Challenges of military leadership in changing armies

Abstract

In this article we review current developments in the environments, tasks, and composition of the armed forces in industrial democracies, and speculate about the implications of these developments of military leadership. In particular, we emphasize the opening of military organizations to their environments, the more flexible and modular structure of military forces, and the increased cultural diversity within military organizations.

Headnote

In this article we review current developments in the environments, tasks, and composition of the armed forces in industrial democracies, and speculate about the implications of these developments for military leadership. In particular, we emphasize the opening of military organizations to their environments, the more flexible and modular structure of military forces, and the increased cultural diversity within military organizations. We believe these changes increase the level of complexity in the military commander's task at all levels and multiply the challenges facing military leaders. We discuss some of these challenges and spell out their implications for theory development and research.

INTRODUCTION

This essay examines how key developments in the armed forces of the industrial democracies are raising a set of profound challenges for military leadership. In a previous article (Shamir and Ben-Ari 1999), we examined how changes in contemporary military establishments imply new modes of leadership training and education. This essay develops some of these themes in an integrative and speculative direction. It is integrative because we seek to draw together the diverse findings of previous studies into a coherent analytical framework. It is speculative because on the basis of this framework we conjecture or theorize about the concrete patterns of leadership challenges as they have been emerging in the past few decades. We make four main points.

One, we commence from one of the most dominant views of present-day armies as being organized around electronic and information technologies. We contend that this technological perspective is much too limited to encompass current trends in the environments within which armed forces currently operate and the kinds of tasks they are assigned. Two, based on of a critique of this viewpoint, we offer a framework that integrates changes in the environments, internal structures, and tasks of contemporary militaries. These transformations include the obscuring of conventional distinctions between "front" and "rear," and "war" and "peace," (Bellamy, 1996); the increased exposure of the armed forces to various media; new modes of political and civilian control; the expanded participation of troops in (temporary and permanent) inter-organizational and multinational frameworks; and alterations in the human configuration of the armed forces. The model that we trace out predicates an addition of new military capacities, conditions, and organizational configurations to conventional ones. Thus while we emphasize how military institutions are now undergoing alterations, we stress that the pattern is not a simple transformation from one state to another. Rather, we suggest that the most fruitful way to understand contemporary developments is through a model of an expansion -- a growing complexity -- of assignments and exigencies and not a pattern of replacement of older missions by newer ones.

Three, in theoretical terms, we see current militaries in democratic societies as becoming organic structures, "open systems," and capable of being aligned in loose, modular forms of temporary frameworks. We suggest that these developments do not emanate only from changes in the military sphere but, since changes in civilian organizations inform and influence military organizations, also from changes in the broader organizational arena. Four, we take our contentions further to show how these trends imply a growing complexity in the roles military leaders undertake and in their need for new skills and capabilities. This growing complexity is not only related to the simple addition of new assignments and circumstances but to new kinds of role conflicts and tensions. The new skills required of military commanders are similar to some of the faculties managers of multinational corporations must master: negotiation, liaison, persuasion and teamwork. In addition, we argue that a main challenge facing military leaders is how to integrate units and forces under conditions of loosely-coupled structures, diverse cultures, temporary membership, and technologies that increase the distance between leaders and unit members.

"INFORMATION" WARS?

Among a variety of scholars, military professionals and security experts, it has become rather fashionable to talk about what may be termed "digital," "cyber" and "information" or "computer" wars (Van Creveld,1991). This kind of warfare developed since World War Two on the basis of new technology that has permeated into the armed forces through the militaryindustrial interface (Mendelsohn et al., 1988). These terms allude both to land, air and sea battles fought on and with computer networks, and new wars involving a country's communications networks, security webs, or economic infrastructure (Gray, 1997). From our perspective, what is of importance in such perspectives on future warfare, is that the primary feature of military forces will be their mastery of information and of technology. As we stated in our previous paper (Shamir and Ben Ari 1999), the current consideration in the design of many future armies, and as reflected in the US Army Force XXI literature, is that of attaining electronic connectivity between and among all echelons and units of a given force. The most radical image portrayed by proponents of this view is the creation of what may be termed "military internets" which will increase commanders' perceptions of their environment, and provide them with accurate pictures of battlefields. The outcome of these developments, according to this technological viewpoint, will be more reliable and speedy decisions that, in combination with more accurate weapons systems, will make for more efficient military forces.

