ALTERNATION IN POWER IN BUCHAREST AND CHISINAU AND THE DISCOURSE ON ROMANIAN-MOLDOVAN RELATIONS

Abstract

The article explores the political consequences of successive alternations in power in Bucharest and Chisinau on the bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The main interrogation is whether and how Romania's accession in the European and Euro-Atlantic order influenced the way in which both capitals relate to each other. As the comparative research clearly indicates, predictability and consistency in foreign policy is to a large extent depending on the status of the country in relations to a stable system of values, policies and institutions.

Headnote

Abstract: The article explores the political consequences of successive alternations in power in Bucharest and Chisinau on the bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The main interrogation is whether and how Romania's accession in the European and Euro-Atlantic order influenced the way in which both capitals relate to each other. As the comparative research clearly indicates, predictability and consistency in foreign policy is to a large extent depending on the status of the country in relations to a stable system of values, policies and institutions.

Keywords: Romania, Republic of Moldova, alternation in power, Romanian-Moldovan relations, European integration.

1. Introduction

Under the historical name of Bessarabia, the Republic of Moldova belonged until 1940 (excepting the secessionist region of Transnistria) to Romania. Using the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939 and its secret clause regarding the "Soviet interest for Bessarabia" (Wilson Center Digital Archive, 1939), Stalin decided to occupy the region in June 1940, giving an ultimatum to the Romanian government to leave immediately the territory between the Prut and the Dniester Rivers.

In August 1991, amid the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova declared its sovereignty. Romania was the first country to recognize the new state, as Charles King noticed, "a few hours after the declaration of independence" (King, 2004, 64), which was later seen as a very controversial issue of "lost opportunity", still dividing politicians, historians, analysts and public opinion on both sides of the River Prut.

2. Transfer of power in the post-communist Romania and the Republic of Moldova: benchmarks and political relevancy

Once the totalitarian regimes were dismantled in both states, at the end of the Cold War (1989), respectively after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the successive transfers of power from one president/government to another, in now politically pluralistic Romania and the Republic of Moldova, have been usually non-violent and based on constitutional, democratic mechanisms reflecting the will of voters.

With the exception of the April 2009 riots in Chisinau, followed in a few months by the dissolution of the Parliament and early general elections leading to the resignation of the former Communist President Vladimir Voronin, the overwhelming majority of government changes as well as the sequence of presidential terms, both in Romania and the Republic of Moldova, were peaceful and based on the results of elections at the end of electoral cycles or changes of majority in the legislative. From this perspective, Moldova has been a notable exception among the non-EU and non-NATO post-Soviet republics, having no "color revolution" and no dramatic change of power. Taking into consideration the former Soviet Union, only the Baltic republics have had more successful political transitions but this group of countries is being part of the European Union and NATO since 2004, meeting therefore higher democratic standards. Considering Moldova the most democratic state in the post-Soviet space (with the already mentioned exception of the Baltic countries), Nicu Popescu sees the transfer of power in Chisinau as "widespread use of administrative resources and perhaps small-scale fraud (2-4 percent) here and there, but Moldova has largely avoided the massive fraud that has often canceled outright the value of elections in many post-Soviet states" (Popescu, 2012, 38).

On a different analytical tone and with a more critical approach, Lucan Way describes the Moldovan politics as "pluralism by default" and affirms that "Moldova lacks most of the qualities that social scientists consider critical for democratic development. [...] Prospects for pluralism in Moldova would also seem to be threatened by divisions over national identity" (Way, 2002, 127-141). According to Lucan Way, local political pluralism would be therefore only the result of government fragmentation within the postSoviet system of interests and also a consequence of the societal division between the Romanian-speaking western and central zone and a Slavic-speaking, highly industrialized zone in the separatist region of Transnistria.

It is also important to mention that Moldova revised the Constitution in 1999 and switched to a parliamentary republic. This way, Moldova grew apart from the postcommunist political tradition in Central and Eastern Europe, the overwhelming majority of countries in the region choosing the semi-presidential regime, with a popularly elected president. The reshape of the Moldovan political system has had however a number of significant consequences: among the positive ones, the consolidation of the role of the legislative institution, based on political pluralism, and the limitation of the risk of having an excessive authoritarian executive branch. On the other hand, the requirement of getting at least 61 votes in favor (out of 101 MPs) to elect the President of the Republic, which nominates the Prime Minister, makes the formation of such majority a real challenge for the parties and usually creates the premise of political instability and crises. Later on in this section we shall indicate certain moments when this constitutional provision have had crucial effects.

