CHALLENGES OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS' PRACTICE

Abstract

This paper attempts to explore the complexity of the interactions between intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of their products, to underline the incongruence that marks these interactions, as well as the consequences generated by these difficulties. We intent to do that from both protagonists perspective, seen as personalities with distinct goals and interests (not always in harmony or consensus) and from the development at the institutional level represented by the protagonists themselves, respectively the intelligence process and the political and politico-military decision-making process. In pursuing this aim, we will examine the constraints and endeavors that the intelligence analyst-faces in successfully fulfilling his mission, starting with his profile. We will compare these constraints and endeavors with the needs, expectations and exigencies of the decision-making factors. After that, we will analyze the differences in approach, as well as the impact that these differences have on the interactions and on fulfilling the mission by each of the involved parts.

Headnote

This paper attempts to explore the complexity of the interactions between intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of their products, to underline the incongruence that marks these interactions, as well as the consequences generated by these difficulties. We intent to do that from both protagonists perspective, seen as personalities with distinct goals and interests (not always in harmony or consensus) and from the development at the institutional level represented by the protagonists themselves, respectively the intelligence process and the political and politico-military decision-making process.

In pursuing this aim, we will examine the constraints and endeavors that the intelligence analyst-faces in successfully fulfilling his mission, starting with his profile. We will compare these constraints and endeavors with the needs, expectations and exigencies of the decision-making factors. After that, we will analyze the differences in approach, as well as the impact that these differences have on the interactions and on fulfilling the mission by each of the involved parts.

Keywords: intelligence analysis, intelligence products, beneficiaries of the intelligence products.

Introduction

Ideally, interactions between those who provide analytical products - intelligence analysts - and the political and politico-military decision-makers, as beneficiaries of those products, are governed by a range of strict rules, norms, principles of conduct and specific working procedures. However, these rules, norms and principles should not be understood as a rigid framework regulating the activities of those persons. While, from the perspective of the persons working in the intelligence field, such an approach would not face any resistance, as they are used to work under numerous restrictions, from the political and politico-military decisionmakers' side, such an approach would be perceived as inacceptable, because of several factors of organizational, institutional, political, social etc. nature (for instance, professional background, specific working medium, assumed role, personal goals).

In practice, disobeying norms, principles and procedures regulating the relationship between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of the intelligence products leads to a range of differences in the mutual approach of the protagonists.

1.Intelligence analyst: profile, role, personal constraints and endeavors

The minimal skills for an analyst are knowledge in one or more specific fields, appropriate linguistic skills, as well as editorial skills at a level considered acceptable (especially the concision of the analytical text is of interest). These represent the basic skills on which, in time, strong analytical skills are built.

An important request for an analyst aims an objective reflection of the analyzed situations. Analysts have their own opinions regarding the issues treated in their papers, but this aspect should not be noticed. Analysts are listened and trusted because of their expertise accumulated in time and not because of their personal opinion's strength. In fact, the disclosure of their own opinions would represent a trespassing of the line that separates the intelligence activity from that of the political field. In order to overcome this drawback, analysts should learn to distinguish their own opinions from the facts presented.

The intelligence analyst often works with information that is contradictory, wrong or even misguided from different points of view. The ability with which the analyst manages this information depends on his training degree, as well as the analytical platform he uses (through analytical platform we understand the analysis and assessment process of the information used inside an organization). Consequently, the analysts' training is an essential process for the success of the mission of any intelligence organization.

Unfortunately, the intelligence organizations do not have enough time to train the analysts within some programmers especially designates to this goal. Thus, analysts have to train on their own, at the working place. Analysts arrive in these organizations with certain skills learned in the tertiary cycle of their education that they adapt to the specific of the intelligence activity. Here they learn, between other things, the basic requirements and the preferred means of expression. These vary from one organization to another.

By carrying out a research activity, the analyst often has intellectual ambitions. In fact, he wants his work to receive an attention in line with the effort consumed in that sense. Here intervenes a first problem for the analyst. Each analytical product elaborated in an intelligence community is the result of a collective activity and represents in itself an important stake for the entire organization. As Kay Oliver stated, "there is an inherent tension between the intellectual autonomy of the analyst and the institutional responsibility for each product"1.

In order to be listened and trusted by the beneficiaries of his work, the intelligence analyst has to establish some personal desiderates that we present as follows.

