GULF CRISIS AND WAR REPARATIONS PROCESS

Abstract

The current paper is a research on the very special case of 1991 Gulf crisis and the following process through which UN imposed a structured and institutionalised compensation payment mechanism, on a war reparation logical basis. What makes the Iraqi case so special is an unprecedented UN involvement and surveillance regarding transitional justice, as well as political motivation of international actors, that use this system to control the Iraqi economy and influence its military, political and economical potential.

Headnote

The current paper is a research on the very special case of 1991 Gulf crisis and the following process through which UN imposed a structured and institutionalised compensation payment mechanism, on a war reparation logical basis. What makes the Iraqi case so special is an unprecedented UN involvement and surveillance regarding transitional justice, as well as political motivation of international actors, that use this system to control the Iraqi economy and influence its military, political and economical potential.

Keywords: war reparations, Gulf crisis, Saddam regime, transitional justice.

1. War reparations concept

"War reparations" thematic is part of the larger domain "reparations", an essential element of of "transitional justice" processes. It refers to various cases in which balancing of abuses and violence produced in conflict period is considered, be it from state or non-state actors. As a consequence, whenever "transitional justice" procedures are implied, "reparations" are considered a central topic, for they consider victims' situation, human factor and a compensatory moral component. Not only do reparations try to compensate losses, human and material, but they also contain a symbolic conscience component in that wrongful agent admits and recognises reprehensible actions. The objective of balancing compensation is to finally rebuild a space for dialogue, trust and respect towards moral and juridical values and norms between actors involved in a transitional justice process. The perpetuated injustice in considered cases, such as violent actions, conflicts, human rights violations must be anathematized through an almost psychoanalytic process, but which should have real and explicit forms, meaning those of establishment of mechanisms and reparation processes for victims.

Therefore, transitional justice process is utilised to revert to normality in post-war and post-crisis situations, integrated in the larger context of socio-political and economic recovery that offers a real normative and functional basis to start it. Obviously, transitional justice and reparations phenomenology is extremely varied, the most classic cases being those of civil wars and conflicts or autocratic regimes. Concerning reparation forms, especially the ones formalised in international law and implying the existence of national and international institutional mechanisms for their de facto implementation, there are three categories according to Lisa Magarrell: a) reparations through administrative programs; b) material and symbolic benefits; c) collective and individual reparations1.

The term "war reparations" refers to compensations received by states, organisations, public or private institutions, persons, after an aggressive and guilty state has been defeated. From the legal point of view, they are justified by establishing an action (war, conflict, invasion, aggression), illegitimate from the perspective of international law. Financial compensation is seen as a justice form, beyond classic geopolitical settlement regarding disputed territories. It is very often imposed during peace treaties, like in the case of Germany after World War One, where important compensations had to be paid.

As for the Gulf conflict, it is to be established if post-conflict situation follows the same logic of a post-war settlement stated through a conventional treaty that legitimates regional order. As many analysts conclude2, UN Resolution no. 687 from April 1991, establishing end of hostilities and war obligations and reparations Iraq had to assume can be considered the equivalent of a classical peace treaty, formalising legally a new regional and international order, peace between parties and conditioned re-admission of Iraq in the international community. As a consequence, Resolution 687 will be referenced during the research, as it is the normative reference regarding war reparations and compensations issue, in post-conflict situation.

From international law point of view, post-conflict reparations were adopted through "Law of the Hague", in 1907, which states that "responsibility for any wrongful act committed in violation of the Regulations by members of the armed forces must be incumbent upon the Governments they serve (...) A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces"3. Analysing their juridical directions and application ways, Emanuela-Chiara Gillard considers that war reparations come in three forms: Restitution, Compensation and Satisfaction4, that are mentioned as well in Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.

Accordingly, Restitution aims at reverting back to the situation before illegitimate actions: liberty, equal rights, property and house, familial and societal status etc. Under this category, there are situations in which recovery is not possible to the full value before conflict; it constitutes however a fundamental presupposition of any war reparations action.

It is sometimes complemented with Compensation, a financial assignment from the aggressor meant to cover the losses produced through its actions: "Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as: (a) physical or mental harms, (b) lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits, (c) material damages and loss of earnings, (d) moral damage, (e) costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social services"5.

