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Abstract
As a result of the revitalization of federal institutions in Latin American countries, a growing number of works have focused on the analysis of intergovernmental interactions and negotiations taking place in those contexts. While most of these studies have focused on presidents-governors relations, less attention has been paid to understand the type of relations between governors that decisively affect the dynamics and the outcomes of intergovernmental bargaining.
In order to fill this gap, this dissertation presents an innovative theoretical framework to understand horizontal (governor-governor) relations in the context of intergovernmental bargaining and explain under which conditions governors are more likely to build coalitions and negotiate as a bloc.
Two structural variables are central in my argument: on the one hand, the level of interprovincial fiscal and political heterogeneity; on the other hand, the level of presidential political and fiscal strength. I propose that governors have more chances to coalesce when the level of homogeneity between provinces is higher, since they will have more in common and, as a result, more incentives to remain together. In addition, mutual commitment will be easier to sustain when presidents are weaker and therefore less able mobilize targeted resources and sanctions that would make the individual option more appealing.
In the empirical section, my argument is tested by looking at nine concrete cases of intergovernmental negotiations that took place in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico during the last three decades, after the restoration of democratic rule and competitive politics.
In light of the empirical cases I conclude that while the previously mentioned structural factors generate the conditions for horizontal coalitions to emerge, the concrete way in which these coalitions are effectively formed is mainly the result of the action of particular governors who take the lead and deploy different mechanisms to increase peers' incentives to join the block and remain together.
In the same vein, particular configurations of the fiscal institutional settings produce incentives for governors to compete with each other, exacerbating mutual distrust and making coalition building more difficult, even in context when interprovincial heterogeneity has been in decline.
