On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace

Abstract

"On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace" by Donald Kagan is reviewed.

On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. By Donald Kagan. New York: Doubleday, 1995. 606 pages. $30. Reviewed by Colonel David A. Fastabend, FM 100-5 Writing Team, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

On the Origins of War is directed "to those who wish to have a clear understanding both of events in the past and of those in the future which will, in all human likelihood, happen again in the same or a similar way." These are the words of Thucydides, one of Donald Kagan's earliest predecessors in that long line of chroniclers who have examined war's origins and causes. Thucydides figures prominently in this work, and not only as a primary source for Kagan's account of the road to war in the Peloponnesus. He is also the fountainhead of Kagan's fundamental thesis that people go to war out of "honor, fear, and interest."

Professor Kagan does not discount the more prevalent, realist position that war springs from the competition for power. But he goes on to argue-compellingly, in my view-that there is "a clearer, more profound, more elegant, and comprehensive explanation of why people organized in states are moved to fight wars." Honor, fear, and interest are "that trio of motives most illuminating in understanding the origins of wars throughout history."

To demonstrate his thesis, Professor Kagan presents five intriguing case studies that span 2400 years of recorded history and a wide range of societies, cultures, and international environments. His subjects include the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.), the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.), World War I, World War II, and an "almost-war," the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Professor Kagan does not aim for definitive history, but rather-in his own words-a "comparative narrative history" that presents events through the lens of honor, fear, and interest. In demonstrating the utility of a more detailed perspective than simply "power," Kagan illuminates seemingly familiar ground with fresh insight.

Half-measures, for example, are not the policy that maintains a "free hand," but are more often a formula for disaster. The Athenians' halfhearted intervention against Corinth and their embargo of Megara infuriated their targets without rendering them impotent, leaving them angry and dangerous. The Romans sought a similar course, hoping to strike a happy medium between offending a growing Carthage and making a firm military commitment to Spain. Like the Athenians, they committed honor and prestige without a concomitant commitment of resources. In both cases their "middle course" confirmed their rivals' suspicions of weakness, and disaster ensued.

Kagan asserts that "No peace keeps itself." He suggests, "A persistent and repeated error through the ages has been the failure to understand that the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as war does." Army officers should note with interest his imperative to match a deterrence strategy with an effective, decisive capability. Both the Athenians before the Peloponnesian War and the British on the eve of this century's world wars sought deterrence on the cheap. They rejected the cost of land warfare and emphasized their "asymmetric advantage"-their navies. But the lack of a decisive, offensive land capability gutted their deterrence strategies. Their opponents saw no risk, other than wasted effort or stalemate, to challenging the status quo.

Kagan's account of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis will attract the most attention over the coming years. Drawing on recently declassified material, Kagan shreds the image of a brave young President Kennedy, resolving the crisis through virtue and measured toughness. In the place of Camelot, Kagan presents an inexperienced, irresolute politician whose vacillations at the Bay of Pigs and during the Berlin Wall crisis virtually invited Krushchev's grab for prestige. Although superior military capability ultimately prevented war, fear generated unwarranted concessions that were denied and concealed from Congress, the press, and the American people. Professor Kagan has probably not heard the last on this topic.

Thucydides hoped his observations on the causes of war 2400 years ago would be "a possession for all time." Has Donald Kagan earned a similar aspiration? Some might question his restriction to nation-state examples, or his loose, imbalanced approach that gives uneven attention to the individual case studies. Others might worry that his relentless call for peace through strength fails to directly address Paul Kennedy's alternative thesis (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers) that imperial overreach is a formula for failure. Finally, military readers who cast themselves in the "warrior" mold may be disappointed with an account that focuses not on echelons smashed or centers of gravity unhinged but on the tedious work of diplomats and politicians, the prelude to "the good part."

These critiques pale in comparison to Kagan's service to the field of international relations in recasting the "power" paradigm. The true professional, recognizing he serves a country committed to a strategy of deterrence, would be well advised to study Kagan's explanation of what actually makes deterrence work. On the Origins of War may not be found on bookshelves 2400 years from now, but it merits a place of honor on ours for at least the next 24.