ON MAN'S ONTOLOGICAL INCAPABILITY TO FORGIVE

Abstract

Forgiveness is undoubtedly a topic that requires an inter and transdisciplinary approach, but whose understanding is closely related to revealing the human nature's mystery. The imperative of self-knowledge is essential to avoid a simplistic approach to forgiveness; therefore, based on texts research and ideational, cultural and historical contexts dedicated to this issue and on our own life experience, we propose an analysis of the inner trigger of forgiveness, a metaphysical perspective on this phenomenon, also considering the psychological, historical, moral and theological explanation of forgiveness. This article proposes a new paradigm of forgiveness, designed to draw a profound attention to the causes underlying our actions, clarifying somehow the relationship between forgiveness and happy oblivion.

Headnote

Abstract: Forgiveness is undoubtedly a topic that requires an inter and transdisciplinary approach, but whose understanding is closely related to revealing the human nature's mystery. The imperative of self-knowledge is essential to avoid a simplistic approach to forgiveness; therefore, based on texts research and ideational, cultural and historical contexts dedicated to this issue and on our own life experience, we propose an analysis of the inner trigger of forgiveness, a metaphysical perspective on this phenomenon, also considering the psychological, historical, moral and theological explanation of forgiveness. This article proposes a new paradigm of forgiveness, designed to draw a profound attention to the causes underlying our actions, clarifying somehow the relationship between forgiveness and happy oblivion.

Keywords: forgiveness, oblivion, memory, love, evil, injustice, man, Jesus.

Forgiveness is a topic of analysis and research, which has aroused the special interest of philosophers, theologians and psychologists. Reference works in this respect are those of Vladimir Jankelevitch1, Jacques Derrida2, Paul Ricoeur, some of which have also been translated into Romanian3. Moreover, in the specialized literature we can find numerous approaches showing a genuine phenomenology of forgiveness, from one perspective to another.4 "For some, forgiveness has these forward-looking benefits because of the way it transfigures the past. Emmanuel Levinas claims that "Forgiveness acts upon the past, somehow repeats the event, purifying it", a notion similar to Hannah Arendt's view that forgiveness alters the ethical significance of a wrongdoer's past by keeping it from having a permanent or fixed character (Guenther, 2006)5.

Naturally, the philosophical analysis of forgiveness gives rise to the following interrogations: What is forgiveness? What do we to forgive? Why do we forgive? How can we forgive? Where does forgiveness come from? How far can we go with forgiveness? Is forgiveness in our power? If yes, what is the faculty of the soul which supports us in forgiving?

On forgiveness as a way of salvation from evil

The implications of forgiveness in our lives are so multiple and diverse that we can talk about a variety of forms or types of forgiveness, starting with forgiveness regarded from the psychological point of view, to the social and community one. In other words, we would like to note and point out that no one is exempt from the pains caused by frustration, disillusionment, disappointment, grief, all kinds of concerns, of sufferings due to love, betrayal, etc. For instance, conflicts arise in couples, families, between divorced persons, between employers and employees, between friends, between neighbours and between nations. We all need to forgive and to be forgiven in certain moments, to restore peace and our relationships with the others in order to be able to live together. Therefore, we propose to muse on the semantics of this term, identifying its meanings and connotations, an imminent aspect for a research work that has in view a proper epistemic delimitation, in order to avoid confusions and ambiguities concerning the understanding and the way in which forgiveness can manifest itself.

The term "forgive" derives from to 'give' or to 'grant', as in 'to give up', or' cease to harbor (resentment, wrath). More specifically, "forgive" refers to the act of giving up a feeling, such as resentment, or a claim to requital or compensation. And the term "forgiveness" is defined as the action of forgiving, pardoning of a fault, remission of a debt, and similar responses to injury, wrongdoing, or obligation. In this sense of the term, forgiveness is a dyadic relation involving a wrongdoing and a wrongdoer's status by, for instance, acknowledging yet moving past a transgression. Though a dyadic relation, this general conception is not an account of forgiveness between two persons only, since it allows for forgiveness between individuals and groups, such as the forgiving of an individual's debt by a financial institution, or the commutation of a prison sentence by an act of official pardon. And forgiveness may occur between groups of people, as evidenced by intra-national restorative justice efforts and government commissions established to effect truth and reconciliation between perpetrators and victims of historical wrongs.6 The Oxford English Dictionary7 defines "forgivable", 'the first entry under the general term 'forgive', as that which may be forgiven, pardonable, excusable, referring thereby to the quality of deserving to be forgiven. This sense is illustrated in Jesus' appeal "God forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Luke 23:34), which suggests that ignorance is sometimes a condition that negates or tempers culpability, rendering wrongdoers forgivable. Notwithstanding the association with excusing conditions, forgiving is not, strictly speaking, equivalent to excusing. For wrongdoing that is excused entirely there is nothing to forgive, since wrongs that are fully excused are not blameworthy or culpable. And although excuses that mitigate, rather than negate culpability, may serve as a rationale for forgiveness, they are not the same as forgiveness. Moreover, the application of the concept of forgiveness to non-moral behavior, as in the case of forgivably poor musical performance by a pianist, shows that forgiveness is not always or necessarily a moral term8.

