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Moral identity has received increased attention from psychologists who are interested in people's motivation to act morally (e.g., Blasi, 1983; Colby & Damon, 1993; Frimer & Walker, 2008; Hardy & Carlo, 2005, 2011a). This attention has led to an incredible array of theory and research on moral identity constructs recently appearing in the literature. The purpose of this article is to translate this new body of theory and research into general educational applications through the following: (1) an examination of the developmental progression and stability of 3 moral identity constructs, (2) an exploration of how moral identity might develop in different educational contexts through a review of existing research guided by a general principle derived from the 3 constructs, and (3) highlighting the relevance of the 3 constructs within these educational contexts. Although significant theoretical questions remain, this analysis and evaluation reveals that these constructs can inform effective approaches to moral education.
One long-standing purpose of psychological theories is to inform the improvement of education (Damon, 1997). Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) stipulated more specifically that theories of psychological development (specifically cognitive-developmental theories) should have education as their aim and provide the foundation of education. This psychologicaltheory-to-educational-practice relationship is the cornerstone of the current paper. Our aim is to examine recent, specific psychological constructs of moral identity and the educational implications that follow from them.
Psychologists have been increasingly discussing the importance of the role moral identity plays in moral action (e.g., Blasi, 1983; Colby & Damon, 1993; Frimer & Walker, 2008; Hardy & Carlo, 2005, 2011a). Considered by many to be the modern father of moral identity research, Blasi (1984) argues that moral commitments are at the core of a strong moral identity, with those commitments and moral values being central and essential to one's self-understanding. However, not everyone has a strong moral identity. Others with a weak-or even no-moral identity exhibit a self-understanding that has moral notions at the periphery of importance to the self, or are not included at all. His conceptualization of moral identity is embedded in his self model of moral action (1983), which he created to explain why people's moral judgment may or may not be consistent with their moral behavior. He argued that individuals' moral judgments might...