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I. Introduction
The subject of this essay is the moral value of anger. One of the main obstacles to thinking clearly about the morality of anger is that we tend to have two competing intuitions: we think that the effects of anger-for both self and others-are often bad, destroying both our relationships and our peace of mind, and that the expression of anger in response to injustice can be good or even required. It may seem that there is an easy solution to this obstacle: anger is usually bad except when directed at actual wrongdoing or injustice, in which case anger is good or even required, but at the very least permissible.
But this solution is too quick. First of all, it fails to take into account the fact that human beings form emotional habits-in this case, angry dispositions-that can greatly alter our view of what counts as a wrongdoing and our susceptibility to being (or at least feeling) wronged. It is unfortunately not uncommon to feel angry, perhaps from habit, and then to seek out an opportunity to be wronged by, say, picking a fight. Second, the quick solution fails to account for the fact that even when anger is directed toward actual wrongdoing or injustice, it may nevertheless not be good. This could be because, given the circumstances, the wrongdoer should really be forgiven, the anger is not morally efficacious, or the anger, while accurately tracking an injustice, has the effect of corroding the moral character of the one who feels it.
The tension caused by these competing intuitions has long been noted in Western philosophical works on anger. Stoics have argued for the elimination of anger on the grounds that it is irrational and destructive; yet, some, such as Seneca, are surprisingly sensitive to the worry that the complete eradication of anger may have deleterious effects on the public moral order. Aristotelians argue that proper anger is a virtue; yet, even Aristotle claims in the Nicomachean Ethics that the virtuous person tends toward sympathetic judgment (NE 1126a1-5). In this ancient discussion we see our competing intuitions refined into more substantive philosophical claims: Seneca urges us to "cherish the qualities that make us human," a moral accomplishment that he, somewhat begrudgingly, claims can...