Concerning Satisfaction, to the material component is added a moral one, addressed to a person or state; it can take the form of Official Apologies, recognition of unjust character of actions performed by aggressor and even punishing guilty officials.

Last but not least, Guarantees of non-repetition are also considered. On this basis, war reparations are analysed in the context of Gulf crisis and subsequent UN decisions obligating Iraq to remuneration.

2. The Gulf crisis and conflict

Occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 was primarily a result of the Iraqi-Iranian war, but also of changes at international relations level, produced by collapse of the Communist bloc and disappearance of Cold War6. Its main causes are described in next sub-chapters.

2.1. Economic motivations

The central issue of Iraq after war with Iran - on which depended both its internal stability and regional position, was the necessity to solve the economic situation. Eight years of conflict have caused the downfall of Iraqi economy and an external debt of 80 billion dollars, from which 40 towards to the Arab countries, especially Gulf monarchies. It is a dramatic change of Iraq's status, as in the 70s it was one of the major creditor countries not only in its region, but also internationally, and now it is transformed into a borrower. In the middle of the eighth decade, oil crisis resulted in decrease of Iraq's revenue, three times. To this were added the difficulties of war with Iran: inflation, increased military spending, destruction of economic and civilian infrastructure due to Iranian offensives, increasing dependence on imports of food and raw material resources, closing the pipe-line passing the Syrian territory - which affected the export of petroleum products on the Northern path, to the extent that South was witnessing a military conflict. Between 1980 and 1985, military expenditures were $ 94 billion, losses of oil revenues estimated at $ 55.5 billion, losses of gross national product estimated at 26.2 billion; synthesized, all of them meant annual 87% of the Iraqi GDP7. In total, it is estimated that the war with Iran costed Iraq 452 billion dollars. After the end of hostilities with Iran in 1988, Iraq inaugurated an intensive restoration process of the state and civilian infrastructure, seriously affected during the conflict; but this required massive investments, which the country wasn't able to finance out of its own resources, while international creditors, Arabs in the first place, were demanding return of their debts. Army demobilisation, that numbered now around 1 million soldiers, was also a problem for the Iraqi decision-makers, as long as it required social and professional reintegration policies. Yet, after the end of war with Iran, Iraq had asked from OPEC countries an increase in the oil price to facilitate a post-conflict recovery of its country but, on the contrary, it decreased, because the Arab countries and Iran were not interested to decrease production. It is about a radical break between two petroleum strategies inside OPEC, illustrated by Iraq and Kuwait: this duality will contribute in a decisive manner to increase conflictual climate between the two countries in the coming months, preceding the Kuwait invasion. States like Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, but especially Saudi Arabia were in favour of policy based on massive exports, in search for a fast foreign exchange, at the expense of a strategy that focuses on a moderated controlled production, in order to maintain a high price of oil.

The effect is visible in first part of the year 1990, when barrel price switches from 18,84 $ in December 1989, to only 14,02 $ in June 1990. Kuwait is one of the main responsibles for this drop in price, for it throws on the market large quantities of petroleum, in an act of disobedience to its quota laid down in OPEC: with more than 1 million barrels per day above limits imposed by the organisation. Considering that maximalist export policy directly affects his own financial interests and politics for the restoration of Iraq, Saddam Hussein started to interpret step by step strategies of partners from the Gulf as a personal insult and even as elements of an economic war against Iraq, backed by the United States or Israel. Keeping in mind the problems with extraction capacity, processing and distribution of petroleum of Iraq, that were being affected partially by war, and the transit restrictions imposed by Syria, or the difficulties posed by Kurdish resistance in the north, it was perfectly understandable that Baghdad desired to give priority to a higher price rather than to quantity. Considering the background of Gulf countries refusal to moderate or renounce petroleum policy, the Iraqi leader begins more and more to put pressure and threats, together with an attempt to build a field of regional sympathy around Iraq's difficulties.

