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Crime Law Soc Change (2013) 60:375400
DOI 10.1007/s10611-013-9456-8
Claire Angelique R. I. Nolasco & Michael S. Vaughn &
Rolando V. del Carmen
Published online: 25 June 2013# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract This exploratory study operationalizes the variables comprising the choice model of white collar crime through analyzing cases decided by federal courts, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Cases were extracted from the LEXIS-NEXIS, WESTLAW, and the NERA Economic Consulting databases and categorized according to the indicators of the choice model: size of pool of criminally predisposed, supply of lure, prevailing beliefs about credibility of external oversight, internal oversight and self-restraint, and supply of criminal opportunities. The findings show that unequal access to information among the investors and misuse of trust and affinity relationships affected the size of the pool of criminally tempted individuals. Supply of lure was affected through advances in modern technology and promises of wealth and material success at low costs and risks. Prevailing beliefs about the credibility of external oversight and internal corporate regulatory controls were affected by the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement authorities. Variables described by the choice model of white collar crime can be operationalized through analysis of existing case law.
Introduction
During the last decade alone, misappropriation of investor funds through fraudulent activities has reached alarming proportions [37]. The Ponzi schemes
Presented at the 2009 American Society of Criminology meeting, held in Philadelphia
C. A. R. I. Nolasco (*)
School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Criminology, Texas A&M-San Antonio, One University Way, San Antonio, TX 78224, USAe-mail: [email protected]
M. S. Vaughn : R. V. del Carmen
College of Criminal Justice, Institute for Legal Studies in Criminal Justice,Sam Houston State University, 816 17th Street, P.O. Box 2296, Huntsville, TX 77341-2296, USA
M. S. Vaughne-mail: [email protected]
R. V. del Carmene-mail: [email protected]
Revisiting the choice model of Ponzi and Pyramid schemes: analysis of case law
376 C.A.R.I. Nolasco et al.
perpetrated by Bernard Madoff and Sir Allen Stanford involved estimated amounts of $65 billion and $8 billion, respectively [23]. In contrast, the number of settlements obtained by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from fraudulent investors has declined over the yearsan indication of the difficulty of proceeding against these types of...