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J Ethics (2013) 17:275304
DOI 10.1007/s10892-013-9152-z
John Martin Fischer
Received: 6 September 2013 / Accepted: 11 September 2013 / Published online: 18 October 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract I explore two thought-experiments in Judith Jarvis Thomsons important article, A Defense of Abortion: the violinist example and the people-seeds example. I argue (contra Thomson) that you have a moral duty not to unplug yourself from the violinist and also a moral duty not to destroy a people-seed that has landed in your sofa. Nevertheless, I also argue that there are crucial differences between the thought-experiments and the contexts of pregnancy due to rape or to contraceptive failure. In virtue of these differences, it would not follow from my conclusions about the violinist and people-seeds cases that abortion would not be permissible in a case of rape or in a case of voluntary intercourse with contraceptive failure.
Keywords Abortion Cabin Case Judith Jarvis Thomson Person Rape
Voluntary intercourse Violinist example People-seeds example
1 Introduction
It is often thought that if a developing human being is considered a person from the beginning, then it would follow that abortion (at any time) would be impermissible. For, after all, a person has a stringent right to life; since life is a prerequisite for enjoying any other goods, it is plausible that the right to life is a basic or fundamental one, not easily overridden by other considerations. The right to life, it would seem, could not be outweighed by an individuals preferences, even preferences about what should happen in or to her body.
J. M. Fischer (&)
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521, USA e-mail: [email protected]
Abortion and Ownership
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276 J. M. Fischer
Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that even if we assume that the fetus is a person, it does not follow that abortion is always impermissible (Thomson 1972).1 Part of her argument is that in some contexts an individuals right to determine what happens in or to her body overrides anothers right to life. To support this contention, Thomson offers her (now famous) violinist example. The example raises subtle and difcult questions about the relationship between the right to life and the cluster of rights that constitute ones right to control...