The solidarity conjuncture with the GCC during war with Iran was outdated already and Bagdad propaganda resumes old slogans relating to the decadence of emirs and power holders in the Middle East, seen as traitors of the Arab cause and agents of Westerns and Zionists. Already in February 1990, during the Summit of Arab Cooperation Council, Iraq has expressed for the first time explicitly its request to the Gulf Arab Emirates not only to delete the loan but even provide a reward of 10 billion dollars, as support for defending the "Arab nation"8. During the Arab League Summit in May 1990, held in Baghdad, Iraq reiterates its request to "petroleum" emirates, arguing that it is motivated by massive economic crisis of the country, resulting from OPEC's refusal to increase oil prices. For Saddam, the decrease of 1 dollar per barrel was equivalent to an annual loss of 1 billion dollars for Iraq; he suggests $ 25 per barrel as a new right reference price. More than that however, it is for the first time when Iraqi leader suggests that a continuation of the petroleum policies by Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia, that were affecting in a disastrous way their country - is equivalent to a conventional war. In July 1990, Saddam Hussein accuses the emirate to have extracted illicitly Iraqi oil from Rumeilah field, which is located in the "neutral area" between the two countries and asks for damages of 2.4 billion dollars, starting already to bring first troops at the border. Kuwait refuses to give the amount requested as well as to cancel the debts of Iraq to emirate($ 10 billion) and being afraid of an Iraqi military intervention, asked for international and Arab help. But all attempts to resolve the dispute that followed did not have positive results: nor could Saddam be persuaded to give up his requirements, neither proved Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabbah to be more flexible.

2.2. Geopolitical imperatives

From a geopolitical point of view, Iraq's action pursued both increasing hydrocarbon resources and achieving an older desideratum to have full access to Persian Gulf. One of major geopolitical obsessions of Baghdad was to broaden its access to the Gulf waters. With the exception of little Umm Qasr harbour, which is located effectively on Gulf's seaside, the Iraqi transport and inland navigation are carried out through Basra harbour, which is located on Chatt el-Arab, 70 km away from the Gulf waters. This is forcing Iraq to export a large part of its petroleum by land, through pipelines that convey neighbours often hostile (in 1982 the pipes passing through Syria to the Mediterranean are closed, being diverted to Turkey). The insurmountable problem for Iraq is that the islands Warba and Boubyane, where channel Shatt el-Arab flows into the sea, belong to Kuwait, blocking the opportunity for achieving a goal of an Iraqi heavy navigation to the Gulf waters and also extending Kuwaiti maritime boundaries for oil exploitation.

2.3. Ideological motivations

Finally, 1990 crisis is the consequence of pan-Arab Ba'athist vision's persistence and especially of Saddam Hussein's regional ambitions. Recognising opportunities offered by the fact that Soviet influence in the Middle East was weakening9, feeling that the main effect of latter was the stepping up of American military presence in the region, Iraqi leader is coming back to the old project promoted by Nasser, namely the creation of a strictly Arab new regional order, obviously with Iraq holding the hegemonic role, in particular due to its military supremacy10. Reiteration of an intense anti-imperialist and Arabic rhetoric had as main effect winning more supporters from the Iraqi population, that see in Saddam's mobilisation a sign of promoting national interests; this propaganda with double dimension, nationalist and Islamic-revolutionary, will find a strong receptivity, especially among young disadvantaged population from the Arab countries, in particular in Palestinian territory and Maghreb.

After February 1990, Baghdad starts a virulent anti-American and anti-Zionist campaign, caused in particular by Saddam's suspicions, believing that there is a Western plot used against him. To justify his lack of availability to pay debts toward his creditors, mostly Arabs, Saddam resumes old speech, which is portraying his country as protector of the "Eastern flank of the Arab World" against the Iranian and Shi'a threats and pretends to have cancelled his country's obligations towards Gulf states, explaining that Iraq has been affected directly a long period by the war against Iran11. In fact, the Iraqi President's intention to occupy the neighbouring emirate has been encouraged at the beginning by the ambiguous attitude of some USA officials12. The Kuwait invasion was based on hope, made possible by these ambiguous signals that the United States will not intervene in the case of occupying the little emirate. However, at the end of Iran-Iraq war, American strategy towards Iraq was going to change. Washington backed intensively Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq conflict, as long as this strategy served its own interests in the region, i.e. locking Iranian policy to destabilise the Gulf region. Now, with an Iran re-centred on national dimension, with changed Russian strategies after the end of Cold War in Arab World, American policy in the Middle East has chosen to increase its hegemonic positions that Iraq claims, more and more and in which it is substituting itself to Iran as the main power that threats the status quo in Gulf region and security of Gulf monarchies. There are three major factors that have produced a cooling of US relations with Iraq: continuous production and build-up mass destruction weapons, the inability of American governments to effectively control Saddam, despite the financial military and political support which they have offered during the whole period of war with Iran, the increasing demand of Baghdad for the Western capital, even the insolvency of the regime, which raises questions on the possibilities and effective means with which the Iraqi regime would have re-coursed to pay back. To these are added an increasing criticism of the Jewish lobby in America, particularly in Congress, who accuses Iraq that they are using Western funds to increase the arming program13.