Such forecasts suggest that the image of military leaders will undergo a radical transformation. For instance, in the US Army literature about Force XXI ("The Army of Tomorrow") the military commander is located in an information center and immersed in deciphering a mass of data and then transmitting orders and instructions by electronic means. Even in field units, future commanders are represented less as leaders than as managers or engineers of information technology who stay in a control room or vehicle, and are physically and socially distant from the majority of their troops. If we accept this line of reasoning, as the practice of war becomes more distal and synthetic, so will the exercise of leadership. The cast of military leadership in all modern wars has centered on a model of heroism in the face of danger and death, and physical hardships and suffering. No less importantly, leadership has depended on strong emotional bonds with troops and an emphasis on honor, loyalty and commitment. If these affective components will be removed from leaders' roles (or at least largely diminished), the prototype is likely to undergo some fundamental changes. The governing depiction of the "digitized" army, or of computer warfare clearly demphasizes the social and human elements of the military, and presents a very "cold" model of technical managers in place of conventional military leaders.

At the same time however, this scenario proceeds from an assumption of technological determinism: that technology is both autonomous and has determinate effects on the structure and operation of military forces. In the first place, a close reading of studies on contemporary armed forces reveal the continued need for regular forces performing what have come to be termed "conventional" tasks. In Boene's (1990: 31) words, the uniqueness of the military lies in its design for combat, the localized, violent encounter of armed forces. As the Gulf War has taught us, whatever changes the military has undergone in the previous decades, it still remains true that only ground troops can take and hold land. As a host of scholars have contended, what this situation implies is the persistence of conventional military leadership which is based on self-control, proficiency, inspiration and personal example (Zakai, 1990: 6)

Second, a perspective stressing the advent of "cyberwar" risks giving technology primacy in the analysis of change. If we have learned anything from social scientific studies of technology, it has been that practical knowledge and techniques are not the sole determinants of social or institutional change. For instance, while two decades ago communication networks were thought to lead to the relocation of work back to the home (Nilles et al.,1976), such changes have evolved at a slower pace than initially forecast (Hall, 1990; Shamir, 1992). From our perspective, note that firms and organizations adopted the possibilities of working from home carefully because of managers' hesitation in relinquishing their leadership roles (Olson, 1988; Perin, 1990), and employees need for face-t-face interaction with superiors and peers (Shamir and Salomon, 1985). Accordingly, the new technological possibilities of "computer wars" will encounter social norms, organizational practices and human preferences that will affect their adoption. We foresee that the interaction between these technological innovations and human and organizational features will eventuate in a less "digitized" military reality than that envisioned by the technologically driven scenarios.

Third, a number of other developments associated with the functions and missions of the armed forces and the conditions within which they perform seem no less important than the move to electronic and information technics. These developments have enlarged and transformed the established roles of the armed forces in ways that are no less relevant to military commanders than the effects of communication techniques and information technologies.

CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES AND MILITARY ACTIVITY

Since the Second World War, the military establishments of the industrial democracies have taken on a host of new duties and assignments. "Peace operations," for example, refers to a number of types of operations some harking back to conventional military tasks, some involving policing and control of civilians, and others including negotiation and mediation. The accepted scholarly distinction is based on the amount and type of force involved in peace operations with the emphasis shifting from fighting and winning wars to deterring, to ensuring the fulfillment of agreements, and to performing police tasks normally reserved for constabulary forces. Often such tasks involve mediating between rival forces (Bosnia, Somalia), and in many cases such forces include non-state and semi-military organizations (for instance, drug cartels, militias in disintegrated societies, or various insurgents). Sometimes, "peacekeeping" operations extend to political tasks, as when armies are involved in monitoring democratic elections (Cambodia) or protecting an elected government (Haiti). All these missions commonly bring the military and especially its leaders into close contacts with civilian bodies and civilian populations.

In the past twenty or so years, armed forces have increasingly participated in various humanitarian and environmental projects that involve either missions of "mercy under fire" (Minear and Weiss 1995) or do not directly entail considerations related to national (or international) security. Armies now often directly participate in administering aid efforts (Somalia, Bosnia) (which often legitimize the peacemaking efforts themselves) and are heavily involved in disaster relief during floods, earthquakes and fires. While such assignments are usually carried out within the military's home country, in case of emergencies in less developed countries, they are also carried out in different national locations, often under the auspices of international frameworks. Closely related to these missions are the roles of armed forces in "environmental security" (Harbottle,1995: 13): i.e. in the conservation and protection of environmental resources and in defending national interests against environment protection bodies (for example, the French military in its struggle with Greenpeace in the Pacific Ocean).

