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The evolution of relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe is examined. Ways in which their relations interact with the international relations of southern Africa are discussed.
In this article we examine the evolution of relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the ways in which their relations interact with the international relations of southern Africa. We analyze the impact on these relations of past, recent, and contemporary changes, including colonialism, liberation struggles, independence, uneven economic decline, democratization, structural adjustment programs, and dramatic changes in neighboring countries. Such changes have engendered various forms of cooperation but have also heightened tensions stemming from economic inequality and political uncertainty. The analysis of relations since Zimbabwean independence emphasizes several issue areas, including political-symbolic and strategic relations, several types of economic interactions, and the generation and distribution of electric power. In a future article we will present a quantitative events-data analysis of each of these issue areas. Here we present a historical description of the interactions between Zambia and Zimbabwe, discuss the perspectives on these interactions of policymakers in each country, and relate both interactions and perspectives to the regional context.
Relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe have been close since colonial times. In 1953 the two were incorporated into the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland by the British. The two states have played key roles in the liberation of southern Africa; after its independence in 1964 Zambia was instrumental in the liberation of Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, and after its independence in 1980 Zimbabwe became equally instrumental in the liberation of the latter two countries. Zambia gave crucial support to Zimbabwean nationalists in the 1964-1980 period, although it also had conflicts with them. Because one important theme of our analysis is the impact of this history on contemporary relations, we will present the historical background in some detail. The Historical Background of Zambia-Zimbabwe Relations
Zambia and Zimbabwe, formerly Northern and Southern Rhodesia, respectively, were closely connected during the period of colonial rule, having been colonized by British imperial forces, primarily from the south, under the control of the British South Africa Company headed by Cecil Rhodes. This company was the instrument of colonial rule in both Rhodesias until 1923, when Southern Rhodesia gained self-government under the control of the minority white settlers and Northern Rhodesia became a British Protectorate under the Colonial Office, but with substantial settler political influence. The economies of the two territories, controlled by what was essentially a single settler community and by the same multinational corporations, were closely integrated.
Federation, 1953-1963
Connections between the two countries became closer when they were joined (along with Malawi, formerly Nyasaland) in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963 at the instigation of the white settlers in the two territories and over the opposition of the Africans. It was argued that the three countries together would be an economic giant in central Africa, an alliance that would benefit all of them economically. It was also argued that such an entity would not be dominated by South Africa, as was the case when they were separate. But Northern Rhodesians-both black and white-often felt that Southern Rhodesia gained economically from federation at their expense, since they produced the primary export commodity, copper, while government and corporate headquarters and secondary industry were concentrated in the south.l All Rhodesian (and Nyasaland) Africans also felt that federation strongly favored whites and was designed to rob the Africans of the northern territories and of their legitimate right to selfdetermination. Because most of the federation's Europeans resided in Southern Rhodesia these two biases were often mutually reinforcing. The federal capital was Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia, and federal political structure closely resembled that of Southern Rhodesia; this was not surprising given that federation represented the extension of most of the power exercised by Southern Rhodesian whites to cover Europeans in the northern territories, and that Southern Rhodesians occupied most of the significant roles in the federal government.
Federation planted the seeds of the economic difficulties that are now being experienced by the two countries and continue to bedevil their relationship. In the process about 80 million pounds of Northern Rhodesia's potential tax revenues were shifted to Southern Rhodesia through the pattern of federal government spending.2 The federal government spent its tax revenues almost exclusively on services for Europeans because this was its constitutionally established domain; most federal government offices were in Southern Rhodesia, and industrial expansion during the federal period was heavily concentrated in that territory. The most dramatic single decision made by the federal government in favor of Southern Rhodesian European interests was the decision to build the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River between Southern and Northern Rhodesia rather than the Kafue Dam, on the river of the same name, located entirely within Northern Rhodesia. This decision represented the reversal of an earlier commitment to Kafue, which was less extensive, would have displaced many fewer Africans, and would have been more beneficial to African agriculture. The Northern Rhodesian government was not notified of the Kariba decision prior to its announcement in the press, and even Europeans in that territory publicly protested the policy change. Officially, Kariba was chosen because of its greater capacity, but its first power plant was on the southern bank of the Zambezi, making it a predominantly Southern Rhodesian project. The distribution of federal assets at the breakup of the federation in 1963 greatly favored Southern Rhodesia, giving it, largely intact, the major governmental institutions and structures such as the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as well as financial and commercial institutions. Zambia claims that it was robbed of resources in this process; for example, it was never paid the promised compensation for the federal air force going to Southern Rhodesia. Zimbabwe claims that the resources the Rhodesian government inherited from the federation were all squandered fighting the liberation forces, and that Zimbabwe cannot be expected to correct all the wrongs of its predecessor.
The Zimbabwe Liberation Struggle, 1964-1979
Following the breakup of the federation as a consequence of African opposition, Northern Rhodesia became independent, majority-ruled Zambia, while the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia made its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain. The latter event led to a protracted and in some respects revolutionary struggle by Zimbabwe Africans to overthrow this minority Rhodesian government. Present-day relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe owe much of their real dynamic to the post-1964 period, beginning with the independence of Zambia in October 1964.
The literature on the Zimbabwe revolution indicates that changes in the roles played by neighboring countries were crucial in determining outcomes within Zimbabwe.3 Zimbabwe's African-ruled neighbors, acting individually and later collectively as the Frontline States, gave indispensable support to the revolution, although they were much less wealthy or powerful than Rhodesia's settler-colonial allies.4 Zambia's support was most significant through 19745 and involved drastically reducing the economic ties that had existed under federation, although the country felt the impact of anti-UDI economic sanctions more strongly than did Rhodesia. Zambia also provided a home in exile for Zimbabwe's nationalist leaders and other refugees and a base of operations for guerrillas, and suffered great economic difficulties and violent retaliation from Rhodesia as a consequence. Trade between the two countries was cut to a fraction of its previous level, the common railway and airline were separated, and Zambia obtained foreign aid to construct alternative transportation routes through Tanzania.
Just before Zambia gained independence in 1964, a serious split occurred in Zimbabwe's main nationalist movement, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), resulting in the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Initially, Zambia decided not to choose between the two parties, although President Kenneth Kaunda seemed to lean toward Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU. Tensions developed over the next decade between Zambian hosts and Zimbabwean guests, especially the largest guerrilla movement, the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), operating under ZANU. In March 1975 Herbert Chitepo, ZANU's top leader in Zambia, was assassinated by a car bomb; there is still disagreement over whether his enemies in ZANU or Rhodesian agents were responsible.6 The Zambian government believed that rivals in ZANU were responsible and detained a large number of guerrillas and their leaders. These developments led to the replacement of Zambia by Mozambique as the most important ZANLA base and the major target of Rhodesian retaliation after Mozambique's independence in 1975.