On the other hand, political culture of Saddam Hussein, despite his long experience in leadership, was deeply rooted in regional specificities and he foresaw the wrong action limits that the international community was prepared to accept from a second-hand actor, as Iraq was perceived. The decision to invade Kuwait was par excellence the idea of Saddam Hussein's regime and a circle of close collaborators from the Revolutionary Command Council, excluding major Iraqi military decision makers14. The invasion idea was based on misinterpretation of signals sent by American diplomacy and especially on the belief that Iraq being the largest military power in the region, it was unlikely that a pure Arabic alliance would be formed against it. The invasion from 2nd of August, 1990, which happened immediately after last failed discussions between the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait on the 1st of August, at Jiddah in Saudi Arabia, lead to the military occupation of the emirate and rapid take over Kuwait's administrative control.

Al Sabah, the regal family fled to Saudi Arabia, and on August 8th, Saddam Hussein announced that Kuwait becomes "nineteenth province" of Iraq. Through this, Baghdad came to occupy second place in the world regarding petroleum reserves (19 %) and in terms of production (7 % ); in addition, the price per barrel will have doubled instantly, passing from 16 dollars in July to 30 in August and 40 dollars in September15. Occupation of the emirate and installing here a puppet regime, led by Ali Hasan al-Majid, a cousin and faithful collaborator of Saddam, had three immediate positive effects for Iraq: deleting any Iraqi debt to Kuwait, massively increase of the Iraqi oil capacities, which allowed development of projects for the recovery of damages occurring in the war against Iran and, finally, a significant part of its military personnel, was still left in activity. Iraqi military presence in the emirate and intention to integrate this little area in Iraqi state has been accompanied by political reprisals against the Kuwaiti civilian population (a few thousand persons arrested and other several hundred killed), especially on the background of popular tests of resistance. The confiscation of goods both from civilians as well as from Kuwaiti state institutions has been carried out on a large scale; this being not only the expression of disparate excesses from Iraqi civilians and military forces, but especially the result of assumed strategies.

Kuwait was one of the richest countries in the region, which caused for decades its neighbor's envy. Hundreds of thousands of Arab and Asian workers were permitted to leave the country, passing through Iraq and then in Jordan; instead, the larger part of the Palestinian population from the emirate, which was representing especially the educational, intellectual, industrial, engineering, elite, remained in the country. As a result of Saddam Hussein's policy and pro-Palestinian rhetoric, the Palestinians have had a positive position towards new Iraqi authorities and even collaborated with them, position that affected dramatically their destiny after liberation of Kuwait, when they have been expelled in full and their wealth confiscated. Iraq closed foreign embassies in Kuwait and sent officials in Baghdad by force.

Iraqi action determined an unprecedented international mobilization against it, hardly seen during the Cold War, marked in particular by the adoption of a common position joining both the United States and the Soviet Union. Already on August 2nd, the UN Security Council will adopt, in an emergency meeting, the Resolution 660 which required "the complete and unconditional withdrawal" of Iraqis. On August 6th, a new resolution (661) will impose rigorous trade sanctions into and out of Iraq, while the resolution 662 on August 9th will declare void the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq16.

At this point an extensive diplomatic process started, to which participated almost all great powers, including Arab and Asian countries, in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to Kuwaiti crisis. Since August 6th, 1990, the United States, which after the initial ambiguities, will adopt a determined and unequivocally attitude against the violations committed by Iraq, will persuade King Fahd that the threat from Iraq may be extended including to Saudi Arabia petroleum areas and shows its willingness to send troops in the Saudi kingdom to block a possible Iraqi invasion.

