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Philosophical Studies (2006) 129:517543 Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-2904-7KENT INGVAR HURTIGINTERNALISM AND ACCIDIE*ABSTRACT. Bernard Williams has famously argued that there are only
internal reasons for action. Although Williams has produced several,
slightly dierent versions of internalism over the years, one core idea has
remained the same: the reasons a person has for acting must be essentially
linked to, derived from, or in some other way connected to, that persons
subjective motivational set. I have two aims in this paper. First, after
having cleared up some initial ambiguities, I try to show that Williamss
internalism admits of two rather dierent interpretations. Second, I will
argue that both these interpretations are inadequate. The rst interpretation
is incompatible with certain claims that supposedly provide the reasons why
we should accept internalism in the rst place. The second interpretation
faces other problems: given the essential link between reasons and motivation, this interpretation cannot adequately deal with the phenomenon of
accidie. Furthermore, those who subscribe to this interpretation of internalism are, on pain of inconsistency, forced to accept an implausible account of reasonable regret.1. INTRODUCTIONIn his Internal and External Reasons,1 Bernard Williams
distinguishes two interpretations of the claim A has a reason
to / and argues that all true reasons statements about an
agent must be given an internal interpretation. Perhaps the
main reason why some commentators have sought to refute
Williams is that internalism about reasons seems to leave us
with a worrying prospect. As John McDowell puts it, if all
reasons for action are internal in Williams sense, then this
will bearon a familiar problem that arises about ethical reasons in particular, in view
of the evident possibility of being left cold by them. The implication of
Williams scepticism is that ethical reasons are reasons only for those for518whom they are internal reasons: only for those who have motivations to
which ethical considerations speak, or can be made to speak.2I agree with McDowell. Williams internalism threatens to
undermine what we might call the categorical, or universal,
normativity of moral demands. This is nothing new, of course.
So although the potential problem highlighted by McDowell
constitutes the backdrop against which this paper takes shape, I
shall not be discussing this particular problem any further.
Instead, I want to focus...