THE "DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT" AND LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ELEMENTS OF THE DEBATE

Abstract

The article examines the level of legitimacy in the institutions of the European Union, a topic that has been haunting the leaders and the people of the EU since its very foundation. The political apparatus in Brussels has been continually criticized for its lack of democratic legitimacy. The purpose of this article is to analyze some of the most powerful views on this fundamental issue. We will analyze concrete aspects of the "democratic deficit" of the EU and problems with its legitimacy. First, drawing upon the reflection of Fritz Scharpf a definition of legitimacy is proposed. Legitimacy will be regarded as having two forms: input-oriented and output-oriented. Through this framework the legitimacy of the European Union will be assessed in a systematic fashion.

Headnote

Abstract: The article examines the level of legitimacy in the institutions of the European Union, a topic that has been haunting the leaders and the people of the EU since its very foundation. The political apparatus in Brussels has been continually criticized for its lack of democratic legitimacy. The purpose of this article is to analyze some of the most powerful views on this fundamental issue. We will analyze concrete aspects of the "democratic deficit" of the EU and problems with its legitimacy. First, drawing upon the reflection of Fritz Scharpf a definition of legitimacy is proposed. Legitimacy will be regarded as having two forms: input-oriented and output-oriented. Through this framework the legitimacy of the European Union will be assessed in a systematic fashion.

Keywords: legitimacy, democracy, governance,Europe, parliament

Throughout the 1990s, European scholars and politicians alike worried about what was referred to as the "democratic deficit" of the European Union (EU). The foundation of the European Union after WWII was undertaken by political elites who lacked popular legitimacy. Some concepts commonly used in political science have their origins in the nation-state, democracy being one of them Suddenly, scholars had to apply such concepts to a completely diflèrent political entity (Rozenberg, O., 2009; Wükerson, J. et aL, 2009).

As Eriksen and Fossum point out, 'The tyranny of the concepts and principles associated with the nation-state relate to how sovereignty, identity, community, citizenship and democracy have all been tied to the notion of nation-state and made subject to the territorial logic of the state" (Eriksen and Fossum, 2000:7).

The terminological debate firstly aims to establish whether we can apply the concept of democracy to the EU entity or if the concept cannot be applied to an entity completely different to a nation-state. Some scholars found that the concept of democracy cannot be applied to the EU (Majone, 1998; Moravcsic, 2002) while others have found that it is necessary, or even urgent, to democratize the European Union (Schmitter, 2000, 2004).

In this paper, concrete aspects of the "democratic deficit" of the EU and problems with its legitimacy will be analyzed. Following the definition of legitimacy proposed by Fritz Schärpe the concept will be regarded as having two forms: input-oriented and outputoriented. Through this framework the legitimacy of the European Union will be assessed in a systematic fashion (ScharpÇ 1999).

Scharpf made a distinction between input and output legitimacy. Input-oriented legitimacy - government by the people - is based on the existence of a collective identity. Output-oriented legitimacy - government for the people - is based on the existence of common interests. As the EU does not have the preconditions for the former, important problems with establishing or claiming this type of legitimacy are clear. Some authors have identified several problems with output-oriented legitimacy in the EU. However, although in nation-states input-oriented legitimacy is often taken for granted, output-oriented legitimacy may likewise be questionable in certain other cases (Best, H., G. Lengyel and L. Verzichelli, eds., 2012).

This paper is divided into four sections. The first explores some of the most common approaches to the legitimacy problem within the EU. The second outlines problems of input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy and addresses some relevant literature in the sphere of European studies. The third presents possible solutions to those problems while the fourth makes some reflections and draws conclusions concerning legitimacy in the EU.

At least three main approaches to the case of the European Union and its legitimacy are discussed in this paper. The first is that of the "regulatory state", as defined by Giandomenico Majone. The second is the intergovernmental position held by Moravcsik. The third is the multilevel governance approach. A fourth approach could be distinguished if we consider deliberative democracy as an independent theory.

1. Problems of Legitimacy in the EU

Giandomenico Majone has argued that democratic legitimacy is not an appropriate concept if the EU is assessed from a normative perspective. The EU is fundamentally a regulatory union, which avoids taking on the discretionary power of allocating resources. It is mainly concerned with establishing and implementing regulatory policies whose efficiency is guaranteed through decision-making processes in which expertise is allocated a fundamental role (Haller, M., 2008).