The post-communist Romania has had so far four democratic presidential transfers of power: in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2014, and a quite significant number of government changes, most of them after general elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008) but also a few after the prime ministers' resignations (1991, 1998, 1999 and February 2012) or, as in the spring of 2012, after a change of majority followed by a vote of no confidence. Only once, in September 1991, a Prime Minister (Petre Roman) resigned under the "street pressure", in the context of the assault of the angry miners over the headquarters of the government. However that resignation did not mean a real political alternation in power since neither the president nor the ruling party or the majority in Parliament has been changed. Other two prime-ministers, Emil Boc (February 2012) and Victor Ponta (November 2015) resigned amid massive protests regarding government policies, but without the imminence of a violent assault over the central institutions, like the one in 1991.

In Romania, the post-communist politics split the parties and society in a tough binary rivalry between "anti-communists" (center-right wing parties) and "neocommunists" (center-left wing parties), competing for pre-eminence (Miscoiu, 2013, 85101) in a deeply divided society. The cleavage became evident starting with the first free elections, in May 1990. "The 'two Romanias' will soon confront each other, violently, during electoral campaign and long time after" (Dorin, 2006, 304) remarks Mihai Dorin. There were basically two major victories of the anti-communist, liberal-oriented forces against the powerful and influential successor of the initial Front of National Salvation (FSN), represented by the present center-left wing Social Democratic Party (PSD). The two switches from center-left wing government to center-right wing government occurred in the general elections of 1996 and 2004. In both cases, PSD accepted the defeat and did not oppose to the democratic transfer of power.

After seven years of slow reforms (1990-1996), administrative corruption and economic decline, the so-called neo-communist regime led by President Ion Iliescu suffered a first major defeat in October 1996 presidential and legislative elections. ThenRector of the University of Bucharest, Emil Constantinescu became President of Romania while the alliance that supported him, the center-right wing Democratic Convention won a relative majority in the Parliament. More or less surprisingly, the formation of the coalition government made up of four significant parties (including the center-left wing Democratic Party, actually a faction of the former FSN) as well as a number of small parties, ethnic and civic organizations generated political instability and severe tensions among quite heterogeneous partners. Alina Mingiu-Pippidi believes that "the victory of 1996 was too little, too late to change radically the direction and rhythm imposed by the post-communist parties" (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002, 60). Beyond the fact that they lacked political and government experience, the anti-communists did not win an absolute majority and had to co-opt PD which blocked the integral restitution of properties and opposed to radical reforms. In 1998, PD prompted a severe government crisis that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea but after all remained in the coalition, under the new premier Radu Vasile.

The disagreements and crises between government partners, reflected in three changes of prime ministers during one legislature, led eventually to a significant loss of popular support for the two "historic parties", PNTCD (The National Peasant ChristianDemocratic Party) and PNL (The National Liberal Party). In a controversial statement, President Emil Constantinescu renounced to run for a second term, admitting himself "defeated by Securitate". The whole project of the Democratic Convention was thus politically ruined, although Romania made some essential reforms in the 1996-2000 legislature, stopped the economic decline in 1999-2000 and was accepted to start negotiations with the European Union as a candidate state, in February 2000. Nevertheless the disastrous image of the leaders and parties in power made the alternation unavoidable.

This is the main reason why PSD and its leader, the former high-ranking communist activist Ion Iliescu, returned in power in the November 2000 general election, promising again the benefits of "political peace and stability". The second ballot of the presidential election was actually a desolating choice between a moderate neo-communist politician and the choleric leader of the nationalistic and extremist party PRM (The Great Romania Party), Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Ion Iliescu became therefore the lesser evil for Romanian democracy and was reelected comfortably as President of Romania, in his third term. It is important to mention that, despite the clear constitutional limitation to two terms, Iliescu's candidature for the third term was accepted because the Constitutional Court, dominated at that time by PSD appointed members, did not take into consideration the first presidential term (1990-1992), started before the adoption of the Constitution in December 1991.