1. To add value to the abundance of information existing on different mass-media channels. Current technological developments allow decision-makers to inform themselves, sometimes even faster than the intelligence analysts can do regarding a certain event or phenomenon in every point on the Globe. The analyst has to be aware of this fact and to act in consequence. His response to this challenge aims at elaborating analytical products with an added value to the information existing on the global flows of news2.

2. To exceed the analytical abilities of the beneficiaries of his products. The dissemination of a large volume of news at global level permits for a large spectrum of persons to develop the analytical abilities, as well as the capacity to decode the hidden messages (from the diplomacy field, but not only). Evidently, among those persons are also the beneficiaries of the intelligence products. As such, in order to be listened, the analyst needs to make sure that he is always one step ahead the decision-makers or that he has an understanding of the message that the latter do not have3.

3. To focus on the main ideas, as well as on contextualizing and interpreting these ideas, and not on the relation of the punctual information4.

4. To develop imagination, keeping, at the same time, its realism. The development of the imagination permits the analyst to elaborate possible scenarios for the analysis of the future events5. These scenarios represent a very useful device in preventing the strategic surprise. However, the analyst does not have to slip towards uncertainty. For that, he has to understand well in what conditions a hypothesis has real chances to materialize6.

The development of the critical thinking is essential in order to reach all above mentioned endeavors.

When he elaborates a paper, the intelligence analyst often asks himself questions like: how relevant are the information he posses?, how significant are those for a specific issue?, how fast he has to elaborate an analytical product?, what kind of information has to transmit to a certain beneficiary?, how detailed has to be an analytical product?, what is the best way to transmit an information? etc.

2.Differences between the intelligence analyst and the decision-makers

The paramount goal of the intelligence analysis consists of informing the decisionmaking factors in order to improve the quality of the decisional act. From this perspective, it is shaped the necessity of a close relationship between the one to provide intelligence and the one to receive intelligence (either he requests it or not). As one of the role that intelligence analyst has to fulfill is that of advising the decision-making factors, this relationship should be based on the acknowledgement by the first of the latter's needs.

In practice, this aspect is especially important. A simple look on the profiles of the two actors reveals important differences between the actors, linked to interests, professional background, political belongingness, working environment, assumed roles, personal and professional expectations. In practice, these differences are potentially generators of frustrations among analysts, preconceived ideas among decisionmakers and, in the end, misunderstandings between the protagonists of the relationship.

A first difference consists in defining the success of the mission from each perspective. The success can represent different things (or different perspectives) for the two actors. Thus, the decision-making factors define the success as an advance in the submitting their own agenda. The success of the governmental agenda has to be measurable (quantifiable) and proved in ways easy to bring political gains. It is important here to recall that national security policy is elaborated inside a political system and process, whose last reward is keeping, gaining and regaining the domestic political power.

On the other hand, the intelligence community defines its own goals in a different way. Sherman Kent stated that the intelligence analysts have three desires: to know everything, to be listened and to influence positively the political and/or politico-military decision-making process, as they understand it7.

We would add that the intelligence analysts wish to keep their objectivity as far as the political field is concerned as well. This latter aspect tends to become increasingly difficult to prove in the current international context (political, economic, social, cultural and ecological), characterized by controversies in a great number of issues on the states' agenda. In these circumstances, the intelligence analysts risk to face a moral dilemma: either they reflect the truth as they know it, as competent researchers, but assuming the risk of being disapproved even by their bosses (and not only by the decision-making factors, in their quality of beneficiaries of the intelligence activity), or they choose to present things in a manner that will please decision-making factors, fueling themselves with the belief that their straying from the scientific truth serves a noble cause (supporting state interests) 8.

Another difference between the intelligence analyst and the decision-making factors refers to the motivational resorts of the two. The analyst's imperative is of intellectual nature, respectively to produce assessments that reflect the truth regarding a fact or a situation (on the basis of providing credible proofs)9.

On the other hand, the beneficiaries' imperative is often of political nature, respectively to make political decision and obtain results, as well as the quick and effective action.

The different responsibilities promote and support different attitudes. The beneficiaries of the intelligence activity are inclined towards optimism, as anything they do is useless if the desirable results are not achieved. They tend to keep open as many options as they can, sometime when it becomes evident that they cannot realize them, operating with what the analysts consider "the incompatible objectives". On the other hand, intelligence analysts are inclined towards pessimism, as the risk of their reputation to be affected is greater if they fail in foreseeing a negative evolution of one issue than if they make a warning that eventually proves to be exaggerated or wrong.