From 1975 onward, Zambia's support went almost exclusively to ZAPU and its guerrilla army, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which continued to operate from Zambia with minimal restrictions. ZAPU's main operational area in the liberation struggle was in southwestern Zimbabwe, the main border with Zambia. Thus ZAPU used Zambia as its most strategic operational base: Its military camps were mostly in Zambia and ZIPRA crossed the Zambezi River from Zambia. Also significant was the long-standing friendship between Kaunda and Nkomo that was reflected in the generally warm relations between United National Independence Party (UNIP) and ZAPU. Circumstances never offered the opportunity for Kaunda to develop a similarly close relationship with ZANU leader Robert Mugabe. Kaunda remained one of the most active proponents of the reunification of the two nationalist movements. The formation of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe between ZAPU and ZANU in 1976 was the result of efforts by Kaunda, the other Frontline States presidents, and the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee.7
From white Rhodesia's perspective, relations with Zambia were determined primarily by Zambia's dealings with the Rhodesian "terrorists." If Zambia were to actively discourage the activities of these "terrorists" and not allow its territory to be a staging ground for attacks in Rhodesia, there would be a strong basis for normal relations. On the other hand, if Zambia allowed its territory to be used as a training ground for Zimbabwean guerrillas, and as a base for mounting military attacks in Rhodesia, as it in fact did, there would be severe retaliation. Beginning in 1975 Zambia took a leading role in arranging negotiations between the Zimbabwe nationalists and the Rhodesian government that slightly reduced the latter's hostility for a few years. Retaliation against Zambia and Mozambique became especially severe under the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian "internal settlement" of 1971979, when it was clear that the intensity of guerrilla activity was thwarting this attempt to preserve significant white power. Both of these Frontline States closed their borders with Rhodesia for several years, at great cost to their economies.
The major regional force that initially postponed revolutionary success in Zimbabwe was the support given to Rhodesia by southern Africa's other settler-colonial states, South Africa and pre-1975 Mozambique, which contained the major ports serving landlocked Rhodesia. This support was vital in "sanctions busting," in providing Rhodesia with necessary imports-especially petroleum products, of which the entire supply had to be imported-and in disguising the true source of Rhodesian exports. Furthermore, South Africa provided crucial military equipment and personnel, and Portugal coordinated its counterguerrilla warfare with Rhodesia's until 1974. The importance of these forms of support from South Africa and Portugal is revealed by the effects of their withdrawal: accelerated guerrilla warfare after Portuguese withdrawal, and rapid Rhodesian concessions in response to gradual South African withdrawal, accompanied by pressures to make such concessions. South Africa joined the Frontline States in putting pressure on their respective Rhodesian/Zimbabwean allies to sign the final settlement negotiated under British auspices at Lancaster House in December 1979.
Support for different parties in the Zimbabwean struggle, and tactical differences over relations with both Rhodesia and South Africa, divided Mozambique from Zambia on the one hand and from Botswana on the other. Common membership in the Frontline States tended to minimize the significance of these differences and focus the foreign policies of all three states on a united opposition to white minority rule in the region. South Africa was in conflict with all three of these countries to varying degrees. As it was losing its protective belt of white-ruled neighbors, the South African government developed what it called a "total strategy" for dealing with the newly hostile regional environment.8 Zambia was seen as a hostile neighbor to be destabilized if possible,9 although it was not as much a target as Mozambique because of the 1974-1975 Zambian-South African "detente" effort to solve the Zimbabwe conflict.10
Finally, Zimbabwe gained independence in April 1980 as a result of a settlement among the Patriotic Front, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia internalsettlement government of Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith, and the British government, negotiated in London. But behind the scenes there were other forces that could not be ignored, among them the significant role played by the Frontline States, and in particular Zambia and Mozambique. Because they were paying heavy military and economic costs, these states exerted substantial pressure on the Zimbabwean nationalist revolutionaries to agree to a negotiated settlement in 1980. There was no doubt in the minds of the new rulers of Zimbabwe of the positive role Zambia had played in bringing about that settlement. The Zimbabwean nationalists wanted Zambian military personnel to participate in the Military Commission set up to effect the cease-fire in Rhodesia at the beginning of 1980. This was a tricky and dangerous step in the making of Zimbabwe. The people appointed to effect the cease-fire needed to be acceptable to all parties, and the Zimbabwean nationalists' trust in the Zambians justified their presence there.
Zimbabwean independence followed an election that brought into power a majority government controlled by the African nationalists of the Patriotic Front (PF). ZANU-PF won a solid electoral majority, and PF-ZAPU became the minority party in the governing coalition. President Kaunda of Zambia was accorded an honorable place in Zimbabwe's independence celebrations. Relations Under the Kaunda and Mugabe Regimes
The Initial Change to Cooperation
Zambians had eagerly anticipated Zimbabwe's independence for some time. It very quickly and dramatically changed relations between the two countries from extreme conflict to extensive cooperation. Formal diplomatic relations were established and a number of agreements were signed relating to economic cooperation, electric power, extradition, health, telecommunications, trade, road and rail transportation, and so on. Rail was especially important to Zambia, providing an alternative route to the overworked railway through Tanzania for exporting the country's copper to the international market. There were almost a quarter of a million Zimbabwean refugees in Zambia, and plans were made for their orderly return. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was founded in 1980 to coordinate the development efforts of the majority-ruled states of southern Africa against the economic power of South Africa, which was attempting to bring those states into cooperative relationships that would prevent them from supporting liberation movements. Zimbabwe's independence not only ended Zambia's military confrontation with Rhodesia and moved the front line of confrontation with minority rule from the Zambezi to the Limpopo; it also created a new ally in that confrontation and-as indicated by the founding of SADCC almost immediately following that independence-new opportunities for economic cooperation within the southern African region. Cooperation between Zambia and Zimbabwe was an essential element in regional cooperation.
Intensified conflict with South Africa drew the two countries' leaders somewhat closer. However, with the deepening of the global recession and further decline in the price of copper, the differences in economic prosperity between Zambia and Zimbabwe increased. Both countries experienced intensifying economic problems, including rapidly increasing foreign debt, and both entered into agreements for structural adjustment programs (SAPs) with the IMF and the World Bank, although Zambia had begun dealing with the IMF well over a decade before Zimbabwe did.
