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Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. Edited by Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 278 pp. $95.00 cloth, $34.99 paper.
What shape do constitutions take in authoritarian regimes, when governmental power is not limited? Can even "sham" constitutions generate state legitimacy? If so, how? These related questions guide Ginsburg and Simpser's edited volume, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. This book begins with a concise introduction in which the editors explain why constitutions matter and what they do for authoritarian rulers. Specifically, constitutions solve "problems of governing" (p. 3) by creating incentives for different political actors to do "what authoritarian rulers wish them to do" (p. 2). These documents can also help to set up governing institutions and build public trust. The political functions of authoritarian constitutions include coordinating competing oligarchs and subjects, establishing "focal points," and even imprinting on rulers and citizens a set of common values, such as the boundaries of permissible and impermissible discourse (Ibid.).
The remaining ten chapters are divided into four parts that showcase either theoretical frameworks or empirical cases. Two chapters focus on authoritarian constitutionalism, three on constitutional design, two on the contents of authoritarian constitutions, and three on the consequences of authoritarian constitutions. Generally, the overarching themes relate to the pathologies of authoritarian rule, why authoritarian constitutions exist, and how they might serve or harm democratic transition.
Five of the chapters expose the democratic potential of authoritarian constitutions. Tushnet (Chapter 3) looks to Singapore to show how rules found in authoritarian constitutions commit even autocrats to particular courses of action, which may encourage stability and predictability. Using the Polish communist constitution of 1952, Przeworski (Chapter 2) shows how,...