The time horizon at which the two actors report their mission fulfilling is also different. The objectives and the interests of the politicians are more often defined on short term (usually a mandate) as they are evaluated in accordance with the results obtained in that period. The careful and rigorous intelligence analysis needs, in exchange, more time of reflection. For that, more important than the time horizon to which they react is its objectivity.

At the same time, the beneficiaries of intelligence products are most often interested in the informative products that cover a short horizon of time (usually, up to a month), that is of what we usually name current analysis. Of course, this aspect represents an advantage for the analysts working in this sector of the intelligence analysis (the current analysis), but a reason of frustration for those analysts working in the medium and long term intelligence analysis. Thus, a conflict appears between what the decision-making factors want to read and what the intelligence analysts want to treat in their papers.

Shortly, the differences between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of the intelligence products are presented in Table no. 1.

Least but not last, the analysts' desire to make their expertise on a certain geographical areas or issue known, as well as the analytical skills they have gained face the disinterest, the unavailability and the incapacity of the beneficiaries to detach on the current problems, otherwise pressing. The best analysis could be usefulness if they that have the authority to act do not use.

3.The report between intelligence analyst and the beneficiaries of their work

The interaction between the beneficiary and the intelligence analyst is not only one of offering and receiving of intelligence and assessment, but it also represents a permanent dialog. Therefore, the analyst has to wait for questions and judgments from the decision-making factors. Within this permanent dialog, the analyst does not always have to provide concrete responses, but rather focus on the identification of the major directions of evolution of a phenomenon or on the possibilities of actions of a foreign actor. As well as that, the analyst has to explain the limitations imposed by the insufficiency of data and information that he uses10.

The clear distinction between the political activity and that specific to the intelligence field leads to questions linked to the manner in which the workers in the intelligence field and those working in the political arena have to relate. The core of the problem is the desirable degree of proximity between the two communities.

At present, two points of view prevail regarding this aspect. A first point of view is that the intelligence analyst has to keep a certain distance towards the decision-making factors, as they avoid the risk of providing information lacked of objectivity or that favors a certain options (political or military). The adepts of this point of view support that such a position presents the risk of the decision-making factors to interfere with the intelligence activity, and this interference would aim at stimulating the production of analysis that support or oppose to certain political lines. Therefore, they consider that a too closed relation between the intelligence analysts and the decision-making factors raises the risk of the politicization of the intelligence analysis.

The other point of view argues that a too big distance between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of the intelligence production creates the premise for the first to be less aware of the needs of the later and thus the analytical products would be less useful. The adepts of this point of view argue that the adequate training, but also the periodical internal analysis and assessment can lead to the avoidance of the politicization of the intelligence analysis.

Within this interaction, the two actors mutually shape their attitudes. Thus, the beneficiaries influence the thematic and the structure of the analytical paper, the language used the editorial style and the length of the paper. On the other hand, the intelligence analyst chooses the argumentation that supports his conclusions, the possible scenarios, makes up the prognosis on the issues treated and, sometimes, makes recommendations for the decision-making factors.

4.The role of the intelligence analysis in the decision-making process

Information means power, it is often said. This statement is not always or in any context true. Not always information speaks from itself. In addition, information can sometimes be wrong or simply irrelevant. Other times, the information can contain in itself the germens of power, but that who possess it either do not correctly or completely understand it (sometimes it is needed that the information be decoded), or he or she do not know how to use it in order to reveal the power.

In order to produce the desired effects, information should be implemented through the decision-making process. Consequently, the power of information depends on its degree of accuracy, but also on the manner in which those who poses the information know how to use it. In other words, in order for information to generate power it is not enough for it to be correct and complete, but it also has to be opportune, contextualized and communicated to those that, on the basis on the authority with which they have been invested, can give it power11.

In a world that abounds in information and in which those invested to take decisions are most often too busy to reflect at the daily avalanche of information, it is difficult to identify which information is worth to be treated carefully and which isn't. The surest way to persuade someone that a piece of information should be carefully treated is to give it an added value to that assigned on other channels of information. That is usually realized by personal interpretations. Consequently, the power of information depends sometimes on knowledge of the elements of power by the intelligence analyst12.

