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TAKASHI IWATAAN INTERPRETATION OF DHARMAKRTIS SVABHVA-HETU*One of the contributions Dharmakrti made to Buddhist logic is his
reinterpretation of Digngas logic by means of the ontological relation
of essential connection (svabhva-pratibandha), i.e. on the one hand
tdtmya, the relation in which the sdhana (proving factor) is the
essence of the sdhya (factor to be proved) or alternatively the sdhana
has the sdhya as its essence1, and on the other hand tad-utpatti, the
relation in which the sdhana is the effect of the sdhya. On the basis
of this essential connection, he restricts all valid reasons basically to
two kinds: reason as essential property (svabhva-hetu) and reason as
effect (krya-hetu). The validity of the logical relation between the
svabhva-hetu and its consequence, a property to be proved (sdhyadharma), is based on the ontological relation of tdtmya, while that of
the logical relation between the krya-hetu and a property to be proved
is based on the ontological relation of tad-utpatti.In spite of the important role the svabhva-pratibandha plays in
guaranteeing the validity of an inferential relation in the domain of real
things, in the case of the svabhva-hetu the dynamic interpretation of
tdtmya has not been made sufficiently clear. Namely, in contrast to the
well known relation of cause and effect, which is the basis for the
establishment of the inferential relation between the krya-hetu and its
consequence, the relation of tdtmya, probably because of its static
feature, does not seem to be self-evident when the question arises as to
how it appears concretely in the domain of real things. The present paper
aims to illustrate this dynamic feature of the tdtmya from the aspect of
the causal relation of real things and their own material causes.Although Dharmakrtis interpretation of inference by means of the
minimalistic principle of the svabhva-pratibandha is systematically so
simplified that it makes it possible for us to grasp the general scheme of
his logic, just because of this very simplicity the validity of his logical
system is called into question: how is it possible to interpret arbitrary
valid reasons only on the basis of either tdtmya or tad-utpatti? In other
words, how are valid reasons reduced to either svabhva-hetu or kryahetu? I have treated some of these questions elsewhere2. Among the
problems that...