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IN 1905, the Admiralty approved the construction of the Dreadnought, la battleship that achieved major increases in firepower and speed at relatively small cost through the exploitation of innovative systems of armament and propulsion. Dreadnought was the product of deliberations that had been initiated by Admiral Sir John Fisher, the technologically radical service chief of the Royal Navy. During the bitter controversy that followed the revelation of Admiralty intentions to the public, which lasted for several years beyond the commissioning of the new model vessel in 1906, Fisher presented himself as an uncompromising defender of the decision. Under his authority, moreover, the construction of ships designed in accordance with the same general principles was continued. To most historians, Fisher's thinking about the matter has seemed straightforward, unproblematic, and even obvious: Dreadnought represented his ideal capital ship, and the goal of his naval policy was the replacement of the predreadnought battle fleet with one made up of dreadnoughts.(3)
Recent scholarship, however, has presented a fundamentally different picture of Fisher's view of capital ship design and his larger intentions. What Fisher really wanted, according to the revisionists, was the fast, heavily armed, but not well protected battle cruiser. This alternative type of capital ship was to be equipped with an advanced fire control system that would enable it to hit before it could be hit, which would mean that the thinness of its armor would not be a tactical liability. Battle cruisers, Fisher believed, would be swift and powerful enough to catch and destroy enemy battleships or armored cruisers, and could be quickly deployed to defend distant imperial possessions whenever necessary because submarines would prevent hostile navies from undertaking any serious operations in the narrow seas around Britain. Fisher was also convinced that a fleet of battle cruisers and submarines would cost less for a variety of reasons than a conventional force made up of battleships and armored cruisers, and thus reduce naval spending, which by 1905 had reached the outer limits of what many believed Britain could afford.(4)
Coming to terms with the revisionist view just described and all of its implications poses a number of difficulties. Understanding the complexities of naval finance, technology, bureaucratic politics, and the thought processes of an errant strategic genius, demand...