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[...]is the incorporation of a robust unmanned aircraft system (UAS) processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capability within the ACE. [...]the G2 and ACE must train together enough to develop a nested understanding of the enemy forces, friendly forces, and the operational environment.
Introduction
The 38th Infantry Division's intelligence enterprise is an integrated network architecture of Soldiers, systems, sensors, information, and processes. This enables the G2 to provide support to targeting, support to subordinate and adjacent commands, and provide the commander situational understanding of the battlefield. The most important element of the intelligence enterprise is the people who make it work. Army intelligence analysts are the foundation of the enterprise, and Distributed Common Ground StationArmy (DCGS-A) is their weapon system. Like any system, it requires focused training and dedication to be an expert. The 38th ID and the Indiana National Guard's commitment to Military Intelligence digital master gunnery over the last decade provides the Division expert institutional knowledge and a robust intelligence architecture.
The road to Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 15.3 provided the G2 an opportunity to integrate digital systems into all facets of individual and collective training. In addition, after observing a warfighter exercise, the G2 and the intelligence staff recognized that not leveraging the entire DCGS-A enterprise placed division success at WFX 15.3 at risk. This led to the analysis and control element (ACE) integrating the Multifunction Workstation, Tactical Ground Station, GEOINT Workstation, and ACE BLK II system during the exercise.
The key outcome of the employment of the DCGS-A enterprise was a reduction in the sensor-to-shooter time lapse. The 38th ID's employment of the DCGS-A intelligence systems during WFX 15.3 demonstrated an ability to provide a direct digital link between the sensor and shooter, greatly reducing the time between acquisition and effects on target, providing the division a decisive advantage on the battlefield.
Background
Three primary techniques and procedures within the ACE enabled these capabilities. First, is the use of ABIIs to decrease the sensor-shooter link. Second, is the creation of a situational development cell within the ACE. Third, is the incorporation of a robust unmanned aircraft system (UAS) processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capability within the ACE. The integration of DCGS-A Ace Block II enabled the success of these techniques. The ABII processed approximately 15 percent of the information received by the division and enabled approximately 40 percent of the division's understanding of the enemy.
The key capability of ABII was near seamless interoperability with the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS) and Advanced Field Artillery Targeting and Direction System (AFATDS), enabling timely and effective fires against division high-payoff targets. This allowed the ACE to greatly reduce the sensor-to-shooter time while enabling more than 70 percent of the division's acquisition for targeting of radar-guided air defense, and 122mm and larger tube and rocket artillery systems. ABII permitted the efficient destruction and neutralization of the nearly 300 indirect fire systems supporting four enemy divisions, thereby reducing enemy combat power by nearly half. DCGS-A ABII enabled the precise and accurate assessment of relative combat power, allowed the destruction or neutralization of high payoff targets (HPTs), and ensured that Cyclone Division forces retained favorable combat power.
The creation of a robust PED team within the ACE allowed the division to seamlessly tip and cue UAS based on sensor reporting received through the ABII, ground moving target indicators, and tactical reporting. The PED Team used the DCGS-A Tactical Ground Station to exploit the UAS feeds and input reporting in the DCGS-A intelligence database. The reporting from this team was key to the effective destruction of the enemy's fires capacity and greatly increased the division understanding of the enemy's course of action. The PED team provided targetable data on more than 60 percent of the total number of enemy artillery systems identified as Division HPTs.
The ACE situational development cell tracked the capability and capacity of the enemy. This allowed the G2 to describe the enemy in terms of its ability to perform a tactical task against friendly forces. The cell is comprised of analysts from the fusion, target development, and information collection cells. It is responsible for tracking the current enemy situation template and battlefield damage assessment and accomplished these tasks through the analysis of information provided by the PED team, ABII, and higher, lower, and adjacent units. Together this ensured the G2 was able to accurately provide situational understanding to the commander while continually assessing the current situation against the predicted enemy course of action.
The technical and tactical knowledge of its Soldiers enabled the success of the Division's intelligence enterprise during WFX 15.3. The Division's commitment to intelligence training greatly increased its capability during the time leading to the WFX. The training plan included the incorporation of digital systems during all phases of individual and collective exercises.
