ROMANIA AND THE ENTENTE DURING THE SECOND BALKAN WAR (II)

Abstract

Romania and the Entente during the Second Balkan War. The study analyses Romania's relations with the Entente in the course of the Second Balkan War, in the context of the Great Powers' policies, positioned in opposite political-military groups with respect to the South-East European zone. Gravitating in the political orbit of the Triple Alliance, which faced a true crisis situation, Romania had a great freedom of action in the relation with the Triple Alliance. But his relationship with this political-military group did not lead to a reorientation of the Romanian state's external policy towards the Entente, as was sometimes considered in the historiography of the researched theme. Basing on a rigorous analysis of historical sources, the author shows the real nature of this relationship and emphasizes the exceptional value of Romania's political-diplomatic and military actions, which led to the ending of the war and to the conclusion of peace between the conflicting states. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Headnote

Abstract: Romania and the Entente during the Second Balkan War.

The study analyses Romania's relations with the Entente in the course of the Second Balkan War, in the context of the Great Powers' policies, positioned in opposite political-military groups with respect to the South-East European zone. Gravitating in the political orbit of the Triple Alliance, which faced a true crisis situation, Romania had a great freedom of action in the relation with the Triple Alliance. But his relationship with this political-military group did not lead to a reorientation of the Romanian state's external policy towards the Entente, as was sometimes considered in the historiography of the researched theme. Basing on a rigorous analysis of historical sources, the author shows the real nature of this relationship and emphasizes the exceptional value of Romania's political-diplomatic and military actions, which led to the ending of the war and to the conclusion of peace between the conflicting states.

Keywords: mediation, arbitrage, non-intervention, European concert, Great Powers' conference, conference of the conflicting forces, the Turtucaia-Balchik line, Balkan balance, negotiations, agreement, armistice, demobilization, peace.

While Russia and France's diplomatic representatives in the Romanian capital, according to the instructions received, wished to obtain a cessation of the advance of the Romanian army towards Sofia, the diplomatic chancelleries of the Great Powers developed an intense activity concerning not only the ways deemed necessary to follow in order to end hostilities, but also the role which they understood to assume for solving Balkan problems. They considered the solution of direct negotiations between the belligerents, as well as the opportunity of organizing a conference of the Great Powers that could impose peace or at least ratify the decisions to be taken by the States participating in the war after the peace talks.

If the governments in Petersburg and Paris understood to take measures for holding direct negotiations between the belligerents in Nis, simultaneously exerting pressure on Constantinople and Bucharest to cease the advance of their armies on the Bulgarian territory1, the Great Powers of the Triple Alliance had different views. Germany, while accepting the idea of direct negotiations between the belligerents, considered Romania's military actions as justified. Jagow took into consideration that 'the Romanians' march has no other object than giving them pledges, providing them the possession of Turtucaia-Balchik border, as the character of the Bulgarian policy would not only allow them to rely only on Sofia's assurance' 2 . Instead, the Austro-Hungarian Government showed less favourable to a direct agreement between the warring states, believing that 'he had his say in such regulation, as well as the other Great Powers'3. In fact, Vienna wanted to give satisfaction to Sofia so as to reach a settlement by the Great Powers of the Balkans.

It is interesting to note that the point of view of the German diplomacy was consistent with that of the Romanian diplomacy. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, informed Pichon that Jagow proposed to Sazonov that the 'plenipotentiaries of the warring states to meet for the final settlement of peace in Bucharest'. The German diplomat argued that in the Romanian capital all Major Powers are represented, from this point of view, Bucharest 'would seem well placed to serve as the center of the negotiations.' In the opinion of the German State Secretary, the Great Powers' ministers will not attend the conference, but will naturally exert their influence'4.

Edward Grey deemed there was necessary to be a previous agreement between the Great Powers, in order to solve the Balkan problems. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, informed Pichon that the British minister's conception, 'the six Great Powers, especially Austria and Russia would first have to agree on a partition taking into account two considerations:

1. A common frontier to be fixed between Greece and Serbia;

2. Bulgaria's access to the Aegean Sea is to be respected5.

While the diplomatic chancelleries of the Great Powers were making such plans, the events in Bulgaria highlighted again the importance of Romania's military actions. For the Great Powers of the Triple Entente these had a special significance. In Sofia there could not be a pro-Russian government led by Malinov, leading to the solution of a government run by Radoslavov, in favour of a policy of rapprochement with Austria-Hungary. Panafieu informed Pichon that the new government 'was prepared to immediately accept direct negotiations with Serbia and Romania, in order to know their exact intentions.'6 In these circumstances, Baron Fasciotti, the Italian Ambassador in Bucharest, came to Titu Maiorescu with a note from the new foreign minister Ghenadiev, Radoslavov cabinet, "and using the well known statements, à la Danev" asked the Romanian prime Minister of Romania's desire, which he promised them to examine with high conciliation" and asked him to immediately stop the advance of the Romanian army. That note came through the Italian Minister, as Italy used to represent Romania's interests in Bulgaria after Ghica's departure to Sofia7.