Decisions about such policies as competition or monetary policy, which are accepted without polarization, gain credibility with the public by being Pareto-efficient. The procedural legitimacy of the EU as a regulatory agent is guaranteed by the Council and the governments of the member states (Majone, 1994, 1998; see also Follesdal and Hix, 2005; Kohler-Kockand Rittberger, 2007; Roth, F., 2011).

Moravcsik has developed an approach focusing on inter-governmental relations (Moravcsik, A., 2002). He argues that the EU's political system has deep procedural constraints. There are institutional checks and balances in the EU's institutional configuration, with the separation of powers between different actors guaranteeing reciprocal control among them Another aspect of the guarantee of separation of powers, which grants the EU legitimacy, in his view, is the multilevel structure of the implementation of EU decisions. In the implementation of policies, various actors from different levels (national, regional and local governments) are involved. Moravcsik concurs with Majone's argument that the EU's governing bodies perform in most instances the task of elaborating EU regulations. As such there are some redistributive policy areas where strong control is exercised and crucial rules are necessary for decision-making process. For example, there are both direct and indirect sources of control: The Council of Ministers and national governments, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and national parliaments. Examples of redistributive policies are the Common Fisheries Policy or the Common Agricultural Policy (Brouard, S., Costa, O. and König, T. (eds.), 2012a). As a result, the author affirms that we cannot draw "negative conclusions about the legitimacy of the European Union from causal observation of the non-participatory nature of its institutions" (Moravcsik, A. 2002: 622).

The third approach to the EU and its problem of legitimacy is the multi-level governance approach, which distinguishes between vertical and horizontal diffiisions of authority (Marks et aL, 1996; see also Kohler-Kock, 2007). In the vertical dimension power is shared between supranational, national and sub-national institutions. But there is also a horizontal diffusion of authority across the EU, in which particular jurisdictions are task-specific and flexible. Both public and private actors play a role in the policymaking process (Costa, O. and Latek M., 2001; Grossman, E., 2008). The novelty of this type of governance is the direct participation of organized private actors in the policymaking process and the sharing of responsibility with private stakeholders. In terms of legitimacy, the vertical diffusion of authority has as channels of accountability national, regional and local governments and parliaments as well as the European Parliament (EP from here). The vertical diffusion of authority has governments and parliaments, as well as the European Parliament (EP) itself as channels of accountability on the national level as well as on regional and local ones.

Moreover, the participation of private interests in the decision-making increases the legitimacy of the EU (see for example Kohler-Kock and Rittberger, 2007). However, there are reservations about this view. Equality of access to participation is lacking, as the costs of taking part are often prohibitive. As a result this system can lead to bias development in favor of those who can gain this access.

The political structure of the EU is a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational institutions. The European Council and the Council of Ministers are intergovernmental, but the European Commission, European Court of Justice and the European Parliament are all supranational institutions. Consequently, the EU political system implies more than just cooperation between sovereign states. However, it is also far more than a supranational body. The multilevel governance concept considers that the multilevel nature of EU politics helps give legitimacy to EU institutions; however, this legitimacy can be improved in different ways (Grossman, E. and Sauger, N., 2007; Hayward, J., 2004; Holzaker, R., 2002).

Advocates of the deliberative democracy approach claim this is an approach significantly different than others (Eriksen and Fossum, 2000).They maintain that deliberation is in itself a source of democracy and legitimacy. In this scenario, public deliberation should be based on convincing and modeling participants' arguments, rather than competition between different visions.

2. Input-Oriented Legitimacy in the European Union

The EU member states have different histories and languages and are culturally and ethnically diverse. The EU has not achieved the 'thick' collective identity we take for granted in nation-states (Schärpe 1999). The formation of a political community with a common identity is part of the process of nation-building. The existence of different languages and cultural and ethnic diversity within a state does not inpede the development of a common identity. Belgium and Switzerland are key examples of ethnically and linguistically diverse countries which have been able to develop a shared identity and build stable institutions under which all their people can live.

