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The subject of this talk is the nature of critical reasoning in ethical arguments in general, and on justice and injustice in particular. I am principally concerned with the widespread presumption, often implicit, that reasoning about choice remains unfinished until an optimal alternative has been identified. I would argue that not only is this belief mistaken, the ill-reasoned presumption has far-reaching implications in arbitrarily limiting ethical reasoning.
Since this lecture is about reasoned choice - not choice in general - I start with a few general remarks on the role of reasoning in ethics. An ethical - or political - claim is often made without invoking any reason to persuade the unpersuaded. This is sometimes supplemented by an admonition to others to refrain from counterarguments. Immanuel Kant complained about a common tendency in that direction more than two centuries ago:
But I hear on all sides the cry: Don't argue! The officer says: Don't argue, get on parade! The tax-official: Don't argue, pay! The clergyman: Don't argue, believe! All this means restrictions of freedom everywhere.2
Kant argued powerfully for the 'freedom to make public use of reason on all matters'.
Further, for ethical choices based on reasoning, it cannot be adequate just to offer some argument described as a 'reason' - no matter what form it takes (even if it reflects special pleading or attitudinal eccentricity). It is necessary to examine and scrutinize the nature of what is offered as a reason. To count as an ethical reason, the arguments must have some discipline.
A much discussed requirement for ethical reasoning is some sort of objectivity in the form of impartiality. William Shakespeare ridiculed the allegedly ethical reasons people sometime entertain - and advocate - in line with their own advantage, or the advantage of their particular class, or specific group. In his play King John, Philip the Bastard caricatures the temptation to make one's morality spring from the pursuit of self-interest, or from the solidarity of class interest.
Well, whiles I am a beggar, I will rail
And say that there is no sin but to be rich;
And being rich, my virtue then shall be
To say that there is no vice but beggary.
In developing his rightly celebrated...