On August 10th, in Cairo, twelve Arabic leaders take the decision to send a pan-Arab force in Saudi Arabia; in its turn, the UN Security Council adopted on November 29th resolution 678 which authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures against Iraq if it does not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15th,1991. Saddam Hussein's refusal to leave unconditionally Kuwait has led to the implementation of resolution 678, first by bombing Iraqi targets on January 17th, 1991, that caused large human losses among civilian population. On February 24th, land offensive in Kuwait started, initiated by international coalition and led by the United States, that after three days, on February 27th, would lead to liberation of Kuwait and issue of a cease-fire agreement with Iraq.

3. Regional and international consequences of the Gulf crisis

Political, economic, human consequences of the Gulf War have been disastrous, for Iraq in the first place, then for Kuwait and the entire region. Over 100,000 civilians and military troops have been killed between August 1990 and February 1991 and more than 300,000 were injured. 2.5 million people have been displaced, either intentionally or voluntarily in the two countries. At the level of damage, Iraq has suffered direct losses and destruction estimated at 170 billion dollars, which have increased a more dramatic economic situation and, at the same time, condition of civil population. In his turn, Kuwait has suffered damages estimated at 60 billion dollars, representing ealth, resources, state and the civilians that have been seized or stolen by Iraqis, petroleum resources directed to Iraq, as well as destruction in the conflict from January and February 1991. Here is also included the sabotage of 700 oil wells, torched by Iraqi forces during withdrawal and which has produced serious environmental consequences, requiring intervention of international community. According to estimates made by American Congress, the United States (whose military troops and auxiliary represented 74% of the total international coalition forces) have been involved in the management of crisis and conflict at a level of over 61 billion dollars but from which, however, most part was provided by other countries. In the first place, 36 billion were provided by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other states in the Gulf, while Japan and Germany have provided, in their turn, 16 billion dollars.

At the economic and social level, conflict has affected in an important manner foreign labour force from Kuwait and Iraq, and therefore, in correlation, situation of the states from which workers came. 200,000 Palestinians have been expelled from the emirate, after release, including those who had resident status and lived for tens of years there; their fortunes have been fully seized by the state. There are also 150,000 Egyptians, and 600,000 Asians (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) to be considered. In the case of Iraq, situation was also serious, because they have been forced to dismiss 350,000 Egyptians, came here in previous years in order to work in agriculture, providing that an important part of male population of Iraq was away on the battlefield. Egypt is the main supporter of Arab anti-Saddam offensive, therefore Iraqi government has decided to expel them. All the same, approach and support for Iraq by Yemen, in moment of crisis, has led to cooling relations with Saudi Arabia: 700,000 Yemeni workers from the Kingdom were dispatched in the second half of 1990. All these have affected financial resources and income of states which they came from, in the years that followed: only population of Bangladesh has lost over 1.4 billion dollars through deposits seized or remained in Kuwait, in addition to that it has ceased the sending process of foreign currency toward metropolis. Jordan, which has been the sole Arab neighbour of Iraq and has tried to maintain a neutral position, was among the most affected. The Kingdom lost petroleum received at preferential price from Iraq, the position of transit space (Aqaba) for a large part of the products that were brought to Iraq, more than 500 million dollars received from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as well as banned commercial relations with the states in the Gulf. Turkey has limited drastically commercial relations with Iraq, especially in agricultural products and closing pipeline in the moment of crisis affected its own supply with Iraqi petrol. Already in March 1991, a report drawn up by Overseas Development Institute offered a statistics on losses suffered by developing countries up to that time (e.g. Yemen - 830 million dollars, Pakistan - 855 million dollars, Jordan - 1.77 billion dollars, Turkey - 3.46 billion dollars, Egypt - 985 million dollars, Morocco - 410 million dollars, etc., in total, 12.1 billion dollars)17. In subsequent years, these figures will increase, contributing to persistence of economic unbalance at international level generated by the crisis of 1990-1991.

4. Legal and institutional mechanisms of War Reparations process

This is the general context on which Gulf conflict was projected; the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq has had not only major political consequences but also economic; it affected the whole international field to a significant extent, exactly in an overall context marked by disappearance of the communist bloc and by geopolitical and geoeconomical repositioning of Central and Eastern European states and those from the Middle East and NorthAfrica. Regardless the very complicated and questionable complex of factors that led to invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, which has, as we have shown, the origin in very complex realities of Gulf regional relations from postcolonial period, the action of Baghdad has been unanimously considered by international community, but firstly by the UN, as an act of aggression.

