The Clandestine War in Asia. 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda, and Special Operations

Abstract

"The Clandestine War in Asia. 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda, and Special Operations" edited by Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley is reviewed.

The Clandestine War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda. and Special Operations. Edited by Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2000. ISBN 0-7146-8096-6. Photographs. Figures. Notes. Index. Pp. 298. $24.50.

In their wide-ranging introduction to these essays (which first appeared in a special issue of Intelligence and National Security 14 [Winter 1999]), the editors suggest that Asia was the "hottest" theater in a global Cold War, and remind us that of the five occasions when the United States gave serious consideration to the use of nuclear weapons, four of them arose over conflicts in Asia. On the other hand, they suggest that for the United States, Asia was deemed to be of lesser importance than Europe and the Middle East, which were regarded as the "flashpoints" in the 1950s, even though the combination in Asia of nationalist and anticolonialist movements, the emergence of postcolonial neutral and nonaligned positions, and the on-going Sino-Soviet rivalry produced an unusually volatile situation in which the tensions of the Cold War assumed new proportions. The essays that follow deal with intelligence aspects of Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Burma, the Philippines, Cambodia, the Malayan Emergency, and the Indonesian "Confrontation." Each of them makes use of newly available archival material, whose release, the editors argue, enables "new chapters" of the history of the Cold War to be opened.

Two of the most interesting essays in this collection are those by Karl Hack and Kumar Ramakrishna, dealing with aspects of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60. Hack looks at the transformation of the British intelligence system in Malaya, from its obvious deficiencies at the beginning of the Emergency to its great successes of 1957-58, when the achievements of the Special Branch were central to the defeat of the "now ailing" communist insurgency. Most accounts of the British victory in Malaya regard the appointment of General Sir Gerald Templer as High Commissioner in 1952 as the turning point in the campaign, and credit him with "energising" the anticommunist effort. Hack argues, however, that while Templer was important, the overall transformation was much more a question of incremental development. Central to this intelligence apparatus improvement was the policy of population control, combining as it did coercive and persuasive powers, which over time separated the communist guerrillas from their vital bases of support in the fringe-dwelling Chinese population. Once denied ready access to food supplies, the Communists were forced to reassess their strategy, downgrading their previous policy of direct military action, and moving their headquarters north (and away from concentrations of population where they might have expected to receive support). Hack makes two points regarding the population control strategy: that it preceded Templer's appointment, and that, from the Communist perspective, it exposed them even more to the "objective" characteristics of a "geographic, social and ethnic terrain," i.e., of waging a "Communist Chinese-led insurgency facing a mainly hostile Malay population." This, it now seems, is also the explanation of the Malayan Communist Party's leader, Chin Peng, increasingly available for interview and comment after decades of virtual invisibility. In the absence (unlike the situation in of much of post-Cold War eastern Europe) of extensive documentary sources from the "other side," sources such as Ching Peng are of great importance, and as with Dr. Hack I found it a fascinating experience to hear Ching Peng talk at length about the Emergency at his seminar at the Australian National University in February 1999. However one reconciles the avuncular and charming Chin Peng with the ruthless insurgent who directed a campaign that was responsible for the deaths of thousands of Chinese, Malay, and British civilians, soldiers, and police, Hack makes a most important point when he argues that what is needed is to "try and integrate the dominant and divergent British and Communist stories into one internally coherent analysis." As a contributor to what he styles the "Anglo-Saxon" historiography of the Emergency, I welcome his attempts to effect such an integration.

Kumar Ramakrishna examines the government's surrender policy in terms of its content (what was actually promised to insurgents), its credibility (how much the promises could be and were believed), and its context (how it fitted in with an overall government strategy). He argues that in the early years of the Emergency, surrender policy was seriously compromised by British military activities, whereas after 1954, when government activities constituted much more than merely "mopping up" the remnants of the Communist forces, the surrender policy was an essential part of eliminating the "residual threat" posed by the hard-core insurgents. The success of the policy was underscored by the mass surrenders of December 1957.

The essays in this collection demonstrate that a close study of intelligence activities will shed new light on the period of the Cold War, and will require historians to reassess established positions. In all, this is a most valuable collection.