In order to research forgiveness in a problematic way, we consider it necessary to have a certain life experience, besides knowing how it was analyzed from different perspectives in the specialized literature. Therefore, we naturally ask ourselves the following question: are we entitled to conduct a research on a topic of an immense complexity and of a maximum ontological depth? Do we know ourselves well enough to afford to talk about forgiveness? How to explain the need for forgiveness when the injustice is monumental and ungrounded and it harms honor and human dignity? "To tolerate injustice, especially when it affects you or those close you, it is harder than to tolerate a lie or something extremely unpleasant"9. Doesn't forgiveness run the risk to become "an assault" on truth and on the truth itself? We find it necessary to resume this topic today because human moral decadence has reached unimaginable heights, evil proliferates all around us and behind forgiveness are actually hidden such hideous facts that they are hard to accept. The vital importance of forgiveness can be understood only by those who have realized that the most important thing in their lives is their relationship with those around them, and, more than this, the quality of this relationship. Only the one who truly loves, who suffers deeply longing for the beloved one, who rejoices seeing his friends, will be able to understand how necessary and beneficial forgiveness is for recovering a relationship which has been affected by our weaknesses or temptations coming from third parties or from a geniun malignum. Otherwise, the discussion about forgiveness would be unconvincing.

We speak about forgiveness only in relation to the error, the sin, the evil in general, in which each of us takes part consciously or unconsciously, voluntarily or involuntarily, to a greater or lesser extent. Otherwise, the theology of salvation couldn't be explained. All our history, the human being's destiny in the world proves that man is in a constant struggle with his own weaknesses: selfishness, pride, envy, lie, ignorance: "no man is evil willingly, but only out of ignorance10; a certain "outside greed" makes man live in the "oblivion of Being"11. The huge gap existing today between the evolution of human intellect and his moral decay is not accidental. More than two thousand years have passed since the Savior came and the world continues in bloodshed; humanity is experiencing pain, evil and suffering have increased. In the fight against the evil, man is often contaminated by it, without realizing the power evil has on him. Man who fights evil often finds himself caught in its traps, which will keep him captive forever12. What man thinks to be the fight against evil, for himself becomes the good itself. "The state is called to limit the manifestations of evil in the world, but the means it uses easily change into the evil itself, even morality has the ability to degenerate into its opposite, destroying the creative life of the spirit. The law, the customs, the ecclesiastical law can deform life. The obsession of evil and the need to fight against it, through coercion and violence, enslave the man to the sin and prevent him from freeing himself. The true spiritual hygiene does not consist in absorbing evil from world, but in focusing on the good, on the divine world, on the vision of light"13. The antinomy of evil can only be clarified through spiritual experience, which Dostoevsky understood in a remarkable way. The experience of evil, the disclosure of its nothingness, may lead us to the apogee of goodness. By living the evil, we can get full knowledge of truth and goodness. In fact, man, peoples and all mankind follow this path, experiencing the evil and thus getting to know the power of goodness, of the elevation of truth. Man learns the nothingness of evil and the greatness of goodness, neither through a formal law nor through prohibition, but through the experience lived on the path of life. Besides, the experimental spiritual path is the only way to knowledge. The Man and the world are undergoing a voluntary attempt through free knowledge and head freely to God, to His Kingdom.

Above of all, Christianity teaches us to be ruthless as to the evil which is inside us. But destroying it, we must be indulgent towards our peer, in other words we need to forgive. Firstly, I have to realize the strength and beauty of goodness inside me and not to impose on the others what I couldn't achieve, hard as I might have tried myself14. The evil can be overcome only innerly and spiritually. The victory obtained over it is linked to the mystery of Salvation; it can be gained only through Christ and through Christ. We defeat the evil only in communion with Christ, participating in his Work, taking upon us His Cross. Jesus is the symbol of love, and love is the first principle of all that was and will ever be15.

In order to remove the evil we must build our lives on love, not on vanity and selfishness. Through love man keeps his link with God whom he begs for leniency and forgiveness for his sins. God's forgiveness occurs only on the background of eliminating the evil from ourselves (purifying) and forgiving those who have caused us evil. At this level, forgiveness can be a way of salvation, by changing the evil into goodness.

