COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: A NEW STAGE IN CHINA-EGYPT RELATIONS

Abstract

Since 2014, Chinese-Egyptian relations have emerged as one of the most important bilateral axes in the Middle East. Over that time, a new era of closer political and economic ties has begun to develop between the two countries. This study analyzes the motivation behind China's actions to formalize a comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt in light of the relative decline in U.S. influence and power in the region. Its findings show that economic interests are the primary consideration in this burgeoning relationship, but that the strategic potential of Egypt's geographic location and the size of its economic market make it a promising partner for Chinese ambitions in the region.

Headnote

Since 2014, Chinese-Egyptian relations have emerged as one of the most important bilateral axes in the Middle East. Over that time, a new era of closer political and economic ties has begun to develop between the two countries. This study analyzes the motivation behind China's actions to formalize a comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt in light of the relative decline in U.S. influence and power in the region. Its findings show that economic interests are the primary consideration in this burgeoning relationship, but that the strategic potential of Egypt's geographic location and the size of its economic market make it a promising partner for Chinese ambitions in the region.

INTRODUCTION

In December 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Egyptian president Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi held talks to upgrade their countries' bilateral relationship to a "comprehensive strategic partnership." The two leaders pledged to boost political, economic, military, cultural, and technological cooperation along with coordination at the regional and international level.1 Between 2014 and 2016, it appears that a new era of closer political and economic ties has indeed begun unfolding between the two countries.

This study examines the rapid growth of China's bilateral ties with Egypt, in order to understand the extent of economic engagement, high-level diplomatic exchanges, and emerging strategic alliances. Chinese-Egyptian relations have become one of the most important axes of bilateral relations in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA).2 Egypt is a major regional power with an important and influential role in the Sunni axis and the Arab world, as well as a key ally of Washington, thus also it plays a pivotal role for the U.S. in achieving its broader aims in the Middle East.3

This study further analyzes the motivation behind China's measures to formalize a comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt in light of the relative decline in U.S. influence and power in world politics, particularly in the Middle East. Additionally, it examines the question of whether China's intensified engagement with Egypt may indeed reduce Washington's sphere of influence in Cairo, which could threaten U.S. interests in the region.

For China, the emerging strategic alliance with Egypt represents an attempt to strengthen its influence and power in the MENA region, expand its commercial activity, and reinforce its strategic standing at the expense of the U.S.4 As Xi said during his visit to Egypt, China is considering its relationship with Egypt from a long-term perspective. "We are ready to work with the Egyptian side to carry forward our traditional friendship, learn from each other, and deepen our practical cooperation in various fields under the Belt and Road Initiative, so as to let our people share development benefits and enjoy a better life."5

Moreover, gaining a foothold in Egypt may prove to be of vital importance to China's economic interests and strategic long-term prospects,6 as Egypt's strategic geographic location makes the country a marketplace of great potential and influence in the entire MENA region.

EGYPT'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH CHINA

Since the mid-1950s, China and Egypt have maintained equal and friendly relations in political, economic, and cultural exchanges. Egypt was the first Arab and African country to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1956, supporting the "One China" principle and China's role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.7 It is true that the relationship between China and Egypt has not always been smooth, and there remain some serious issues between the two countries, such as the trade imbalance between the two since the 1980s, which has worsened significantly over time and, without determined corrective action, seems set to worsen and distort further Egypt's overall trade balance in future8. Nonetheless, the foundation of this bilateral relationship remains relatively solid.9

Although the present study focuses on the motivation behind China's measures to formalize a comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt, the Arab world's most populous country, it is important as well to understand why the Sisi administration considers relations with Beijing to be essential. There are two reasons: strategically, Cairo wants to deliver a message to its erstwhile U.S. partner alluding to its strategic alternatives and its frustration with U.S. attempts to interfere in Egypt's internal affairs. Strategic cooperation with Beijing also suits Cairo's desire to forge a sovereign foreign policy that proceeds based on purely Egyptian interests and is not bound to international and regional axes.10

Economically, like many African countries, Egypt has been actively seeking Chinese investment, viewing it as an alternative to the rigorous conditions often attached to Western investment. The two countries can complement each other' s advantages and have coordinated activities in many fields: for example, there is huge cooperation potential in fields like economic and trade investment, energy and electric power, minerals and tourism, railway and transportation, port logistics, and aerospace science and technology.11 Chinese capital is crucial for Egypt's economic growth and for creating jobs for the millions of unemployed in Egypt, who are a threat to the regime's stability.12