The theory that there is a lack of European identity is outlined in the literature on European integratioa Although the EU has expanded its competency beyond purely economic cooperation, there is still no shared feeling of common EU identity within its borders. The absence of a European demos, a European citizenship, is seen by some authors as proof of the lack, or even the total impossibility, of a single European identity. Nevertheless, several commentators have tried to challenge this pessimistic view and offer another perspective (Eichenberg, R. C. and R. J. Dalton, 2007).

The existence of a demos is a precondition for the existence of any type of collective identity. This begs the question of whether the existence of a European demos is even possible. Various EU member states have argued that there is no real demos in Europe (see Weiler, 1995), and as a consequence a common European identity is impossible. Some would say that even democracy is impossible in the EU, as there is no demos which can express its will (Ilondci, G., ed., 2010).

Nevertheless, even pessimistic authors do not deny the possibility of a European demos developing sometime in the future, despite its nonexistence at the moment (Mair, 2005). Weiler and others posit the existence of a European demos, basing their argument on the certainty of two different types of demos, one related to the nation-states and the other to the EU. Each of these is based on different elements: a subjective component rooted in objective organic conditions (nation-state demos) and civic elements - or the feet of membership (European demos) (Weiler, 1995).

Another important concept close to that of European identity is "European citizenship". Is it possible to have such a thing as European citizenship? Recent academic contributions have answered this question positively. However, is it realty possible to create a single citizenship when the concept of citizenship is rooted in liberal democratic principles and rights rather than "shared values" and "the common good" (Lehning, 2001)?

European citizenship can be interpreted as a compound of two elements (Cotta, 2008). It has both an "indirect citizenship", originally derived from nation-states, and a "direct European citizenship", resulting from the existence of a European polity (Cotta and Isemia, 2009). The feet that European citizenship is possible due to the existence of the EU may in itself lead to the development of a distinct European political community (see Scheuer, 1999).

However, when linking input-oriented with output-oriented legitimacy, a question can be raised: What is the nature of the European polity? We should first ask whether there is a European polity. Again, there are some ambiguous answers to this question. One thesis asserts that there is within the EU a 'polity-in-the making' (Mair, 2005) or an "emerging polity" (Schmitter, 2000). However, Bellamy and Castiglione, amongst others, accept the existence of a real European polity, and define it as "being post-national in character and post-state in form". It is post-national in the sense that nationhood no longer supplies the socio-cultural glue essential to political integration and to the unconditional assent of the people living in a given territory. It is post-state in form as the congruence between territory and functional competence, which has been one of the main elements of state power, has broken down (Bellamy and CastigHone; 2000:68). As a result, the EU is characterized as a kind of "mixed polity" where member states continue to be the main players but other actors, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, play prominent roles in certain areas, likewise proposing or making poHcy.

In sum, we can subscribe to the existence of a European citizenship, but one with different characteristics than those of the nation-states. It is indirect, but also direct. Direct European citizenship derives from the EU's principles and rights. There is also a European demos, but this again is different in character to those of nation-states, as it is based on civic elements. There is also a European polity, likewise different in nature to those of nation-states. All these factors enable the EU to build institutions which can provide output-oriented legitimacy. However, we are left asking whether the European compound citizenship and the European demos solve the problem of whether it has input-oriented legitimacy. Should we affirm with Scharpf that the EU cannot aspire to this type of legitimacy (1999:12)?

PubHc opinion on European citizenship can be used as an indicator of the existence of a European political community (Scheuer, 1999; Best, H., 2012). The existence of a political community is an apparent prerequisite for a common European identity to emerge. However, this does not seem to be in place at present (see figure 1, 2, 3 and 4) This makes it impossible for the EU to obtain input-oriented legitimacy in the near future, as the relevant numbers have not changed in nearly 20 years with regards to the European identity. For instance, between 1992 and 2004 the number of people who considered themselves "merely European" was unchanged from 1992, and the numbers of people who consider themselves as first citizens of their own countries and then European, and likewise first European and then national, had also remained the same.

When challenging this 'static' view of European citizenship, one can argue that changes in identity cannot be reflected in short time frames such as 10 or 12 years, and if we analyze trends against generational patterns the results can be interpreted somewhat differently (Toshkov, D., 2011).

