Lee, Grant and Sherman: A Study in Leadership in the 1864-65 Campaign

Abstract

Reid reviews "Lee, Grant and Sherman: A Study in Leadership in the 1864-65 Campaign" by Alfred H. Burne.

Lee, Grant and Sherman: A Study in Leadership in the 1864-65 Campaign. By Alfred H. Burne. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000 [1938]. ISBN 0-7006-1073-1. Maps. Notes. Index. Pp. xxiii, 226. $16.95.

I have long admired the historical works of Lt. Col. A. H. Burne. Commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1906, he served on the Western Front in the First World War. In 1934 he retired to become a professional writer. My copy of the 1939 American edition of this book published by Scribner's, with an Introduction by Douglas Southall Freeman, is much marked and annotated. It is this version that the University of Kansas Press has used for its welcome new edition, replete with a sharp Foreword and additional endnotes by Albert Castel. Although perhaps not among Burne's very best work, Lee, Grant and Sherman has many striking qualities. It embodies the best features of military history written by a former officer: firm tactical grasp, common sense about what is and what is not practicable in the deployment of armies, shrewd judgement in regard to debates over the merits of commanders, and a provocative edge. The whole is composed in a sinewy, readable style.

Castel is in no doubt about Burne's merits as an historian, and perhaps does his cause little good by exaggerating them in comparison with the well-- known works of Major General J. F. C. Fuller and Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart on Civil War generalship. Whatever the validity of their individual arguments, the works of the latter are incontestably superior to Burne's in terms of sweep, imagination, range, and research; they also do a better job at relating the study of command to the general nature of the war, which Burne fails to attempt. Of course, Burne is highly critical of some aspects of W. T. Sherman's generalship, and anticipates some of Castel's own strictures in Decision in the West (1992). This partiality perhaps distorts Castel's overall judgement, for the majority of his endnotes focus on Sherman's campaigns. Although I do not always agree with Burne's criticisms of Sherman, he is surely more sensitive to "the faulty system of command" (p. 114) under which he laboured than is Castel in his much more thorough later work. Castel is, needless to say (and rightly), concerned to introduce the book to American readers. He believes that Burne's work "anticipated a major shift, starting in the 1960s" in historians' views on Civil War generalship; but this seems a dubious claim. Here Fuller and Liddell Hart are a much more accurate guide, especially the former. Both were in the vanguard of writers keen to shed the pro-Confederate bias in the writing of Civil War history. The core of Fuller's case against Robert E. Lee (which Castel dismisses scornfully) was that Grant was the superior grand strategist. Burne accepts this argument as "undoubtedly true" (p. 203). Although Burne was not uncritical of Lee, his book is essentially a throw-back to the pro-Confederate emphasis that was such a feature of the British Army's study of the Civil War before 1914.

Castel's limited perspective on the readership Burne had in mind for Lee, Grant and Sherman leads to a failure to appreciate some of its weaknesses. It was published by a publisher, Gale and Polden, who specialized in military works, as a textbook for British officers who were preparing for the Staff College qualifying examinations and for those that studied the Civil War once they had arrived there. This explains the format with numerous subheadings, the "Comments" sections, and Burne's rather cavalier attitude both to sources and controversies among historians.

Still, his book stands on its own merits, whatever disagreements might exist over these. Burne was essentially conservative in his military outlook, but that did not mean he was unable to reach individual and well-considered conclusions. These are worth thoughtful reconsideration. Modern scholarship has not accepted his defence of John B. Hood, and I, for one, cannot agree with his harsh verdict on Philip H. Sheridan's career as an independent army commander, that he "must be set down a failure" (p. 168). Burne might neglect factors such as logistics, but he exhibits an impressive understanding of the art of war. He is suspicious of any panacea. Many modern historians emphasise the value of the defence; some argue that if the Confederacy had pursued a defensive strategy it might have won its independence. To such claims Burne retorts, "A passive defence never has secured results, and it never will" (p. 98). In short, and this is the book's strongest recommendation, Burne can still take swipes at conventional wisdom.