CHINA'S COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH EGYPT

For its part, Beijing's comprehensive strategic partnership with Cairo is ultimately motivated by economic imperatives, but strategic intentions also play a part. China perceives Sisi's regime, which gained power after the Egyptian military toppled elected president Mohammed Morsi, as a partner which will allow it an opportunity to gain influence in the Arab world and the MENA region at Washington's expense13 Since China-Egypt relations promise unprecedented opportunities and far-reaching prospects, Beijing wants to wedge itself between Egypt and the U.S., given their identical objectives to strengthen economic and strategic relationships.

Strategic incentives

Sisi's two visits to Beijing and Xi's reciprocal visit to Egypt in January 2016 marked China's emerging position in the Middle East and the shifting geopolitical landscape in the MENA region. In December 2014, as a new Egyptian President-elect, Sisi decided to visit China after his visit to Russia in August 2014, and within a short period he made a second state visit, in September 2015. By way of comparison, Sisi only met with U.S. President Obama once, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meetings in September 2014.14 To date, no invitation for the Egyptian president has been forthcoming for a state visit in Washington.15 The intense diplomatic exchanges between China and Egypt and the high-level reciprocal visits may illustrate the strategic alliances emerging at the expense of ties with the U.S.

This represents a significant shift from previous relations under the regime of dictator Hosni Mubarak, when Egypt was an anchor of stability and a reliable partner in regional security, and thus a core pillar of U.S. Middle East foreign policy. For decades, Washington had considered Cairo to be among its most reliable and influential allies in the Middle East. As President Obama said during that meeting with Sisi in September 2014: "The U.S.-Egyptian relationship has been an important cornerstone of our security policy and our policy in the Middle East for a very long time."16 However, this stability may have come at a cost. Over the years, the U.S. administration long ignored the autocracy, corruption, and abuses endured by Egyptians under the Mubarak regime, and provided Cairo with economic aid and military support in exchange for Egypt's pro-U.S. orientation.17

However, Washington-Cairo relations faltered somewhat in the wake of the political turmoil in Egypt, beginning with Mubarak's ouster in 2011. The new Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi, made his first official trip outside the Middle East in August 2012 to Beijing rather than to the U.S., signaling his intent to reduce Cairo's reliance on Washington.18 Morsi's visit to China came at a time when China's position in the region was posing an increasing challenge to U.S. influence, and Beijing has continued its role as a major economic actor in the MENA region.19

Since Sisi took office on June 2014, U.S.-Egyptian relations have continued to deteriorate, exacerbated in part by the military intervention which toppled Morsi.20 In response to the military coup and killing of hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood demonstrators, the U.S. temporarily halted military aid to Egypt. Although some support has since resumed, the issue of human rights and freedoms continue to cast a pall over U.S.-Egypt relations.21

China, on the other hand, has no qualms about dealing with the Sisi regime and remains silent regarding Cairo's internal affairs. In fact, in an article in the state-run Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, Xi expressed Beijing's support for the Egyptian people's right to choose their own political system, along with its criticism of external attempts to interfere in Cairo's internal affairs.22 The current tensions in U.S.-Egypt bilateral relations have allowed China to insert itself as a wedge between the two nations, while seeking to supplant Washington as Egypt's major economic and strategic partner.

Moreover, China views Cairo as a key partner in the war against terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. Egypt is one of the nations on the front line of the regional war on terrorism because of its struggle against jihadist extremist militant group operating in the Sinai Peninsula, and given its central role within the traditional Sunni camp.23 Along with this, China has demonstrated increasing concern over the threat posed by the Islamic State and its desire to keep the threat far from China's borders. With deadly extremism on the rise, both nations face unprecedented security challenges. Thus, both seek to combat terrorism and extremism by providing intelligence, collecting evidence, arresting and repatriating suspects, and cutting off sources of terrorist funding.24