2. People are seeking forgiveness but they are incapable to forgive

We live in a time when the quality of human relationships has decreased considerably and has diminished until the disappearance of its content. I fear that we are witnesses or spectators, if not the main characters or extras of an increasingly aneraste [deprived of love] world, more and more incapable of love, and therefore incapable of genuine forgiveness. Everything around us is a simulacrum. It is a world in which "God is dead"16. People are keen to be forgiven, but are not as willing to offer forgiveness. Most of them believe that forgiveness can be granted under certain conditions, while some facts should never be forgiven. Our permanent helplessness generates conflicts and tensions between people, between friends, between spouses, between parents and children, between neighbors, peers, bosses and their subordinates. There is no other way to overcome real and actually conflicts, tensions, quarrels except for forgiveness. Forgiveness is the one that removes everything. Bilateral agreements, peace treaties are merely conventions, proclaiming an exterior reconciliation but do not ensure it interiorly, which means that it does not eliminate the attitude of war, but only removes war. In interpersonal relationships, not having eliminated the warring attitude towards each other, any pact is vulnerable and may disappear at any moment. We support this point with the following: "Forgiveness, which is totally oblivious of any hidden thought, is likely to have never been granted on earth, it is likely that an infinitesimal dose of resentment still lasts in the remission of any insult; any disinterest hides, somewhere, in its depths, an imponderable calculation, a microscopic reason of one's own interest, a small imperceptible speculation that makes desperation be a theatrical disperato, and which is the impure consciousness of the guilty consciousness. From this point of view, forgiveness is an event that has never occurred in history, an act that has no place anywhere in space, a state of mind that does not exist in current psychology. And, yet, even if, let's say, the gesture of forgiveness would not be a feature of psychological experience, it should remain a duty"17. Jankelevitch summarized his own philosophy on forgiveness in his famous work, Le Pardon, published in 1967, which has also been translated into Romanian, as stated in the preamble of this article. From the text above, we can infer that Jankelevitch dealt with man's ontological incapability as a fact, asserting that no one has ever been capable of total forgiveness. And the lofty ethical expectations of forgiveness are opposed to it, so forgiveness is an imperative, not an indicative. It is very important for our research work to analyze if Jankelevitch is right and to find out which is the basis of such a vision of forgiveness. We consider it appropriate to present, even briefly, the three basic qualities of true forgiveness in Jankelevitch's opinion: this is an event that occurs at a certain point in time, irrespective of all legal points of view, this is the merciful gift of the victim for the perpetrator, and it is justified by the personal relationship between them. We concur with the author's position when he argues that true forgiveness, besides sacrifice, is the greatest gesture of love and cannot be left at the mercy of time and oblivion. If we leave it at the mercy of time, we come across the grotesque pattern of abolishing war crimes, according to which, what is one day an unforgivable sin, the next day will no longer be. Therefore, forgiveness must be instant and immediate, this necessity not being abolished either by the time spent in penitence by the perpetrator, or by the victim's oblivion, that quenches early anger and pain, but keeps the spark of resentment deep down in one's soul.

At the same time, forgiveness does not make sin inexistent, but, rather, according to Jankelevich, there is a difference between personal atrocities and crimes committed against a universal order. Jankelevich's philosophy of forgiveness did not arise out of nowhere, it is the prerogative of the existential drama he lived. The Second World War brought a huge disruption in his life. With Hebrew ancestry on both lines, he simultaneously overcame two invincible obstacles. Firstly, his own anger and compensatory instinct, and, secondly, the world's expectations, which require the rectification of balanced justice.

Analyzing comparatively Jankelevitch's and Derrida's texts, we note the fact that both authors' philosophy of forgiveness liaises rather to their own life circumstances, experienced by each of them, than to what is called convention, morality, faith. Due to the fact that Derrida did not experience the Holocaust, and his family avoided its horrors, his attitude is more distant and objective while addressing the topic; there are, of course, similarities between the two authors analyzed, when it is argued that forgiveness is offered to someone and not to something, it is conceived only in the contact between two persons, it overrides the limit of law, justice and institutions. According to his approach, Jankelevitch's statements make forgiveness problematic, or even impossible, because of two circumstances: if the author does not ask for forgiveness, even though he showed reverence, or if the crime committed is too serious, Jankelevitch refuses the forms of impure forgiveness, indulgence surrogates, appearing as substitutes for pure forgiveness and are expressed by the following expressions: iron tooth of time, acquitting by explaining the motivation, giving up. The first approach blames the erosion of time and memory for the decomposition of the block sin, which is the obstacle of each approach, the second search mitigating circumstances, the third means instant amnesia, choosing cheap pardon without facing facts and people, eradication of the sin with one instantaneous and non-reflective movement. He speaks about three reasons that mixed in the gesture of forgiveness, that make its purity questionable. In the first case, the victim forgives, because he/she leaves open the possibility that extenuating circumstances concerning the crime, which are still unknown, could be unraveled. The second type of impure forgiveness occurs when the one who forgives keeps his speculative hope that the perpetrator - just as a consequence of forgiveness - becomes another man. A grotesque type of this kind of forgiveness is the gesture of national reconciliation, like the German-French one. The third kind of forgiveness, whose purity can be spotted, is when honest, pure and spontaneous forgiveness subsequently seeks justifying arguments. According to Derrida's interpretation18, in Jankelevitch's opinion, Endlosung also means the end of history and of the historical possibility of forgiveness. Concerning the excerpt where Jankelevitch stated that forgiveness is not for those who are satisfied with the economic miracle, it is not for pigs and sows, because forgiveness died in the concentration camps, about this hard expression of aversion towards the Germans, Derrida said: it would have been better not to read these lines and this aversion is unjust and undignified for everything that Jankelevitch has written in other places about forgiveness. Derrida's critique on the tension between Jankelevitch's hyperbolic and everyday ethics (which Jankelevitch also admitted), the fact that this tension is sinful, and one that requires forgiveness, we consider it somehow fair. Yet, we can notice that this famous critic did not read Jankelevitch empathically, from the interior, but distantly, from the exterior.