The last idea brings the intelligence analyst closer to the beneficiaries of the intelligence products. Instead, on the other hand, this closer relationship presents the risk of contaminating the analytical products with the presuppositions or the preferences of the beneficiaries.

Some authors and intelligence experts consider that the beneficiaries of the intelligence products are not part of the intelligence process. Their main argument is that once the intelligence product has been delivered to the beneficiaries, the intelligence process, as such, is over.

We consider that it would be a mistake to skip the beneficiaries of the intelligence products from the intelligence process. The role of the beneficiaries of the intelligence products do not limit to the receiving some intelligence products; they shape the intelligence activity during the intelligence process. Indeed, without a constant reference to the political or military action, the intelligence activity would not make sense. It can be said, without the fear of being wrong, that the beneficiaries of the intelligence products can play a decisive role in every phase of the intelligence process.

5.Assessment of the analytical products

Starting from those presented above, there appears the following question: what represents a good intelligence product? To this question does not exist a response clear or unanimously accepted by the researchers in the field. But there are, however, several elements generally accepted to be the ingredients of a good intelligence product. These are: objectivity, opportunity, concision, clarity and coherence13.

We did not include here accuracy. That is not because accuracy would not represent an important criterion in decryption a good intelligence product, but because it often represents criteria difficult to measure in order to be used in the evaluating process of the intelligence products. Generally, no one desires to make mistakes, but, at the same time, no one is infallible. As such, it is difficult to imagine a viable standard for accuracy that can serve to the evaluation of a good intelligence product. If we would continue the list of the significant attributes that make an intelligence product a good one, we would notice that other metrics also do not prove to be enough useful for this goal.

This does not mean that there are not enough clear ways to recognize a good intelligence product. Usually, two elements make the difference between a good intelligence product and a regular one - the quality of the writing and the impact upon the reader.

The quality of the writing is a skill that the analysts gets and improves it over time. As such, as far as these characteristics of a good intelligence product are regard, the problem is solvable. Instead, as far as the impact upon the reader is considered, the issue is questionable, as it is not always the sole concern of the analyst. The availability of the beneficiary for the reading of the information presented in a paper, the time allocated to understand it, the professional background and, not least, his or her intelligence culture represents important factors in defining the impact upon the beneficiaries of the intelligence products14.

If we take into consideration the fact that the analyst and the beneficiaries of the intelligence products use different sets of tools in evaluating the analytical products, we can deduce that this process is put under question.

This question mark put on the evaluation of the intelligence analysis by its beneficiaries should not represent a reason of frustration for analysts. They have to understand that, on the basis of a personal sustained effort, they can realize useful analytical products for current decision, but the exceptional analytical products can be realized very rarely. In fact, no one can be all the time exceptional, but this does not have to be the main concern of the intelligence analysts. The realization of a consistent and relevant intelligence product is a more feasible goal for the intelligence analysts and, at the same time, an appropriate goal for the beneficiaries of the intelligence products.

6.The feedback from the decision-makers

Ideally, the decision-making factors in the political and military fields have to provide to the intelligence community a frequent, clear, coherent, objective and constructive feed-back regarding the utility of the intelligence products they have received.

But in reality, the intelligence community receives this feed-back more rarely than it wants and it does not receive this feed-back systematically. This practice is based on some explanations.

The first explanation is that only a small part of the beneficiaries of the intelligence activity considers that the feed-back is necessary. This attitude is also a consequence of the fact that these beneficiaries do not take part into defining the intelligence requirements.

Another explanation is that decision-making factors are often too busy in order to make time to transmit such kind of response. Often, these persons simultaneously manage more problems and have a limited time to reflect particularly at what was inappropriate or incomplete for an intelligence product that they have received.

A third explanation for the lack of the feedback is that the beneficiaries of the intelligence products and the intelligence analysts have different institutional and personal expectations regarding the issues with which they operate. Beneficiaries are concerned with the development and implementation of the social, economic or security policies and programs and they hope to get further benefits (promoting in their career, reelection in the electoral campaign) as a result of the success of these policies. For them, the information delivered by the intelligence agencies does not represent more than a tool for the sustenance of their decisions. On the other hand, intelligence analysts are not responsible for the elaboration and implementation of the policies or for its success, but they focus on the filling the gaps in their personal training, in finding out new information regarding an event etc. Therefore, receiving a feedback represents a landmark in the analyst's training and, at the same time, a signal regarding the directions for the efforts that they have to study further.