The Romanian government's position, expressed during this 'diplomatic approach' of the Bulgarian Government is clear from the report made by Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu, the next day, towards King Charles I: 'The telegram of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, in which he was talking about "examining our aspirations" and whichI brought to the attention of His Majesty King today, soon after HM returned from Corabia, was transmitted both to the Austro-Hungarian and Russian ministers, and we expressed our astonishment for these outdated proposals which I will not even respond to. Mr. Schebeko who still insisted yesterday that the Romanian army should not advance to Sofia, today never repeated his advice, but he confined to saying that "we have to wait attitude of the new government." And the Prince of Fürstenberg looked just as surprised as me and he found the telegram of the Bulgarian Minister even less appropriate to the circumstances, as it came after Emperor Franz Joseph himself, to whom King Ferdinand of Bulgaria had addressed, had advised him to yield Turtucaia-Balchik territory to King Charles of Romania.

The Prince of Fürstenberg informed me that the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Sofia was commissioned by Count Berchtold to communicate the Bulgarian Government that Austria-Hungary had always advised the Bulgarian government to meet the demands of Romania, but was not obeyed. The serious situation of today's Bulgaria comes mainly from the major mistakes committed in Sofia against Romania.... Another consequence of this wrong policy is that through the current conflict between Romania and Bulgaria, the freedom of action of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is low... Only if an agreement between Romania and Bulgaria was established, could the Monarchy to continue its willing policy in favour of Bulgaria"8.

We think it follows clearly that Austria-Hungary had not renounced its earlier project of attracting Bulgaria towards the Triple Alliance through an agreement between Romania and Bulgaria, at the cost of satisfying Romania's territorial claims. In the new situation created by the establishment in Bulgaria of Radoslavov government for the Triple Entente Bucharest grew more and more important for its efforts to restore peace in the Balkan Peninsula. In a telegram of the head of the French diplomacy, Pichon, to the French Ambassador in Romania, from July 18th 1913 it was stated: "The assurance that you sent me from Mr. Maiorescu are likely to give us hope that Romania will not give up the moderator role it declares it wants to take and in front of Europe (a.u.). In these circumstances, I will not have objections to assisting the Romanian government in the choice of Bucharest (as a place of peace talks - Ed). You should also agree on this point with the governments in Petersburg and London. Moreover, I estimate that we will have to continue our efforts, in any case, to enable direct negotiations'9.

It was actually the meaning in which the Romanian government deemed it appropriate to act, and whose conduct began to be increasingly appreciated by the Great Powers, eager to have the peace restored. On July 18th, 1913 Titu Maiorescu sent the following telegram to the plenipotentiary minister in Belgrade: "Ask Mr. Pasic's opinion about whether he considers it appropriate for the representatives of the five belligerents to immediately start discussing the preliminaries of peace in order to avoid any catastrophe in Sofia and any European complication'10. Blondel, in a report to Pichon, stated on the same day: "Based on the information that I received during the night, I urged the Minister of Foreign Affairs to think of the serious inconvenience which would caused by a march of the Romanian army to Sofia. Maiorescu told me that he had telegraphed the king the summary of the conversation that he had yesterday on this topic and that he was going to receive the sovereign's answer.

The King, who is actually returning this evening to Bucharest, he added, has no intention of allowing the troops to advance to the Bulgarian capital, but he considers it indispensable for us to occupy the ravines in order to prevent the resumption of a Bulgarian offensive against the Serb army. Once masters on these ravines, which must have happened by this time, the troops will stop. This measure, Maiorescu continued, is all the more important since, based on the information received from Sofia, the 200000-300000 Bulgarians concentrated around Sofia are ready to reject the Greeks and Serbs if they advance and attack them if the Bulgarian government might think that we retire or that we are indifferent, yet we do not want this.' From Blondel's report it follows that Maiorescu had informed him about the telegram sent to Belgrade in order to enforce negotiations. The fear of any 'European complications' expressed in the last part of the telegram was explained by Maiorescu as it follows: 'I informed Mr. Pasici about this particular danger, which is clear from the last conversation I had with the Austrian Minister. This conversation makes me worry that Austria might want to take advantage of these circumstances so as to complicate the situation by its interference. Thus we will have to act quickly and agree directly without wasting too much time.' Maiorescu remained consistent in proposing Sinaia or another place in Romania as the venue of the peace conference11.

The Austrian-Hungarian government hesitated to intervene in any way in favour of Bulgaria because they knew it would not be supported by Germany and Italy in its actions. As a matter of fact the German Ambassador in Petersburg recommended the Russian government 'to let the belligerents deliberate in Bucharest', and Sazonov did not object'. Berchtold had once the intention to propose Macedonia's autonomy, in agreement with Italy, a solution that might have enabled confining the annexations of Serbia and Greece, the separation of the two states 'allowing Bulgarians to preserve hope', but he himself was pessimistic about the success of such a project 12 . Therefore, the request of Radoslavov Government to the Viennese Government of proposing the Great Powers a congress to regulate all issues raised by the war and to pronounce itself on the autonomy of Macedonia' did not receive a favourable response13. Besides, on the same day the Bulgarian government announced that they had decided to start negotiations14.

