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Kiper discusses the effectiveness of the unconventional warfare (UW) conducted during the Korean War. He says that the CCF had an almost inexhaustible pool of manpower, and the number of casualties inflicted by the partisans had virtually no effect on the war's outcome. He opines that the operational ineffectiveness of partisan operations can be blamed on a number of factors, including the lack of experienced guerilla-warfare personnel in the US Army, the lack of understanding at FECOM of what partisans could do, and the haphazard mechanisms for identifying soldiers who had OSS experience.
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Those who are familiar with the history of Army special operations recognize the terms "OSS," "SOE," "Det 101" and "Jedburgh" - all those terms are associated with unconventional warfare, or UW, conducted during World War II.1 Few who are familiar with the foregoing terms, however, have heard of "Donkeys," "FEC/LG," "8086 Army Unit," "8240 Army Unit," "CCRAK" and "JACK" - those terms are associated with UW during the Korean War.
The military legacy of the Korean War has been Task Force Smith, Inch'on, the Yalu River, the Chosin Reservoir, Heartbreak Ridge and the 38th Parallel. Yet while conventional soldiers were fighting initially for survival, and finally for re-establishment of a free South Korea, guerrillas and partisans - aided by a few American soldiers - were conducting an active UW campaign behind the lines of North Korean forces, or NK, and the Chinese Communist Forces, or CCF.2 Although the 50th anniversary of the Korean War has given rise to several works that examine the previously unrecognized role of partisan operations in that conflict, UW remains a little-known aspect of the Korean War.
During World War II, the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, provided the United States with the capability for performing UW. But three weeks after World War II ended, President Truman disbanded the OSS, and the American military capability for performing unconventional operations disappeared.3 Not until the National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency did the U.S. government formally acknowledge the need for a UW capability. National Security Council Directive 10/2, "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," dated June 18, 1948, assigned to the CIA the responsibility to "conduct covert operations," including "direct action, including sabotage ... assistance to underground movements ... [and] guerrillas."
NSC Directive 10/2 also directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the CIA during "wartime covert operations." The Joint Chiefs implemented the military's portion of Directive 10/2 through a March 1, 1949, memorandum, "Study on Guerilla Warfare," which stated that the Army "shall be assigned primary responsibility for all other guerrilla warfare functions."4 But not until September 1950, when secretary of the Army Frank Pace forced the Army to activate the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare under Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, was there a branch of the Army G3 section that was responsible for UW.5
General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the U.S. Far Eastern Command, or FECOM, in 1950, had a long-standing antipathy toward the OSS during World War II. It is therefore not surprising that when war came to the Korean peninsula on june 25, 1950, the CIA (the successor to the OSS) had only six personnel in Japan for planning and conducting UW operations.6 The FECOM G2, Major General Charles Willoughby, had not detected any basis for conducting UW operations in Korea, although he had received unconfirmed reports of guerrilla resistance.
In fact, after United Nations forces landed at Inch'on Sept. 15, 1950, and advanced northward, Korean guerrillas rose up behind the UN. advance and supplanted the communist North Korean government officials who had been in control since 1945. But after China entered the war, the UN. forces were forced to withdraw from North Korea, leaving the Korean partisans in dire straits. The partisans soon withdrew to Hwanghae Province, on Korea's west coast. From there, many of them were able to flee to nearby islands; others went into hiding.
Not until FECOM's Army component, the U.S. Eighth Army, or EUSA, received a message from Navy Task Force 95.7 on Jan. 8, 1951, that there were 10,000 partisans in Hwanghae Province, were the reports of guerrilla resistance confirmed.
The intelligence regarding the existence of such a large body of partisans was passed immediately to Colonel John McGee, the officer in the EUSA G3 who was responsible for UW. One week later, EUSA created, within its G3's Miscellaneous Division, the Attrition section, which had the responsibility for managing partisan operations. By Jan. 23, McGee had produced "Operational Plan Number One" for employing partisans in support of an anticipated UN. counteroffensive.