Contemporary with Jankelevitch, P. Ricoeur dealt with forgiveness on multiple pages19, somehow formulating a response for the former: according to him, forgiveness is neither easy nor impossible, it is simply very difficult. Thus, Ricoeur says that love is able to leave behind everything, even what is unforgivable; forgiveness either refers to what is unpardonable too, or does not exist. He lists the sins in four categories: criminal, political, moral and metaphysical ones; he admits that being a sinner means that man can be punished, but refuses the disdain towards the perpetrator; the inability to address with respect towards the perpetrator is the imperfection of love. Even if forgiveness cannot be institutionalized, this culture of respect defines politics and the relationship among peoples - Ricoeur considered.

Jankelevitch's vehement question: Hasn't forgiveness been asked for? shows that forgiveness is much easier where the parties have acknowledged their own sins. Ricoeur is interested precisely in this dynamic of reciprocity. Ricoeur illustrates a relationship between gift and forgiveness. Both refer to an asymmetrical relationship. He agrees with Jankelevitch as to the fact that the maximum ethic is the love of the enemy which does not expect any reward. Jesus eliminated the rule of reciprocity in the Sermon on the Mount. In reality, forgiveness exceeds an interval between the top and bottom, between the High spirit of forgiveness and the gap of culpability. This dissymmetry is the constitutive element of the equation of forgiveness. It accompanies us as a mystery that we have never stopped researching20.

In this respect, forgiveness as a problem of moral philosophy is also exceptionally explored by Griswold who starts his work dedicated to this issue 21 with a historical discussion about forgiveness putting in antinomy the vision of the ancients and that of the moderns. Contrary to the traditional belief approved by thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, that forgiveness is exclusively Judeo-Christian as opposed to the pagan idea, Griswold argues that forgiveness and the notions related to it are indeed present in the Romanian and Greek thinking. However, classical as well as modern philosophers influenced by them, especially Nietzsche, did not look upon forgiveness as an authentic virtue. Griswold offers four reasons why we must start from the classical doctrines about perfectionism and human dignity: 1. virtuous people would be by definition morally perfect and would not need the others' forgiveness. In addition, they would probably be unforgiving to others, to the extent that (2) they would have no interest in overtaking in a sympathetic way the moral flaws of individuals lacking moral virtue; 3) they would consider themselves immune to the moral injuries of those lacking moral virtue and, last but not least, 4) due to a hierarchical system of values, they would not accept that those lacking virtue might claim mutual moral compensation or have an equal moral position, contrary to our modern ideal of human dignity. The author uses as an argument the case of Socrates who said in his Defence22: "Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way; he could not harm me, for I do not think it is permitted that a better man be harmed by a worse" idea that was later developed by more thinkers. The main idea underlying Griswold's analysis is his claim that "forgiveness comes with certain conditions or rules"23. More specifically, forgiveness involves a social dyadic relationship regulated by norms in which the offender and the victim are interdependent. In this way, we cannot talk about a victim just giving unconditional forgiveness to its wrongdoer, as a gift. Both parties would rather meet certain conditions to fit in what Griswold used to consider "paradigmatic" cases of forgiveness. The author considers "three basic conditions" that must be met to characterize forgiveness as genuine: 1. the victim's desire to reduce resentment; 2. the offender's readiness to take minimum corrective measures for forgiveness; 3. the damage must be humanly forgiven. He concludes: "only when all these three are met can we speak of forgiveness"24. The author warns us about the limits of forgiveness, speaking about unilateral, imperfect forgiveness, when there is no reciprocity in this relationship. Thus, he argues that until the offender takes steps to become worthy of forgiveness, forgiveness does not occur, even if the victim wants and chooses to forgive the wrongdoer. Unless both parties involved take the necessary measures with a view to a possible moral reconciliation - forgiveness moves away of the ideal one. It seems to be a basic conceptual confusion here. Even if forgiveness cannot be ideal, Griswold argues that forgiveness may be appropriate only in the private sphere of interpersonal relationships, as the public sphere requires something quite different, namely political apologies that are characterized precisely by the lack of connection with the feeling25 and that, different from forgiveness, do not claim to articulate the feelings and motivations of individuals" (151). All the viewpoints mentioned above illustrate the fact that forgiveness is not a simple act, that there is no universal recipe concerning forgiveness. There is an infallible model of forgiveness capability and this is given by Jesus, who gave masterly the "lesson of forgiveness through love". Man, in general, has the impression that he is capable of forgiveness and feeds on this illusion, maybe out of a personal selfishness but in reality he is resentful, envious, full of resentment and feeds their ego thinking revenge. This happens at the lowest level of human action, of mediocrity and cowardice of those who do not live in resonance with the Golden Rule (these are the most): I will not do to others what I would not like to be done to me, and I will do what I wish. True forgiveness also implies a negative judgement in the sense that someone has wronged you. A person who rarely, if ever, had no resentment or did not judge, then he rarely or never meets the necessary conditions for forgiveness26.