The question of damages caused by the Iraqi action, in the first place in Kuwait, the country directly affected, and then in other states and third party entities, has been discussed and formalized from the very first legal positions taken by the UN, in the moments immediately following invasion. Resolutions 665, 667 and 670, in 1990, stated that Iraq is guilty of "unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private property, environmental damages and other human violations, and therefore, violating international law, including human right law, humanitarian law and diplomatic immunities". But the most important has been Resolution 687 of the UNSC from 3rd April 1991, which certified the end of hostilities between Iraq and international coalition and imposed mainly four restrictions and obligations to Iraq: identification and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, final settlement of the relations with Kuwait - the boundaries establishment and official recognition of emirate's sovereignty, releasing Kuwaiti and other nationalities citizens still jailed on the Iraqi territory and finally, regulation of financial obligations between Iraq and the institutional mechanisms by which they should be implemented. In the years that followed, from the imposed conditions, Iraq complied with only the recognition of Kuwait as a state, and this especially under the international community pressure, in November 1994. As for the problem of war reparations, text of the resolution said, "Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to August 2nd, 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as the results of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait"18. Still, in the same resolution, paragraph 18, the United Nations decided to create a special fund and a commission that will be in charge of managing compensation process on behalf of Kuwait to Iraq: United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC)19.

The Commission has been constituted and has acted/acts as a body depending directly on the UN Security Council; in the forthcoming period, its role and legislative framework and operation have been covered by other Security Council resolutions, 692 (1991), 986 (1995) or 1483 (2003). Role of the Commission has been/ is to manage war reparations processes and payment of compensation for the losses and damages suffered by individuals, governments, companies, international organizations; it worked not as a court but rather effectively as an administrative structure. It consists primarily of a Governing Council, formed by all members of the UN Security Council - and plays the role of coordinating actual activities of the Commission. In the first phase, after setting up the Commission and the Governing Council, a set of commissioners was installed, who worked in panels, with the function to make recommendations and verify the amounts of the required compensation. Another structure was/is the Secretariat, composed of an Executive Secretariat and a set of juridical consultants, collecting and checking the massive number of complaints submitted to the Commission. Finally, there was a fund as such, responsible for compensation payments.

The Commission has established five major categories of claims in respect to which it has ordered payment of compensation, from individuals to governments and international organizations20.

First-class (A) includes applications for individuals who had no choice but to leave Kuwait and Iraq between the invasion time and conclusion of the conflict; the amounts to be awarded by the Council have been established between 2,500 dollars per person and 5,000 per family. Applications had to be submitted by national governments of those affected, and they had to be done within certain conditions: presentation of evidence that they have been harmed and that they are due to Iraq's action, etc.

The second category (B) included complaints from individuals who have suffered, they or their family members, serious personal injury; for these cases the compensation has been established for 2,500 dollars per person and 10,000 per family.

The third category (C) comprised complaints from individuals, divided in 21 major categories, relating to different types of damages such as: physical, mental, economic, real estate, for those from Kuwait and Iraq: the sums granted might be up to 100,000 dollars. Managed by commissioners, the war reparations process has been often very difficult, for there were uncertain or insufficient proves.

A fourth category (D) comprised individuals that are in the same situation as the ones in C, but they had asked for compensation over 100,000 US dollars - from the point of view of formalities, they were the same as in C.

Another category (E) included complaints from legal companies state or private owned, affected by crisis and then by the conflict (in construction, services, petroleum industry); a difference was made between the Kuwaiti and the foreign ones.

Finally, a last category (F), comprised the complaints and requests from governments and international organizations, divided into four subcategories: F1 - complaint regarding evacuation expenses, lost property; F2 - complaint only for Saudi Arabia and Jordan, F3 - complaints from Kuwaitis; F4 - complaints relating to damage to the environment and the current state of the environment. Due to a massive number of applications, in particular for categories A and B, the Commission has used a series of additional ways for checking the information; in order to facilitate settlement of cases, to a large extent the dossiers were quite quickly executed and the amounts for compensation awarded. Situations were more complicated in the last category, where large amounts and governments were involved, and big companies took a more accurate analysis of each individual case.

