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[Extracts from the 1965 War History by SN Prasad & UP Thapliyal, sponsored by Indian MoD, published in 2011]
It is surprising that despite the Kutch affair and subsequent unfolding of Pakistan's 'Operation Gibraltar', Indian defence planners had not prepared any inter-service contingency plans. IAF had no inkling of its role in the event of a war with Pakistan. It appeared on the scene only on 1 September 1965, when the Pakistan Army threatened to cut the Jammu-Poonch highway, and air-support became necessary to stem the tide. IAF responded with alacrity to meet the threat.
The IAF's role during the Indo-Pak War 1965 included close air support, fighter sweeps and interceptions, interdiction and counter air operations. In the opening phase of the war, it blunted the Pakistani thrust in the Chhamb sector and denied a breakthrough to Pakistani armour in Khem Karan sector. IAF not only damaged and destroyed Pakistani tanks, guns, equipment and installations, but also demoralised them. Bearing in mind that the IAF fought the war with poor quality aircraftover a large area, from far offairfields without any advance notice, its performance could perhaps be rated as near satisfactory.
There were certain deficiencies in the command and control of operations. Air defence and offensive support, two vital aspects of air operations, were controlled by two separate organisations, viz. AD (Air Defence) Area and Advance HQ, WAC (Western Air Command) respectively. This led to grave problems during the war. In the initial stage, when the objective was to achieve a favourable air equation, air effort in the tactical area should have been appropriately controlled by a single authority.
In the absence of favourable air equation, the IAF had to perforce devote much of its effort to defensive measures. CAPs and escorts used up 66% of the entire GA/AD effort, which at times even gobbled some of the air effort, urgently needed for offensive support. As ground attack aircrafton offensive missions (close support to army) had to be provided with fighter escorts the need could not be easily dovetailed with the requirement of Air Defence, particularly due to dual control. Consequently, offensive efforts could not be sub-allotted by Air HQ to TACs as planned. The actual procedure for seeking the air support was as...