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Abstract
The space shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, killing its 7 astronauts. Subsequently, the Rogers Commission concluded that the explosion occurred because of seal failure in one of the solid rocket booster joints. Roger Boisjoly, senior scientist and rocket seal expert at Morton Thiokol, presented testimony that top management at NASA and Morton Thiokol had been aware of problems with the O-ring seals but decided to launch against the recommendation of Boisjoly and other engineers. This disaster illustrates the dynamic tension between organizational and individual responsibility. Boisjoly's experiences serve as a paradigmatic case study for ethical problems ranging from accountability to corporate loyalty and whistleblowing. The organizational structure governing the space shuttle program is shown to have become the locus of responsibility in such a way that it undermined the responsibilities of individual decision makers and became a way of avoiding real, effective responsibility throughout the whole management system.