Training
The ACE nested its training within the G2's vision statement for the intelligence enterprise:
The G2 received support from the command staff and the headquarters battalion command to prioritize G2 training in order to reach the goal of 50 percent of inactive duty training (IDT) periods dedicated to individual and collective intelligence training. The G2 instituted a policy of maximum utilization of IDT periods, often extending the training day well past that of other sections, averaging a nine hour duty day for Soldiers and an eleven hour duty day for leaders. The G2 held all leaders accountable for planning and resourcing training that nested with the G2's designated lines of effort as depicted in Figure 1.
The road to the warfighter exercise started in the summer of 2013 with the ACE conducting an intelligence focused, five-day, computer-assisted map exercise hosted for the division by the 101st Airborne Division's maneuver training center. The five-day event re-oriented division intelligence Soldiers to intelligence in support of combined arms maneuver during decisive action after years of supporting wide area security missions and two years conducting a do- mestic all-hazards response mission. The center provided the necessary mission command systems to replicate most functions resident in the division and also provided subject matter expertise, trainers, lodging, and meals. The division resourced the event using annual training funds and several GSA vehicles.
Training Year 2014 IDTs focused on individual and section level tasks to provide the Soldiers an understanding of their roles and responsibilities during combined arms maneuver and to build institutional knowledge in the decisive action training environment. This year of training was significant as the G2 worked directly with the ACE to fully integrate the two components of the division intelligence enterprise.
The ACE must have a good understanding of the expectations, preferences, and idiosyncrasies of the G2. Likewise, the G2 must understand the capabilities and limitations of the ACE. The G2's role as senior intelligence advisor to the division staff and general officers makes it essential the G2 can articulate ACE capabilities and limitations.
In the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2014, the Division acted as the higher command for another National Guard division's WFX. The Division command team locked the Division intelligence team in place based on their performance as the HICOM ACE. The G2, TAC deputy G2, deputy G2, ACE chief, Collection Manager, targeting officer in charge, and the combat operations information center intelligence OIC all attended this event. This allowed the G2 team to understand the digital architecture of the WFX exercise, as well as the unique operational environment of the warfighter combined arms maneuver simulation. The command again demonstrated its commitment to intelligence training when it used annual training and warfighter support resources to fund participation of more than 20 intelligence Soldiers in the exercise.
A key outcome for the ACE was a recognition that the operating tempo of combined arms maneuver was much higher than the G2 had planned. The G2 estimated that a reduction in available time to analyze and respond to threat forces was a factor of 10 less than in the wide area security and defense support to civil authority missions to which the Division was accustomed. The ACE has 2.5 hours in combined arms maneuver, where it had 24 hours in wide area security to analyze, understand, and react to threat actions. Realizing this early in the process allowed for a final adjustment of the training plan and enabled the sections to mentally prepare for the pace of operations.
Key leaders and Soldiers not involved in the HICOM event participated in a multi-intelligence training collective exercise hosted by the Indiana National Guard Intelligence Center using annual training funds. This five day Foundry support training provided the Soldiers a greater understanding of information flow within the ACE. Five days of training focused on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) culminating in a mission analysis brief to the G2 immediately followed. The division ACE demonstrated proficiency in graphically depicting the enemy in time and space, use of doctrine, and use of the primary weapon system of a division intelligence Soldier-DCGS-A.
The division conducted the military decision making process (MDMP) during the warfighter seminar. This training event stressed the ACE in a time-constrained environment as it conducted IPB using the DCGS-A MFWS and Command Post of the Future (CPOF). This validated the adjustments to training to account for increased tempo identified during the HICOM mission. The Division G2 and ACE achieved a nested understanding of the operational environment, enemy operations in time and space, and the planned friendly scheme of maneuver. The ACE demonstrated mastery of DCGS-A, and improved its capability to depict the operational environment and the enemy graphically in time and space. The command resourced more than 20 intelligence Soldiers to support MDMP using a combination of warfighter and additional annual training funds.
From July 2014 through January 2015 the ACE chief and G2 executed collective training together during IDT periods. During this time the G2 stressed digital proficiency, collective training, and integration of DCGS-A ACE BLOCK II with AFATDS, CPOF, and JADOCS to enable training and effective production in support of all division battle rhythm events. The key enabler of this training was the ability to establish the G2 network architecture and hardware at a location and leave it set up throughout the year's training. Several times during the year, the division moved its division main and tactical command post causing the G2 to tear down and reestablish its network and hardware footprint.
