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Philos Stud (2013) 164:357370
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9859-x
Neil Mehta
Published online: 20 January 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Abstract In his 2009 article Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology, Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegels argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegels argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegels argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences to the claim that all experiences are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences. This inference is inadequately defended, for the explanandum may also be given a straightforward evolutionary explanation. Second, contra Kriegel, I argue that phenomenological investigation does not support the thesis that we are always peripherally aware of our experiences. Instead, it delivers no verdict on this thesis. Kriegels phenomenological mistake may be explained via a highly diluted version of the famous transparency thesis about experience.
Keywords Higher-order representationalism Phenomenology Peripheral
awareness Introspection Uriah Kriegel Transparency
Representationalism is a broad approach according to which a mental state is a phenomenal experience in virtue of being an appropriate type of representational state, and perhaps also in virtue of playing a certain functional role. Common
N. Mehta (&)
The University of Michigan, 2215 Angell Hall, 435 South State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003, USAe-mail: [email protected]
Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?
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motivations for representationalism include (i) the transparency of experience1 and(ii) the prospect of a naturalistic reduction of phenomenal experience (assuming that the phenomenon of representation can be understood naturalistically). A major internecine dispute among representationalists concerns how many layers of representation are required for a state to be an experience.
According to rst-order representationalists, experiences merely involve ground-level representations of certain propertiessay, environmental or bodily properties. First-order representationalists usually also require that such representations play a certain functional rolefor instance, that they be available for practical reasoning, verbal report, and/or motor-control. So rst-order representationalism is the view that a state is a phenomenal experience in virtue of appropriately representing certain...