On July 20, 1913, Billy, the French chargé d'affaires in Rome, reported the following telegram to Pichon: 'Russia's chargé d'affaires informed the Consulate his government has no objection, that accordance with a German proposal, the representatives of the Balkan states meet in Bucharest in order to discuss the terms of peace. Besides, the Russian government reserves the Great Powers the right to review it. The answer of the Italian government was favourable to the summit in Bucharest, also specifying that 'Italy will join Germany'.15

The same day, through the Italian legations in Bucharest and Sofia, Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu sent the Bulgarian government the following telegram, which was also reported to the French ambassador, C. Blondel: 'The offer that Bulgaria is making through the telegram, sent from Sofia on 5/18 July and reported to the Italian Legation in Bucharest on 6/19 July, 'to give Romania the Bulgarian territory lying north-east of a line leading from Turtucaia and reaching Balchik", has already been officially made on behalf of Bulgaria, more accurately, especially assigning Romania Turtucaia-Dobrich-Balchik towns, and Romania acknowledged it, adding, of course, the number of kilometers shown in the topographic situation westwards and southwards of the line above specified'. As for Bulgaria's request that the Romanian army would stop its march and retreat on the leftbank of the Danube, it cannot be accepted, Romania ordering its army to advance in order to hasten peace between all belligerents. If Bulgaria wants to reach the same result, it must inform Romania about it as soon as possible and appoint its plenipotentiary to discuss the preliminaries of peace between all belligerents. In this discussion Romania will proceed with a spirit of conciliation and equity'16.

Having received a favourable response from the Bulgarian Government, on July 21st, 1913 Titu Maiorescu sent to Sofia, through the Italian legations in the Romanian and Bulgarian capitals, the following statement: 'I have received this morning the dispatch Your Excellency (The Bulgarian Foreign Minister - a.n.) condescended to send to me directly. I am happy to note that you are animated by the same desire to hasten the peace. Following our communication, either direct or mediated, the Romanian government considers it a gain out of the question that Bulgaria gives back the territory requested for the new border by giving Romania Turtucaia, Dobrich, Balchik towns and the necessary number of kilometres westwards and southwards.

In addition, it is obvious that the autonomy promised to the Aromanian schools and churches, the creation of a bishopry and also subventions are also gained, as well as Bulgaria's obligation of destroying the fortification works and of not to building any others, an obligation which, given the change of circumstances, Romania is willing to limit to Sumla, Rusciuk fortifications, to the intermediate site and to an area of 20 kilometers around Balchik. As for the decisions on peace, we have to distinguish between military negotiations and political discussions. For the military talks, Romania is willing to appoint its representative who will go to the place agreed upon by Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, in order to convene about the truce, the positions occupied by the armies, supplies, etc. But for the discussion of the preliminaries and for the peace treaty we consider that Bucharest is the best place and simultaneously with the military representatives we ought to appoint the delegation that will go to Bucharest for this purpose. We will also report this opinion to Serbian and Greek governments'17.

For the Romanian Government there began a period of intense diplomatic efforts in Belgrade and Athens, which ultimately were to lead to a truce in Nis and later on to the peace conference in Bucharest18. Meanwhile, the Romanian Prime Minister rejected the request made by the Turkish government, through its ambassador in Bucharest, Sefa-bey, for Turkey to attend peace talks in the Romanian capital. Titu Maiorescu argued that 'the negotiations that are to take place in Bucharest, either for the preliminaries or for the final peace will only concern territorial exchanges between the Christian states'19.

The diplomatic efforts made by the Romanian state in order to make peace, in which King Charles I directly involved himself, proves the role of mediator that Romania had practically assumed after Bulgaria had insisted upon the Romanian authorities to stop the army and exercise an influence on Belgrade and Athens for the cessation of hostilities20. Besides, these diplomatic efforts made after the Romanian Government's requests had been accepted can definitely prove the significant role Romania had in restoring peace, while the Great Powers, as we have noted, showed more and more willingness in accepting the Romanian capital as a venue of the peace conference, under the reserve of expressing further on their agreement on the decisions to be taken by the belligerents.

Accepting the role of mediator, a mission in which a great power like Russia had failed, the Romanian government firmly rejected the attempts of the Bulgarian government to make a separate peace with Romania. On July 21st, 1913, Panafieu Pichon informed Pinchon about the contents of a telegram sent by King Ferdinand of Bulgaria to King Carol I, in which the Bulgarian soverein accepted the situation resulting from the refusal of the Romanian party 'The vivid and profound desire that animates me into ending the current situation leads me to once again ask Your Majesty, on behalf of myself and my government, to ask the peace.