Forgiveness does not have to be a mere formality, accomplished to emanate a sense of moral superiority, but it requires a certain attitude of understanding and tolerance in relation to the subject of forgiveness.

We can speak about a moral and psychological benefit of forgiveness when any matter which is the subject of this relationship (supply and demand of forgiveness) is clarified through adequate communication in terms of honesty, fairness and respect from everyone involved. This level of interpersonal relationships is difficult to achieve, especially today, when in the world there is too much pride and forgiveness is seen as a manifestation of weakness and less as an evidence of kindness and love.

3. I want to forget in order to be able to forgive

We propose a new paradigm of forgiveness, which reverses the relationship between forgiveness and oblivion, invalidating thus the truth of the statement: "I forgive, but I don't forget you".27

The experience of forgiveness raises the man to another existential plan, detaching him from the concrete, mundane things, from everyday nothingness. Of course, we can talk about several comprehensive levels of forgiveness, caused by diverse and varied factors of psychological, cultural, historical, moral and metaphysical nature.

Each one of us, along our life, had to ask for forgiveness or provide forgiveness or we were forgiven, either by parents or by other people close to us: relatives, friends, acquaintances, for certain facts which we had committed, intentionally or not. Asking for forgiveness is the sign of recognition of our fault, of our repentance. But if we have the power and strength to forgive without being asked, it is even better. Only in this way we can reconcile ourselves, inside of us, with the other. And not only do I reconcile with the other within me, eliminating the tension accumulated in my soul, in my mind - maybe rightfully due to abuses, or errors, or injustices that we received from others - but my path is open to the other, it is cleansed of obstacles. I, with my soul and mind, I go leisurely towards the other, to meet him, which is very important. The attitude of forgiveness that comes unilaterally determines, according to the testimony of the Gospel of Christ the Saviour, the other to cast off the weapons of war. Forgiveness is the only and most effective way of reconciliation.28. Man through his essence is forgiveness29. The human being's strength to continue fighting is amazing, making him keep his soul unaltered, even when the circumstances make such action almost impossible. Where does the power to forgive come from?