However, the net time saved and availability of the established ACE for immediate or hip-pocket training opportunities during white space on battalion and company training schedules enabled many hundreds of Soldier hours of training conducted that were not planned. This allowed the G2 to reach its goal of leveraging 50 percent of IDT periods for intelligence training. G2 and ACE collective and individual training for WFX 15.3 did not end until change of mission on the final day of the exercise. Figure 2 shows the training conducted and availability of critical personnel and capability in support of Warfighter 15.3 and reflects the commitment of the state and division command and staff.
ACE BLOCK II Accreditation
The Division committed to deploying to WFX 15.3 with its DCGS-A ABII in July following its HICOM mission, after recognizing the need for the unique capability it provided. The G2 and the intelligence staff recognized that not leveraging ACE BLOCK II placed division success at WFX 15.3 at risk. Neither the G2 nor the ACE chief fully realized the difficulty they faced. The G2 appointed a project officer who was also the OIC of the Indiana Intelligence Center, had extensive experience in networking and Army digital systems, and was available full time to execute the tasks associated with ABII accreditation. A full-time MOS 350T Intelligence Systems Maintainer, special security officer (SSO), and DCGS-A trainer were part of his team.
While the team was primarily engaged in the management of the Intelligence Center and execution of its Foundry mission, it dedicated a significant portion of days to solving the many problems and overcoming the constant friction associated with fielding and accrediting the ABII components of the DCGS-A System. Figure 2 shows the critical personnel, the number of days they were available, and how many days they directly supported accreditation and condition setting for successful use of DCGS-A.
The process first required that the ABII system be updated and accredited by securing software upgrades and licenses outside of the normal fielding process. This required some skill in software integration, patching, and upgrading as well as knowledge of local area networks and information assurance.
Second, the Division undertook a search for applicable regulations, guides, handbooks, and examples to aid in the process with the project officer constantly coordinating with multiple stakeholders to produce the hundreds of pages of required standard operating procedures (SOPs) and separate documents for the single-source ABII, allsource ACE BLOCK II, and the cross-domain server. This part of the process took more than two and a half months to work through. A formal request to Department of the Army (DA) G2 for certification and appointment orders is required for the process to formally begin.
Table 1 shows the different products and the estimated time to complete the documents. PL2 systems include the all-source and single-source components of ABII but not the cross-domain server system. These times reflect no rewrites, system failures, or communication friction, and the availability of existing examples and experience in producing these type products.
Receiving necessary orders and authorities and developing proper SOPs took the Division much more than 27 hours, primarily due to waiting for review of documentation and signature. The state and quality of the parent SCIF SOP assisted the Division in completing the rewrite, however a lack of clarity on what the rewrite must include delayed its completion. The completion of the long-form System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA) may take more or less time than 200 hours and depends on availability of the necessary information, experience of the Soldier filling out the long-form SSAA, and availability of SMEs to guide the author. The table does not depict hours needed to assemble supporting documentation, and only provides the time to complete the long-form SSAA itself.
The hours listed for ACAS certification are the course's listed credit hours. If the person taking the training is unfamiliar with network scans, network vulnerability analysis and information assurance, the online certification takes longer. Likewise, the table does not assign time to requesting, receiving approval, and download of required scanner software.
ACAS Certification and the construction of the ACAS scanner enabled the submission of the request for Interim Authority to Test (IATT) for each of the single-source and all-source components of the ABII. If prior coordination occurs, approval of the request is rapid. Otherwise, the delay could last days or weeks. Interim authorizations to test (IATTs) for each component allow the conduct of separate vulnerability scans. Performing the actual scans may take days or a week. The Division experienced extended delays and a requirement for extensive consultations with the DGCS-A field service representative in order to successfully complete the full set of scans and the collection of sufficient body of evidence to support a request for Interim Authority to Operate (IATO) or Authority to Operate (ATO). The table does not list these times as they are variable and largely dependent on the expertise of the scanner, the availability of a scanner, and the characteristic of the local area network for each of the single-source and all-source components. Minor resubmissions were required in order to receive an IATO. DA G2 estimated the time to receive an ATO at several weeks.