In a concrete manner, the process of war reparation has beenestablished throughResolution 687, at paragraph 19: "directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present Resolution, recommendations for the full load to meet the requirement for payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a program to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16,17 and 18 above, including: administration of the full load; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed the figure to be suggested - Allow drive to The Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the economy help; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the full load; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, yield mapping claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above". Therefore, in accordance with these rules, the Security Council has delegated the compensation Commission, in its Resolution 705 of August 1991, the task to retain 30 % of oil revenues of Iraq, designated to serve as a financial source for the actions for compensation (they have been reduced to 25% in 2000 and, after 2003, had fallen to 5 %). The remaining 70% of petroleum revenues have been designated to be managed by the UN, within the framework of program "oil for food", the same principle, i.e. entry of funds from the sale of petroleum to an account of the United Nations, who assume the task of establishing products and their purchase, in order to be used by Iraqi civilian population. Immediate application of such rules of the United Nations was blocked by Saddam Hussein, which in the early years refused to accept decisions of international community which, in its Resolution 706, in August 1991, claimed that Iraq has the right to sell oil only worth 1.6 billion every half a year with a deposit of all these revenues into a fund managed by the United Nations. It was only in April 1995 when a compromise was reached, with the resolution 986 of the Security Council, which established the program Oil-for-food, that authorise sale of petroleum 1 billion per quarter - from this moment 30% of the revenue were intended, through UNCC, for applications of compensation payments. As more analysts find21, this is the first time when the UN Security Council would lay the foundations for a system of compensation, based on creation of a payments fund for compensation, managed by the UN and supplied through oil revenues of Iraq. UNCC has started to operate in 1991: a total of 2.686.131 complaints have been filed with the total sum of more than 350 billion dollars but from which only 52 billion has been established as amount to be paid from Iraqi oil revenues. The UNCC privileged, from the very beginning, applications from individuals, according to a logic of a justice system based on humanistic principles, leaving the situation of companies and governments in secondary frame. Iraq has paid, over the years, during the period of Saddam and after, on average about one billion every six months. Up to 2014, in accordance with UNCC site, compensations have been offered for 1.5 million applications, worth 46.7 billion dollars, out of which almost 12 billion for individuals. In a foreseeable way, official and private applications from Kuwait have been the most, equivalent of 37 billion of the total 52 billion. "What was left of the payment yet, worth 5.7 billion, represents the equivalent loss suffered by the Kuwaiti petroleum company. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, in 2003, on the background of deep economic and social crisis in Iraq, continuing in fact a tendency from previous years, there have been several initiatives, in the first place under the supervision of Paris Club, to cancel the Iraqi debts and especially its financial obligations in the process of war reparations. A large part of the States concerned have accepted their deletion or to find a new formula for compensation, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. On the other hand, Kuwait, which has received up to the present time more than 30 billion dollars, still continued to persist in the request for compensation, through citizens and various public and private entities, which, after Iraqi estimates, must be completed in 201522.

Conclusion

What the Gulf crisis has brought for the first time as a special element in comparison to previous situations is the Reparations issue under Compensation form, that was made structurally dependent on the Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression)23 and especially that the Security Council was directly involved in managing the process of compensation.

This is a situation that goes beyond the classic cases, in which the issue of Compensation and War Reparations is rather a bilateral agreement between aggressor and the aggressed country - to whom is made the payment of damages. In this case, the Security Council, through the special institution that was created for this case, the United Nations Compensation Commission, is not just the referee and supranational agent responsible for compliance and enforcement of agreements between actors in conflict but the authority, that is setting rules and their application in the War Reparations process. Furthermore, Iraq, even if it was the aggressor, had no role in negotiation but was forced to obey the decisions of the Security Council. Finally, and perhaps the most important and special in this case, was taking as a justification support the norms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, limiting the Iraqi sovereignty to the extent that the entire economy of Iraq passed under an international tute-lage. This overbid of the Security Council's role, in a visible distance to previous situations, was legitimated formally by the idea that Iraq has been guilty of international crimes, so the issue of regulating regional security and Compensation exceeds the classical situation of relations between the aggressor and aggressed, i.e., only Kuwait and Iraq. On the other hand, as it was visible from the very beginning after installation of the UNCC, this direct involvement policy of the Security Council, to control the economic and military realities of Iraq, was beyond the mere issue of compliance with international law and international order. This policy was also a result of international actors' intention, primarily the United States and Great Britain to rein Iraq, both in terms of military and resources potential. The ninth decade of the last century was characterised by an uninterrupted cooperation between the biggest companies and international privileged

