Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study Vol. 4

Abstract

Isby reviews Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study Vol 4 by Seth G. Jones.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study Vol. 4. By Seth G. Jones. Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8330-4133-3. Maps. Figures. Notes. Bibliography. Pp. xvii, 157. $26.50.

This is the Afghanistan volume of a multivolume study by the RAND Corporation for the U.S. Department of Defense on different conflicts involving insurgency and counter-insurgency. As such it incorporates and refers to findings from the extensive existing literature, especially that from RAND, applying a broad range of sources on insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, development and nation-building (but not narcotics eradication), and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan (set out in a 16-page bibliography), updated with a number of interviews with senior Afghan, coalition, and U.S. leaders.

This is not a book but rather a government report - a different prose creature - and so has been prepared and printed not to sell well or receive good reviews but to be responsive to its sponsor's specifications. Here, stressing unclassified metrics and a social-science approach, unlikely to be the top priority in a stand-alone book, is part of the multi-volume survey in which different conflicts are compared with RAND's database of 90 (highly disparate) post-1945 insurgencies. Similarly, a government report can assume a greater degree of familiarity with the subject matter than a comparable book, relieving the author of the need to explain terms, systems, or actions unfamiliar to the layman.

Conversely, omissions that would be considered an oversight in a book may be inevitable in a report. There is no index. There is only limited coverage of intelligence and special operations - frequently a critical element of counter-insurgency success or failure in many conflicts. A book could rely on press reports and interviews with non-military personnel to provide at least a partial picture; in this case such an effort was apparently not required. However, as a contractor-prepared report it can be forthright on a number of sensitive issues - such as Pakistani intelligence and military support for the insurgency that is killing Afghans and U.S. and coalition soldiers - where its client has too often equivocated in recent years.

Despite the acknowledged review efforts of two leading Afghanistan experts, there are still too many errors of fact that should have fallen to the red pen. In addition, the report equates "central" with "national". Any action that might have even the potential to undercut Kabul's authority - such as forming local militias for defense against insurgents - is viewed with suspicion. Unnamed "warlords" are invariably evil and a national police force is a needed goal; judgments commonplace in Kabul, but not necessarily pointing the way to adapting insurgency lessons to hard Afghan realities. But the identification of the top priorities - build security forces, improve local governance, eliminate cross-border insurgent support - is certainly accurate.

The Department of Defense may have paid for this report but the author recognized that the story is about Afghanistan and the Afghans while "most policymakers - including those in the United States - repeatedly ignore or underestimate the importance of locals in counterinsurgency operations" (p. xiv). There is no error, however, about the report's bottom line recommendation: "The most significant lesson from Afghanistan is the importance of encouraging legitimate and effective indigenous governments and security forces" (p. 111). Bringing together "legitimate" "effective" "Afghanistan" and "government" for the first time since the reign of the former king will be the work of a generation even if the insurgents that would smash the whole frustrating project can be kept out by Afghan, coalition, and U.S. forces. Only the "locals" - the Afghans - can save themselves, but can only do so if enabled - and not undercut - by their friends and allies. Developing a sustainable U.S. policy to do that will be a challenge indeed.

This is a successful effort and worthwhile reading for a broader authence than those that commissioned it. As a capstone report, intended to refer to a broad sweep of preexisting research, it, of necessity, talks in generalizations and it is harder to generalize about Afghanistan than just about any other small country. While it "smells of the lamp" (rather than the chai khana), its methodology is well employed and its overall results deserve consideration. In addition to being sold in a paperback edition, this report is available for download at:http://www.rand.org/ pubs/monographs/MG595/.