The level of political-symbolic cooperation varied during this period. Stephen Chan has done the most extensive study to date of relations between the two countries up to 1991.11 He stresses the rivalry between Kaunda and Mugabe for regional leadership, the latter's resentment of Zambia's support for Nkomo, and Kaunda's greater pragmatism. In the contest for regional leadership Kaunda had seniority and experience, while Mugabe had a stronger economy and a more effective army. Chan attributes increased cooperation after 1986, which we also find in our data, to Mugabe's need to take Kaunda into his confidence after the death of Samora Machel of Mozambique.
Strategic interactions between Zambia and Zimbabwe were frequent in the 1980s and early 1990s but consisted overwhelmingly of multinational meetings-mostly in the context of the Frontline Statesabout the ongoing confrontation with South Africa over the liberation struggles there and in Namibia, the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, and South African destabilization policies. These strategic conflicts and associated economic difficulties were the principal characteristics of the regional context during this period. A bilateral Joint Permanent Commission on Defense and Security was established, but it was relatively inactive by the early 1990s and was always less important than the Frontline States' initiatives.
A number of agreements regarding telecommunications, postal services, health, and journalists and national news agencies were reached between 1980 and 1985. Several of these agreements involved cooperation against South Africa, including a ban on South African-based journalists and the establishment of a telecommunications link independent of that country.
Economic Relations
As indicated above, economic cooperation between Zambia and Zimbabwe, both bilateral and within SADCC, increased substantially after the latter's independence. SADCC operated at two levels. First, it arranged several meetings each year at the presidential or ministerial levels. Second, and more important, it also held a number of multilevel international meetings-involving officials from as high as permanent secretaries all the way down to the lowest level-at which real problems were worked out, including the achievement of dramatic results in the area of food security.l2 But SADCC had a history of only modest success in creating multilateral agreements among its members to integrate their economies. It was thus seen as weak and not very significant by most policymakers interviewed, as well as by many academics. Economic relations within the region remained primarily bilateral.
Thanks in large part to its development under the federation and UDI, Zimbabwe consistently had by far the strongest economy in SADCC,13 and the organization's secretary general from 1980 to 1993 was a Zimbabwean. Thus Zimbabwe, acting in its own national economic interest, was SADCC's strongest supporter, although Zambia and most other members were also very supportive. The organization's goals were very much in accordance with the African-socialist ideals shared by Zambia's UNIP and ZANU-PF governments.
Cooperation on trade in the 1980s took several forms: bilateral agreements, establishment and operation of a Joint Trade Commission, and meetings of and actions by the newly formed Preferential Trade Area (PTA). Having the stronger economy, Zimbabwe consistently exported more to Zambia than it imported from that country. This trade imbalance was frequently discussed at Joint Trade Commission meetings, and there seemed to be a consensus that the imbalance should be corrected, but very little effort was made to do so.
Cooperation in transportation was also significant in the early and mid-1980s. Rail and road linkages that had been closed during UDI were reopened just prior to Zimbabwe's independence, railway passenger service was restored three years later, and several regional transportation agreements were signed. But cooperation decreased in the late 1980s and 1990s. Tickets on the two national airlines were no longer interchangeable after Zambia Airways was expelled from the International Air Travel Association for failure to pay dues, and Air Zimbabwe took no action to preserve interchangeability. During UDI Zambia had built a railway through Tanzania with Chinese aid to avoid using Rhodesia Railways. After 1980 the UNIP government urged Zimbabwe to use this railway to reduce its reliance on South African railways, while Zimbabwe urged Zambia to return its traffic to the Zimbabwe-Mozambique route. Zambia purchased thirty new locomotives whose parts could not be supplied from Zimbabwe and South Africa, as had previously been the case.
Another area of cooperation has been in electric energy generation and distribution, for which a number of agreements were signed in the mid-1980s. Two of these agreements were especially significant. First, the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) was established in 1987, replacing the Central African Power Corporation (CAPCO), which owned and managed Kariba Dam and distributed the power it generated after the dissolution of the federation. The ZRA continued to own the dam and control the river, but power distribution was turned over to parastatals within each country. Second, in 1990 the ZRA and the two governments agreed to build a second dam on the Zambezi at Batoka Gorge above Lake Kariba. There was opposition to this decision in Zambia, which did not need the new dam because it was already generating power in excess of present and future needs and wanted to continue exporting its excess power to Zimbabwe. The Kaunda government favored the Batoka project in the 1970s and early 1980s (when Zimbabwe was reluctant to cooperate with Kaunda because of his support for Nkomo), and Kaunda reports that he was cautious in expressing his growing opposition later on.14 Both governments were ready to commit to the project-temporarily, it turned out-in 1990.
Current and Future Zambia-Zimbabwe Bilateral Relations
Current and future relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the implications of those relations for the rest of southern Africa, have been heavily influenced by two recent events in the region: the coming into power of Frederick Chiluba as president of Zambia in 1991, and the democratic election of Nelson Mandela as president of South Africa in 1994. The bilateral relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe have a bearing on the development of the whole region. The reverse is equally true: The rapid developments in Southern Africa will influence the nature and direction of the relations between these two neighboring countries.
The relationship is also affected by its regional setting, in that both states are landlocked and both have neighbors (Angola and Mozambique) whose recent history has been anything but peaceful. Zambia and Zimbabwe have been adversely affected by the internal wars in Angola and Mozambique, respectively. President Mugabe was heavily involved in bringing about the Peace Accord of 1992 in Mozambique in his capacity as chairman of the Frontline States and as the leader of a neighboring state. President Chiluba of Zambia was involved in the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accord between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) of Angola, though only in his capacity as a leader of a neighboring state. President Mugabe also participated in the Lusaka Peace Accord as chairman of the Frontline States.