McGee's plan called for the establishment of three partisan units: "William Able Base" (soon renamed Leopard), which would operate off the west coast of Korea; "Kirkland," which would operate off the east coast; and "Baker section," which would conduct airborne operations throughout North Korea. The plan included a fourth unit, "Task Force Redwing," which was actually a company of Republic of Korea Marines that was organized for conducting raids and sabotage. All the partisan units were to be commanded by McGee's Attrition Section.7 Thus began U.S. Army UW operations against North Korean and Chinese-communist forces.
Immediately after McGee received the report of a potential partisan force on the islands off the west coast in January 1951, he sent Major William Burke to assess the situation and to provide the partisan force with weapons and ammunition.
Burke learned that partisans occupied five islands, with the largest group being on the island of Paengnyong-do, which is just south of the 38th Parallel. On the basis of Burke's report, McGee quickly revised Operational Plan Number One. Among the revisions was a provision that American officers would command each partisan base. The Americans would train and equip the partisan forces and deploy them in accordance with orders from EUSA.8 After making his report, Burke quickly assembled a staff and returned to Paengnyong-do in February to establish a partisan-training program.
Burke's new mission was to prepare the partisans to conduct guerrilla operations in conjunction with a planned U.N. counterattack that would force the NK army and CCF to withdraw at least to the 39th Parallel. he moved quickly to establish training bases on Paengnyong-do, Taechong-do, Sok-to, and Cho-do.9 By March the training bases were ready.
The partisans had organized themselves into bands whose leader was usually a prominent individual from the area that was home to that particular band. The bands referred to themselves as "donkeys." Three primary theories exist for the origin of that name, none of which can be agreed upon by former partisans as the reason. One theory is that the name originates from the Korean word "dong-li," which means "liberty." Another theory is that the name refers to the traits of a donkey: mean, patient and sturdy. A third theory is that the partisans thought they looked as if they were riding a donkey when they were operating the crank-driven generator for the AN/GRC-9 radio.10 Whatever the origin, the name was a source of pride. So, too, would be their accomplishments.
'Leopard' activities
On March 3, 1951, Donkey 1, led by former merchant Chang Jae Hwa, became the first Donkey unit to return to the mainland of North Korea. Chang and 37 partisans moved to the vicinity of Sari-won and Hwang-ju to obtain information about enemy movements on the main highway leading south from P'yongyang. When the partisans returned to their island base, Chang reported 280 enemy killed and railroad and telephone links cut.11 On March 5, Donkey 4 (known as the "White Tigers") landed on the mainland, followed by Donkey 7 on March 27, Donkey 11 on April 14, and Donkey 3 on May 27.12 Most Donkey units had one or more American advisers, but existing records indicate that the Americans only occasionally accompanied the partisans on operations.13
One such operation was launched from Wollae-do, two miles off the North Korean coast, on july 13, 1952. A North Korean 76 mm gun was harassing the partisan base on Wollae-do as well as ships operating in the coastal waters. Pak Chol, leader of Donkey 4, persuaded the U.S. adviser on Paengnyong-do, 1st lieutenant Ben MaIcom, that the gun had to be eliminated. After four months of intense training, Pak, Malcom and 118 partisans boarded four junks and set sail for the mainland.
At 4:30 a.m., according to plan, the U.S. Navy began a 30-minute barrage of the objective. At 5 a.m., Donkey 4 began its attack. With Navy air support, the partisans gained the top of the bunker that housed the gun; from there, they threw grenades through the gun apertures. Eventually they forced open the door leading into the bunker. Close-quarters fighting ensued, and several partisans were killed. Finally, Donkey 4 overcame all enemy resistance and, using C-3 explosive, its members destroyed the gun and the bunker. When Navy aircraft reported that enemy reinforcements were moving in rapidly, the partisans began a wild run to the beach. Naval gunfire was invaluable as it covered their withdrawal. Soon Pak, Malcom, the partisan force and 10 refugees reached Wollae-do.14
The mission was a success. Sustaining losses of six partisans killed and seven wounded, Donkey 4 had destroyed a hardened enemy position, had killed approximately 60 enemy soldiers, and had garnered an abundant haul of intelligence. Also important was the fact that the training techniques and skills of the partisan advisers had been proven effective. By accompanying the raiders, Malcom had gained great "face" with the Koreans. The raid also demonstrated that the North Koreans were not invulnerable.15
Two of the Rangers involved in Operation Virginia, Edward Pucel (2nd from left) and William Miles, are received on board the USS St. Paul foiiowing their rescue by helicopter. Miles had been shot in the left side of his face.