The promised political stability had however a heavy price. The legislature 20002004 was marked by a concerning accumulation of power in the hands of the Prime Minister and new PSD leader Adrian Nastase. Massive corruption in central and territorial administration, control and limitation of press freedom through financial instruments (like government paid advertisement for "friendly" media trusts), ballooning "local barons" (a terms used for the abusive, greedy and opulent PSD local leaders) and, most of all, the augmentation of the discretional powers of the Prime Minister Adrian Nastase generated a new critical pressure for political change. Leading comfortably in the polls, PSD and Nastase were behaving like they were already winners of the next scrutiny, making plans for the composition of the new government and joking on the weaknesses of the centerright Alliance for Justice and Truth (D.A. PNL-PD).

The legislative and presidential elections of 2004 brought the second major defeat of PSD and also the unexpected, last minute victory of the center-right wing candidate for presidency, Traian Basescu, coming only on the second position in the first ballot. With an advance of about ten percent in the first ballot and with his party PSD having already won a relative majority in the new Parliament, Prime Minister Adrian Nastase was heading towards a predictable victory in the presidential election. The mobilization of the urban, educated and young electorate, based on a persuasive anti-corruption discourse, made the opposition leader Basescu won at last a tight but spectacular victory. The triumph of Traian Basescu and the formation of the PNL-PD government (in coalition with two other small parties), despite the ultra-politicization of state apparatus and the pre-electoral concentration of administrative power and resources in the hands of Adrian Nastase and PSD, was an encouraging sign of a mature, functional democracy. In 2011, Adrian Nastase became the first Prime Minister of the post-communist Romania to be sentenced to prison for corruption.

The two terms of office held by Traian Basescu ended in December 2014, being interrupted twice by the Parliament, after President's impeachment in 2007 and 2012. Each time the referendum called for President dismissal failed and Traian Basescu returned in office. The hostile relations that Basescu used to maintain with the legislative made the parliament majority try to impeach him, based on accusations of constitutional infringement.

In the fall of 2014, an "epic" electoral confrontation between Prime Minister Victor Ponta, the young and promising leader of PSD, and Klaus Iohannis, the sober and respected newly elected leader of PNL and also long serving mayor of Sibiu, reproduced to some extent the pattern of the political battle of 2004. It was again the confrontation between the representative of the most corrupted party (in the eyes of many Romanians) and the leader of the opposition, recently involved in high politics, perceived rather as a non-career politician, having no dependencies and links with the eroded parties. After an advantage of ten percent in the first ballot (40%-30%), Victor Ponta saw himself confronted with a "tsunami" of unpopularity, mainly caused by the incidents at the polls organized abroad, when long queues were formed and tens of thousands of Romanian citizens, usually voting for center-right wing parties, could not vote. Instead of ceding to the pressures of diaspora and opposition, and increasing the number of polls, the government led by Victor Ponta maintained the same number for the second ballot. This uninspired decision prompted an impressive mobilization of new voters in the second ballot for Klaus Iohannis, inside and outside Romania, so that the turnout raised to a historic 64% and the liberal candidate won comfortably, with a plus of one million votes. Under these circumstances, the presidential elections of November 2014 represented a transfer of power from one president to another, but not necessarily an alternation in power, since the outgoing president and the incoming one were both center-right wing leaders with more or less the same political orientation, and Traian Basescu supported Klaus Iohannis in the second ballot.

Just like Romania, the Republic of Moldova has currently its fourth elected president since 1991, but certainly the political story is different. Mircea Snegur, the first President of the post-Soviet Moldova, left office in 1996, after a normal electoral process. His successor, Petru Lucinschi, was not reelected in 2001, being replaced by Vladimir Voronin, the leader of the PCRM (The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova). Voronin and the communists developed a quite authoritarian regime during their two terms between 2001 and 2009, but the consolidation of power, politicization of administration and the attempt to control media did not eventually cancelled the constitutional framework and the political pluralism.