As in the past, Zambia will need to weigh the benefits and costs of utilizing the TanZam or the Benguela transportation systems, as against the Zimbabwe/Mozambique or the Zimbabwe/South African routes, in its external trade. The latter routes have a proven record of viability and reliability; the former have always been highly tenuous and unreliable. The choice between the two options will not only affect relations between the two countries but is likely to alter patterns of trade and economic activity at the regional level. All such aspects of the regional setting can be exploited in the name of good neighborly relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Bilateral Political-Symbolic Relations
Tensions between Zambia and Zimbabwe increased in 1990 and 1991 because Zambia was moving toward democratization and liberalization more rapidly than Zimbabwe. A series of events in Zambia during these two years resulted in the holding of multiparty elections in October 1991. The Zimbabwe government had expected long-time Zambian president Kaunda of the ruling UNIP to be re-elected in 1991, and was thus surprised when his opponent-Chiluba of the opposition Movement for a Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)-won overwhelmingly. Chiluba was an unknown, and there was some concern that he planned to export the new and apparently very different Zambian model of multiparty democracy and unbridled capitalism to Zimbabwe and other neighboring countries. These perceptions caused some political tension in the months preceding and following Chiluba's election that spilled over into other areas-such as electric power, economic cooperation, and trade-in which the new Zambian government appeared to be taking positions more strongly opposed to those of Zimbabwe. Zambia objected to an attack on its SAP in the government-owned Zimbabwean press, while ZANU-PF accused MMD of meddling in internal Zimbabwean affairs. Zimbabwe's shipment of maize to Zambia shortly before the election was perceived by MMD as support for UNIP Zimbabwe was the last Southern African country to congratulate Chiluba on his election. Chiluba received a cool reception at his first Frontline States meeting, at which, as host, he was in charge of conducting the election of a new chair of the organization to replace Kaunda; he was seen as unenthusiastic about the eventual outcome-the election of Mugabe.
Political interactions between the two countries became more cooperative in 1992 and 1993, as both governments went out of their way to reaffirm their solidarity on a number of public occasions. These public statements reflected a genuine accommodation that was facilitated by Chiluba's lack of interest in exporting the Zambian model and by Zimbabwe's move toward both democratization and economic liberalization.
At the very least, relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe entered a new and unpredictable phase with Chiluba's election. Understandably, the perspective of the new Zambian authorities was that the electorate had entrusted to them the mandate not only to bring about drastic changes within Zambia but, if necessary, to reorient the foreign relations of the state, at least within southern Africa. In the new Zambian leadership's analysis of the past sins of Kaunda and his UNIP Government, especially regarding the pathetic economic condition in which Zambia found itself, it must have been very tempting indeed to view the warm Zambia-Zimbabwe relations during the Kaunda regime as partly to blame, at least by association.
From the Zimbabwean point of view, on the other hand, the democratic election in Zambia that had swept out of power a popular panAfricanist, a widely acclaimed apostle of humanism, and the chairman of the Frontline States, must have had a sobering effect. The lessons from the 1991 Zambian election seemed to be loud and clear: The people of Zambia, and by logical deduction, those of Zimbabwe, were successfully challenging the political status quo. Zimbabwean authorities could only wait and see what the Zambian election would mean in terms of the possible spillover effect in Zimbabwe, and for their relations with the newly elected government of Zambia. Of immediate concern within the Zimbabwean government was whether the new government of Zambia would be in the mood, or in a position, to continue the cordial relations that had been established with the previous UNIP government. If so, well and good; if not, what could Zimbabwe do to at least preserve the status quo?
The change in Zambia's government had come during a very sensitive time for Zimbabwe, when the government was struggling to overcome the effects of the most devastating drought in its history. The Zambian election also had taken place in the wake of a pattern of dramatic changes in southern Africa, Africa, and the world at large: Zimbabwe was still trying to come to terms with the disintegration of the mighty Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it seemed that democratic forces in Africa and elsewhere had taken heart and were organizing themselves furiously in preparation for governing. In this, southern Africa was not to be left behind. Ironically, the ascendancy of Frederick Chiluba to the presidency of Zambia on this wave of democratic impulse coincided with significant changes in the political direction of Zimbabwe. The country had just (in 1990) gone through a general election that, by all accounts, had put to rest the idea of one-party rule in Zimbabwe with the tacit acceptance of a multiparty system. In 1991 the World Bank introduced its SAP in Zimbabwe, perhaps indicating the beginnings of an irreversible commitment to a market economy.
Although Zambia and Zimbabwe were somewhat different ideologically during the 1980-1991 period,ls the two states seemed to be moving in similar, if not convergent, directions. Yet the perception has persisted that Zambia-Zimbabwe relations may be on a collision course.16 Since the democratic elections of 1991 in Zambia, relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe can be characterized as only cordial, with occasional tension around such differences as the Batoka Project, and the various reported incidents regarding poaching, drug trafficking, and vehicle thefts across the border points between the countries. The dispute over the ownership of the Kariba North (Zambian) Bank Power Station also helped to sour the relationship.l7 Strategic relations also changed substantially about this time, but those changes are best understood in the regional context that is the focus of the next section.
There have been frequent news reports of differences between the two governments, but also official denials of such differences by members of both governments. This has been reiterated by President Chiluba himself on several occasions.ls In any case, all indications suggest that personal relations between Mugabe and Chiluba are excellent. Perhaps this is what matters most in the current foreign relations of southern African countries, where the personal relations of political leaders seem to take precedence over other factors. Whether this can be translated into good bilateral relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe remains to be proved over time.
Bilateral Economic Relations
Although it is not expressed at the official level, it is now common knowledge that the Chiluba government is displeased that the Zimbabwean government inherited a substantial industrial infrastructure that had been largely financed by Zambian copper export revenues during the federation years. That it has taken so many years for such disgruntlement to surface is easily understood: immediately after Zambia became independent, Kaunda's government could not realistically be expected to negotiate openly with the illegal regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. In fact, Zambia and UDI-Zimbabwe were in a kind of undeclared war with each other. However, resentment about the division of federal resources was a popular theme in Zambian domestic political discourse.
During the Kaunda-Mugabe years of 1980-1991, the subject of who owed what to whom was never raised openly because of the warm and fraternal relations between their countries, as represented by their presidents' good personal relationship. Their central concerns during the 1980-1991 decade were the drive for independence for Namibia and the all-consuming preoccupation with their support of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in their struggle to overthrow the apartheid system in South Africa.
However, it appears that Frederick Chiluba's MMD government holds Kaunda-and by association, Zimbabwe-personally responsible for Zambia's past and present economic woes. An unambiguous manifestation of this was the initial move by the Chiluba government early in 1992 to close its government-owned Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines purchasing company in Harare and move it to South Africa. This move was justified by the large number of purchases made in the latter country, but the change was effected suddenly, without even the courtesy of consultation with the Zimbabwean government. Although, as an independent state, Zambia had the sovereign right to make the change unilaterally, from a diplomatic angle it raised suspicions that the new Zambian government was not happy with Zimbabwe's past role. It was also a signal that it would not be "business as usual" from then on between the two countries. The extent to which that act of the new Zambian government is likely to affect the future relations between the two countries is not yet clear.
