accountable, and inclusive governance capable of withstanding both violent threats and subtler forms of institutional decay.