Interestingly enough, the indications are that the younger generations feel more European and national (or vice versa), instead of purely national, than the older generatioa This difference may go even deeper than it appears. Figure 2 shows the answers to the same question for 2004, but divides the sample into age cohorts. This graph further demonstrates that older people have a stronger national orientation (feeling themselves only a national of their country) than younger people. Moreover, younger people, more recently, have a higher level of "feeling" of being national and European and European and national at the same time than their elders (see graph 4).

Nonetheless, it is necessary to be cautious and not generalize about these figures, or to conclude that European identity is increasing and will in turn increase the input-oriented legitimacy of the European Unioa

3. Output-Oriented Legitimacy in the European Union

Output-oriented legitimacy, or government for the people, is based more on common interests and an identifiable constituency than on common identity. Moreover, there is no difficulty in using output-oriented legitimacy just as there is no difficulty in allowing for the coexistence of multiple, nested or overlapping, collective identities defined by "specific classes of problem-solving concerns and organized according to territorial as well as functional criteria" (ScharpÇ 1999:11). Output-oriented legitimacy offers a wider variety of mechanisms than input-oriented legitimacy. It appears that this type of legitimacy can be more easily achieved by the EU, as it is much more institutiondriven. It is derived from the desire to develop the capacity to resolve problems requiring "collective solutions, because they could not be resolved through individual action, through market exchanges, or through voluntary cooperation in civil society" (ScharpÇ 1999: 11). Consequently, modifying institutions and processes can change - positively or negatively - output legitimacy.

As stated above, two different forms of output-oriented legitimacy can be distinguished: direct and indirect. Direct forms derive from European institutions themselves, basically the European Parliament, as there has been no direct election of a European executive by the people. Indirect forms derive from national governments and parliaments, the Council of Ministers and the European Council.

3.1. Direct Sources of Output-Oriented Legitimacy: the European Parliament

The legitimating function of the European Parliament has three different dimensions: its legislative power, its control and selection of the European Commission, and its competency as a representative body (Paolini, 2007).

The legislative power of the EP has increased in recent years. Since the Single European Act (1986) brought into being the co-operation procedure, the EP has augmented its capacity to intervene in EU policy-making processes, and also now has the capacity to present proposals, its so-called "conditional agenda-setting power" (Tsebelis, 1994). Under the Maastricht Treaty (1992) the co-decision procedure was introduced, giving the EP the right to collectively decide matters with the European Council Nevertheless, scholars still claim that its power is too weak compared to that of the Council (Follesdal and Hix, 2005; Raunio, T., 2009).

The second dimension is the EP's control and selection of the Commission This power has also increased in the 2000s. The Maastricht Treaty gave the EP two different rudiments in terms of appointments to the Commission: governments of member states must consult the EP before putting forth candidate for the presidency of the Commission and the EP must approve the designated members of the Commission. However, once again some authors maintain that its control over the Commission and the Council remains insufficient (Hix and ForesdaD, 2005).

The third dimension is the representative capacity of the EP. Several aspects of this are highlighted in the literature in relation to providing output legitimacy (Wessels, B., 2005). This is clearly the dimension where the fewest enhancements have been made in the last 10-15 years and no serious effort has been made to resolve this problem. The literature has identified at least three problems in terms of how all the institutions and processes of the EU work: (1) there are no European elections per se, except for national ones that concern European institutions, (2) there is the lack of European parties and a real European party system, (3) and the internal functioning of MEPs within the European Parliament is inefficient.

(1) In reality, EU citizens cast their votes to elect their own governments who, in turn, elect the Commission Mark Franklin suggests that voters have still not developed preferences for one European policy over another. European elections are contested on the basis of national political issues instead of European ones, and thus merely reflect national processes and concerns, what Franklin and van der Egk call "second-order elections" (Franklin and van der Egk, 2009; Thomassen et aL, 2004). These two experts on elections borrowed this concept from Reif and Schmitt, who used it to differentiate between first order elections, in which people decide who governs a country, and second order elections, in which voters are nevertheless driven by national political cues and have the same party system and parties to vote for as in first order elections. Although Reif and Schmitt were discussing sub-state elections, Franklin and Egk have applied this concept to European elections (Franklin, M. N., van der Egk, C., 2009).

