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Philos Stud (2011) 154:161184
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9533-0
Alexander Sarch
Published online: 6 March 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract Internalism about a persons good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a persons well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a persons good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering ve independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about ones good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems dont end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls two-tier internalism would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about ones good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about ones good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a persons good do not look promising.
Keywords Internalism Well-Being Welfare Good Motivation
Subjectivity Desire Satisfactionism Hedonism Intrinsic value
Internalism about a persons good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a persons well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. This sort of view enjoys widespread support. Peter Railton, for instance, holds that what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a
A. Sarch (&)
Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, 359 Bartlett Hall, 130 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA 01003-9269, USAe-mail: [email protected]
Internalism about a persons good: dont believe it
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connection with what he would nd in some degree compelling or attractive at least if he were rational and aware. (Railton 2003, p. 47) David Velleman endorses a version of internalism that is restricted to statements about whats intrinsically good for a person. (Velleman 2000, p. 85) Many others endorse the view as well.1 While a few philosophers have sketched arguments for internalism about a...