In so doing, we have no intention of taking advantage of any favourable response that Your Majesty might give to our request in order to continue war with Serbia and Greece. On the contrary, my government is firmly determined to quickly make peace with the two states and it really proves it by sending to Nis the two delegates charged with full powers to do so. If Serbia and Greece respond accordingly, it is ready to immediately cease hostilities and to proceed to demobilizing the army. Providing all possible guarantee as a proof of his sincerity, King Ferdinand asked King Carol I to stop the advance of the Romanian army21

The Great Powers of the Entente welcomed the news concerning the start of negotiations between the belligerents, but persisted in the idea of a ratification of the treaty that was to be signed. Reporting the content of a discussion with Sir Edward Grey, Paul Cambon, the French minister in London, informed Pichon: 'He (Sir Edward Grey - s.n.) told me that if the government provides Bucharest as a meeting venue for a conference between the five belligerents and if Bulgaria is sending its plenipotentiaries, we only have to wait for the outcome of the negotiations. The agreement that will be established will have to be ratified by the Powers. [...] We agreed to speak only of the need for the European ratification of the arrangements of the Balkan states. Who mentions ratification mentions an opportunity of examining and reviewing, but speaking now about a revision would mean raising the susceptibility of the Balkan governments. We think it is not proper to explain right now the word ratification, nor to pronunce the term conference which would involve choosing a meeting venue'22.

The proposal of submitting the peace treaty, which the belligerents would agree upon, to the 'examination and approval' of the Great Powers was made by Sir Edward Grey to the accredited ambassadors in London on 21st July 1913. On this occasion Paul Cambon let Pichon know that 'Sir Edward Grey's opinion did not raise any objection by the ambassadors, who will submit it to the approval of their governments'23. Accepted in principle by the Great Powers, the idea of revising the treaty, which was to be concluded between the belligerents, had no real chance of success, however, because of the opposition of Germany to establishing the French capital as the venue of the planned Conference of the ambassadors. The German government's position was communicated by Pourtalès to Sazonov24, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg's. Although he did not not rule out the idea of organizing such a conference in London and not in Paris25, in reality the German government was, generally hostile to any conference of the ambassadors26. Secretary of State Jagow 'persisted in believing that an exchange of notes between the chancelleries of the Great Powers would be enough'27.

Germany's attitude could only ensure the success of the Romanian diplomacy. Blondel constantly informed Paris about the significance of the Romanian government's diplomatic actions. On July 22, 1913, in a report to Pichon, the French Minister accredited to Bucharest stated that 'the Romanian government took note of the commitment of the Bulgarian government regarding the border between the two countries. As for signing the armistice, the Romanian government easily admits it to be signed in Nis or in any other town that the belligerents would like to choose. Romania will send its own delegations. Regarding the peace preliminaries, the Romanian government estimates that for the general interest it would be good for them to be signed in Bucharest or any other Romanian city. Having no other territorial claims - its claims have already been admitted - Romania will be able to better use its offices to reconcile the interests of others parties'28.

On July 24, 1913 Blondel informed Pichon contents of a telegram which Charles I sent to the kings of Greece, Serbia and Montenegro: 'His Majesty King Ferdinand addressed me with a request to intervene with Your Majesties to hasten peace. The knowledge I have about the general situation and the relations between the Great Powers, which will not allow too much reduction of Bulgaria, makes me draw your attention on the precarious state of this country and on the interest to reach a truce as soon as possible after the most urgent military measures have been established. I do not doubt that Your Majesties will see my approach as one more proof of my friendship and that you will notice that our mutual interests are that the balance in the Balkan Peninsula, desired throughout Europe, is not too long troubled. Any further bloodshed could only worsen the situation'. Blondel added that 'the plenipotentiaries of the four states are expected to arrive for the weekend. The meeting will be held in Bucharest'29.

These Romanian diplomatic steps were absolutely necessary for the restoration of peace, while the armistice talks were hanging fire and the Serbs were preparing to initiate a new offensive against the Bulgarian army. The same day Blondel informed Pichon about the concerns of the officials in Bucharest in this regard: 'The king and the government are very concerned about the preparations for the attack of the Serbian General Staff, which called for the Romanian military cooperation. The king has just sent one of his ministers to draw my attention on the serious complications that Serbia would face if it accepted to let itself caught in a kind of aggression that seemed to hinder peace negotiations. [...] The government fears that Serbia's attitude might cause an Austrian intervention'30.

The Great Powers of the Entente were concerned not only about the prospects of a truce between the Christian warring states, in which the Romanian diplomacy played an important role, but also about the purpose that the Turkish troops evacuated Adrianopole, in order to thus enforce complying with the rules of the Peace Conference in London. Their diplomatic efforts, particularly those of Russia, for making certain naval demonstrations of the Great Powers to intimidate the government of Constantinople, were not meant to succeed though, because of the categorical opposition of Germany, joined by Austria-Hungary31, which risked disintegrating 'the European concert' through a unilateral action by the Triple Entente.