A fragmentary feed-back can have two important consequences for the activity of an intelligence agency. The first is that the intelligence agency develops the collection plan starting from the presuppositions, and not from the certainties. In this case, there can appear the conflicting situations between the analysts and the beneficiaries of their products because of the discrepancies between the intelligence agency's supply and the expectations of the beneficiaries. The second important consequence is the distortion of the analytical message so that this to serve the preferences and the political interests of the beneficiaries, but not the objectivity. In this case, it appears the risk of the subjectivity (politicization) of the intelligence analysis.

7.Conflict generator elements between analysts and beneficiaries

The differences between analysts and beneficiaries in terms of interests, training, political belonging, working environment, assumed roles, expectations etc. can lead to divergences in the views of the protagonists, as well as to preconceptions as far as the beneficiaries are concerned.

The differences (the uneven approach) between decision-makers and the intelligence community and the preconceived ideas with which beneficiaries sometime operate can generate divergences between the later and the intelligence analysts and even tensions between the two groups. These divergences in views can appear in each stage of the intelligence cycle, as follows in the next lines.

In the information requirements stage. The information requirements are not simple phrases. In fact, they represent the agenda of the political decision-makers. Therefore, the intelligence community expects that the decision-makers to orientate the intelligence activity by clearly establishing and delivering the priorities of the political agenda, of the information requirements, so that the collection and the delivering of the data and information to be possible and useful. But, in practice, things do not happen in this way all the time. When these requirements do not come from the decision-makers, the intelligence community has to establish on its own the information requirements that it considers necessary. Instead, this approach creates the premises for some further disagreements as far as the resources allocation is concerned, particularly when the intelligence community does not succeed in covering an issue which becomes important for the decision-makers in a very short time.

At the same time, there is not an intelligence community that allows itself to completely neglect an issue, even if that is not on the top of the decision-makers preferences. The reasons are most often linked to the changing in the dynamics of the issue in discussion, as well as to the "game of interests" of the powerful states. An illustration of this fact is the changing in the interest of the former US State Secretary, James Baker for The Middle East region. Baker announced, in 1989, that he is not interested too much in the region, and only a year after his statement, Iraq invaded Kuwait, event that immediately and significant changed the US position towards the region15.

In the collection stage. Beneficiaries are not interested in the details regarding data collection (the sources from this data are obtained), if this does not involve political sensibilities. Instead, their practical concerns consist, in the first line, of establishing the budget allocated to the collection of data and information, as this activity consumes important financial, technical and human resources. At the same time, beneficiaries have the tendency to wrongly suppose that every issue is covered by the intelligence community at least at a basis level. Thus, when an issue with a low level of importance grows up quickly in importance, the beneficiaries of the intelligence products expect that a certain level of collection to be already in place and the collection phase can be rapidly intensified. These suppositions are evidently false.

The collection of data and information represent the basis of the intelligence activity and, from this perspective, any intelligence organization is interested to extend this activity as much as possible. Nevertheless, when the beneficiaries of the intelligence products, in their responsibility of political decisionmakers, impose limits to the collection, the intelligence community obeys these limits, even if the preferences of the later are evidently for intensifying the collection. Eventually, the intelligence community cannot consume more resources for collection than it receives from the political community.

The officials in the intelligence community are aware of the fact that they do not have enough resources to collect any kind of data and information. Therefore, they periodically take the decision of excluding some issues from the collection process. The usual practice is that the political community to set its own limits on the resources allocated to the collection which, many times, is below the level that the intelligence community wants.

In the analysis stage. As far as the analysis activity is concerned, there are some aspects that can lead towards tensions between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of their products.

People working in the intelligence branch frequently operate with ambiguities and uncertainties of varied nature. In fact, if a situation or an issue were known, there would not be need for intelligence. Consequently, intelligence reports underscore uncertainties and ambiguities.

This situation is rarely accepted by the beneficiaries of the intelligence activity, at least for two reasons. One reason is that an intelligence activity marked by uncertainties and ambiguities will be less useful (perhaps useless) for an informed decision-making process by the beneficiaries.

The second reason is linked to the fact that beneficiaries do not know the features of the intelligence activity. The later cannot understand why (or they cannot accept how) the intelligence community, which consumes huge financial resources from the state's budget, cannot know these issues.