Changing conceptions of "war." Arguably, conventional wars tend to relatively clearly differentiate between the geographical and social positions of military forces and civilians. The new "postmodern" wars tend to confuse, baffle, and mistake such conventional categories. In the Tofflers' (1994) apt formulation, these are problems having to do with the "vanishing front." In present-day conflicts whether large-scale or minuscule, it has become unclear where front and rear are and who are the warriors on the "battlefield" and who are the supporters at "home". New missiles and other long-range weapons easily cross national borders, and thus bring the rear nearer to the front. For instance, while Israel did not participate in the Gulf War, due to missile attacks, Israeli civilian centers became "fronts," and hitherto marginal military units became important in guiding and directing the civilian population.

Accompanying changes in the nature of military tasks are changing attitudes within wider publics about the legitimacy of using force to achieve national ends. The implications of these shifting attitudes for military activities have been explored only peripherally by scholars. Cultural transformations around the world have led to questioning, within the military and outside of it, of the morality of using military power; to what Bellamy (1996: 30) succinctly terms the differences between wars of "necessity," "choice," or "conscience."While these "anti-military" attitudes can be traced to the Vietnam War era in Western countries, they are also related to the end of colonialism, the growing power of East Asian countries, and the intensification of struggles over global economic issues. Concretely, many current wars now take place within settings marked by dissensus over the goals and procedures of armed conflicts (Gal, 1987: 54; Faris, 1995). In addition, wider contentions about such questions often seep into military or military-politicalforums (Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Intifada, or Bosnia). As a result of these developments, military leaders are faced with new problems. On the one hand, more often than in the past, they must handle moral misgivings among soldiers and among themselves and create internal credibility for their actions. On the other, they must regularly react to politically charged environments in order to establish external legitimacy.

The greater exposure of military units to the media has intensified these problems. Various publics are now not only informed about the background to conflicts and wars, but thanks to television they can vicariously participate in what Michael Mann (1987) has termed "massspectator militarism," a fascination with 'things military' as depicted in the electronic media. Beginning with the war in Vietnam and culminating in the Gulf War, military operations are more frequently televised, and military leaders are now expected to provide regular media reports explicating their actions "live from the battlefield" (Arnett 1994). Within these circumstances in which military authorities have very little control over media coverage, commanders find it difficult to hide the consequences of military actions. And, as a result of television's presence very near war zones, media coverage is important for how troops interpret external views of their efforts. The centrality of the media is reinforced through their active manipulation by the warring parties. Indeed, technological developments that have occurred in the last decade have made any person with a camera, computer or Internet link a potential reporter. As we suggest elsewhere (Shamir and Ben Ari, 1999), at the same time that advances in information technologies increase military commanders' control of their troops and their environment, they also decrease this control.

CULTURES, ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNAL COMPLEXITY

An increasing number of military and humanitarian operations are now performed within multinational frameworks. Such frameworks may be temporary coalitions as in the Gulf War, or more permanent bodies such as NATO (Connaughton, 1992). They may be commissioned by international associations as the UN or more regional ones as the OAU. As for managers of corporate "alliances" so for military leaders, participation in multi-national missions necessitates cooperation across different languages, doctrines, and levels of military competence. In many cases, armed forces find themselves interacting not only with other armies but also with a variety of governments and voluntary associations (Bosnia, Somalia, Lebanon, or the Gulf War). Each organization and its representatives, of course, have their own viewpoints and internal agenda. Theoretically speaking, these interorganizational frameworks are characterized by temporary structures, fuzzy boundaries, and unclear division of labor and authority. In addition, they are political arenas through which their constituent "actors" promote and advance their own ends (Johansen, 1990: 59).