Finally, Beijing views deeper strategic ties with Egypt as part of its agenda to expand its political influence and commercial connections globally. Given its regional influence and central geographic location, Egypt provides Beijing with a gateway to the African continent's natural resources, as well as a huge market potential for Chinese goods. Cairo is associated with African countries through trade agreements and tax exemptions. These create many investment and industrialization advantages for China in Egypt with respect to exporting into African markets.25 Egypt is also close to the European market, one of the main destinations for Chinese exports of low-cost goods. Beijing is the E.U.'s second trading partner behind the U.S., and the E.U. is China's biggest trading partner.26 Thus, Chinese investments in Egypt's economy, particularly in infrastructure, could provide a springboard for exports of goods and products to Europe.27

To be sure, the establishment of deeper Sino-Egyptian strategic ties may signify the decline of U.S. influence in Egypt and perhaps in the entire region. For instance, in July 2015, Egypt submitted an application to receive dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).28 Egypt membership in the SCO will offer it greater flexibility and an alternative to its historical alignment with the U.S., decreasing its economic and military dependence on the U.S., and weakening American influence in the region.

Economic incentives

Since 2010, China and Egypt have enjoyed rapid development in economic and trade cooperation. According to Chinese ambassador to Egypt Song Aiguo, bilateral trade between China and Egypt reached a record high of $11.6 billion in 2014, representing an increase of 96 percent compared to 2009. Moreover, in the first three quarters of 2015, reciprocal trade amounted to $9.67 billion, an increase of 13 percent year-on-year, making Egypt China's third biggest trade partner on the African continent.29 China ranks fourth among countries investing in Egypt, through 1,213 Chinese companies operating in the sectors of industry, construction, and services.30

Traditionally, the U.S. represented a much larger export market for Egypt than China, and Washington remains among Egypt's largest trading partners. However, in 2012, China bypassed Washington for the first time as Egypt's top trading partner and in 2013, China's imports from Egypt inched past those of the U.S.31 Moreover, bilateral trade between U.S. and Egypt decreased from $7.8 billion in 2014 to $6.1 billion in 20 1 5.32 Consequently, Egypt may become more dependent on Chinese investments and economy as an export market than on the U.S. over the long term.

Xi's state visit to Egypt in January 2016 was a turning point in bilateral relations and demonstrates the huge potential for commercial initiatives between the two countries. The visit came at a time when the two countries were celebrating the 60th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations, and at a critical time for the Middle East, a region rife with conflict. The two countries signed 21 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) aimed at ramping up Chinese investments in Egypt within the fields of economic cooperation, electricity, energy, trade, civil aviation, science, technology, communications, and aerospace.33 As of the end of 2016, the two countries are currently planning 15 projects in electricity, infrastructure, and transport with investments that could total $15 billion.34

During President Xi's visit to Egypt, the countries signed deals cementing investment and aid worth billions of dollars, including the development of the Suez Canal axis and economic and trade cooperation in the Suez Canal economic zone. These deals aim to increase Chinese presence in Egypt's Suez Canal zone from 32 Chinese companies, which are investing more than $400 million to 100 companies and an investment of $2.5 billion in the next phase of the project.35 The agreements also include the first phase of construction of a new Egyptian administrative capital, a $1 billion financing agreement for Egypt' s central bank, and a $700 million loan to the state-owned National Bank of Egypt, 36 although it is unclear how many of these agreements and MoUs represent completely new projects and how many mark incremental progress in deals struck over the previous two years between Egypt and China,37 one thing remains clear: the test of these agreements will be in their implementation.

The Chinese government encourages and supports qualified companies to participate in Egyptian mega-projects.38 Moreover, Chinese companies view Cairo as a business environment with great profit potential, and thus many are willing to participate in major projects in Egypt, especially in industries such as electricity, petroleum, natural gas, nuclear energy, railways, highways, ports, mining, construction materials, chemical and optical industries, textile, electrical appliances, and other fields.39 The cost of these projects is estimated at billions of dollars and will take years to complete.

Among these industries, the energy sector is emerging as one of the important areas of cooperation in Chinese companies' commercial relations with Egypt. In 2015, the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum, along with China's Star Oil & Gas (SOG), established an International Drilling Materials Manufacturing Company. The Chinese company will invest $250 million to establish a seamless pipe rolling mill to supply the entire MENA market. This joint venture demonstrates Chinese companies' activities in the Egyptian energy sector, and China's aspirations to use Egypt as a hub to branch into other markets in the region.40