Without having clear information about the positions of the various parties on European issues voters are unable to either determine the platforms of the various parties or clearly form their own views. Consequently, elections held under such circumstances become a reflection of national issues, and even serve to punish national governments, as parties in opposition are more likely to be elected on a pro-Europe platform (Lord, 2001). Another factor which does not help create a sense of real European elections is that they are not held on the same day in all countries (Schmitter and Trechsel, 2004). Moreover, the electoral turnout in Western European countries' elections is very low, and in general falls below the turnout seen in national or regional elections. This low electoral participation can also be explained by the feet that after European elections there is no government formation process, contributing to a certain lack of engagement on the part of elected deputies and commissioners. People can also misunderstand the utility of these elections, as they cannot see any short term outcome from their participation (Sanders, D., G. Toka, P. Bellucci and M. Torcal, 2012).

(2) Another aspect of this third dimension is how parties in the EP act. The political groups within European political institutions do not function as European parties or federations of parties. They are created by national or regional parties and then adapted to European institutions and politics. As a consequence, the internal differences among them are enormous and they have very little organizational structure (Schmitter and Trechsel, 2004). Thomassen et. aL, have also demonstrated that party groupings are based on ideology but there is no group cohesion (Thomassen et al, 2004).

(3) Finally, and as other researchers have pointed out, organizational structures of MEPs in the European Parliament are similar to those of their parent political parties at national levels. Nevertheless, according to Hix and ForesdaD, this tendency is changing, and MEPs are now more likely to vote with European issues in mind, and against their national leaders, rather than on the basis of national political interests (Follesdal, A and Hix, S., 2005; Gabel, M. and K. Scheve, 2007b).

3.2. Indirect Forms of Output-Oriented Legitimacy: National Governments and Parliaments

Literature on the legitimacy problem of the EU has generally taken for granted the level of legitimacy deriving from national governments and parliaments. Most authors assume that national governments provide legitimacy to the EU through participation in the Council of Ministers. At the same time, national parliaments are held accountable for the actions of their governments at European level. But some scholars have attempted to empirically determine the validity of such a statement. Based on empirical data, Auel and Tapio have recently demonstrated that national parliaments today are much more involved in European aflàirs than previously (Auel, K, Tapio R, 2012) Moreover, their scrutiny powers have been augmented, and so they are now investing more resources (time, money, people) in trying to account for what their governments are doing in European political institutions. Two things, though, should be taken into consideration. Not all national parliaments are equally effective as scrutiny bodies. Additionally, in the same way that EU aflàirs are more important for certain MPs than others, EU aflàirs are more important for certain national parliaments than for others (O'Brennan and Raunio, 2007; Paolini, 2007).

4. Solutions to the Legitimacy Problem of the EU

Several authors have defended the idea of increasing political competition in the EU (Lord, 2001; Hix and ForesdaD, 2005; Best, H., 2012) in their search for a solution to the problem of legitimacy. Best maintain that such competition has in feet increased in recent years, especially in terms of 'left' versus 'right' competition and in the internal functioning of the EP. Groups have a common ideology, and MEPs are now thinking more in terms of ideology than nationality. These same authors note that more negotiations and votes are taking place within the CouncD. They maintain that polarization could increase democracy in the EU, and this would in turn increase its legitimacy in at least three ways: (1) competition wDl aDow citizens to identify the protagonists and understand the likely consequences of electing different options; (2) it wDl produce a mandate for the winners; (3) today's losers can become tomorrow's winners.