'Baker' activities
Although the CIA had begun parachuting agents into North Korea shortly after the war began, Baker section did not conduct its first airborne operation until March 15, 1951.16 That night, the Special Air Mission Detachment of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron dropped four Americans and 20 Koreans near Hyon-ni, 30 miles inland from the Sea of Japan, where the partisans were to destroy railroad tunnels. The Americans - three corporals and one private first class - were from the 4th Ranger Company and had volunteered for a classified mission.
The mission, code-named Operation Virginia, was a disaster. The team missed the drop zone, and a blizzard delayed the team's arrival at its primary objective. Finding that tunnel to be too heavily defended, the team slowly moved east to attack another tunnel. After the attack, because of heavy cloud cover and cold so severe that it caused the team's radio batteries not to function, the team was unable to contact friendly units for two weeks.
When the team was able to make radio contact, the Navy dispatched three helicopters to rescue the team. One helicopter was shot down as it approached the pick-up zone. The remaining two helicopters managed to hoist three Americans out, but heavy enemy fire prevented any further evacuations. The pilot of the downed helicopter, the remaining Ranger and seven Koreans escaped the site. The two Americans were captured after they had evaded the enemy for 10 days. They would not be released until Sept. 6,1953. Five of the seven Korean partisans returned to friendly lines on foot.
By the end of the war, Baker Section had conducted 19 airborne operations, involving 389 partisans. Including the five partisans who returned from Operation Virginia, only 10 of the 389 partisans returned. Two advisers were never heard from. Tangible results of airborne insertions made by Baker sec tion are nil. A 1956 study concluded: "These decisions to use partisans against enemy supply routes in airborne operations appears to have been futile and callous."17
'Kirkland' activities
Kirkland, the third partisan force, was organized in April 1951. Jurisdictional disputes between the Army and the CIA led to Kirkland's area of operations being limited to the area from Wonsan south. The CIA conducted all operations north of Wonsan. McGee transferred 1st lieutenant William S. Harrison from Donkey 4 to command Kirkland. Initially, one other U.S. officer and two U.S. enlisted soldiers assisted Harrison. Based on the island of Nani-do, Kirkland had the initial mission, as did Leopard, of supporting a major U.N. counteroffensive.
When the U.N. did not mount the counteroffensive, Kirkland's mission changed to conducting coastal raids, collecting intelligence, and identifying targets for Navy air operations and naval gunfire. The scarcity of islands off Korea's eastern coast forced Kirkland to become a secondary partisan operation. During the war, slightly more than 1 percent of the partisan operations occurred along the east coast. By January 1952, only 11 Americans and 195 partisans had been assigned to Kirkland's region. Seventeen months later, Kirkland's personnel strength peaked at 4,844 partisans and 32 American advisers. Soon afterward, an increase in the number of enemy troops along the east coast and the pending armistice led the U.N. to evacuate the partisans to islands lying south of the 38th Parallel.18
Reorganizations
At the same time the Army's UW operations began, there also began a bewildering series of command changes, reorganizations and redesignations, as FECOM sought to establish the responsibility for UW. Fortunately for the Americans who worked closely with the partisan groups, the successive UW reorganizations had little direct impact on partisan operations.
Although the Attrition section was established in January 1951 as part of the FECOM G3's Miscellaneous Division, which was an operational organization, the Attrition Section received its operational guidance from the FECOM G2, through a sub-section known as the Far East Command/Liaison Group, or FEC/LG. On April 11, 1951, Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway replaced MacArthur as commander of FECOM, and Lieutenant General James Van Fleet replaced Ridgway at EUSA. On May 5, Van Fleet redesignated the Attrition section as the Miscellaneous Group, 8086 Army Unit, or 8086 AU, "to develop and direct partisan warfare."19 Partisan operations were now the responsibility of an Army unit, not of a staff section.