In addition, in May 2015 the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the Egyptian Nuclear Power Plant Authority (NPPA) signed a MoU for nuclear energy cooperation that could open a second overseas market for Chinese nuclear power technology.41 The signing of the MoU marks a new phase in work to develop nuclear energy in Egypt, and highlights the fact that China has become one of Egypt's official partners in its nuclear power projects. Chinese companies are also staking their claim on Egypt's solar energy market. In 2015, Chinese solar energy company and photovoltaic (Yingli Solar), one of the largest solar panel manufacturers in the world, signed a MoU with Egypt' s Ministry of Electricity and Energy for development of a solar energy plant in which they established a target of 50 gigawatts of total solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity for local consumption in the following three years.42

Railways are another growing and important field of cooperation between Chinese companies and the Egyptian government. In April 2014, a MoU and a preliminary agreement were signed between Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AICC) and Egypt's Ministry of Transportation to develop an 80 kilometer electric railway from El-Salam City to Belbeis and Sharqeya in greater Cairo. This line will also link with the third metro line currently under development in Cairo. The Chinese company will finance the project through loan repayments which will be due over a 20-year period, and which are estimated at $ 800 million; the railway will take three years to complete.43 Additionally, in December 2014, the Egyptian government signed an initial agreement with China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) to construct a high-speed train project line covering the 900 kilometer distance between Egypt's Mediterranean city of Alexandria and Aswan, close to the border with Sudan. The project would cost $10 billion, and the train's speed would reach 350 kilometers per hour, allowing it to cover the distance between Egypt's the two cities in three to four hours. Egypt will contribute 20 per cent of the labor the project will require, local materials, and executive oversight. The majority of workers directly employed will be Chinese.44 Finally, in January 2016, Egypt signed a MoU with China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) to construct a sixth metro line in Cairo. The 30-kilometer metro line will run from New Maadi in southern Cairo to Al-Khosous in Al Qalyubia, with a total of 24 stations and an estimated 1.5 million passengers daily. This metro project will cost an estimated $3.5 billion, the financing of which remains under negotiation between the two parties.45

Further large-scale agreements include the June 2015 framework agreement between Egypt and China calling for the implementation of 15 projects worth $10 billion, to be funded by Chinese banks and built at least in part by Chinese companies. The projects aim to boost bilateral industrial and investment relations in all of the above-mentioned industries. These include the establishment of three power plants, railways linking east Cairo with Tenth of Ramadan City, a multi-purpose station in Alexandria port, and trains, glass and leather factories, as well as the development of the Alexandria-Abu Qir railways.46 Another large-scale agreement took place in January 2016, when China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) signed a MoU with Egyptian officials to implement the first phase in construction of the administrative part of the new capital. The new Egyptian capital will be constructed over 490 square kilometers of land and is slated to include 1.1 million housing units to serve 5 million citizens. The Egyptian capital will also include 10,000 roads and a new airport; it will take between five to seven years to complete and estimates suggest that the total cost will be around $45 billion.47

While these agreements certainly provide Egypt with economic support from China, it is expected that Beijing will benefit in turn by gaining a foothold in the MENA region and beyond. This could be of vital importance to Chinese economic interests, particularly with its "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) initiative, which aims to bridge China, Europe, and Africa through infrastructure, transportation, and communications. Given Egypt's geostrategic significance, open economy, and relatively cheap labor force, Beijing will also gain opportunities to increase exports of low-cost consumer goods throughout European, African, Arab, and the sub-continental markets. Thus, a strong economic presence in the Egyptian economy will almost certainly strengthen Beijing's OBOR vision, securing both access as well as the smooth transit of energy resources to China.

More importantly, Egypt is a crucial element in the implementation of the OBOR project. The Suez Canal is an essential trade route for China's economy.48 Cairo, especially, is a crucial component of the Maritime Silk Road, with the Suez Canal functioning as the main transit point between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. That makes Egypt one of the few indispensable partners for the OBOR initiative. Simply put, the Maritime Silk Road as currently envisioned cannot exist without Egypt's participation.49

Therefore, it is only natural that Beijing's offer to Egypt to jointly build the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" accords with Egypt's New Suez Canal economic corridor strategy.50 The new Egyptian canal is a natural fit for China's Maritime Silk Road initiative which will make Cairo a "pivot" or "hub" for the success of OBOR. As Yang Jiechi, China's State Councilor, remarked on an official trip to Egypt: "China is keen to join Egypt in boosting pragmatic cooperation by centering around the 'Belt and Road' initiative with a focus on infrastructure and industrial capacity."51

Certainly, economic interests are the primary consideration in the burgeoning comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries, as in other key countries that will greatly involve Chinese cooperation on infrastructure projects, with additional investment in industrialization. Egypt's wish to develop its own economy, coupled with China's economic restructuring, create many opportunities for both countries to carry out infrastructure construction and capacity cooperation. Therefore, if Cairo continues to benefit from greater Chinese investment, it may well significantly decrease economic dependence on Washington within this decade.

