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In his classic study of divided government, [David Mayhew (1991)] noted that broad, bipartisan coalitions occurred frequently on major legislation in the U.S. Congress. Super-majorities, he observed, result from a "Capitol Hill mindset of problem-solving and a logic of aggregation" in the fragmented American system ([Mayhew 1991], 134). Indeed, between 1981 and 2008, roughly 18 percent of bills with a recorded vote in at least one chamber passed Congress with veto-proof margins. The continuation of "a logic of aggregation," despite increasing levels of polarization, raises questions about the internal workings of Congress and the institution's relationship with the White House. How did legislative leaders create supersized coalitions during a period of rapid political change, and how did presidents respond to bills with such widespread backing? Procedural maneuvers provided the means for expanding support for a bill, we argue, and the resulting veto-proof tally enabled presidents to assess reputational costs and benefits of a veto. Paradoxically, as Congress became more polarized, its leaders exercised positive agenda controls to sustain bipartisan super-majorities and signal lawmakers' commitment for a bill to the Oval Office.
In theory and practice, we might expect veto-proof bills to be rare events in Congress. Some theories stress the median lawmaker as decisive in legislative outcomes (cf. [Krehbiel 1998]), while others emphasize the majority party's control of the agenda to satisfy its median member (cf. [Aldrich and Rohde 2001]; [Cox and McCubbins 2005]). Oversized coalitions not only are larger than necessary but also muddy the majority's efforts to establish a favorable reputation with voters. In addition, empirical work on Congress emphasizes the ability of minorities to obstruct legislation (cf. [Bach and Smith 1988]; [Koger 2010]; [Sinclair 2006]) and the negative effects of polarization (cf. [Binder 2003], [2014]; [Mann and Ornstein 2006]; [Theriault 2008], [2013]). Although veto-proof majorities are not the norm in Congress, the fact that they occur at all in an institution prone to gridlock warrants investigation.
The president gains enormous leverage over Congress through the decision to sign or reject a bill ([Cameron 2000]; [Groseclose and McCarty 2001]; [Martin 2012]; [McCarty and Poole 1995]). A veto-proof tally, however, undermines the president's influence by signaling lawmakers' unwillingness to negotiate. It also poses a costly choice for the executive between a veto with a...