It became more and more obvious that Romania represented the most meaningful factor that could contribute most significantly to restoring peace. But aware of this, the Great Powers were trying to influence the Romanian diplomacy according to their own interests. In this regard, Blondel wrote in a report to Pichon: 'The responses of the kings of Greece and Serbia do not appear to let us hope for a prompt cessation of hostilities. The fears inspired by the Bulgaria's past dishonesty compelled them, they say, not to consent to the cessation of hostilities until the preliminaries of peace have been signed. If they persist in this intention, the only salvation will be a very prompt decision of the delegates, who are expected to come to Bucharest: it is the the government which will attend to this. (the Romanian one - Ed).

Austria and Italy's efforts have been focused for a few several days to determine Romania to support Bulgaria against Serbia and Greece (sn). The Italian Minister is on various occasions, the warmest defender of Bulgaria and does not hide his hope of seeing an alliance between Bulgaria, Romania and Austria (sn). Serbia's hardline attitude might enable Austria's projects, being helped by Italy. [...] At the same time, Russia shares its feelings for the Serbs or Bulgarians, supporting them at turns (sn), not displaying any definite impression and giving to understand that it envies Romania which plays the role of mediator in which it failed. It seems that St. Petersburg does not fully acknowledge the importance of the Romanian friendship, which in our opinion tends to go towards Russia. They admit the utility of Romanian intervention, but it seems to be seen rather as serving momentary interests of the than to ensuring the continuity of a collaboration whose benefit I still believe in32 (s.n.)".

About an exchange of telegrams between King Charles I and the Kings of Montenegro and Greece we were also informed by Delaroche-Vernet, the French minister in Cetinje, who wrote about it on 25 July 1913. The Romanian sovereign's telegram was calling for hastening peace, alluding inter alia, that 'the Great Powers will not allow for a too big reduction of Bulgaria' and the need for a balance in the Balkan Peninsula. If in principle the Kings of Montenegro and Greece agreed on sending plenipotentiaries in order to make peace, the Greek sovereign pronounced in favour of the need for some 'real pledge' from Bulgaria, through Sofia's acceptance of the conditions imposed before signing of the armistice. Moreover, he communicated to the King of Montenegro: 'I am deeply convinced that if we do not impose our conditions on the battlefield, we will lose, if not entirely, at least a large part of the fruits of victory'33.

The actions of the Romanian diplomacy undertaken in order to make peace were fully consistent with those of the Triple Entente. Yet while Romania focused its interest on the necessity of the cessation of hostilities between the Christian warring states, by tempering down the warrior zeal of the Serbs, Greeks and Montenegrins, the Great Powers of the Entente were mainly focused on the evacuation of Adrianople by the Turks, thus ensuring compliance with the Treaty from London. Knowing the German opposition to the project, the French ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, and the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey had discussions on this issue with the Minister of Germany to London, Prince Lichnowsky. Paul Cambon envisaged 'the possibility of a Russian intervention in Turkey to determine the evacuation of the Bulgarian territory and Adrianople'. Sir Edward Grey deemed that 'it would be impossible for Russia not to defend Bulgaria'; he did neither believe in an agreement of the Great Powers on a collective action, nor in the possibility of a separate action of the Triple Entente'. The British Foreign Minister suggested that an agreement should be reached between Berlin and Petersburg about an intervention from the part of Russia, a power which should receive 'White Book', but with its commitment not to act in Asia, but only in Europe34.

The Russian diplomacy was not informed about these discussions by the Russian ambassador in London, but they were not willing to pursue them, perhaps sensing that Germany would oppose a Russian intervention. In addition, the Austrian-Hungarian attitude had to be known. The position of the Viennese diplomacy position was expressed by Count Thurn, the Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, during a meeting he had with Sazonov. The Austrian diplomat 'hinted that, following Germany's model, Austria-Hungary would not join a naval demonstration'. Yet, he considered that 'it is high time to cease hostilities everywhere (sn)". Count Thurn suggested that a concerted diplomatic action by Russia and Austria-Hungary was required in order to put pressure upon Constantinople and, Belgrade, summarizing: 'Act against Turkey. We will press on Serbia'.

Delcassé informed Pichon that 'Sazonov did not subscribe to this isolated and parallel action'. He also believed in a possible collective action of the Great Powers to urge the Turks to evacuate Adrianople and make it withdraw through Enos-Midia line and if necessary to strongly require the officials in Athens and Belgrade to stop military operations and sign the 'preliminaries' of peace in Bucharest35. Beyond a certain disagreement between the positions of England and France on the one hand and Russia on the other hand, the issues of the discussion between Count Thurn and Sazonov reveal that the statement of the Austrian ambassador was part of a diplomatic manoeuvre that Berchtold had conceived of so as to prevent Russia from taking military action against the Ottoman Empire36.