The April 2009 general election marked the beginning of the only major political crisis that the Republic of Moldova had in its short history, when the small republic was indeed on the brink of a revolution. The Party of Communists won the election but, with "only" 60 seats out of 101 seats of the Parliament, they failed to elect the President. Following the legislative election of that month, people took the streets in Chisinau and the dissatisfaction with the results degenerated in violent riots. After two failed attempts to elect the President, the Parliament was dissolved and early elections were called for July. Comparing Moldovan riots with what happened in other Eastern European countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia etc.) in fairly similar situations, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Igor Munteanu conclude that "Moldova's Twitter Revolution had some elements of an aborted color revolution'. [...] What was missing in Moldova? The short answer is a unified opposition that could put itself in the driver's position" (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu, 2009, 136-142).

On July 29th, after three tensioned months, the surprise came. Despite the polls predicting a new victory of the communists, the three liberal pro-European parties and a dissident faction from the Communist Party led by Marian Lupu, now under the name Democratic Party, won a majority of 53 seats and formed the government, having the liberal-democrat Vlad Filat as premier. Four parties formed the Alliance for European Integration (AIE): the Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), the Liberal Party (PL), Our Moldova (MN) and the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM). In September, President Voronin resigned and Mihai Ghimpu, the Speaker of the Parliament and PL leader, became Acting President. A full alternation in power was thus achieved.

The difficulties created by the constitutional provision of the election of the head of state have not, however, ended with this episode. In its turn, the AIE designated candidate for presidency, Marian Lupu, did not pass the required threshold of 61 votes in the Parliament and, after two failed attempts, the Parliament was dissolved. New early elections were called in November 2010. PLDM, PDM and PL won again a majority of 59 seats and formed a pro-European government. In March 2011, after a political compromise and with the support of a dissident communist deputy who later on formed the Socialist Party, the independent Nicolae Timofti, a former judge at the Supreme Court of Justice, was finally elected President of Moldova.

3. The discourse on Romanian-Moldovan relations after 1991

Romania was the first country to announce recognition of the independence of the Republic of Moldova, in August 1991. This surprisingly swift movement of the Romanian government, in the context of the USSR imminent dissolution, seemed to represent only the beginning of a very substantial and promising relation between Bucharest and Chisinau.

The question of national identity, the use of the same language and the fact that Moldova was until 1940 part of Romania became very soon an asset but also a barrier in Moldovan politics, regarding bilateral relations with Bucharest. The local political elites and Moldovan society split shortly after obtaining the independence in unionists ("Romanians") and sovereigntists ("Moldovans").

V.G. Baleanu sees the evolution of the Romanian-Moldovan bilateral relations in historical dynamics. "After a romantic period of idealistic exaltation dictated by nationalistic demands for reunification based on the 'German model', Romania's relations with Moldova became more pragmatic and less dominated by big words" (Baleanu, 2000, 16). According to Baleanu, the policy of small steps, despite criticism and disappointment produced to nationalists from both sides of the River Prut, helped the two parties to resume their talks on concluding a bilateral basic treaty after the 1996 general elections in Romania and Moldova.

The discourse on Romanian-Moldovan relations have had a few common, steady features during the past 25 years but also a number of variable nuances and tones, depending on individual national sensitiveness of different political leaders. While the former transcended regimes, governments and presidential terms in Bucharest and Chisinau, the latter reflected alternation and transfers of power, with some visible ups and downs. From the euphoria of the post-Cold War era and the "flowers bridges" of 19901991, which very much looked like the break of the Berlin Wall, the worst moment of the Romanian-Moldovan relation was by far during the April 2009 tensions in Chisinau, when the Communist President Voronin expelled the Romanian Ambassador for "plotting a coup" (The Guardian, 2009). Later on, Voronin denied agreement for the proposed new Romanian ambassador, imposed visas for Romanian citizens and almost closed the frontier. After his resignation, in the fall of 2009, the new authorities in Chisinau resumed good relations with Bucharest.

On both sides of the River Prut there were politicians with higher or lower inclination to the question of Romanian national unity and with more or less bias for the idea of a union between the two neighboring Romanian-speaking states. However the political climate in Chisinau related to Romania had much bigger variations than the Romanian perception concerning close relations with Moldova, which was constantly positive but rather flat and not so passionate. This is somehow understandable, since the Republic of Moldova is a young state, having deep identity cleavages and a very sensitive attitude regarding its relation with the motherland.