First, political competition aDows citizens to identify who the protagonists are and understand the consequences of the agendas they want to develop. However, as Hix and ForedaD point out, questions about the leadership of the EU and its future agenda is avoided during the elections of national leaders and members of the EP. Moreover, EP elections are 'second order elections', and often not held at the same time as national elections. There is no European party system, but only one of national parties competing on the basis of national issues, not European ones. Besides, opposition and protest parties often gain the most from these elections, especially those who are European Union skeptic. The positive side of competition is that alternative poDcies that educate the pubDc about European matters are presented and aDow citizens to position themselves in function of leaders and their given agendas (Franklin and Eijk, 1996; Hix and ForesdaD, 2005). Opening the issue of European leadership to the pubDc does not imply in itself the direct election of the President of the Commission by the citizens. This could either be a direct election by the people (see Lord, 2001) or an election by national governments. An increase of pubDc discussion within Europe has been demanded by the advocates of the "deDberative democracy approach" (Eriksen and Fossum, 2000). Such an approach has positive impacts on input-oriented legitimacy, as it increases the idea of shared values and common aspirations. Expanded deliberation also shapes identity (Eriksen and Fossum, 2000), and this in turn can reinforce a shared European identity. It likewise increases output-oriented legitimacy by bringing about an improvement in the capacity to solve collective European problems. Deliberative democracy is considered to imply the creation of a more encompassing European Public Sphere. But in spite of this, deliberative democracy remains elusive and undeveloped in the EU.

There is also the issue of how ineffective the European media is in providing citizens with a clear vision of European problems and current affairs. Moreover, NGOs, considered an effective instrument for change and social marketing and key components of civil society, have not been very effective in bringing about an improvement in the deliberation process; their visions and goals do not often coincide and are not property connected with those of the EU. Accordingly, two of the key elements for the development of a European public sphere - the media and an organized civil society - have not been developed.

Second, competition produces a mandate for the winners - almost a winner-takesall system. A coalition of winners would be legitimized in being able to develop its own policy agenda. Hix and Foresdall maintain that the Commission, which should have its own program and policies, developed over a span of five years, and the authority to prepare laws in various policy areas and negotiate budgets in support of such policies, would benefit from greater competition and criticism (Hix and Foresdall, 2005).

Third, electoral losers (people who voted for a party left out of the winning coalition) will easily accept this outcome provided they are convinced that they can prevail in future elections. That is to say, those who have concrete preferences about policies, and the leader who represents their agenda, will accept the result of an election if they feel the process gives them an opportunity for their voice to be heard. This is a way of convincing people that their interests can be served in European institutions, arenas where they feel they can play a role.

More concrete proposals for increasing legitimacy have been made, relating to specific institutions (Hix, 2006; Best, H., 2012). In terms of the European Parliament, it has been proposed that its president could be elected for a five-year rather than a renewable term of two-and-a-half year term A survey carried out by TNS Opinion & Social Network in the 27 Member States of the European Union in 2012 shows that a significant majority of respondents are in fàvor of a direct election of the President of the European Commission (Special Eurobarometer 379, 22-31). Such a change would encourage the formation of majority coalitions, as parties would seek to gain this more coveted position rather than let it pass to another group (Hix, 2006).

Changing the system of allocating committee membership and chairs would increase competitioa Instead of doing this on a proportional basis, Hix suggests a system which would guarantee greater representation to the largest or majority group. For example, by allowing the largest political group to choose several committee members directly, while the rest would be allocated under the d'Hont rule or proportional representation (Hix, 2006).

The Council's legislative deliberations could be made more transparent, allowing the public and governments to scrutinize amendments proposed by the presidency prior to their deliberation in the COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives responsible for preparing the work of the Council of the European Union (Hix, 2006). Moreover the public and media should have access to the deliberations of the Council, as supporters of deliberative democracy maintain (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Hix, 2006; Toshkov, D., 2011: 180).

Regarding the Commission, a more open battle for the election of its president is also recommended as a source of providing greater legitimacy. This election could be made by the people directly, or, as Lord as also proposed, by the European Parliament (Lord, 2001). One difficulty of having an executive elected by the EP is that there is a need for it to have stable majorities which support the Commissioa This would be difficult to achieve, given the number of parties and different countries represented in the EP (Lord, 2001). Hix also proposes that rival candidates should present their ideas in manifestos, public debates among key candidates should be held, and open declarations of support by the heads of national governments and party group leaders in the EP (preferably before European elections) should be made. Allowing direct public election of the Commission and its president would require campaigns to debate European issues and thus give the opportunity to citizens to see where they stand on these issues in relation to the various parties (Hix, 2006; see also Franklin et aL, 1996).