More exclusively bilateral is the issue of alleged Zambian poachers of wildlife in Zimbabwe, especially their alleged targeting of the now almost extinct black rhino. Zambians have not categorically denied the veracity of the allegations; but they have stated that, even if it is true that Zambian nationals have been responsible for all of the reported poaching, they have done so as fronts for "big" sponsors, most of whom are outside Zambia.l9 Zambians have charged in return that Zimbabwe's policy of shooting poachers on sight, be they Zambians or not, is inhumane because it suggests that animals are more important than human being$20 and it is politically unwise because it prevents investigating the charges against those allegedly sponsoring the poachers. Zimbabwean policymakers defend the "shoot to kill" policy of their game wardens on the grounds that it is necessary for the safety of both the wardens and the animals.
Some of the alleged poacher sponsors who had been sacked by Kaunda returned to office under Chiluba. Conflict over this issue reached a second peak in 1993 when Zimbabwe threatened to pursue poachers into Zambia and the Zambian Parliament passed a motion condemning Zimbabwe's shooting of poachers. Additional meetings followed, and public statements were made in 1994 and 1995 that the two governments are cooperating in the fight against poaching, but such cooperation has probably not been very effective and the issue remains potentially troublesome.
Cooperation over the issue of border crossings has been relatively successful. As is the case in most of Africa, the boundary between Zambia and Zimbabwe divides peoples of the same ethnicity or related ethnic identities. The Tonga ethnic group occupies both sides of the Zambezi River and Lake Kariba along the central section of the boundary. Large numbers of people cross the border frequently to visit relatives or exchange goods on the other side. Zambians frequently complain that Zimbabwe border officials are hostile and often prevent them from crossing. It is not possible to document trends in the frequency or intensity of these complaints from available data, but the fact that they have recently attracted more public attention indicates that both variables have probably increased in recent years. This conclusion is supported by the reasonable assumption that the motivation for the alleged treatment is Zimbabwe's desire to keep Zambians from taking advantage of its more developed economy, which has pulled further ahead of Zambia's in the years since independence. Complaints by Zimbabwean citizens against Zambian border officials appear to be much less common.
In February 1993 the foreign ministers of the two countries met to discuss the border crossing issue and agreed in principle that residents of border areas should be allowed to move freely across the border without passports, which many cannot readily afford. This agreement was frequently cited by interview respondents as a major recent example of cooperation between the two countries.21 The agreement has not been fully implemented, however, because of Zimbabwean concern that poachers, smugglers, drug dealers, and traders in illegal second-hand clothing (who have ruined the Zambian clothing industry and threaten to do the same in Zimbabwe) will take advantage of any relaxation of border controls. A number of suggestions have been made for controlling this problem, from restricting the travel of those without passports to border areas to strengthening cooperation between the two countries' police forces. The desire for cooperation on this point appears strong, although it stems in large part from internal political considerations on both sides, and it can be relatively easily isolated from more conflictual issues. Yet the uneven level of economic development in the two countries makes implementation of a cooperative agreement difficult.
Electric Power
The disagreements between the two countries over the Kariba North Bank Power Station and the Batoka Project have also been highlighted in the news as evidence that the two countries are not on friendly terms.22 This dispute worsened in 1991, and it remains the most severe area of conflict between the two countries. It is a prime case of recent changes aggravating a long-persistent problem. Tensions are so high that this is the only area in which it was impossible to interview directly involved policymakers in either country, although it was possible to interview informed officials who are indirectly involved. The division of the assets of the formerly jointly owned CAPCO has been taken to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after many years of dispute, and the related issue of building a new dam on the Zambezi at the Batoka Gorge is currently a major source of tension.
Policymakers in the two countries have sharply differing interpretations of the financing of the Kariba North Bank Power Station in the 1960s. Both Zambia and Rhodesia, which were then virtually at war, wanted to enlarge the station's generating capacity. Rhodesia could not borrow money externally because of international sanctions, but Zambia could do so. Zambia claims that this is the whole story: It borrowed the money and paid it back; therefore the North Bank Station is Zambia's, even though the station became part of CAPCO after it was built. Zimbabwe claims that Rhodesia secretly repaid Zambia some of the money that had been borrowed by depositing assets with CAPCO, and that the assets of that recently dissolved company should therefore be distributed more evenly. Policymakers in both countries claim that their country is certain to prevail in the ICJ. Both sides voluntarily agreed to have their Kariba North dispute settled by the ICJ when they could not agree on who actually owned the North Bank Station. Whatever its causes and outcome, this particular case demonstrates that relations between the two countries were at an all-time low.
Differences over the Batoka project were clearly exacerbated by that process of resolving the Kariba Power Station dispute. Policymakers in the two countries long differed over the need for more electricity in the region in the near future. Zimbabwe imports power from Zambia and other countries in the region, and believes that the available supply is sometimes inadequate. Policymakers cite shortages of power from Zambia during recent years because of the breakdown of the Kafue power plant and low water levels due to drought, and the consequent necessity for Zimbabwe to import power from Zaire at a high cost because of Zambian transmission fees. These fees were reduced when Zimbabwe threatened to retaliate by refusing to transport maize and copper to and from Zambia, respectively. There was suspicion that some of the power sold at the more expensive Kafue rates was actually cheaper Zairian power. Zimbabwe's plans for expanding its relatively developed industrial sector include substantially increased consumption of electric power. Although these plans may be unrealistic, they do justify the need for new sources of power in the future. Finally, there is a substantial element of nationalism in Zimbabwe's desire not to be dependent on Zambia or any other country for so vital a resource as electric power. This is revealed in the decisions to build and then expand the Hwange coal-fired power plant in violation of SADCC guidelines in order not to import more power.23
Zambia is highly dependent on exports of power to Zimbabwe to minimize its balance-of-payments deficit with that country. Zambian policymakers dispute the alleged inadequacy of their supply and claim that as a member of SADCC Zimbabwe is obliged to import Zambian power from existing sources. If more power is needed in the future, Kariba should be expanded. In the 1991 election campaign, the MMD announced its opposition to Batoka on the grounds of the environmental damage that it would cause. This was probably a move to win votes among people who would be physically displaced or would lose income from tourism if it were built (because the dam would flood most of a popular river-rafting area). Whatever the roots of its opposition to Batoka, the Zambian government has held firm. After agreeing to delay a final decision pending further study of environmental impacts and the feasibility of donor funding, the government has announced that this further study justifies making a definitive negative decision. One Zimbabwean respondent indicated that his country had offered to increase its imports from Zambia if that country would approve Batoka, but that this offer was rejected. The ZRA is avoiding a public stance on this issue, but the top Zimbabwean official of this organization claims to have been forced out by Zambia.