In this respect, we bring into discussion philosophical concerns of reference for our analysis. If Paul Ricoeur argues that forgiveness is a "heavenly gift" and "love of enemies is the absolute measure of the gift30, the position we share, as far as the position adopted by Hannah Arendt is concerned, there is a significant distance leaving us to understand somehow that forgiveness does not come from any other faculty, possibly higher, but it is one of the virtualities of human action31. Regarding this aspect, Hannah Arendt uses the Gospel exegesis extremely favourable to his interpretation. These texts say that only if people change forgiveness, they can hope to be forgiven by God: the power to forgive is a human power.32 Thus, Arendt argues: "Only freeing each other from what they did, can people remain free agents"33. A fact confirmed, on the one hand, by the opposition between forgiveness and revenge, the two human ways to react to insult and, on the other hand, by the parallelism between forgiveness and punishment, both interrupting an endless series of evil facts. On this point, H. Arendt has some hesitations: "So, it is a very significant fact, a structural element of the field of human works, the fact that people are incapable of forgiving what they cannot punish and are unable to punish what proves unforgivable. This is the true mark of insults since Kant called them "radical evil" and about which we know so little, even we, the ones who have been subjected to one of their rare explosions in public. All we know is that we can neither punish nor forgive these offenses and that, consequently, they transcend the human work and the human potential power which both destroy radically wherever they make their appearance. So, when we the act itself deprives us of any power, all we can do is repeat together with Jesus: << It would be better for him if a millstone were hung around his neck and he were cast into the sea ... >>34. Hannah, argues Paul Ricoeur35, is aware of the fact that the relationship of forgiveness with love keeps it away from politics. Proof of the absurd is the failure, sometimes monstrous, of all attempts to institutionalize forgiveness. The French philosopher conjured up "the caricature of forgiveness which is amnesty", the institutional form of oblivion36. Appealing to Nietzsche's texts37, Paul Ricoeur, analyzing the symmetry between forgiveness and promise, brings to attention the Nietzschean approach on the relationship between memory and oblivion, that we consider useful in our analysis. Oblivion is not considered a mere inertia, but an "active positive braking capacity in the strictest sense of the word"..."the benefit of active oblivion consisting in the fact that it is a sort of concierge, a sort of preserver of spiritual order, of tranquility and etiquette"38. It is against such oblivion that the memory works, not any memory, not the memory which is a preserver of the past, a reminder of the past events, of the revolute past, but the memory that confers men the power to keep their promises, to maintain themselves: ontological memory, we would say, a memory that, regulating the future after having engaged the past, makes man be "predictable, well-ordered, necessary"- and thus able "to be responsible for his future"39. Paul Ricoeur's conception of memory and oblivion is a reference point for the current issue, but the French author's arguments are valued in terms of historical hermeneutics.40 The most irreducible reason of the dissymmetry between oblivion and memory as to forgiveness lies in the ineffable nature of the polarity that divides against itself the underground empire of oblivion: the polarity between oblivion by deleting and reserve oblivion. If the French author concludes that there cannot be happy oblivion, as we can dream of a happy memory, we believe that the two are complementary, not in antinomic relationship. It is true that oblivion is not a law of memory, meaning that we forget what we do not want to forget and keep in our memory's reservoir information that harms our soul.

Thus, the paradigm we propose is based on the premise that the education of memory is in our power. Therefore, man can take possession of his retrieval capacity. Only by loathing the evil, keeping in the intellect, in the memory, the noble aspects, repudiating rancor, resentments or guilt, only such an intellect can be enlightened by the divine grace. It is certain that forgiveness is the prerogative of an inner freedom conferred by achieving a state of peace of mind. This can be accomplished through self-knowledge, through reason and will, which acting jointly regulates the ontological memory.

Therefore, we propose a new paradigm of forgiveness: I WANT TO FORGET IN ORDER TO BE ABLE FORGIVE. This has as backing pillar the next argument: the gift of forgiveness can be received only based on a happy memory or happy oblivion. The happy memory is when the memory's reservoir is full of noble ideas, pure thoughts and happy oblivion occurs when you remove from the memory those issues that cause suffering. One can forget only by detesting the evil. This is where free will acts. If man uses properly the free will, he can then avoid the error, the sin, the evil. The climax of forgiveness is only God. The power to forgive comes only from God. It is a trans-human feeling. The lesson of forgiveness cannot be learned or acquired through knowledge, it can occur somehow through self-knowledge, through the psychoanalysis of the self. And self-knowledge is not a passive reflection, it is a fight that requires a synergistic action of intelligence, faith and will. "Forgiveness is a decision of the will, as victory over temptation: it remains however, like any decision, an initial and sudden, spontaneous event."41 At human level, in general, there is no total forgiveness for man is ambivalent: the combination of subjective/objective, sacred/profane, rational/irrational, entropy/ negentropy etc. This is the greatest difficulty that philosophical conceptions have faced in explaining man. Forgiveness is an Absolute or, in other words, the man capable of genuine forgiveness lives in Truth, being connected to a noumenal world of perfect order. The man who knows himself measures against the Absolute and can experience forgiveness through contemplation, the highest activity of the soul to which man can accede by nous "the most elevated part of man, the human being itself"42. What we speak about is disinterested forgiveness similar to disinterested love. We can meet it in the case of elevated spirits, who know that inner freedom results from renunciation. We consider it a proof of moral superiority when a man exposed to some unfair assaults which are hard to bear by a rational being, finds the strength to answer to any exterior enticement with an interior virtue.