The 264 hours (or 33 working days) accounts only for completion of paperwork and under optimum conditions. The amount of time for ABII accreditation of 120 days includes the 33-plus days for paperwork and 87 days for coordinating with appropriate authorities, overcoming network and software friction, seeking approvals and signatures, rewrites and rescans, coordinating with the Division G2 for direct interventions with various organizations in First Army and the Department of the Army G2, executing necessary training and training oversight, and assisting in DSCG-A ABII integration into the Division Intelligence Enterprise prior to start of a warfighter exercise. A 120 day timeline represents the best case timeline and possesses significant risk. Units should plan and resource more than 120 days for the accreditation process.
The 350T, 350F, and SSO were available for 240 days because they were Title 32 active duty, technician, or contractor working at the Indianapolis Indiana Intelligence Center assigned M-Day to the 38th ID G2 section. However, their day-to-day duties and jobs restricted their availability. The accreditation process takes at least six months and units who place its project officers and enabling personnel on orders achieve better results.
An available 350T accomplished an additional 60 days of work assisting in establishing the ACAS scanner and local area networks, collecting information on hardware and software for documentation, and integration of DCGS-A ABII into the Division intelligence enterprise. Integration of hardware, connecting subordinates into the Division networks, and tying CPOF, JADOCS, and AFATDS into the division intelligence enterprise accounts for most of this work.
Authorities to operate ABII as a component of the intelligence enterprise possess significantly reduced value if the system does not interface with the Fires enterprise or the common operational picture.
The G2 SSO established a TSCIF to house the entire ACE as well as the ABII at WFX 15.3 concurrent with the effort to accredit ABII. This caused second-order impacts to accessibility of the ACE by members of the intelligence and operations enterprises. However, planning and SSO days spent managing the access roster and conducting read-on mitigated this greatly. The close proximity of the DCGS-A ABII systems and operators with collection management, UAS feeds, imagery analysts exploiting UAS feeds, mission managers controlling UAS missions, and the target development team all enabled rapid acquisition and destruction of enemy fires systems. The digital links among DCGS-A ABII, AFATDS, and JADOCs enabled rapid processing of auto-generated fire missions.
Conclusion
The 38th ID's intelligence enterprise greatly improved during the training prior to throughout the execution of WFX 15.3. The command's support of intelligence training and commitment to mission command systems caused the success of the intelligence enterprise. While the entire DCGS-A enterprise demonstrated its ability to greatly increase intelligence support to targeting and provide situational understanding to the command, a robust training program is necessary to leverage this capability. The command's continued commitment to intelligence training using its primary weapon system, DCGS-A, is essential to ensure continued increases in the intelligence enterprise's ability to provide timely, relevant, and fused intelligence products benefiting the entire division.
There are several critical lessons learned from this Division's experience. First, units must properly resource the six-plus month accreditation process with a full-time project officer. Second, units must leverage every available moment to train on digital systems. This training must be scenario driven and focused on producing products required by the Division battle rhythm. Third, the G2 and ACE must train together enough to develop a nested understanding of the enemy forces, friendly forces, and the operational environment. The G2 and ACE must understand each other's capabilities and limitations. Fourth, the G2 must fully integrate DCGS-A ABII into the intelligence and fires enterprise. The Fires and Aviation communities must trust ABII and its operators. This requires time and demonstrated capability. Finally, the command must commit to and resource the continuous and integrated nature of intelligence training. The command must recognize the importance of DCGS-A ABII as the primary weapon system for intelligence Soldiers.
LTC East was commissioned in 1998 and is a Signals Intelligence Officer. He is the ACoS G2 for the 38th ID. His previous assignments are S2 138th Fires Brigade; S2 2/138th Artillery Battalion; Commander, Kentucky MI Detachment 20th SFG(A), and assistant S2 63rd Aviation Brigade. LTC East holds a PhD and MA from the University of Kentucky and an MA from the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies.
MAJ Wells is an MI Officer in the Indiana Army National Guard. He enlisted in 2000 as an MOS 13F, Fire Support Specialist, and completed Officer Candidate School at the Alabama Military Academy. He is the S2 for the 76th IBCT. His previous assignments include ACE Chief, 38th ID; and Target Development Officer, 38th ID during OEF. MAJ Wells holds an MS in Technology and BA in Political Science, both from Purdue University.
Copyright Superintendent of Documents Jul-Sep 2015