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HISTORIANS claim that the changes evident in Napoleonic artillery practices from 1807 resulted from declining standards throughout the Grande Armee brought on by years of constant warfare. This paper argues that this is incorrect. Examination of the long-term development of the French artillery arm, the growth in artillery numbers, and improvements in artillery practices reveals the increasing importance of artillery tactics within Napoleon's overall battle plan. This should be seen as a culmination of years of experimentation and innovation, rather than compensation for a decline in other arms.
It is generally recognised that French successes under Napoleon came at a price: battle casualties slowly thinned the veterans from the ranks, while an influx of inexperienced recruits took their place. Many historians dealing with French tactics believe that the artillery's rise was occasioned by the declining quality of French infantry that resulted from this ongoing process,1 a situation exacerbated by the loss of experienced officers.2 A second school of thought attributes this trend in artillery tactics to France's inferiority in cavalry numbers during 1813-14.(3) This massing of cannon has been seen by some as a decline in artillery tactics.4 While a major shift did occur in French tactical practice from 1809, this article argues that it was the result of improvements in the use of artillery, rather than a response to declining standards. Nevertheless, the new artillery tactics did compensate for the decline in the quality of France's infantry and cavalry.
Beginning with the Battle of Friedland (14 June 1807), Napoleon's system of artillery began to make its presence felt upon the battlefield. While the aggressive handling of a small number of cannon is evident prior to 1807, Friedland was the moment when the system begin to crystallise into the Napoleonic artillery regime that thereafter systematically handled large artillery formations in an aggressive manner. At this time the artillery moved from being exclusivly a support arm to one that could take the lead with the other arms supporting it in turn. To understand the nature of this new system and why it appeared when it did, we need to examine the development of the artillery arm in the wake of the Seven Years' War (1756-63). Two important trends with roots in the reforms of that period...