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THE JIHADIST ASSAULT IN ALGERIA IN JANUARY 2013 highlighted the extent to which the Algiers Government, operating with its own set of rules quite apart from the international community, moved to the center of the debate as to whether or not al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies could be eliminated from their control of neighboring northern Mali, and if so, where those jihadis might move next. The dead at the facility - run by the Algerian state oil company along with BP and Norway's Statoil - were mostly foreign civilian workers and jihadist combatants from six countries.
The hostage-taking affair at the Ain Amenas natural gas plant showed the Algerian Government as less than a cooperative player in security matters, while breathing new life into the salafist movement.
THE JIHADIST ASSAULT IN ALGERIA IN JANUARY 2013 highlighted the extent to which the Algiers Government, operating with its own set of rules quite apart from the international community, moved to the center of the debate as to whether or not al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies could be eliminated from their control of neighboring northern Mali, and if so, where those jihadis might move next.
What had become clear was that the Algerian Government's obsessive secrecy and authoritarianism had become the main obstacle in dealing with the issue. Much of the problem for the international community is not that the Government was supportive of the salaflst/jihadist terrorists, but that it is entrenched in an historical approach which has an imperative toward national expansionism1, and an accompanying paranoia, particularly with regard to its nuclear weapons program2.
The Algerian Government was uncompromising in its response to the January 2013 crisis at Ain Amenas natural gas plant, and equally emphatic in its refusal to brook intervention or cooperation with the several foreign governments - including the UK, Norway, and the US - which felt that they had a strong interest in the handling of the incident. When it was reported on Sunday, January 20, 2013, that 81 people had died in a four-day assault, prisoner-taking, and Government counter-attack at Ain Amenas in the eastern border area of Algeria, it was clear that the Algerian Government approach had resulted in an end to the situation, but at the cost of the hostages' lives. The Government had refused any form of negotiation. The reality is that, by January 2 1 , 20 1 3, the actual number of dead, and who they were, had not been finally established. The key leadership of the attacking group escaped in vehicles to Libya, whence they had come; one or both of the Canadian jihadists involved escaped.
The Algerian attack on the jihadists was direct and brutal. A convoy of buses carrying both jihadists and their prisoners was attacked by two Algerian Air Force (South African-modified) Mi-24 Super Hind helicopter gunships; there was no attempt to protect the captives. T-90 main battle tanks surrounded the facility and opened fire. This was not a tight, controlled special operations response. However, the Algerian Government had, by January 21, 2013, still not shared direct information with its foreign "allies" on the operation.
The dead at the facility - run by the Algerian state oil company along with BP and Norway's Statoil - were mostly foreign civilian workers and jihadist combatants from six countries. It was reported that five militants had been captured, and three others had fled.
Algerian Government authorities said that the attack was carried out on January 16, 2013, by 32 heavily-armed men from six countries, ostensibly operating under the authority of the Mulathameen Brigade ("Masked Brigade"), based in Mali. The group was founded and led by a one-eyed Algerian, Moktar Belmoktar (pictured), and is linked to AQIM, and was, in fact, originally a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé. GIÀ), but was also a veteran of the Islamist campaigns in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The attacking force of his "Masked Brigade" called itself "Those Who Sign With [Their Own] Blood" (denoting a commitment to martyrdom). The Masked Brigades are Tuareg-dominated raiding forces. The "Those" are a separate special tasks command comprised of regional and international volunteers and in recent months have been operating mainly out of Libya and Niger. French-origin jihadist spies - of Algerian and Moroccan origin - were also involved in the preparations, having taken jobs in Ain Amenas. The commander of the actual operation was Abdul Rahman al-Nigeri, a Nigerian involved in training Boko Haram cadres in Niger. The jihadis gathered a dedicated expert group for the operation, along with weapons and equipment, from camps in Libya.
Sources linked to the attack indicated that the assault on Ain Amenas had been at least two months in planning, pre-dating the French military campaign against Islamist forces in Mali, where Moktar Belmoktar has been based with the Masked Brigade. What seems clear is that the Ain Amenas incident was not part of a coordinated set of operations by the various jihadi groups in northern Mali, but rather a symptom of their disarray and mutual competitiveness. There is a complicated web of jihadist and tribal forces stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea of which AQIM is a small, distinct, command and spiritual guidance element.
Weapons have been available in abundance to the various Malian and Algerian jihadis since the collapse of the Qadhafi Administration in Libya in 2012. This includes light armored vehicles as well as an array of infantry weapons. Those attacking the Ain Amenas compounds had the AK104 model of the Kalashnikov assault rifle used by the Libyan élite forces and subsequently the rebels in the war against Qadhafi. The jihadists also had F5 rockets and 60mm gun-mortars provided to the Libyan jihadis by France and Qatar. The jihadists wore the same type of uniforms and flak-jackets which Qatar provided to the Libyan National Transitional Council in the war against Qadhafi.
One thing which the French attack on the Mali-based jihadists achieved, and what was compounded by the Ain Amenas attack, was the reality that the Algerian Government cannot stave off international - or even African Union - interest in rapidly addressing the Islamists. Even as this occurs, Algerian Pres. Abdelaziz Bouteflika is himself in poor health and has committed to retiring in 2014. In the meantime, will the Algiers Government begin a process of change, or will it, because of its reluctance to see foreigners in the region, find itself increasingly isolated?
1 See, particularly, Cherkaoui, Mohamed: Morocco and the Sahara: Social Bonds and Geopolitical Issues. Oxford, 2007: The Bardwell Press, 6 Bardwell Road, Oxford OX2 6SW, UK. www.bardwell-press.co.uk. ISBN-13: 978-1-905622-03-0. 202pp, hardcover; index, bibl., maps, charts. £10; 15 euros, $20. This book, reviewed in Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, October 6, 2007, and in Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 9/2007, chronicles the dramatic territorial expansion of Algeria over the past two centuries.
2 See "Mali: Pivotal Point", Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 11-12/2012.
Copyright International Strategic Studies Association 2013