After initially agreeing to jointly sponsor the Batoka Electricity project with Zimbabwe, Zambia has had second thoughts. The country has decided to opt out because it has no immediate need for more electricity, its present power consumption being far less than it produces.24 If indeed Zambia has sufficient energy supplies it probably cannot be faulted for backing out, presumably because the financial resources are required elsewhere. Although Zimbabwe cannot build the dam on its own without flooding the Zambian tourist area, it may be difficult to use this particular incident as an indicator of strong, lasting hostility between the two states.
Summary
Increasing economic inequality between the two countries, and various forms of political uncertainty-internal, bilateral, and regional-have restrained cooperation and increased conflict, or at least tensions, between Zambia and Zimbabwe. These effects have been manifested differently in different issue areas, but tensions increased overall in the 1990s in response to both the widening economic gap and uneven democratization and economic liberalization. Ultimately, the substantive relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe are a function of much broader and more deeply rooted factors. These include the long-held historical ties and experiences of the liberation struggle, and the common interests of the two states based on their shared border, their being landlocked, and their ethnic contiguity. Such factors underlie present relations and will determine the future relations of the two states.
The liberation struggle-especially common experiences in the opposition to the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and joint support for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa-also stand out as cornerstones of a meaningful and lasting relationship between the two states. Because Zambians and Zimbabweans were on the same side in the fight to destroy the federation-an entity that, if it had been allowed to continue, would have required African servitude to settler colonialism in perpetuity-they will always be on the same side in global and multinational attempts to recolonize this part of the world.25
Zambia-Zimbabwe Relations and Southern Africa
Zambia-Zimbabwe relations can also be understood from the perspective of the region of southern Africa. The two states stand out as key members of the regional political system. Whatever happens to Zambia and Zimbabwe, singly or jointly, is bound to have repercussions throughout the region; therefore relations between them are important. In this section we examine the way the two countries have interacted with one another on certain regional issues and how they have functioned in the major regional organizations. Regional Political-Symbolic and Strategic Relations
Zambia and Zimbabwe have always been on the same side in the struggle for the liberation of the African continent and, in particular, of southern Africa. For instance, the two countries played a pivotal role in the liberation of Namibia, providing sympathy, support, and shelter to its freedom fighters, the Southwest African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO). Their close relationship was anchored in a meaningful joint contribution to the making of the new Southern Africa.
Zambia and Zimbabwe were the first two countries in the region to be hit hard by the South African military juggernaut in South Africa's desperate attempts to stave off the antiapartheid tide. Destabilization in southern Africa was strictly aimed at Zambia and Zimbabwe, the two countries that openly supported and harbored the guerrillas of the South African liberation movements.26 By singling out Zambia and Zimbabwe as target states for harsh punishment by its military, South Africa merely succeeded in consolidating their resolve and joint support for the victims of apartheid in South Africa. There was in fact total unanimity between the two governments in their determination to bring about the downfall of the apartheid regime in South Africa and its replacement by a democratic dispensation. Both states also cooperated in giving asylum and protection to the ANC.
In that exercise, and throughout the 1980-1991 period, Zambia and Zimbabwe not only stood side by side on major issues of the day but were generally viewed as the key players in the evolving regional grouping of states. The liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia will always remind these states of their common stand for freedom, human dignity, and international recognition. Their joint contribution to the fight against apartheid will stand out as the binding force in their future agendas. This solidarity is the foundation for present and future relations between the two countries.
However, democratization in South Africa has sharply decreased the relevance of strategic cooperation against that country and its allies as a crucial form of cooperation between Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as between each of them and other southern African countries.27 This change is reflected in a moderate decrease in cooperative strategic interactions between the two countries in 1990-1993. Kaunda had gone further than Mugabe was willing to go in making overtures to South Africa on a number of occasions,28 including his August 1989 meeting with South African President de Klerk and his August 1991 call for lifting sanctions against that country, but Chiluba was perceived by Zimbabwean policymakers as rushing to embrace South Africa in order to gain advantageous agreements at Zimbabwe's expense. The Zambia-Zimbabwe Joint Permanent Commission on Defense and Security did not meet after Chiluba's election until October 1993, when it issued a bland statement on the continuing concern of both countries for their joint security in the face of continuing violence in Angola and Mozambique and uncertainty in South Africa. More significantly, a strong majority of interview respondents thought that the Frontline States, the principal venue for the substantial strategic cooperation that occurred in the 1980s, would soon become substantially less important with the disappearance of the South African apartheid enemy. Most indicated that this was a self-evident conclusion rather than a policy that had been discussed among government officials. This cooperation will likely be replaced, not by conflict, but simply by a lack of strategic interaction, although there has recently been a move to form a new regional security organization that includes South Africa.
Regional Economic Relations
In August 1992 SADCC was converted into the Southern African Development Community (SADC), allegedly to enhance economic cooperation within the region. South Africa has recently been admitted to the organization. A concrete manifestation of the positive role of Zambia and Zimbabwe in the building of a new Southern Africa has been their enthusiastic support for, and participation in, SADCC and SADC.29 Both countries were founding members of those organizations. Their bilateral relations have been strengthened as a result of their membership, and in the process the regional organizations have benefited from that closeness between the two countries.
However, minor differences have surfaced recently with regard to the parallel existence of the PTA and SADC. When the new Zambian government was elected in 1991 and vigorously embraced SAP policies and bilateral economic relations while explicitly rejecting African socialism, the Zimbabwe government felt that Chiluba was anti-SADCC. Whereas Zimbabwe questions the continued existence of the PTA, in view of the revamped SADC, Zambia still attaches strong importance to the former. This may have a lot to do with the facts that the headquarters of the PTA is in Lusaka and that free trade is more compatible with liberalization than is joint planning. Zambia actually pursues more nationalistic economic policies when necessary, at the expense of both regional organizations. In 1992 Chiluba proposed a merger of SADCC and PTA that was rejected by Zimbabwe and most other SADCC members. In late 1993 the Zambian government issued a "clarification" indicating that it supported the continuation of both organizations, and then a further "clarification" indicating that the matter needed further study. Zambia sees Zimbabwe as southern-oriented, and Zimbabwe sees Zambia as northern-oriented, but both countries are actually pursuing perceived national interests. In any case, the two governments differ on their perceptions of the utility of the overlapping functions of SADC and PTA. This has been compounded by the creation of the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), headquartered in Lilongwe, Malawi.