The European "Moldovenism", seen as a political and societal movement towards edification of a Moldovan identity under the umbrella of the official aspiration to European integration, became in the 1990s and 2000s the "democratic" adapted version but still an extension of the five decades of the Soviet ideology. Beside the fact the "Moldovan language" was invented by the authorities in Chisinau, Moldovenism has been intensively used to convince the younger generation to stay away from the idea of reunification with Romania. In fact, "Moldovenism" is partly explained by the "denationalization theory", which states that "Moldovans" are obviously Romanians but the half-century of Soviet indoctrination made them believe that they form a distinct nation, deteriorating their sense of national consciousness and losing ties with the motherland. In the recent times, European Moldovenism became the adaptation of the same school of thinking of Soviet inspiration to new political realities on the continent, but still making everything is possible to keep away the idea of assuming the Romanian identity.

The fact that civil society has emerged quite slow in both countries didn't help the strengthening of the cross-boundaries national sentiment and rapprochement. "Romanians and Moldovans do not participate widely in civic life. [...] They have little faith in their democratic institutions and do not display the tolerance that is the hallmark of democratic citizen" were concluding Gabriel Badescu, Paul Sum, and Eric M. Uslaner in a 2004 research (Badescu et all, 2004, 316-341).

By far, the most important asset but, paradoxically, also the most sensitive barrier in Romanian-Moldovan bilateral relations is the identity issue. The absence or weakness of a real "national identity" in the Republic of Moldova and the ambivalence of the identity issues (asset and barrier) seem a characteristic of the former post-Soviet republics, caught between their Western neighbors and Russia. Charles King approached the reflection of the disputed multiple identities in the Republic of Moldova (Romanian, "Moldovan", Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz etc.) in its foreign policy. Particularly, these tensions affected the bilateral relations with Romania. As Charles King noticed, "despite the special relationship that has developed in the spheres of education and culture, relations between political elites have oscillated between avowals of pan-Romanian brotherhood and harsh exchanges between the two capitals" (King, 2004, 71).

Once we look to the consistency of the attitude of the two Romanian-speaking states toward each other, we can easily observe much more fluctuation in Chisinau than in Bucharest, with ups and downs depending on a number of political, economic and regional circumstances. This is somehow understandable, taking into consideration that the Republic of Moldova is a small state "suspended" between the West and the former Soviet space, lacking own identity and own resources required for a proper viable state, quite frequently affected by inner crises and vulnerabilities. From the communist president Vladimir Voronin to the non-partisan head of state Nicolae Timofti there is a considerably different attitude in relation to Romania, though in such a short period of time. Even under the same president, Moldova has had dramatic variations of approaches, oscillating between effusion, indifference and reluctance/hostility. Voronin's unstable discourse on Romania, the European Union and Russia during his two terms as president (2001-2009) is probably the clearest proof of the weaknesses, fears and confusion in which the Republic of Moldova conducts its behavior.

In the same cited article, Charles King appreciates that "relations with Russia have been both less and more complex than Moldova's relations with Romania: less since the identity question is not significant, but more since Moldova has been historically far more dependent on Russia than on Romania" (King, 2004, 76). Analyzing Voronin's hysterical Moldovenism and anti-Romanian discourse after 2007, Vincent Henry and Sergiu Miscoiu remark that "the policy of massive allocation of Romanian citizenship [to Moldovan citizens] is repeatedly denounced in violent campaigns by President Voronin himself who, through the press and official statements, is accusing Romania of imperialism and of trying to violate the sovereignty of the Moldovan state" (Henry and Miscoiu, 2015, 211-248, 231).

Not only Moldova changed time after time its political approach in relation to Romania. Bucharest has also formulated its traditional "special relationship" with Chisinau in different tones and nuances, from one president or prime minister to another, although with less dramatic and spectacular variations. However the basic idea of having good relations and offering support for Moldova was a constant element of Romanian The first two presidents, Ion Iliescu and Emil Constantinescu, who led the Romanian foreign policy in the first 15 years after communism, had no significant benchmarks regarding Moldova, aside from the prompt recognition of the Republic of Moldova's independence in August 1991, limiting their discourse and attitude to general assertions and clichés.