If the Russian diplomacy remained reluctant to accepting any suggestions from Vienna, instead, Berchtold's duplicitous policy impacted upon in Sofia. Matharel, the French military attaché in the Bulgarian capital, advised Etienne, the French Minister of War in the cabinet that 'Bulgaria's policy is clearly directed towards the Triple Alliance'37.

Fully sharing Sir Edward Grey's view, Pichon struggled to influence the Russian diplomacy in this direction. On July 26, 1913, during a meeting with Russia's ambassador to Paris, Izvolski, the French Foreign Minister stated that 'if an agreement could be established between Petersburg and Berlin for an intervention of Russia into Europe, to ensure that the Treaty of London is being, we will be the first to appreciate it'38.

Meanwhile, the efforts of the Romanian diplomacy bore fruit. Thus Blondel Pichon informed Pinchon that on July 28, 1913 the delegation of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece would come to Bucharest. But he also showed that the Romanian government did not want to take any action against the Ottoman Empire. 'Several newspapers in Vienna - the text of the telegram mentioned - consider that Romania, as a mandatory, will have to be in charge of convincing Turkey, by means of the weapons. This suggestion is very badly appreciated here and I estimate that no Romanian government could accept this mission without facing the most violent public opposition'39

We consider that the idea of Romania's armed intervention against the Ottoman Empire, for it to abandon Adrianople was only a manoeuvre of the Austrian diplomacy to avert the prospect of any intervention by Russia. In fact, for reaching no conflict with the Triple Entente, the Central Powers were considering a compromise solution for the problem of Adrianople." Count Berchtold and the German ambassador in Vienna, Tschirschky, declared that the two empires allies, Germany and Austria-Hungary are determined, 'out of consideration for the dignity of Europe, not to let Turkey in possession of Adrianople and that they will rally to any arrangement that improving the Turkish border in Thrace, would give enough satisfaction to the Turks'. Dumaine, the French Ambassador to Vienna show that Tschirschky, 'talking on behalf of the two governments, insisted on gaining time, i.e. preventing any precipitated and isolated demonstration from the Russia'. The German Ambassador further stated that the Turkish government would only give in following individual steps, since a collective action of the Great Powers is ineffective40

The Italian diplomacy acted in perfect agreement with the German one, refusing to join a naval demonstration of the Great Powers against the Ottoman Empire, an idea that Sazonov continued to support. The French chargé d'affaires in Rome, Billy, thus informed Pichon that such a request made by the Russian diplomacy at Consulta was leftwith no result, the response being that for the Italian government 'a demonstration of this kind would be very disagreable'. However, "if Germany participated, Italy will follow it'41.

Basically, due to the divergence in positions between the Major Powers to take action enforcing Ottoman Empire to comply with London Treaty, an impasse was reached. It is interesting to note in this regard that in this case the idea of Romania undertaking on behalf of the 'European concert' a mission in this direction was being increasingly debated on. Delcassé, after showing Pichon in a report the difficulties Russia was having, not being able to ensure a consensus of the Great Powers for an intervention upon Constantinople, noted that despite the mood of the Romanian society, hostile to an action against the Turks, Romania 'would be willing to accept a mandate from Europe'. "Delcassé concluded that, taking into account 'its intact strength and the role that it would be allowed to play', it would be almost certain that 'the simple movement of the Romanian Army would lead the Turks to recoil in the Enos Midia line'42.

It seems just as interesting to note that, although among the Great Powers Russia was the most concerned about Adrianople being abandoned by the Turks, the Bulgarian government was drawing closer and closer to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. In a long report to Pichon, Panafieu, the French minister in Sofia, showed, among other things: 'In terms of external affairs, there is no need to repeat that all current government sympathies are going to Austria' and 'the pro-Russian policy went bankrupt' 43 . That was what the government in Vienna had long wanted, government which, while preparing to start peace talks in the Romanian capital, wanted to announce in Bucharest that its views would have to be taken into consideration. Count Berchtold sent to this purpose a telegram to Fürstenberg, the Austrian-Hungarian minister, to notify the Romanian government that 'Austria-Hungary considered that the arrangements intervening between the warring states in Bucharest would have to be ratified by the Great Powers" and if such arrangements harmed its interests, "Austria-Hungary reserves all of its freedom of action." Blondel, commenting the Austrian government's approach, stated that "Mr. Maiorescu strives to help achieve an agreement between the delegates of the states (Balkan states - Ed) based on fairness, in order to remove the interference of the Major Powers, which he would like to avoid at all costs'44.