On July 26, Ridgway designated the FEC/LG as FEC/LG, 8240 Army Unit. He also activated the Far East Command/Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240 Army Unit, or FEC/LD (K). Initially FEC/LD (K) was responsible only for intelligence-gathering; partisan operations remained the responsibility of EUSA's 8086 AU.20
That arrangement changed dramatically on Dec. 10, when, in an attempt to resolve jurisdictional disputes and to deconflict ongoing UW operations, FECOM created another organization - the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea, 8240 Army Unit, or CCRAK. CCRAK, under the command of FEC/LG,21 assumed total control of all partisan operations. Although FEC/LG was based in Tokyo, CCRAK was to be based in Seoul. While EUSA retained some staff, administrative and logistics functions for supporting guerrilla operations, all covert activities were to be the responsibility of one command at the theater level, at least on paper.22 EUSA abolished the 8086 AU, but several of 8086 AU's functions were taken over by FEC/LD (K). FEC/LD (K), which remained under the operational control of the FECOM G2, now had two sections an intelligence section and a guerrilla section that controlled partisan operations.
The reason why there were jurisdictional disputes and conflicting UW operations was that while the U.S. Army had been establishing a structure for managing partisan operations, the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency had been doing the same. In July 1950, one month after North Korea invaded South Korea, Hans Tofte, an OSS veteran, had arrived at CIA headquarters in Tokyo to take charge of the agency's covert operations in Korea in accordance with NSC Directive 10/2. Tofte began to recruit, train and insert agents who would gather intelligence behind enemy lines. In July 1951, the CIA created an operational arm known as the Joint Advisory Commission-Korea, or JACK, for inserting agents.
In early 1951, the Air Force had created Special Activities Unit Number One, one of whose missions was to conduct guerrilla operations, but in March 1951, that portion of the unit's mission had been deleted. The Air Force allowed the CIA to use the Special Air Mission Detachment of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron and aircraft from the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing for parachuting agents into North Korea. The Air Force also operated a fleet of boats for inserting agents into the north.23
At one time, therefore, three autonomous agencies were planning and conducting guerrilla operations in Korea, with no centralized control. After the Air Force relinquished any pretense of advising guerrillas in March 1951, the major issue over the control of UW was between the Army and the CIA. Coordination between the two agencies was not improved by the bitterness that resounded between Tofte and FECOM G2's Willoughby.24
When Ridgway directed FECOM to create CCRAK, he determined that, in order to enhance coordination and reduce conflict, the commander would be an Army officer, and the deputy commander would be a member of the CIA. Unfortunately, while the CIA's JACK came under the operational control of CCRAK, the orders that created CCRAK did not place JACK under CCRAK's command. Furthermore, CIA officers in Korea had no confidence in the ability of the FECOM G2 staff to command operations. So while the creation of CCRAK appeared to alleviate the bureaucratic bickering between the Army and the CIA, the reality was otherwise.25
By early 1952, it became apparent to the partisans, who had believed that they would support a U.N. counteroffensive, that they existed only for providing intelligence. Their perception changed on Oct. 1,1952, when the U.S. activated U.S. Army Forces Far East, or AFFE, as the theater Army-component command. General Mark Clark, who had replaced Ridgway as FECOM commander, then removed CCRAK from the jurisdiction of FEC/LG, renamed it Army Unit 8242, placed it directly under AFFE, and gave it operational control of FEC/LD (K). FEC/LG remained a part of FECOM G2 but would provide administrative and logistics support to CCRAK. Simultaneously, Clark directed that partisan strength be increased from 10,000 men to 20,000 by March 1953 and to 40,000 by July 15, 1953. On May 10, 1953, FEC/LD (K) OPLAN Partisan Operations (K), Phase ILA, directed that partisan activity be increased. FECOM also began drafting plans for a general offensive.26
Another organizational change occurred on Nov. 21, 1952, when the guerrilla section of FEC/LD (K) became United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea, or UNPFK. Of the guerrilla section's partisan units, Leopard, Wolfpack (which had been created Jan. 1,1952, by taking part of Leopard) and Scannon (renamed from Kirkland in September 1952) became partisan infantry regiments. Baker section became the 1st Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment. In December 1952, in a major shift of responsibility for guerrilla operations, Clark ordered that FEC/LG become a support element for partisan operations, and that the operations themselves be returned to the control of EUSA.27
Korean partisan infantry soldiers receive training on American weapons. Partisan forces had no schools for tactics; they learned those through experience.