Starting with Traian Basescu and then Klaus Iohannis, things have changed in the sense that the whole debate of the Moldovan issue in Romania became more substantive and relevant, though sometimes dividing in terms of strategic options. Basescu and Iohannis did not act in the same way in relation to Chisinau but both influenced considerably the reflection on bilateral relations. President Basescu wanted to make "Republic of Moldova" one of the standards of his terms. Sometimes populist, sometimes pathetic, sometimes clearly looking for electoral support from voters with Romanian passport living in Moldova, his platform was explicitly unionist to the point that he stated "union with Moldova has to become the new national project in Romania" (Gotev, 2013). During his two terms of office, Romania implemented intensely the new legislation of "regaining citizenship", according to which approximately 18% of the Moldovan citizens got the Romanian citizenship, based on the fact that their ancestors were Romanian citizens.

After December 2014, with a more sober and moderate political style, President Klaus Iohannis kept the principle of "special relationship" with the Republic of Moldova in the strategic priorities of the Romanian foreign policy, but changed the tone. The effusion disappeared from the presidential discourse while the EU principle in relation to associate members, the so-called "more for more", became the dominant idea. Unlike Basescu, Iohannis believes that "the question of the union of the two states might become feasible only when things will go very well in both countries, when political stability and economic prosperity will be achieved in the Republic of Moldova" (Popa, 2016).

With disastrous economic and political performances in the past two years, with four prime ministers in about one year, Moldova seems to have lost momentum in the process of European integration due to its structural vulnerabilities and weaknesses of its political elites. The European Commission's representatives started to criticize Chisinau for the lack of reforms in justice, public administration and economy, and especially for the massive corruption at high governmental levels. In November 2015, immediately after a new fall of the government in Chisinau, President Iohannis vetoed the bill with regard to the loan of 150 million Euro granted by the Romanian Government to the Government of the Republic of Moldova, based on the fact that "at present, we have no certitude that the reforms in Moldova will continue" (Digi 24, 2015)

4. Conclusions

As many authors observed, in the past 25 years the question of the Moldovan identity was by far the most important issue determining the enthusiasm or, on the contrary, the frostiness of the bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The fluctuations were obviously bigger in Moldova than in Romania, depending on the ideological platform of the ruling party or president in Chisinau, with a clear plus in pro-Romanian attitude at the pro-European politicians and a rather hostile attitude of proRussian leaders. From this perspective, Bucharest was more constant in relation to Moldova, supporting the European trajectory of its smaller neighbor, regardless the centerright or center-left wing successive executives in Romania.

After Romania joined the European Union in 2007, the Romanian passports became more attractive for numerous Moldovan citizens, for some practical reasons like access to European labour market, higher education, business etc. Nevertheless, the differences in political attitude regarding relations with Romania got more transparent and explicit, from one party to another. The grassroots politics in Moldova fully reflected this cleavage. Useless to say that being pro-Romanian (not necessarily in the sense of union, but as identity assumed) and pro-European has soon proved to be fairly similar, as former presidential adviser and analyst Dan Dungaciu has observed (Filimon, 2015). Both the supporters and opponents of the "European option" gained arguments and relevance on local political market, so that the Moldovan foreign policy debate found itself dominated by the geopolitical dispute between Russia and the West for the European periphery. It is therefore useful to mention that the concept of "westernization of Moldova" has never been deep and complete, since Chisinau did not really open the question of accession to NATO. Moldova's constitutional neutrality remains one of the clearest proofs of the strategic ambiguity of this post-Soviet republic, based in fact on the lack of a distinct national and cultural identity.

Almost ten years after Romania's accession to the European Union, one of the main conclusions regarding Romanian-Moldovan relations looks to the stability and predictability of the two states' foreign policy principles. Romania became after 2007 much more stable and predictable in relation to Moldova (with variable tones and nuances, depending on each president's political style) while Moldova remained weak, confused and often oscillating between West and East.

References

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