During the past few decades, the personnel make up of many armed forces has become much more diverse in ethnic, racial and gender terms. The increased complexity of military technology and weaponry has led to a large influx of educated soldiers into the armed forces who are probably better informed and more non-conformist than their counterparts of past. This growing pluralism has been accompanied by variance in motivation for service. As Harries-Jenkins (1986) notes for the British army, today one finds diverse "pull" factors for joining the military (including different roleimages like the warrior, worker or technician), and "push" factors, which are less ideal but practical attitudes regarding what can be achieved within military service (career development, for instance). In addition, the move to a concept of "total force" in some establishments has led to a greater tendency to rely on the use of reserves and, in turn, to further permeation of "civilian" attitudes into the military (Moskos, 1988:47).

Three main themes emerge from our discussion. One, present-day militaries are becoming more and more what may be termed "open systems." This openness is the outcome of the blurring of "front" and "rear," participation in non-military missions, a pluralistic and diverse personnel, heightened role of the media, and a plethora of channels of interaction between the army and wider publics. Two, to a much greater extent than before military leaders are now faced with serious problems of credibility and legitimacy due to wider changes in cultural attitudes to the use of force, increased involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and participation in multicultural and multilingual frameworks. Three, the rapid introduction of new technologies, performance of various tasks under different conditions, and within ah-hoc frameworks create demands for flexible, innovative, and adaptable military forces.

We believe these changes must be viewed as originating not only from the changing circumstances and roles of military organizations, but also from changes in the wider civilian organizational sphere. Scholarly and popular scenarios of current organizational trends seem to agree that the faster pace of environmental and technological change, combined with the trend toward globalization and the opportunities created by information and computer-mediated technologies require, and already produce, more flexible organizations. One important characteristic of the new form of organization is the obliteration of boundaries within the organization and between the organization and elements in its external environment. This "boundaryless organization" (Davis, 1995) is portrayed as containing less fixed structures and more temporary systems, whose elements, both people and technologies, are assembled and disassembled according to the shifting needs of specific projects. Both internal and external relationships change, and people move more frequently between and within organizations. Furthermore, many people are connected to the organization not only temporarily but also virtually through computers. The term "post-bureaucratic" has also been applied to characterize these new organizational forms (Hecksher and Donnellon, 1994).

NEW CHALLENGES OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

While the developments reviewed in the previous sections have important implications for the practice and study of military leadership, they have not been fully explored by leadership scholars. House (1995:411) in a recent speculative essay about leadership in the twenty first century observed that:

"Scholars and practitioners of management generally concur that organizational leaders in the twenty first century will face a number of important changes that will impose substantial new role demands. These changes include greater demographic diversity of workforces, a faster pace of environmental and technological change, more frequent geopolitical shifts affecting borders and distribution of power among nation states, and increased international competition. The popular and business press expect these changes to result in new and different relationships between employers and employees, organizations and resource suppliers, government and business, and buyers and sellers. If this is the case, business, government and military organizations will need to adopt new strategic approaches and organizational forms. These changes will place new demands on the leaders of tomorrow."

While all of these changes are not relevant to all military commanders, we believe that they will bear upon many of their role components. Modern armies are probably the prototype of mechanistic, bureaucratic organizations marked by a fixed division of labor, hierarchical authority, standardization of operations, and reliance on precise regulations for achieving regularity, reliability and efficiency. Leadership in such organizations depends on formal patterns of authority and the exercise of "legitimate" power (French and Raven, 1960). Yet, contemporary militaries are much more "organic," and characterized by a flexible division of labor, decentralized decision making, low reliance on formal hierarchy and greater use of informal communication between the ranks. Such organizations, as scholars have shown, are better adapted to environments with high turbulence and to nonroutine tasks (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Indeed, Bellamy (1996: 199) suggests that the social structure of the future army will resemble that of the police where everyone is an 'officer": i.e. individuals at the bottom of the rank structure are invested with a great deal of authority and the sense of hierarchy is less dominant.

The move to organic structures is the outcome of the need for versatility and adaptability among the armed forces and the growing expectation that they be modular units capable of combining with other forces for varying missions. As a consequence, military commanders often find themselves "in charge" of units not permanently under their authority or even of civilians in various roles. Such developments will be reinforced by the influx of new technologies strengthening decentralization. It is within such situations that leadership, as opposed to "mere" management, has becomes so important. Mechanisticorganizations are characterized by clearly defined roles and predictable behaviors. Organic organizations feature high role-ambiguity and shifting relationships that cannot always be predicted with certainty. This point is especially pertinent to interorganizational frameworks that tend to be "loosely coupled" systems (Weick, 1977). Under such conditions, organizational structures and rules cannot be relied upon for effecting performance. One alternative is the development of normative, or "clan" control (Ouchi, 1980), which is based on an organizational culture shared by members. Leaders are central to the cultivation of such cultures and control systems (Schein,1985). As Bellamy (1996: 196) suggests, in such operations as peace keeping it "is the man or woman negotiating, acting as the intermediary, who matters. Ordinary soldiers, and certainly the most junior commanders will need to understand their commanders' 'intent' very well, and apply it in their dealings with local parties."