In April 1953, FECOM formed two additional partisan infantry regiments. On Aug. 16,1953, FECOM, in cooperation with the government of the Republic of Korea, or ROK, established the 8250 ROK Army Unit to provide administrative support to partisans. The last UW organizational change occurred in the fall of 1953. On Sept. 23, UNPFK became United Nations Partisan Infantry-Korea, or UNPIK. CCRAK was abolished and re-established in Japan as the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Far East, 8177 Army Unit, or CCRAFE. Simultaneously, AFFE activated the AFFE Coordinating Detachment, 8078 Army Unit, in Korea to represent AFFE's UW interests.28
Belated doctrine
These organizational changes and shifts in responsibility for UW occurred during less than three years. Bureaucratic rivalries contributed significantly to the constantly changing landscape of lines and boxes on organization charts. Much of the flux also resulted from the lack of Army doctrine for implementing NSC Directive 10/2. To remedy the lack of doctrine, the Army began drafting two manuals. FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerilla Forces, acquainted commanders with the "organization and tactics of guerillas" and provided "a guide for combating and destroying guerillas." FM SI21, Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare, addressed "organizing, training, commanding, and exploiting guerilla forces in war." Unfortunately, neither manual was published until 1951, and FM 31-21 was not published until October of that year.29
Retired Colonel Ben Malcom, who was the adviser for Donkey 4, made clear how the lack of doctrinal guidance affected those who were charged with executing the mission: "We were sent to conduct partisan operations with no knowledge of the history of these operations and no training in how best to implement them." He continued: "To my knowledge not a single copy of FM 31-21 ever filtered down to the operational level."30 The officers and enlisted men who were detailed to advise the partisan groups were on their own.
The only doctrine available to partisans prior to the arrival of the Americans in January 1951 was the principle of surprise. Although the principle was not codified, as partisan leader Pak Chol stated, "Surprise is the whole of guerrilla warfare." Pak and other leaders knew that, because they lacked training and equipment, they could not stand against regular army units. All their operations had to be planned for striking the enemy when they would be least expected. No school prepared the partisans with studies of tactics; they learned from experience. "We guerrillas had no theory, but we had experience," said Pak. "In the experience we found the theory."31 But experience is of little use without transportation, communications, weapons, ammunition and training.
Compounding the problems resulting from the lack of both doctrine and in-place organizations was the fact, as retired Colonel Al Paddock put it, that the Army's "unconventional warfare capability was nonexistent."32 After World War II, soldiers with UW experience who remained in the Army had been assigned to conventional units. The burden of providing trainers for the growing partisan force fell to McGee and his replacement, Lieutenant Colonel Jay Vanderpool (who had World War II experience with Filipino guerrillas), and soldiers such as 1st Lieutenant William S. Harrison (who had advised a South Korean guerrilla battalion), and a few Rangers who had been recruited when the Army disbanded all its Ranger companies in August 1951.
Competing with the Army for the few available soldiers who had OSS experience was the CIA, which recruited officers such as Major John K. Singlaub, who had served with the OSS in France and in China. The shortage of experienced personnel was the reason that infantry officers, such as Malcom, who had no language skills, no UW experience, and no training to prepare them, were pressed into the role of UW adviser.33
Conclusions
What are we to make of the UW campaign of the Korean War? Did its operations have a material effect on the war? Between March 1951 and the armistice on July 27, 1953, partisans reported 4,445 combat actions and 69,084 enemy casualties. While these figures are impressive, they cannot be verified. Furthermore, because the CCF had an almost inexhaustible pool of manpower, the number of casualties inflicted by the partisans had virtually no effect on the war's outcome. The UW campaign's airborne operations, other than those the CIA conducted for gathering intelligence, were complete failures. Until the beginning of truce talks, partisan activity did tie down enemy forces. Once the lines stabilized, however, the CCF and NK were able to shift their forces to the coastal areas. The subsequent overwhelming number of enemy soldiers in the coastal areas rendered any partisan activity inconsequential.34
The operational ineffectiveness of partisan operations can be blamed on a number of factors:
* The lack of experienced guerrilla-warfare personnel in the U.S. Army as a whole.
