Content area
Full text
War Planning 1914. Edited by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-521-11096-9. Maps. Notes. Appendix. Index. Pp. viii, 269. $85.00.
In July- August 1914 six armies mobilized and deployed to fight. Now, almost a century later, historians have at their disposal a comparative analysis, based on archival sources, of the war planning behind five of those mobilization and deployment decisions. Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig have turned conference papers into a work that now becomes the standard on war planning before the Great War. Though Serbia is not included and the maps are relatively scant, the essays are distinguished for their quailty and their documentation.
The editors asked the writers to focus on the broader topic of war planning, not just war plans, and the strategic choices made (or not made) as planning proceeded. A series of conclusions emerges. First, no government truly engaged in coordinated, strategic planning, not even the British with their Committee of Imperial Defence. Second, the economic dimensions of war planning were almost totally ignored. Third, though intelligence was important, the writers do not find much evidence that it actually influenced war planning, or if it did, it was misinterpreted. Fourth, concerns about secrecy allowed the leading military and naval leaders to keep their plans (and their doubts) to themselves. Fifth, planners talked about flexibility yet they had almost no latitude to alter...