CONCLUSION

The Chinese comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt is one of the most important contemporary developments when it comes to regional alliances in the Middle East. Egypt offers a strategic geographic location and huge economic market potential that make it a highly desirable partner to Chinese ambitions in the region, at a time when Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East is guided by its desire to fill the power vacuum created by the decline of U.S. power and influence in the region.

The new era of closer political and economic ties between China and Egypt must then raise the question of whether Beijing's new intense engagement with Egypt is indeed threatening to reduce U.S. influence in Cairo, thereby threatening U.S. interests in the region as a whole. Put simply, the answer is no; despite these developments, U.S. interests do not seem to be threatened.

The U.S., as the world's largest economy, and as the dominant arms purveyor in the Middle East, gives Egypt about 20 percent of all economic and military support that it provides to foreign countries through the Foreign Military Funding program. Since the 1970s, the U.S. has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt. Between 1948 and 2015, Washington provided Egypt with $76 billion in bilateral foreign aid, including $1.3 billion a year in military aid from 1987 to the present.52

Moreover, in 2015, Egypt received $1.3 billion in military aid and up to $150 million in economic assistance from Washington, making Cairo the second-largest recipient of military aid. It is important to mention that the U.S., through its military aid to Egypt, has achieved leverage and influence over the Egyptian military as well as over the broader contours of Egyptian political life.53 Therefore, although China and Egypt may seek to emphasize their military relationship and have even given signs that Beijing is seeking to supplant the U.S. as Egypt's major military partner,54 if China truly aspires to take over the role played by the U.S., it will need to become Egypt's top military supplier, and that is unlikely to happen any time soon. Washington remains firmly positioned to retain its strategic leverage over Cairo in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, while the growing China-Egypt trade relationship is evident clear trend, there still exist significant obstacles to their growing economic relations. First, many of the agreements that the Egyptian government has signed with Chinese companies constitute MoUs signifying early stage negotiations, rather than actual investment commitments. Second, China's most important investments are spread out over a number of years; therefore, it is difficult to predict how many will actually be realized in the end.55 Finally, the trade imbalance between the two countries has worsened significantly over time and without determined corrective action, the trade imbalance seems set to worsen and further upset Egypt's overall trade balance.56

The Sisi administration is determined to balance its partnership with Washington by diversifying its alternatives to Egypt's traditional reliance on the U.S. Thus, Egypt has welcomed Chinese political support and economic investment. Beijing, however, sees great strategic potential in Egypt, as a key partner to fulfilling its broader regional and global ambitions. Accordingly, China will surely know how to take advantage of the situation at this stage, chiefly in the economic sphere which most interests Egypt.

Footnote

NOTES

1 Xinhua, "China, Egypt elevate bilateral ties to comprehensive strategic partnership," December 23, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-12/23/c 133874597.htm.

2 Wan, Michelle, Lui Maomin and Yang Guang, China-Middle East Relations: Review And Analysis. (UK: Paths International Ltd, 2012).

3 Chris Zambelis, "A New Egypt Looks to China for Balance and Leverage," China Brief, Vol. XII, No. 18 (September 2012), pp. 8-11.

4 Shannon Tiezzi, "The Belt and Road and Suez Canal: China-Egypt relations under Xi Jinping," China Policy Institute: Analysis, February 16, 2016, https://cpianalysis.org/2016/02/16/87681/

5 Xinhua, "Chinese president praises "historic friendship" with Egypt," January 20, 2016

6 James Dorsey, "China and the Middle East: Embarking on a Strategic Approach," The Huffington Post, November 15, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/iames-dorsey/china-and-the-middle-east b 5827276.html.

7 Chris Zambelis, "A New Egypt Looks to China for Balance and Leverage," China Brief, Vol. XII, No. 18 (September 2012), pp. 8-11; Haddad-Fonda, Kyle, Eugene Rogan, and Laura Newby. Revolutionary allies: Sino-Egyptian and Sino-Algerian relations in the Bandung decade (UK: University of Oxford, 2013).