Yet effecting performance through "culture" in present-day armies would appear to be complex given the shifting composition of forces that bring together members of different organizational and sometimes national cultures (Soeters, 1997; Soeters and Recht, forthcoming). This difficulty further increases the potential importance of leaders as the "centers of gravity" of such frameworks. Military leaders are facing an immense challenge of balancing the centrifugal effects of loosely coupled structures, fragmented cultures, and technologies that increase their distance from followers. These challenges will have to be faced with different bases of power at a military leader's disposal. In such structures leaders will have to reduce their dependence on "position power" (i.e., on formal rank and authority). To put this point by way of example, an officer dealing with civilian bodies can no longer rely on rank nor on leadership cultivated within the unit, but rather on consensus building and persuasion. Even informationbased power (derived from access to exclusive knowledge) may be reduced due to the dispersion of information afforded by new technologies. The importance of personal bases of power whether as "expert" or "referent" (French and Raven, 1960) increases under these conditions

Like their counterparts in multinational commercial or public organizations, so military leaders are increasingly called upon to operate in teams marked by a stress on cooperation and wide participation in decision making (Elton ,1997). Transformational leadership behaviors (Bass and Avolio, 1994) as individual consideration and intellectual stimulation are gaining special significance in such frameworks. Individual consideration refers to sensitivity to members' needs, respecting differences, and providing opportunities for development. Intellectual stimulation involves challenging others' assumptions and stereotypes, encouraging viewing the world from different perspectives, and fostering critical and independent thinking. As Toffler and Toffler (1994: 93) contend, the new military needs troops who "can deal with a diversity of people and cultures, who can tolerate ambiguity, take initiative, and ask questions, even to the point of questioning authority." Sometimes military leaders will participate in inter-organizational frameworks which will very often be modular coalitions composed of units who share aims only temporarily. In such coalitions, military leaders may find themselves not in leadership roles but in equal or subordinate roles. Hence commanders will sometimes "take orders" from members of other forces, and from civilians. To be sure, the subordination of the armed forces to civilian authorities is an accepted principle in democratic societies, but this subordination has largely been limited to the authorization of military aims, resource allocation, and involvement in personnel policies. In the operational sphere the military has usually retained its authority, and military officers have received their instructions from other officers.

Scholars have shown that leader traits, behaviors and styles are not equally effective under all circumstances. Leadership depends on contingencies as the task, technology, characteristics of followers, and stress in a given situation (Fiedler and Garcia, 1987). The difficulties of leading organic systems are thus compounded by rapid changes in the contingencies facing military leaders. For instance, Gal (1987: 55) following Janowitz, notes that in constabulary forces one finds a dilemma between the need for peacekeeping entailing the minimal use of force, and the abrupt need for enforcement involving conventional military methods. Being able to shift from peacekeeping operations to fighting and back (at times within a single mission) is presenting a major challenge to military leadership.

As a consequence of the increased openness of the military, exposure to the media, intrusion of civilian publics, and involvement in interorganizational frameworks, the "role set" (Kahn et. al. 1964) of military leaders no longer includes only their superiors and subordinates but also members of other forces, organizations, and civilians. This situation contains two implications. One, it exposes military leaders to potentially contradictory role expectations and role conflicts resulting from the discrepant expectations of relevant "role-senders". Two, the boundary spanning components of leaders' roles such as liaison, negotiation, and management of conflict (Van Fleet and Yukl, 1986) become much more important. For instance, in peacekeeping operations mediation and negotiation are evident within and between combatants, civilians, government officials, and representatives of NGOs. Military leaders can no longer (Gal, 1987: 54) depend only on authority, professional expertise or tactical ability. There is also a need for sensitivity, awareness, and a familiarity with the norms and mores of the environment within which they operate.