This attitude does not diminish mistake, fault, or injustice of the one who committed it, but through pardon the wronged one remains with the soul equally indifferent regardless of the vicissitudes. It is essential for the man who has been subject to an ordeal to acquire spiritual progress, otherwise the great principle of the Leibnizian metaphysics, which in ontological formulation expresses the following idea: "nothing exists without a reason or sufficient reason"43, would be cancelled. Wanting the limited monad to accommodate as well as possible in terms of general harmony, Leibniz would accept to say: << To understand means to forgive >>. As Leibniz admits the necessary evil, and as this evil is a lesser evil, the sin is rather minimized than nihilized; or, if the negativity of evil is a smaller positivity, forgiveness risks, in turn, to be nothing but a smaller grudge. Someone's sin fits into the overall design of the universe, being, forever, an ingredient thereof; since the elements of the universal economy are linked, the singular mistake must be understood, like all other things, as part of a series. Leibniz does not say that sin is inexistent, but that sin does not discord with the overall picture; harmony of the universe is saved, but the sinner is left adrift.44 Less concerned with the beauty of the fresco, Spinoza proves much more humane to the individual. Comprehension involves not only communication with humanity, but also an inner transformation of the subject who understands; to understand means to make friends not only with people, but also with yourself; lucid knowledge is always the great sedative that drives away suffering. Thus, a philosophical attitude in front of existence requires a high level of understanding, awareness, which in metaphysical plane suspends any negative inclination of man. It is only at this level that we can speak about forgiveness as a proof of pure, absolute love, to which only the one who is really capable of authentic philosophy can accede. It is not by chance that Imm. Kant, one of the greatest humanistic philosophers, addresses man the request to use their native disposition towards goodness in order to be able to hope that "what is in not their power will be completed by a cooperation from above".45

Limits of Forgiveness

For a certain class of people, humiliated or offended, to pardon the offender or their perpetrator is extremely difficult: forgiving is an effort that must be continuously resumed; this trial is, in some cases, at the limit of our powers. Forgiveness, in the strict sense of the term, is actually a limit case. The temporal man, the finite creature, is not cut either for eternal suffering, or for immortal rancor: as such an unimaginable eternity would rather mean for us unbearable despair. Forgiveness does not require us to sacrifice our own being and nor to take the place of the sinner; forgiveness does not demand that much from us; it only requires, when it comes to an insult, to give up arguing, passionate aggression and revenge temptation; and when it comes to sin, it requires punishment, an eye for an eye, requital within the most legitimate exigencies of justice. Forgiveness is, after all, more disinterested than so desperately radical.46 Undoubtedly, a forgiving machine, a vending machine for grace and indulgences are only vaguely linked with true forgiveness. On the contrary, the gift of absolute disinterest is rather an ideal limit and inaccessible horizon we are approaching asymptotically without ever actually touching it. Or, in other words: the grace of forgiveness and selfless love is given to us for a moment and as an appearance which vanishes immediately, that is we find it and lose it at the same time. Whenever forgiveness is in the service of a goal, even a noble and spiritual one (redemption or salvation, reconciliation,), each time when it tends to re-establish a state of normality (social, national, political, psychological) through a labor of mourning, through a certain therapy or ecology of memory, every time "forgiveness" is not pure and neither is its concept. Forgiveness is not, it should not be either normal or normative, or normalizing. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, ready to pass the test of impossible: as if it disrupted the normal course of historical temporality.47

Footnote

1 Vladimir Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, Polirom Publishing House, Iasi, 1998.

2 Jacques Derrida, Faith and Knowledge. Century and Forgiveness, Paralela 45 Publishing House, 2003.

3 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgiveness, Amarcord Publishing House, Timis oara, 2001, p.5534-606.

4 Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration is a masterful treatment of a central issue in moral philosophy. Well-written, penetrating, and rich in details, this book discusses a number of related topics including interpersonal forgiveness, political apology, pardon, and civic reconciliation. It not only provides a broad historical survey of the views on forgiveness of many important philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Epicurus, Butler, Hume, Smith, Nietzsche, and Arendt, but also offers insightful analyses of related concepts including trust, narrative, sympathy and empathy, truth-telling, and moral luck. At the end of the day, even if one does not fully agree with all of Griswold's main theses - many of which, as we shall see, are quite controversial - there is still an extraordinary amount to be learned from this impressive account.

5 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosopher, Plato Stanford, edu/entries/forgiveness, First published Thu May 6, 2010; substantive revision Tue Dec 23, 2014.

6 Ibidem.

7 The Oxford English Dictionary, apud. Ibidem.

8 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History Forgiveness, Amarcord Publishing House, Timis oara, 2001.

9 Al. Surdu, On Existence, Being and Reality from the Perspective of Categorical Systematic Philosophy, in Studies on the History of Romanian Philosophy, vol. X, the Romanian Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014, p.14.

10 Platon "Dialogues", translated by Cezar Papacostea, Trei Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998.

11 Heidegger, Letter about Humanism, translated by De Thomas Kleininger and Gabriel Liiceanu, the Universe Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982, p.321-383.

12 Berdiaev, Freedom and the Spirit, Paideia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996, p.222.

13 Ibidem, p.223.

14 Ibidem, p. 227.

15 A. Frossard, Questions about God, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1992, p.131.

16 Fr.Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathrustra, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1966, p.363.

