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Abstract
This dissertation analyzes the political logic behind land institutions and land use and regulation behaviors in China. More specifically, it seeks to address two research questions: first, why does the Chinese government respond to the prevalent land disputes in the country with increasingly centralized administrative control instead of the widely-demanded marketization reform, and second, why do the government's regulatory efforts persistently fail to effectively contain illegal land use practices? To answer these questions, I put forward a theoretical framework that highlights the central role played by informal institutions and political practices within China's single-party political system. The theory argues that land constitutes a key source of patronage and rents essential for elite political stability, and observed land institutions and land use practices reflect CCP leaders' political concern of co-opting important political actors within the regime in exchange for their loyalty. The chapters of the dissertation design empirical tests of three observable implications derived from this framework. The first chapter explores the political origin of land institutions adopted in China, with a focus on the distributive effects of the centralized land administration system. The second chapter evaluates the impact of political-business connections on the enforcement of land regulations. Finally, the third chapter analyzes how local officials' informal political networks affect their land use behaviors. Put together, these empirical chapters suggest that informal institutions play a key role in the formulation and enforcement of land institutions and policies. The findings of this research have important implications for political development and the prospects of land institution reforms in China.