Increasing tensions on trade issues in the 1990s appear to be based on the combination of uneven levels of development and liberalization and uncertainty about the effects of ongoing changes in South Africa. The trade imbalance in favor of Zimbabwe is not shrinking. Zimbabweans attribute it to the more developed state of their economy, which results in the production of a wider variety of higher-quality goods for export and a smaller need to import in comparison to Zambia. Zambians attribute much of the imbalance to Zimbabwe's more stringent import controls. These are now being relaxed, and policymakers in the two countries expect very different consequences. Because the trade imbalance is unlikely to be substantially reduced by these measures,30 tension is likely to increase in spite of the recent efforts of Zimtrade, a private-sector trade-promotion organization, to help Zambian trade representatives contact potential Zimbabwean customers.
Both countries hope to increase trade and economic cooperation with the "new" South Africa, and their policymakers present arguments as to why they will be able to do so. Yet everyone recognizes that majority-ruled South Africa will be pursuing its own interests, which means that Zambian goods may receive the same reception in that country as they currently do in Zimbabwe, and that South Africa may view Zimbabwe in the same way Zimbabwe currently views Zambia. It is in this area that Chiluba's rush to deal with South Africa is most resented by Zimbabwe. In response to Zimbabwean criticism of their opening a trade mission in South Africa, Zambians point out that Zimbabwe has always had such a mission. Policymakers in Zimbabwe respond that they did not open their mission but only inherited it and did not expand their trade but only maintained it.
Democratization in South Africa opens the way to greater economic cooperation between that country and its neighbors, but it has also increased Zimbabwe-Zambia tensions. South Africa's dominant economic position in the region3l means that its inclusion in SADC and other cooperative arrangements will dramatically change the nature of regional economic cooperation. Zambia and Zimbabwe are each concerned that the other will benefit disproportionately from new cooperative arrangements with South Africa. Chiluba's early pronouncements and actions exacerbated this concern in Zimbabwe, but Zambian policymakers now fear that Zimbabwe's stronger economy will make it a more attractive partner for the new South Africa.
Road transportation and tariffs on trucks became a more important source of disagreement under the MMD government. Zimbabwe prefers to work through SADC, while Zambia prefers bilateral agreements, in the belief that these avoid the unnecessary delays involved in reaching a multilateral consensus. Zambian policymakers are critical of SADC's statism, its excessive meetings, its lack of action in the area of road transportation, and its former Zimbabwean secretary general. They want more restrictive regulations to protect their roads than those developed by SADC, and an equalization of the percentage of bilateral trade that is carried by trucks from each country, in order to rebuild the Zambian trucking industry and give foreign truckers an economic motivation to carry Zambian exports on their return journeys. Zimbabwean policymakers respond that these demands involve interfering with free-market competition-which the Zambian government strongly espouseswhenever that competition works to Zambia's disadvantage. Zimbabwean policymakers complain about Zambia's policy of forcing each load of goods to be licensed entirely either for Zambian destinations or for transit to another country, to which Zambian policymakers respond that this practice was instituted to prevent truckers from paying only the cheaper transit duty on goods actually delivered to Zambian destinations.
Conclusion
Differences between the two countries over regional organizations are a reflection of the expected healthy competition between states in a regional setting. There is a probable but not necessary linkage between these regional differences or competition and bilateral relations. There is increasing discussion of organizing the region in terms of security as well as more economic cooperation, if not economic integration. This is not idle talk: The nature of the world economy is now such that small economies like those of Zambia and Zimbabwe can never hope to survive on their own.32 At best, such countries will only survive within strong regional organizations such as SADC; purely bilateral relations are not enough for the development of their national economies. Besides, both states are equally vulnerable due to their being landlocked. The only prudent and forward-looking course would be for the sister states to work tirelessly toward the integration of southern Africa into a permanent political entity modeled on the European Union.
Relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe are an intricate part of the southern African political, economic, and security network. Moreover, the future of both countries is increasingly becoming a function of international and regional forces. The problems that erupt from time to time between the two countries are far outweighed by these larger regional considerations. The future of the relations of the two states, if not the survival of their respective societies, lies in the new southern Africa in which South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Zambia will be key players.33
Hopes for development and the consolidation of interstate relations in southern Africa have found concrete expression in the democratic change in South Africa itself that brought Nelson Mandela and the ANC into political power. Until that momentous event of April 1994, which swept away the 300-year-old apartheid system, it was a matter of speculation as to what form the future of the subcontinent would take. The democratic state of South Africa has come into being at a time when Zambia-Zimbabwe relations are being strained by the economic hardships experienced by both countries. The uncertainty and confusion brought about by IMF and World Bank SAPs in the two countries, though at different times, have exposed their general weaknesses and lack of economic viability. Zambia and Zimbabwe have increasingly become dependent on international donors outside the region. The persistent drought that has plagued southern Africa has exhausted their ability to help themselves and each other.
Thus, the entrance of South Africa into the regional family of nations has raised hopes of self-reliance and confidence in the economic viability of Southern Africa. Expertise from South Africa is increasingly being utilized, as opposed to importing it from far afield. Since the recent political change in South Africa there seems to be greater cooperation between that country and its neighbors in security, environmental, and trade matters. For example, the handling of the recent Lesotho crisis and the Angolan conflict are reflective of a new climate in the region resulting from initiatives led by Nelson Mandela.34
Recently it appeared that Zambia and Zimbabwe would engage in primarily competitive behavior vis-a-vis South Africa. Indeed, the initial rush for diplomatic and other recognition of South Africa by the two states seemed to be leading them toward a tense relationship in the immediate future. Fortunately, however, sense seems to have prevailed and tension may have subsided. Much of this has to do with the evenness with which Mandela's South Africa is approaching its role in the region. In any case, South Africa has too many problems to cope with at home to allow it to indulge in the game of playing one neighboring country against another. From South Africa's point of view, both Zambia and Zimbabwe were highly instrumental in that country's liberation: What would South Africa gain from pitting these two states against each other? Now that South Africa is no longer an outcast state in the region, Zambia and Zimbabwe, together with the other SADC member states, can join with South Africa in creating a viable and prosperous Southern Africa.
Notes
James R. Scarritt is professor of political science and faculty research associate in the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado at Boulder. He
acknowledges the support received from the US. Department of Education, Fulbright-Hays Research Abroad Training Grant, PO19A20020. Solomon M. Nkiwane is senior lecturer and chairman of political and administrative studies at the University of Zimbabwe and visiting professor of political science at Colorado College.
