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Abstract: In this paper, two case studies are analysed, namely Finland's Rapid Reaction Force and the arrest of a Russian citizen in Finland at the request of U.S. officials. A so-called rhizomatic focus (Deleuze and Guattari 1983) is adopted to assess social networking spam and the implications that this phenomenon has for interaction in security cases. In both case studies, the respective timeline of events and the social media impacts on the rhizomatic 'spam ' information context are analysed. It is argued that the rhizomatic way in which junk information spreads within social media is comparable to a 'spam world'. The main objective of spam is to compel someone to act the way the spammer wants. This spam world results from a technologized infrastructure that facilitates social media interaction without a proper understanding of the context of events and how individuals influence each other.
Keywords: Disinformation, Hybrid Rhizome, Social Media, Spam
Introduction
The near exponential growth in social media (SM) communications is widely reported, and services such as Twitter and Facebook have a combined user base in the billions. The growth of SM as a communication tool in recent years has also forced governments to regard cyberspace as an important arena for strategic communication and the dissemination of information. New forms of rhizome-like network organizations are emerging, which are engaging in, and have been the target of, information warfare, such as the Anonymous collective, WikiLeaks, and military and political 'troll factories' (such as Israel's Hasbara or the Kremlin network). The WikiLeaks network has revealed numerous high-profile incidents of corporate and government corruption. Furthermore, if disseminated messages are misleading, distorted, or false, a speedy response is required to limit the damage they can wreak. Recent events in Europe such as Brexit, the war in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 tragedy, and the war in Syria as revealed in reports by The Interpreter magazine, the Bellingcat open-source investigation group, and Russia Today (RT) demonstrate that misinformation is rife in SM.
Social media has become a key player in hybrid warfare (see Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen 2008). To this end, authorities are finding it increasingly difficult to make a clear assessment of threats and to develop situational awareness due to the rhizomatic character...