8 Emma Scott, "China-Egypt trade and investment ties- seeking a better Balance," The Centre for Chinese Studies, June 2015, http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CCS PB China Egypt Trade Ties Emma Final 2015.pdf.

9 Assem Reda Abu Hatab, Nada Abdelhamed Shoumann and Huo Xuexi, "Exploring Egypt-China bilateral trade: dynamics and prospects", Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2012), pp. 314-326.

10 Ofir Winter, Assaf Orion, and Galia Lavi, "Egypt and China following Xi's visit," INSS Insight, No. 795, February 11, 2016, http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11434.

11 China Daily, "Broad prospect for China-Egypt economic and trade cooperation," January 21, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016xivisitmiddleeast/2016-01/22/content 23204973.htm.

12 Ofir Winter, Assaf Orion, and Galia Lavi, "Egypt and China following Xi's visit," INSS Insight, No. 795, February 11, 2016, http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11434.

13 Ibid.

14 Marina Barsoum, "El-Sisi and Obama discuss ISIS threat, Libya crisis," Ahram Online, September 26, 2014, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/111721/Egypt/Politics-/ElSisi-and-Obama-discuss-ISIS-threat,-Libya-crisis.aspx.

15 Mohamed Saied, "Why hasn't Sisi visited Washington yet?," Al-Monitor, October 8, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/egypt-us-relations-sisi-visit.html#.

16 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Obama Before Bilateral Meeting with President el-Sisi of Egypt," September 25, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/25/remarks-president-obama-bilateral-meeting-president-el-sisi-egypt.

17 Chris Zambelis, "A New Egypt Looks to China for Balance and Leverage," China Brief, Vol. XII, No. 18 (September 2012), pp. 8-11.

18 Brian Spegele and Matt Bradley, "Egypt's Morsi Firms China Ties," The Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2012, http://www.wsi.com/articles/SB10000872396390444230504577617271550304082.

19 Degang Sun and Yahia Zoubir, "China's Response to the Revolts in the Arab World: A Case of Pragmatic Diplomacy," Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2014), pp. 2-20.

20 Shannon Tiezzi, "China, Egypt Consolidate Ties After Sisi's Attendance at Military Parade," The Diplomat, September 9, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/china-egypt-consolidate-ties-after-sisis-attendance-at-military-parade/.

21 Mohamed Saied, "Why hasn't Sisi visited Washington yet?," Al-Monitor, October 8, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/egypt-us-relations-sisi-visit.html#.

22 The National, "China inks $55bn Middle East deals," January 21, 2016 http://www.thenational.ae/world/east-asia/china-inks-55bn-middle-east-deals.

23 Ofir Winter, Assaf Orion, and Galia Lavi, "Egypt and China following Xi's visit," INSS Insight, No. 795, February 11, 2016, http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11434.

24 Xinhua, "China, Egypt oppose linking terrorism with specific nations, religions," January 22, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/22/c 135033234.htm.

25 Christina Lin, "China's Strategic Shift toward the Region of the Four Seas: The Middle Kingdom Arrives in the Middle East," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013), pp. 32-55.

26 European Commission, "Countries and regions: China," March 9, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/.

27 Magdy Amer, "Bilateral relations between Egypt and China," China Today, January 21, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2016-01/21/content 37629399.htm

28 TASS Russian News Agency, "Egypt applies to become dialogue partner of Shanghai security bloc-Kremlin aide," July 6, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/world/806320.

29 Global Times, "Chinese president arrives in Egypt for state visit," January 21, 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/964816.shtml.

30 AMEinfo, "China's investments in Egypt amount to $477 million," June 8, 2015, http://ameinfo.com/monev/economv/chinas-investments-in-egvpt-amount-to-477-million/*

31 Emma Scott, "China-Egypt trade and investment ties- seeking a better Balance," The Centre for Chinese Studies, June 2015, http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CCS PB China Egypt Trade Ties Emma Final 2015.pdf.

32 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, "Trade in Goods with Egypt," February 2016, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c7290.html.

33 Aswat Masriya, "Egypt, China Sign 20 Economic Agreements," January 25, 2016, http://allafrica.com/stories/201601211529.html.