17 Vladimir Jankelevitch, cited works, translated by Laurentiu Zvicas, Forward by Valeriu Gherghel.

18 Derrida, Jacques, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, translated by Mark Dooley and Michel Hughes, New York: Routledge, 2001.

19 P. Ricoeur, cited works, 553-606.

20 Ibidem, p.584.

21 Charles L., Griswold, cited works, p.242.

22 Plato, The Apology of Socrates, Works, Dialogues, cited works, p.9-41.

23 Charles L. Griswold, cited works, p.47.

24 Ibidem. p.115.

25 Ibidem. p.140.

26 Wendell O'Bien How Not To Forgive, in Philosophy Now, a magazine ideas, Issue 91, 2015. Wendell O'Brien studied philosophy at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, and is now Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehead State University, Morehead, Kentucky.

27 Ileana Vulpescu, The Art of Conversation, Tempus Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.

28 Pr. Constantin Coman, God's Justice and People's Justice, Bizantina Printing House, Bucharest, 2010.

29 Ibidem.

30 P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Oblivion, Amarcord Publishing House, Timisoara, 2001, p.579.

31 Hannah Arendt, Condition de 'homme moderne, p.266, apud.P.Ricoeur, cited works, 589.

32 In Matei, 18,35, it is said: "My heavenly Father will also do the same to you, if each of you does not forgive his brother from your heart." And: "For if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you." But if you do not forgive men their trespasses, neither will your Father... (6,14-15) Luca, 17,3-4: "And if your brother sins against you seven times a day, and returns to you seven times, saying: << I am sorry >> you must forgive him".

33 Hannah Arendt, cited words. p. 270.

34 Hannah Arendt, cited works, p. 270. p.271, apud. Paul Ricoeur, op.cit., p.590.

35 Paul Ricoeur, cited works, p.591.

36 Ibidem.

37 Fr. Nietzsche, Works, vol.2, The Cheerful Science, On Genealogy of Morale, Twilight of the Idols, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1994, p.287-446.

38 Ibidem.

39 Giles Deleuze "Nietzsche et la Philosophie", Paris, PUF, coll. "Quadrige", 1962, 1998, apud. Paul Ricoeur, cited works, p. 591.

40 Paul Ricoeur, cited words, p.607.

41 Vladimir Jankelevitch, cited works, p.11.

42 Artistotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, the Scientific and Encyclopedic Printing House, Bucharest, 1988, p.17.

43 G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Works, I, translated by Constantin Floru, the Scientific Publishing House, Bucharest, 1972. p.42.

44 Georges Friedmann, Leibniz et Spinoza (1946), apud. Vladimir Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, Polirom Printing House, Iasi, 1998, p.88.

45 Imm. Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, translated by Gabriel Pârvu, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004.

46 Ibidem, p.89.

47 J.Derrida, cited works, p.93.

References

REFERENCES

Artistotle, (1988), The Nicomachean Ethics, Bucharest, the Scientific and Encyclopedic Printing House.

Berdiaev, Nikolai, (1996), Freedom and the Spirit, Bucharest, Paideia Publishing House.

Coman, Constantin, (2010), God's Justice and People's Justice, Bucharest, Bizantina Publishing House.

Derrida, Jacques, (2003), Faith and Knowledge. The Century and Forgiveness. Bucharest, Paralela 45 Publishing House.

Derrida, Jacques, (2001), On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Translated by Mark Dooley and Michel Hughes, New York: Routledge;

Frossard, Andre, (1992), Questions about God, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House.

Griswold, Charles L., (2007), Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, Cambridge University Press;

Heidegger, Martin, (1982,) Letter about Humanism, translated by De Thomas Kleininger and Gabriel Liiceanu, Bucharest, the Universe Publishing House.

Jankelevitch, Vladimir, (1998), Forgiveness, Polirom Publishing House, Iasi;

Kant, Imm., (2004), Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, translated by Gabriel Pârvu, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House.

Leibniz, G.W., (1972), Philosophical Works, I, translated by Constantin Floru, Bucharest, the Scientific Publishing House.

Nietzsche, Fr., (1996), So Spoke Zarathrustra, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House.

Plato, Dialogues, (1998), translated by De Cezar Papacostea, Bucharest, Trei Publishing House.

Ricoeur, Paul, (2001), Memory, History, Forgiveness, Timisoara, Amarcord Publishing House.

(2010), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosopher, Plato Stanford, edu/entries/forgiveness;

Surdu, Al., (2014), On Existence, Being and Reality from the Perspective of Categorical Systematic Philosophy, in Studies on the History of Romanian Philosophy, vol. X, Bucharest, the Romanian Academy Publishing House.

Vulpescu, Ileana, (2010), The Art of Conversation, Bucharest, Tempus Publishing House.

Wendell O'Bien, (2012), How Not To Forgive, in Philosophy Now, a Magazine ideas, Issue 91.