It has also been suggested to adopt Swiss-style referendums or direct democracy on law proposals to increase their legitimacy. Again, this measure would augment debate on European affairs, educate people about the functioning of institutions, and give the public the idea that they control European institutions and processes (Lord, 2001).

Nevertheless, some voices have appeared criticizing political competition within the EU (see for example Bartolini, 2006). One of their most important critiques is that politicization of constitutional issues should be avoided. Not doing so could create situations difficult to manage. The point made by Bartolini is that issues which in some countries divide parties are precisely constitutional ones, and thus these could easily be politicized. Another interesting argument raised by this scholar is that EP political groups are not strong, and there are still no cohesive Europe-wide parties as such. The reinforcement of these structures will be needed before politicization can begin. Another argument is that the utility of partisan politics has been eroded in recent years, due to a variety of reasons, two being the end of the Cold War and globalizatioa Moreover, people are disengaging with partisan politics (see also Torcal and Montero, 2006). This has led to the rise of alternative decision-making forms which aspire to be less democratic but much more effective: judicialization or expert decision-making are now more accepted (Mair, 2005).

Over time the EU has acquired more authority and more policies now have their locus in Brussels. As a result of these extensions, problems related to democracy and the democratic legitimacy of the EU have been raised.

5. Conclusion

The analysis of the problems of EU legitimacy, which distinguishes input-oriented and output oriented mechanisms, leads us to various conclusions. It is first necessary to ask whether old concepts can be made to serve new objects. The apparent "tyranny" of concepts (sovereignty, identity, community, citizenship and democracy), which Eriksen, Fossum and Toshkov have pointed out, can also be applied to the problem of legitimacy. The object of this paper has neither been the concept of legitimacy per se nor the broader conceptual problems related to the definition and description of how the EU functions. In any case, one must tread carefully when applying the nation-state concept to suprastate entities such as the EU.

Regarding input-oriented legitimacy, we find arguments against the idea that the EU embodies this type of legitimacy, as a European identity per se does not exist. Inputoriented legitimacy problems cannot be resolved. Nevertheless, when we look at related concepts such as demos or citizenship, we can conclude that both could possibly exist at the European level, or may one day, or that they may do so in the future, albeit not on the same terms as those of nation-states.

Regarding the output-oriented legitimacy, we have seen approaches that look at the EU as sufficiently different entity that old concepts cannot be applied. Majone, Moravcsik, Kohler-Kock and Roth, although from different perspectives, defend that democracy is not an adequate concept to the EU. Differently, Mair support the idea that EU has, until certain point, went beyond popular democracy, and new forms of decision-making as the EU are more interesting and legitimate for citizens now than popular democracy is.

Regarding output-oriented legitimacy, this paper has presented approaches which regard the EU as being a sufficiently different entity that older concepts of this kind cannot be applied to it. Although they take different perspectives, both Majone and Moravcsik maintain that democracy is not an adequate concept to apply to a discussion of the EU. However, Mairs opposes that the EU has, at least to a certain extent, moved beyond popular democracy and created new forms of decision-making which are now more legitimate for European citizens than popular democracy.

Other approaches consider that democratic legitimacy is not only possible, but necessary for the EU. Advocates of these approaches support the establishment of competitive politics within the EU. Hix, ForesdaH, Lord and Mark Franklin, among others, claim that right-left competition within the EU could increase political legitimacy, particularly inside the European Parliament. According to the advocates of competition, European leaders should lay the basis for real European elections, with real candidates and different agendas. A European party system, with European parties, competing around European rather than national issues should emerge from the clash of ideologies party programs. Left-right competition could also be positive within the Commission, as the latter could be elected for a specific period, with a clear agenda open to critique and review.

The various European parties should position themselves and their agendas in a clearly identifiable way for citizens. Left-right competition could thus be both desirable and necessary to bring about open democracy and greater public scrutiny of the negotiations that take place within the Council and the Council of Ministers. Finally, deliberative democracy is desirable but not easily obtainable at EU level There is a continuing need to develop a European Public Sphere containing a European media and European NGOs. European governance should be based on public deliberation, with evidence based arguments used to convince electors to support various policies and programs for the general population of Europe as a whole.

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