As political decision-makers, beneficiaries of the intelligence products have political preferences and - from their own perspective - it is natural to prefer information that support their preferences or allow them to adopt the political decisions they want. However, this attitude becomes questionable when they ignore the information they receive from the intelligence community.

Sometime, the analysis, information or assessments of the analysts can limit the political options of the decision-makers. For instance, when these assessments suggest that certain courses of political action are either unsustainable or have undesirable effects or results or are dangerous. This situation can represent an area of friction between the two communities.

The above examples illustrate the potential for conflict between the two groups. Some of these divergent opinions can be avoided or eliminated if both parts give more time and effort in order to transform the intelligence production into a process from which both parts can learn. In the last resort, the aim of the intelligence analysis should be established in accordance with realist expectations and rules of engagement accepted from the beginning.

8.Presuppositions of the beneficiaries regarding the intelligence analysis

As stated above, the differences between the analysts and the beneficiaries of their products can determine preconceptions for the latter regarding the activity of the former. We present, in this sense, the most important preconceptions.

Intelligence agencies know the informative priorities of the political and politico-military decision-making factors. In reality, these organizations cannot guess these priorities, if they have not been timely transmitted by those that further require them.

The analysis and the assessments elaborated by the intelligence agencies cannot be trusted. The truth is that then the information delivered by the intelligence agencies undermines the certitudes of the decision-making factors, they bother the latter. As a reaction, the latter often put the responsibilities for the failure of their actions on the intelligence agencies' activity. They can do this quite easy as they know very well that the intelligence agencies will not protest. The best example is the 11 September 2001 events.

Intelligence agencies know everything. This is far from true, although sometimes the intelligence analysts behave as nothing is unknown for them. These organizations know only what it was required them to find out (to monitor). Even if the intelligence services have learnt how to be increasingly effective, they are seldom succeeding in covering the full range of information required by the decision-making factors in a state. The characteristics of the current international framework (including the interdependency and the transnational character of a range of important and controversial issues) make almost impossible to gather valued information referring to all the complex issues that concern a state. It can be stated, up to an extent, that these entities have lost the monopoly upon the information and they have to face new competition and new private intelligence actors from which they have to learn and with which they have to coexist16.

Intelligence agencies have to provide solutions to the identified problems. Beneficiaries have great expectations from the intelligence community, as well as exigencies according to these expectations. From the beneficiaries' perspective, the intelligence community's function is not only to inform the decision-making factors related to risks, threats and dangers, but also to represent an effective and genuine tool in the decision-making process at the strategic level and to prepare a response to the threats that it identify.

The intelligence approach is a universal panacea. Generally speaking, the decisionmaking factors have learnt how to make up questions, but they rarely know how to make up questions adapted to the informative requirements. Not least, the decision-making factors do not understand the activity of an intelligence agency is different from that of a strategic studies center. No one, even the intelligence analysts, can foresight the future. In the last instance, it depends on the decision-making factors to base on right deeds provided by the intelligence community, to choose between more possible scenarios and to define their own policies.

Politicization of the intelligence analysis does not have negative effects. This aspects is especially important, therefore we will treat it at large in this paper.

A main cause of these preconceptions has its roots in the lack of intelligence culture of the decision-making factors. Because they do not have intelligence knowledge, the decisionmaking factors do not understand what the intelligence agencies are, what are the principles that govern its activity and, implicitly, what are their constraints and their possibilities of action. They have not been trained in this direction. The decision-making factors often think that the intelligence analyst is an expert in geopolitics or security, when, in fact, it is an "expert in access to protected information".

9.Facets of politicizing the intelligence analysis

To politicize a deed means to give it a political tone or character or to transfer it to the political field. In the intelligence field, politicization means distorting the existing information in order to serve to some specific preferences or goals. Politicization of the intelligence analysis has negative consequences upon accomplishing its mission because it undermines its fundamentals, according to that the intelligence judgment has to be objective and scientific.

Politicization of the intelligence analysis has a double origin: it can be the result of some judgment errors from the intelligence analysts' side, but it also can be the result of some efforts from the beneficiaries of the intelligence products aimed at determining the intelligence analysts to conform to the interests or preferences of the former.