The Great Powers of the Triple Entente envisaged to intervene only in order to achieve the cessation of hostilities, and seeked to achieve the agreement of the Triple Alliance for action against the Ottoman Empire. Sazonov expected exercising financial constraints on the Ottoman Empire in order to have the occupied territories abandonned beyond the limits set by the Treaty of London. On the other hand, Edward Grey warned the Constantinople government that they "should hope for nothing," given the "alleged discrepancies between the Great Powers". Moreover, the English diplomacy probed the intentions of Austro-Hungary and Germany in case of military action of Russia against the Ottoman Empire. The Austrian-Hungarian government replied they would not prevent such action, yet they "reserve the right to take the measures which are deemed appropriate to protect Bulgaria". The German Government agreed on the Russian intervention with the conditions of it being limited to the European part of the Ottoman Empire, being temporary and made by previously warning the Great Powers45. Delcasse however feared that "Germany limits itself to taking note of the Russian declaration, reserving the right to intervene if the circumstances seemed favourable, when Russia is fully committed". In order to eliminate that problem, Delcassé supported Romania's military action against the Ottoman Empire. "It would be preferable - the French diplomat wrote to Pichon - that once peace is promptly signed with Bulgaria, Romania can be determined by virtue of a warrant of Europe or by any other means (sn) to make Turkey feel the power of its sword46".

When making this proposal to the Head of the French diplomacy, Delcassé disregarded the total lack of receptiveness during the First Balkan War King Charles I had accepted in principle the idea of cooperation between the Romanian and Bulgarian armies so to chase the Turks from Adrianople, provided Silistra was given to Bulgaria. We believe however that such a proposal could not be welcomed by the Romanian decision-makers, due to new conditions created after the application of Petersburg Protocol and the developments of the Second Balkan War - when the Romanian troops had already occupied the territory claimed as far as Turtucaia-Balchik line, and additionally considering the Bulgarian government's approval to concede this territory.

Even in these circumstances, the Turkish diplomacy wanted to eliminate such a danger, by promoting good relations with Romania. The letter of Sultan Mehmed V sent to King Charles I on 28 July 1913 is particularly eloquent in this respect. The Sultan insisted on justifying and explaining why Adrianopoloe vilayet was partly reoccupied as "a limited area and attached by indissoluble ties to its Ottoman homeland"; at the same time, he showed king Charles I that he also wished for a durable peace in the Balkans and that he understood why the King of Romania wanted Bulgaria's territory not to be too much reduced47.

A moderation of over-zelous states that were victorious in the Second Balkan War, was necessary; and the Romanian government understood this, due to the stance of mediator it had taken. Thus it was not only the danger of intervention of the Great Powers that was averted, but also the goals for which Romania entered the war were reached. Among these, the most important one was to ensure the balance of power in Southeast Europe. Moreover, the conduct of the Romanian diplomacy was well understood and appreciated in those circumstances. Descos, the French Minister in Belgrade, informed Pichon in this regard, on 28 July 1913, that according to the Italian chargé d'affaires in the Serbian capital city, who exaggerated to a certain extent, "the Romanians are now furious against the Serbs and Greeks, and are more ready to defend Sofia against them, than to support them against Bulgarians"48.

The assessment seems significant to us in terms of studying the "Origins" of the First World War. Indeed, during the First Balkan War, Romania's entering the war could have led to the onset of a generalized conflict; to avoid such a situation, the Great Powers resorted to a mediation of the dispute between Bulgaria and Romania during Saint Petersburg Ambassadors' Conference. All diplomatic and military actions that Romania took during the Second Balkan War demonstrate the significant role that the Romanian state had in avoiding the World War. If the "European concert" stopped functioning and a Great Power became involved in a military way, the risk was conflict extension.

It is clear, from a historical perspective, that under the aegis of Romania, the conditions for peace settlement were created with a view to establishing a climate of cooperation between South-East European states, thereby ending a war that threatened the peace of the whole continent. Once the delegations of the belligerent states came to Bucharest on July 28, 1913, prerequisites were created in order to solve by negotiations the complicated problems that gave to the Balkan Peninsula a sad reputation of "powder keg of Europe".

Footnote

1 Documents diplomatiques français. 1871-1914, 3 e série, tome VII, Paris, 1933, doc. no. 391, p. 430. Delcassé to Pichon, 17 July 1913.

2 Ibidem, doc. no. 393, p. 431-432. Jules Cambon to Pichon, 17 July 1913.

3 Ibidem, doc. no. 394, p. 432-433. Dumaine to Pichon, 17 July 1913.

4 Ibidem, doc. no 397, p. 435-436. Jules Cambon to Pichon, 17 July 1913.

5 Ibidem, doc. no. 398, p. 436-437. Paul Cambon to Pichon, 17 July 1913.

6 Ibidem, doc. no. 405, p. 441-442. Panafieu to Pichon, 17 July 1913.

7 Original Daily Political Notes, in vol. Titu Maiorescu, Romania, the Balkan Wars and the Cadrilater in vol. Titu Maiorescu, published by Stelian Neagoe, Machiavelli Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 140.

8 The Green Book in vol. Titu Maiorescu, Romania, the Balkan Wars and the Cadrilater, vol. Titu Maiorescu, published by de Stelian Neagoe, Machiavelli Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 222-223.

