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Abstract
This dissertation explains why some political actors willingly surrender sovereignty to great powers and others choose to resist, often violently. It argues that political competition and conflict at a domestic level drive actors to surrender sovereignty. Where domestic political groups are competing over rent-seeking opportunities, they are more likely to surrender sovereignty. In this situation, losing political power results in loss of economic power as well. Consequently, actors become willing to exchange some sovereignty for resources from a great power in order to preserve their political and economic position. This question has implications for how we understand the development of order at the international level and the conflict between great and small powers.
The theory is tested using cases from two different eras. The first set of cases addresses informal empire in 19th century China, the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. The second set of cases addresses Russia's attempts to establish informal empire and hierarchy in the former Soviet Union. These issues are analyzed at the cross-national, national and subnational level. I use a cross-national data set containing observations from all former Soviet Republics since independence, case studies of national level politics in Georgia and Ukraine, and case studies of regional level variation in Georgia. These case studies make use of primary and secondary sources, interviews and statistical analysis of survey data.