34 Lin Noueihed and Ali Abdelaty, "China's Xi visits Egypt, offers financial, political support," Reuters, January 21, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-china-idUSKCN0UZ05I.

35 Xinhua, "China, Egypt agree to boost cooperation under Belt and Road Initiative," January 22, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/22/c 135033384.htm.

36 China Daily Asia, "China, Egypt clinch 21 investment deals," January 21, 2016, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2016-01/21/content 15376318.html.

37 Xinhua, "China, Egypt elevate bilateral ties to comprehensive strategic partnership," December 23, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-12/23/c 133874597.htm; Xinhua, "Xi meets Egypt President Sisi," September 2, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/02/c 134580549.htm.

38 China Daily, "Xi starts Egypt visit to synergize development plans," January 21, 2016, http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/world/2016xivisitmiddleeast/2016-01/21/content 23183336.htm.

39 Hou Liqiang, "Chinese companies boost operations in Egypt," China Daily, February15, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-02/15/content 23481956.htm.

40 Emma Scott, "China-Egypt trade and investment ties- seeking a better Balance," The Centre for Chinese Studies, June 2015, http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CCS PB China Egypt Trade Ties Emma Final 2015.pdf.

41 Xinhua Finance, "CNNC, Egypt ink MOU on nuclear cooperation," April 1, 2015, http://en.xinfinance.com/html/Industries/Utilities/2015/74201.shtml.

42 OFweek, "Yingli will build 500MW solar PV project in Egypt," February 10, 2015, http://en.ofweek.com/news/Yingli-will-build-500MW-solar-PV-proiect-in-Egypt-25326.

43 Daily News Egypt, "Ministry of Transportation signs $800m MOU with China for railway project," April 5, 2014, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/04/05/ministry-transportation-signs-800m-mou-china-railway-proiect/.

44 The Cairo Post, "Egypt's high-speed train project in progress: Minister," March 14, 2015, http://thecairopost.youm7.com/news/141695/business/egypts-high-speed-train-proiect-in-progress-minister.

45 All Africa, "Egypt to Sign MOU With Chinese Company to Construct Sixth Metro Line," January 11, 2016, http://allafrica.com/stories/201601041476.html.

46 Reuters, "Egypt enters into initial deal for 15 projects worth $10 bln with China-minister," June 16, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-investment-china-idUSL5N0Z14NG20150615·

47 Daily News Egypt, "Egyptian-Chinese MOUs signed for administrative capital projects," January 4,2016, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2016/01/04/egyptian-chinese-mous-signed-for-administrative-capital-proiects/.

48 Ofir Winter, Assaf Orion, and Galia Lavi, "Egypt and China following Xi's visit," INSS Insight, No. 795, February 11, 2016, http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11434.

49 Shannon Tiezzi, "Xi's Visit Cements Egypt's Place on the 'Belt and Road," The Diplomat, January 22, 2016 http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/xis-visit-cements-egypts-place-on-the-belt-and-road/.

50 Xinhua, "Xi proposes to build Egypt into pivot of Belt and Road," January 21, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/21/c 135032693.htm.

51 Xinhua, "China ready to back Egypt's efforts to maintain stability, development: senior official," June 2, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-06/02/c 134288758.htm.

52 Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, February 25, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.

53 Michael W. Hanna, "Getting Over Egypt: Time to Rethink Relations," Foreign Affairs, November-December, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egvpt/getting-over-egypt.

54 Xinhua, "China, Egypt to enhance military cooperation," April 27, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/27/c 134189454.htm; Daily News Egypt, "Egypt, China sign new weapons deal," May 2, 2015, http://www.dailynewsegvpt.com/2015/05/02/egypt-china-sign-new-weapons-deal/; NSNBC International, "Egypt's chief of staff meets Chinese counterpart, discuss security cooperation," April 28, 2016, http://nsnbc.me/2016/04/28/egypts-chief-of-staff-meets-chinese-counterpart-discuss-securitv-cooperation/.

55 Emma Scott, "China-Egypt trade and investment ties- seeking a better Balance," The Centre for Chinese Studies, June 2015, http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CCS PB China Egypt Trade Ties Emma Final 2015.pdf.

56 Hossam Mounir, "$63.27bn worth of international trade between Egypt and world in 9 months: CBE," Daily News Egypt, October 4, 2015, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/10/04/63-27bn-worth-of-international-trade-between-egypt-and-world-in-9-months-cbe/.