1. Thomas M. Frank, Race and Nationalism: The Struggle for Power in Rhodesia-Nyasaland (New York: Fordham University Press,1960). 2. United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, and Food and Agriculture Organization, Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia (Ndola: Falcon Press,1964), p.11. 3. Michael Clough, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe," in Michael Clough, ed., Changing Realities in Southern Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 1-60; Jeffrey Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); Martin Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia 1891979 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979); James R. Scarritt, "Zimbabwe: Revolutionary Violence Leading to Reform," in Jack A. Goldstone, Ted R. Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri, eds., Revolutions in the Late Twentieth Century (Boulder: Westview Press,1991), pp. 235-71; Annette Seegers, "Revolution in Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe (1965-1980)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago; Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1988); and Stephen J. Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991). 4. Carol B. Thompson, Challenge to Imperialism (Boulder, Westview Press, 1985). 5. Robert C. Good, UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1973). 6. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Chitepo Assassination (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985); Republic of Zambia, Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1976); Masipula Sithole, Zimbabwe Struggles Within the Struggle (Salisbury: Rujeko Publishers,1979). 7. ZANU and ZAPU formed the Patriotic Front in 1976 in response to pressure from the Frontline States to unite. When ZANU decided to contest the 1980 elections as a separate party rather than as part of the front, both parties added PF to their names. 8. Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, "Interstate Relations Under South African Dominance," in Wilmot G. James, ed., The State of Apartheid (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987); Stephen Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and Reality in Foreign Policy (London: British Academic Press,1992); Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South Africa Regional Policy Since 1978," Journal of Southern African Studies 11 (1985), pp.183-211; Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, "The State of Analysis of the Southern African Region: Issues Raised by South African Strategy," Review of African Political Economy 29 (1984), pp. 64-76; Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbors: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1986); Steve Kibble and Ray Bush, "Reform of Apartheid and Continued Destabilisation in Southern Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies 24 (June 1986), pp. 203-27; Robert M. Price, "Creating New Political Realities: Pretoria's Drive for Regional Hegemony," in Gerald Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and US. Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 64-88; Robert M. Price, "Pretoria's
Southern African Strategy," African Affairs no. 83 (1984), pp. 11-32; Robert I. Rotberg, "Introduction: South Africa in Its Region-Hegemony and Vulnerability," in Robert I. Rotberg et al., eds., South Africa and Its Neighbors (Lexington: Lexington Books,1986). 9. James R. Scarritt, "The Effects of South Africa on Zambian Politics and Society," in Edward J. Keller and Louis A. Picard, eds., South Africa in Southern Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1989), pp.179-99. 10. Karen Eriksen (pseud. for Carolyn Baylies), "Zambia: Class Formation and Detente," Review of African Political Economy 9 (1978), pp. 4-26; Timothy M. Shaw and Agrippah Mugomba, "The Political Economy of Regional Detente: Zambia and Southern Africa," Journal of African Studies 4 (1977), pp. 392-413. 11. Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa, pp. 151-72. 12. Carol B. Thompson, Harvests Under Fire: Regional Cooperation in Food Security in Southern Africa (London: Zed Press, 1991); Carol B. Thompson, in association with Food Security Unit, SADC, Drought Management Strategies in Southern Africa: From Relief Through Rehabilitation to Vulnerability Reduction (Nairobi: UNICEF); and personal interview with Thompson. 13. Carol B. Thompson, "Zimbabwe in SADCC: A Question of Dominance?" in Colin Stoneman, ed., Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State, and Capital in Southern Africa (London: Macmillan,1988), pp. 238-56. 14. Interview in Lusaka, December 1993. 15. Whereas Zambia officially followed Kaunda's humanism and tended toward a one-man dictatorship, Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe was an avowed Marxist-Leninist state. 16. A typical example is echoed by a news item in one of the leading independent papers in Zimbabwe. See "Ties with Zambia Sour Again" in the Financial Gazette (22 December 1994), p.1. 17. In this particular dispute the two countries have agreed to let the International Court of Justice (ICJ) be the final judge, as will be discussed later. 18. The Herald, Harare, Zimbabwe (16-17 December 1995), p. 8 and p. 6, respectively. 19. Available information is that the demand for Rhino horn comes from such places as China and the Middle East, especially the Yemen Republics and other Gulf states. 20. Interview with Zambian High Commission official in Harare, October 1993. 21. "Border folk can now cross to Zambia without passports," The Herald (21 December 1994), pp.1, 6. 22. "Zimbabwe, Zambia in a Bid to Avert Trade Dispute," Sunday Times Johannesburg, South Africa (11 December 1994), p. 1. 23. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbors, pp. 210-12. 24. Ibid. 25. The fear of neocolonialism is real in political circles in Africa today. 26. See Solomon M. Nkiwane, Destabilization in Southern Africa: A Historical Perspective (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Monograph No.13,1988). 27. Thomas Ohlson and Stephen J. Stedman, "Security in Postapartheid Southern Africa," Security Dialogue 24, no. 4 (1993), pp. 415-28. 28. Marcia M. Burdette, "Zambia," in Timothy M. Shaw and Okajide Aluko, eds., The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 319-47; Marcia M. Burdette, Zambia: Between Two Worlds (Boulder: Westview Press,1988); Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa, pp.151-72; Ken Good, "Zimbabwe," in Shaw and Aluko, eds., The Political Economy of
African Foreign Policy, pp. 348-71; Ken Good, "Zambia and the Liberation of South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies 25 (September 1987), pp. 50540. 29. SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) was established in Harare in 1980 principally to outflank and isolate apartheid South Africa. When, in April 1994, Nelson Mandela's African National Congress replaced the National Party in governing South Africa, SADCC's mission was seen as having been accomplished. Thus, SADC (Southern African Development Community) came into existence in 1991 as a fitting replacement for SADCC. For a comprehensive survey of SADCC, see Tom Ostergaard, SADCC:A Political and Economic Survey (Copenhagen: Danida, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark,1990). 30. Steen Folke, Niels Fold, and Thyge Enevoldsen, South-South Trade and Development (New York: St. Martin's Press,1993). 31. Thomas Ohlson and Stephen J. Stedman, "Security in Postapartheid Southern Africa," pp. 415-28; Colin Stoneman and Carol B. Thompson, "Southern Africa After Apartheid: Economic Repercussions of a Free South Africa," Africa Recovery Briefing Paper 4 (December 1991). 32. The Herald (16 June 1995), p.13. 33. This new southern Africa was anticipated in the study by Solomon M. Nkiwane, Regional Security and Confidence-Building Processes: The Case of Southern Africa in the 1990s (New York: United Nations,1993). 34. President Mandela seems to have been the central force behind the recent settlements in Lesotho and Angola. It was in Pretoria that all the Lesotho leaders last met and pledged to honor the peace agreement they made in the presence of Presidents Mandela, Mugabe, and Masire. The Lusaka Peace Accord on Angola was really up in the air until UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi met President Mandela toward the end of May 1995.
Copyright Africa Today Associates First Quarter 1996