Politicization of the intelligence analysis is based on several causes. From the perspective of the analyst, these causes are: losing the objectivity related to the analyzed issue; the preference for some specific options or results; the desire to support these options or results; interests linked to the promotion in their career. From the beneficiaries' perspective, the main reason staying behind the politicization of the intelligence analysis is linked to promotion of a certain political agenda.

From another perspective, politicization of the intelligence analysis by the analysts can be the result of an intentional effort, aimed at answering the content and/or the significance of the information obtained through collection in order to support their preferred options, or it can be an unaware act.

When it is an deliberated act, politicization of the intelligence analysis is a mistake that has to be sanctioned, even if it is based on the best intentions, in other words, it serves a noble goal, which is superior to the intellectual probity. Instead, when it is the result of an unintentional act, politicization of the intelligence analysis can be regarded as an innocent gesture. But even in this situation, it can produce effects that are more difficult to identify and combat than when it represents a deliberated act.

In practice, politicization of the intelligence analysis by the analyst is more subtle because it does not compulsorily involve the fact that it has to overcome the line that separates the intelligence activity from that of the political field. In fact, most often, the analyst adjusts his or her analytical product so that this to be more favorable (to close as much as possible) to the political options of the beneficiaries. The analyst knows that, at the higher levels of the intelligence community, the line that separates the intelligence activity from that of the political field is not so clear and supposes that his or her professional chiefs, being more often in contact with the decision-making factors, want an analysis that satisfies the preferences of the later.

Politicization of the intelligence analysis is more difficult to prove and combat than it appears at first sight. Some experts argue even that politicization is an unavoidable contradiction from the analyst side. In case of the controversial issues (and almost all major issues in the current international relations are controversial), any pertinent analysis risks to be charged, at least partially and at least implicitly, from politicization, regardless of the statements, conclusions or prognosis it supports. The different disputes raised around the intelligence analysis

- if it is valid, what arguments from those used are correct and what are unclear or false, what are important and what are irrelevant, in what context should the presented facts be understood

- are aimed, directly or indirectly, at the political dimension. It can be said that, the more important is the intelligence analysis, the more politicized it is.

A more nuanced point of view considers politicization as a form of contamination of the intelligence analysis with the political predispositions of the beneficiaries.

Regarding politicization of the intelligence analysis by the decision-making factors, it can be said that it can also have several forms - from the direct expression of some preferences that support a certain course of action, to the selective use of the information received from the intelligence community or forcing the gaining of some analytical conclusions that support their political preferences or interests. For instance, the bush Administration has exercised pressure, in more or less subtle ways, upon the CIA analysts, in order that the later to state their believe in the existence of some links between the activists of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and the former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein17.

Not least, politicization of the intelligence analysis is also a problem of perception. In principle, there can be reached an agreement to what politicization represents or how a politicized intelligence product looks like, but, in practice, it is more difficult to prove whether a certain intelligent product fits to the accepted definition or not.

Conclusions

The three desires of the intelligence analysts

- to know everything, to be listened and to positively influence the decision-making process

- expressed by Sherman Kent - aim at the core of the relationship between the analysts and the decision-making factors, as beneficiaries of intelligence products.

The constraints and the personal motivations shape the activity of the involved parts. For the intelligence analysts, the main concern is to be listened and believed by the legal beneficiaries of their activity. F or the latter, the challenge i s to learn how to effectively use intelligence products.

When tensions between the two parts appear, politicization of the intelligence analysis is often brought into discussion. The root of the controversy linked to politicization of the intelligence analysis is based on the existing differences between the dynamics of the analytical process in the intelligence filed and that of the decision-making process in the political and/or politico-military field, the professional norms and the political utility, as well as in the differences between the applied standards in the intelligence analysis, respectively in the political arena.

Ideally, the relationship between the political community and the intelligence community has to be symbiotic. For that to happen, the intelligence analysts have to carry out their role as "advisers" of the decision-making factors; in turn, the latter have to communicate in due time the informative requirements to the intelligence community.

In practice, the result of the interactions between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of the intelligence activity depends on the political culture of those working in the intelligence filed and by the intelligence culture of those working in the political field. The differences between the normal functioning of the relationship between the two actors can be remediated through a mutual effort aimed at better knowing the particularities of each filed and through a better communication process at the top level.