While Mintzberg (1975) demonstrates that every leader role includes a spokesperson component, it is expanded for military commanders who face different publics directly or through the media, represent their forces, describe or explain their actions and use the media as part of military efforts. Military leaders now constantly engage in "public relations" and risk over investing time and energy in justifying their actions at the expense of other duties. In addition, the manner by which leaders face civilian populations and the media is closely observed by their subordinates. Consequently, "internal leadership" has come to depend on successful "external leadership," on the ability to perform the spokesperson role and gain respect and influence in wider circles.

The intrusion of civilian considerations into the military, changing views regarding the use of force, and participation in controversial missions, have increased the salience of ideological and political issues for military leaders. In addition, organic frameworks are by definition more "political" in being open to disagreements and requiring bargaining, negotiation and coalition building within them. Military leaders try to avoid involvement in politically sensitive issues, and adopt a nonpartisan "professional" stance. The advantage to such a position is that in a democracy, the ideological neutrality of military units is necessary for the continuation of the regime for maintaining military strength (Danopoulos and Watson,1996). However, the maintenance of this neutral position and the separation of political from military aspects is becoming more and more difficult. Military leaders are now increasingly examining the moral implications of their actions and the political boundaries within which they operate (MacKinlay, 1989).

When organizational structures and cultures are strong and stable, they may serve as "substitutes for leadership" (Kerr and Jermier,1978) in the sense of coordinating and guiding members behavior. Under new conditions of flexible structures and fragmented cultures, there are no substitutes for leadership, and leaders have to provide the mental models and frameworks to coordinate the behavior of organizational members (Shamir, 1997). The current emphasis in the leadership literature on "framing" (Fairhurst and San, 1996) and "frame alignment" (Shamir et al., 1993) reflects this recognition. Framing refers to leaders' influence on the meanings given to events by other people. It is through such influence on meanings that leaders motivate others, reinforce collective ties, and direct collective action. However, the need for framing in organizational situations, especially in military organizations, extends beyond the needs for regulation or coordination. It also applies to the more fundamental issues of purpose and meaning. Military leaders have always carried primary responsibility for providing a sense of purpose to members of their units. Primarily, they did so by identifying and reinforcing shared values and identities, and linking unit goals and tasks to these values and identities. In view of the increased cultural and demographic diversity of units, and the greater openness of the army to civilian considerations, the challenge of framing unit missions with reference to shared values and identities becomes increasingly difficult.

Theories of organizational leadership in the 1980s and 1990s have focused on "transformational," "visionary," or "charismatic" leadership (Bass, 1985, Sashkin, 1988). These theories acknowledge the role of leaders as providers of meaning for organizational members, and emphasize such leader behaviors as role modeling and articulation of a value-based vision for the organization. As such they may be highly relevant to the military context (Bass; 1996). But they do not deal specifically with leaders in interorganizational and cross-cultural frameworks, nor with the political, moral, and cognitive complexity facing military leaders, as described in this article. In order to adapt these models to the emerging situation of the military leader as we envision it in our speculative inquiry, we need a new wave of empirical studies of military leadership. Hopefully, these studies will not rely only on existing conceptual categories and research instruments, but, in addition, will examine military leadership from a "fresh" perspective in an attempt to capture the new challenges highlighted in this article and leaders' responses to these challenges.

CONCLUSION

Our primary contention is that due to some fundamental changes in the environments of contemporary military establishments, the role of military leaders is becoming more cognitively, socially and emotionally complex. These changes in the opening of armies to civilian considerations, dealing with issues of morality and legitimacy, the changing internal pluralism of forces, and adjustments to new tasks, environments and arrangements all contribute to complex and highly turbulent conditions for military command. The role of leaders of the armed forces (at all levels) is thus increasingly characterized by internal tensions, contradictory demands, and multifaceted responsibilities. An appropriate theory or model of leadership for the emerging military organization has not been developed yet. The theoretical arguments offered in this article clearly point out that existing leadership models may not suffice. We need a new model that focuses on leaders' ability to synthesize contradictory role requirements (Hooijberg et al.,1998), and on their ability to perform integrative functions, offer answers to "why" questions, and maintain unit members' internalized commitment, under conditions of decreasing support from traditional authority structures, unified cultures or other "leadership substitutes". Such a model is necessary in order to provide guidelines for the selection, promotion and education of future military commanders in democratic nations.

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