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Abstract
The Causal Model of introspection has its more than fair share of critics and indeed in recent years the model has fallen out of favor in the philosophical world. In this paper, I defend the model and argue that it is an excellent candidate, given a realist commitment about the mental, to explain our peculiar, but contingent, introspective access to beliefs.
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