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Following two days of intensive battle in the hills and ridges south of Gettysburg, Pa., GEN Robert E. Lee hurled his Army of Northern Virginia against the Union center anchored on Cemetery Ridge on the sweltering afternoon of July 3, 1863. Operationally brilliant but tactically flawed, the Gettysburg campaign constituted GEN Lee's all-out effort to destroy the Union Army of the Potomac on Northern soil. Lee's strategic goal was to so demoralize the Northern supporters of the war that public opinion would pressure President Abraham Lincoln's administration to recognize the Confederate States of America and terminate the Civil War.
More popularly known as Pickett's Charge, the Confederate assault of July 3 is often portrayed by modern historians as a monumental effort of military futility, but to GEN Lee, the Confederate attack was neither ill-conceived nor doomed to failure. Why did Lee order Pickett's Charge, and what did he do to enhance the chances of its success?
Lee's Strategic Reassessment
The Battle of Gettysburg began on July 1 as a meeting engagement when Confederate infantry from LTG Ambrose P. Hill's corps encountered Union cavalry under command of BG John Buford on the ridges northwest of Gettysburg. Hoping to capitalize on his ability to bring more reinforcements to the field before MG George G. Meade could react in sufficient strength, GEN Lee accepted battle even though, in his words, he was "marching blind" due to the absence of MG J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry. GEN Lee's gamble on July 1 paid off as converging Confederate columns smashed two Union corps by late afternoon and the Union Army retreated to Cemetery Hill south of Gettysburg. The following day, July 2, GEN Lee planned to strike both flanks of the Army of the Potomac simultaneously, but he failed to coordinate the attacks. After some of the most ferocious fighting of the war, MG Meade maintained the high ground from Culp's Hill through Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top by day's end, and the Army of the Potomac survived to fight another day.
The dilemma confronting GEN Lee on the evening of July 2 was knowing whether he had devised a good strategy that had been poorly executed or whether the strategy itself was flawed. As he surveyed the field, GEN Lee...