oil exporters from the Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Therefore, maintaining a continuous tutelage, legitimised through post-conflict Compensation mechanisms established in 1991, was beyond the classical framework of a compensatory justice. On the contrary, as the years passed, the oil embargo and control of oil production, along with tight limits on the Iraqi imports led to aggravation of economical situation, that affected Iraqi population at all levels, the legitimacy of this process started to be questioned more and more.

The same doubts reappeared after 2003, with continuation of outstanding payments: the question was now to what extent a new regime and especially the civilian population was required to bear the consequences of actions taken by a former authoritarian regime. Justice shows in such cases its questionability, when judged in terms of humanitarian consequences and political systems that determine significant dynamics in the Middle East, not only destiny of states, but especially of people, very often first and most important victims both during war and peace time.

Footnote

1 Pablo de Greiff, "Justice and Reparations", in Pablo de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 451-477.

2 Lisa Magarrell, Reparations in Theory and Practice , International Center for Transitional Justice, pp. 3-7.

3 Bardo Fassbender, "Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: The Role and Functioning of the UN Security Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq", European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 237-303, http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/13/1/468.pdf

4 Apud Ameur Zemmali, "Reparations for victims of violations of international humanitarian law", in Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Maastricht, 1992, p. 65, http:// www.uu.nl/faculty/leg/nl/organisatie/departementen/ departementrechtsgeleerdheid/organisatie/onderdelen/ studieeninformatiecentrummensenrechten/publicaties/ simspecials/12/Documents/12-07.pdf

5 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, "Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law", International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 851, pp. 529 -553, https:// www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_851_gillard.pdf

6 Basic Principles and Guidlines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/ Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx

7 Walid Khalid, "The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1991, pp. 5-28.

8 Abbas Alnasrawi, "Oil Dimensions of the Gulf Crisis", in Ibrahim Ibrahim (coord.), The Gulf Crisis: background and consequences, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992, p. 49

9 Gresh Alain, Vidal Dominique, "Golfe: clefs pour une guerre annoncée", Le Monde, 1991, p. 202.

10 Ken Matthews, The Gulf Conflict and International Relations, Routledge, 1993, pp. 51-54.

11 Saint Prot, Saddam Hussein: un gaullisme arabe ?, Albin Michel, 1987.

12 Christine M. Helms, Iraq : Eastern Flank of the Arab World, Brookings Institution Press, 1984.

13 Judith Miller, Laurie Mylroie, op. cit. , p. 9.

14 Omar Ali, Crisis in the Arabian Gulf: An Independent Iraqi View, Praeger Publishers, 1993, p. 86.

15 Baram Amatzia, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Bagdad", in Amatzia Baram, Barry Rubin, Iraq's Road to War, St. Martin Press, 1993, pp. 5-36.

16 Robert Springborg, "The United Nations in the Gulf War", in Tareq Y. Ismael, Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.), The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East, pp. 40-51.

17 Overseas Development Institute, The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Developing Countries, Briefing Paper, March 19, 1991, http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/ publications-opinion-files/6770.pdf

18 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 687, Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on 3 April 1991, paragraph 16, http://www.un.org/depts/ unmovic/documents/687.pdf

19 http://www.uncc.ch/

20 Francis McGovern, "Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission", Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 171, pp. 171-193, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl e=2910&context=faculty_scholarship.

21 Monday Dickson, "Legal Issues in the United Nations Compensation Commission on Iraq", Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, Vol. 14, 2013, pp. 21-30.

22 AFP, "Iraq to finish Kuwait war reparations in 2015", Gulf News, May 31, 2013, http://gulfnews.com/news/ region/iraq/iraq-to-finish-kuwait-war-reparations-in-2015-1.1190919

23 http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7. shtml

References

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24. UN website, http://www.un.org/en/ documents/charter/chapter7.shtml United Nations official website accessed 15.09.2014.

Acknowledgement:

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title "Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security - Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - "SmartSPODAS"."