The interaction between the intelligence analyst and the decision-making factors, as beneficiaries of the intelligence products provided the firsts, is not a game between the equals. This game is deeply affected by the preferences and interests of the beneficiaries, which often impose their own point of view on the way in which the relationship between the two protagonists is governed. This asymmetrical relationship is based on the acknowledgment of the fact that the decision-making factors can exist and can work without the support of the intelligence community; conversely, the situation is not valid. In other words, the existence of the intelligence community cannot be discussed outside the political community; in turn, politics can exist even without intelligence. However, this last observation needs an important correction: without intelligence, the political and/or politico-military decision is neither effective nor sustainable for a state.

Footnote

1 Kay Oliver testimony in Gates hearings, cited in Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA analysts resist managers, in International Journal of intelligence and counterintelligence No, 1, 1997, Spring, p. 19.

2 James B. Bruce, George Z. Roger, Intelligence AnalysisThe Emergence of a Discipline, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 2011, pp. 4-6.

3 Robert S. Sinclair, Thinking and Writing: Cognitive Science and Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington DC, 2004, pp. 7-8.

4 Wilhelm Agrell, When everything is intelligence - nothing is intelligence, University of Lund, Sweden, Occasional Papers: Volume 1, Number 4, Oct. 2002, pp. 12-16.

5 Jack Davis, Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence, Sherman Kent Center, Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 2, Jan. 2003, p.10.

6 There are two possibilities to illustrate uncertainty: one consisting of an subjective assessment of the probability, and the other in using statistical data. Verbal expressions such as possible, likely, unlikely can represent forms of a subjective assessment of the probabilities, and the delivering of the data as percents uses the statistical way. Thus, intelligence agencies rarely use quantitative terms and verbal expressions referring to probability are considered irrelevant. Often, the values that the reader gives to these expressions depends on the context in which they are used.

7Jack Davis, Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on AnalystPolicymaker Relations, Sherman Kent Center, Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 3, Jun. 2003, p.14.

8 Kenneth Lieberthal, The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy. Getting Analysis Right, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Washington, D.C., 2009, p.18.

9 Richards Heuer, Psychology of the intelligence analysis, Washington D.C., Washington, 1999, p.89.

10 Christopher A. Ford, Relations between Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Lessons of Iraq, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, DC 2009, pp. 6-7.

11 Michael Herman, Intelligence services in the information age. Theory and practice, Frank CASS, London Portland, 2001, p. 212.

12 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence. From secret to policy, CQ Press, 2000, pp. 152-165.

13 Mark M. Lowenthal, op.cit., p. 85.

14 Teitelbaum Lome, The Impact of the Information Revolution on Policymakers ' Use of Intelligence Analysis, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 2011, pp. 134-145.

15Mark M. Lowenthal, op.cit., pp. 210-211.

16Michael Herman, Intelligence services in the information age. Theory and practice, Frank CASS, London Portland, 2001, pp. 48-52.

17In this sense, Bush Administration insistently asked to CIA analysts to focus on the indices suggesting these links. The Vice-president of that moment, Dick Cheney, paid several visits the CIA Headquaters in order to analyse and disscuss on this subject and the suggested alternative interpretations from the analysts' side. (Source: Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence. From secret to policy, CQ Press, 2000).

References

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. AGRELL, Wilhelm, When everything is intelligence - nothing is intelligence, University of Lund, Sweden, Occasional Papers: Volume 1, Number 4, Oct. 2002.

2. BRUCE, B. James, George Z. Roger, Intelligence Analysis-The Emergence of a Discipline, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 2011.

3. DAVIS, Jack, Tensions in AnalystPolicymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence, Sherman Kent Center, Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 2, Jan. 2003.

4. DAVIS, Jack, Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations, Sherman Kent Center, Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 3, Jun. 2003.

5. FORD, A. Christopher, Relations between Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Lessons of Iraq, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington D.C.. 2009.

6. HERMAN, Michael, Intelligence services in the information age. Theory and practice, Frank CASS, London Portland, 2001.

7. HEUER, Richards, Psychology of the intelligence analysis, Washington D.C., 1999.

8. LIEBERTHAL, Kenneth, The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy. Getting Analysis Right, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 2009.

9. LORNE, Teitelbaum, The Impact of the Information Revolution on Policymakers ' Use of Intelligence Analysis, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 2011.

10. LOWENTHAL, M. Mark, Intelligence. From secret to policy, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2000.

11. SINCLAIR, S. Robert, Thinking and Writing: Cognitive Science and Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington D.C., 2004.