9 D.D.F., 3e série, tome VII, doc. nr. 408, p. 444. Pichon to Blondel, 18 July 1913.

10 The Green Book, p. 223.

11 D.D.F., 3e série, tome VII, doc. nr. 411, p. 446. Blondel Pichon, 18 July 1913.

12 Ibidem, doc. no. 417, p. 452-453. Dumaine to Pichon, 19 July 1913; see also Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette. 1871-1914. Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, 1926, vol. 35, doc. no. 13.508.

13 D.D.F., 3e série, tome VII, doc. no. 421, p. 455-456. Panafieu to Pichon, 19 July 1913.

14 Ibidem, doc. no. 422, p. 456-457. Panfieu to Pichon, 19 July 1913.

15 Ibidem, doc. no 424, p. 459-460. Billy to Pichon, 20 July1913.

16 The Green Book, p. 223-224; D.D.F., 3e série, tome VII, doc. nr. 425, p. 460-461. Blondel to Pichon, 20 July 1913.

17 The Green Book, p. 224-225.

18 Ibidem, p. 225-230.

19 Ibidem, p. 227.

20 See in this respect the exchange of telegrams between King Charles I and the Kings of Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro in A.N.I.C, Fund of the Royal House, file 37/1913, file 40/1913, file 43/1913.

21 D.D.F., 3e série, tome VII, doc. nr. 431, p. 466. Panafieu to Pichon, 21 July 1913. The content of the telegram was reported to Paris by Blondel as well; Ibidem, note 1, p. 466-467.

22 Ibidem, doc. no. 433, p. 468-469. Paul Cambon to Pichon, 21 July 1913.

23 Ibidem, doc. no 436, p. 471. Paul Cambon to Pichon, 21 July 1913.

24 Ibidem, doc. no. 440, p. 476. Delcassé to Pichon, 22 July 1913

25 Such a position was also expressed by Jagow to Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador to Berlin, on 19 July 1913. Ibidem, note 1, p. 469.

26 G.P., vol. 35, doc. no. 13554.

27 D.D.F., 3e série, tome VII, doc. no. 445, p. 480-481. Jules Cambon to Pichon, 23 July 1913.

28 Ibidem, doc. no. 438, p. 474-475. Blondel to Pichon, 22 July 1913.

29 Ibidem, doc. no. 455, p. 492. Blondel to Pichon, 24 July 1913.

30 Ibidem, doc. no. 459, p. 495-496. Blondel to Pichon, 24 July 1913.

31 Ibidem, doc. no. 454, p. 489-491. Paul Cambon to Pichon, 23 July 1913; doc. no. 462, p. 498. Boppe, the French chargé d'affaires to Constantinople, to Pichon, 24 July 1913; doc. no. 465, p. 500-504. Paul Cambon to Pichon, 24 July 1913; doc. no 466, p. 504-505. Pichon to Delcassé, 25 July 1913.

32 Ibidem, doc. no 467, p. 505-506. Blondel to Pichon, 25July 1913.

33 Ibidem, doc. no. 468, p. 4506-507. Delaroche-Vernet to Pichon, 25 July 1913.

34 Ibidem, doc. No 469, p. 508. Paul Cambon to Pichon, 25 July 1913.

35 Ibidem, doc. no. 470, p. 509. Delcassé to Pichon, 25 July 1913.

36 G.P., vol. 35, doc. no. 13588.

37 D.D.F., 3e série, tome VII, doc. nr. 471, p. 513. Matharel to Etienne, 25 July 1913.

38 Ibidem, doc. no. 472, p. 514. Pichon to Delcassé, 26 July 1913.

39 Ibidem, doc. no 473, p. 514. Blondel to Pichon, 26 July 1913.

40 Ibidem, doc. no. 474, p. 515. Dumaine to Pichon, 26 July 1913.

41 Ibidem, doc. no 476, p. 516. Billy to Pichon, 26 July 1913.

42 Ibidem, doc. no 476, p. 516. Billy to Pichon, 26 July 1913.

43 Ibidem, doc. no 478, p. 521. Panafieu to Pichon, 26 July 1913.

44 Ibidem, doc. no. 479, p. 521. Blondel to Pichon, 27 July 1913. See the text of the telegram sent by Berchtold to Fürstenberg in Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. Diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreichisch-Ungarischen Ministeriums des Aussern, Viena and Leipzig, 1930, vol. VI, doc. no. 8016.

45 Ibidem, doc. no. 480, p. 522. Jules Cambon to Pichon, 27 July 1913.

46 Ibidem, doc. no. 481, p. 523. Delcassé to Pichon, 27 July1913.

47 A.N.I.C., Fund of the Royal House, file 45/1913; letter from 28 July 1913, signed by Mehmed V to Charles I.

48 D.D.F., 3e série, tome VII, doc. no. 482, p. 524. Descos to Pichon, 28 July 1913.