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Intergovernmental management is more than just inter-governmental relationships involving the federal government. Though Professor McGuire agrees that the federal government has become more intrusive and opportunistic since the mid-20th century-resulting in less cooperative intergovernmental relations-he argues that collaborative management is much more prevalent than it is depicted in Dr. Conlan's analysis. A bottom-up view suggests that local and regional activity can be both opportunistic and collaborative, and such a perspective must be considered in any discussion of managing federalism.
The 50th anniversary of the Kestnbaum Commission provides an opportunity to reflect on the changes in federalism and intergovernmental management that have occurred over the past half century. In his foregoing essay, Tim Conlan thoroughly documents the intent of the commission's work, the recommendations that emerged from its report to President Eisenhower, and the subsequent remaking of American federalism since that time. There is little doubt diat the intergovernmental management of the 1950s is different from the intergovernmental management of the early 21st century; one should not expect otherwise. These changes have been captured through countless metaphors that describe contemporary federalism, such as the "marble cake" (Grodzins 1960), the "picket fence" (Sanford 1967), and the "matrix" (Agranoff 2001; Agranoff and McGuire 2003a). Some have referred to the existence of "coercive federalism" (Kincaid 1990) and "nation-centered federalism" (Beer 1993).
Conlan offers another descriptive term, opportunistic federalism, which he contrasts with the prevailing paradigm of the past, cooperative federalism. His central point in calling current intergovernmental management opportunistic is that, in some cases, jurisdictions-namely, the federal government-take advantage of other jurisdictions, exploiting opportunities to control or co-opt relationships across governments rather than pursue shared administrative strategies. The implication is that managing federalism is less cooperative now than it was when the Kestnbaum Commission issued its report in June 1955.
Conlan's empirical analysis is a fitting contribution to the research on federalism, offering evidence of change rather than a purely philosophical treatise on where power lies and where it should rest-but not entirely. Though he is optimistic in the end, Conlan remains a skeptic throughout and is concerned that the state of intergovernmental management is dominated by federal government activity, which threatens to "propel opportunistic federalism into the future." From the top looking down, it is not difficult...