* The inability of the Army and the CIA to work together consistently toward a common goal.
* The lack of understanding at FECOM of what partisans could do.
* The lack of U.S. doctrine on unconventional warfare.
The results of those shortcomings were:
* Haphazard mechanisms for identifying soldiers who had OSS experience.
* The assignment of soldiers to a foreign culture for which they had no understanding.
* A lack of training - other than basic infantry training - that would prepare American soldiers for organizing and training partisan forces.
* A constantly changing command structure that only confused UW responsibilities.
* A rotation policy that allowed soldiers who were gaining in-theater UW experience to leave just when they were becoming most effective.
Not until Nov. 14, 1986, when the U.S. Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act, were many of the problems identified above resolved.35 Nevertheless, the little-known story of UW during the Korean War and the courage of the Korean partisans, guerrillas and their American advisers remains a notable chapter in the history of Army special operations.
Notes:
1 The Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was responsible for conducting UW, both in Europe and in the Pacific. The Special Operations Executive, or SOE, was the British equivalent of the OSS. Detachment 101 conducted guerrilla operations for the OSS in Burma. Jedburgh teams coordinated French resistance operations in support of Allied ground operations.
2 The Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms for 1950 defines partisan warfare as "activity carried on against an enemy by people who are devoted adherents to a cause, but who are not members of organized and recognized military forces." The Dictionary defines guerrilla warfare as "operations carried on by small independent forces generally in the rear of an enemy." The Dictionary does not define either "unconventional warfare" or "special operations." In practice, guerrilla and partisan often were used interchangeably.
3 The same is true for Ranger and psychological-warfare capabilities.
4 NSC 10/2, "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," http://www.state.gov//www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html; "Memorandum for the Record: Study on Guerrilla Warfare," 1 March 1949, National Archive Record Group 319.
5 Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 68, 93.
6 Richard J. Aldrich, et al., eds., The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 22-23; John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1986), 68.
7 Message, CTG 95.7, to Eighth U.S. Army Korea, 080135Z Jan 51; Rod Paschall, "Special Operations in Korea," Conflict 7 (1987): 158; Frederick W. Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954 (Chevy Chase, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office, 1956), 30, 32, 39; Ben Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey's, 1996), 19. During World War II, McGee had been captured by the Japanese in the Philippines, had later escaped, and had then fought with Filipino guerrillas.
8 Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 38, 40.
9 William Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 161; Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 32.
10 Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 41; AFFE MHD 8086 AU, UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 21, 94; Malcom, White Tigers, 56. Former Donkey 13 leader Kim Chang Song provides the generator version as the reason for the name "donkey."
11 Breuer, Shadow Warriors, 161; Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 32; AFFE MHD 8086 AU, UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 47. Although Donkey 1 was the first partisan unit to be inserted behind enemy lines, the CIA had been inserting agents. In Operation Bluebell, the CIA inserted stay-behind agents whose mission was to gather intelligence, not to conduct combat operations. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA in Korea, 1946-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1973), 1:100, 3:97; Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, 69. The Tactical Liaison Office, a section of FEC/LG, recruited agents as line-crossers to gather intelligence immediately behind enemy lines. The 25-man Korean teams, usually controlled by one American officer and two enlisted men, were attached to each front-line U.S. division. Garth Stevens, et al., Intelligence Information by Partisans for Armor (Fort Knox, Ky: The Armor School, 1952), 1:19.
12 AFFE MHD 8086 AU, UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 47, 77, 99, 101, 117, 119.
13 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 13.
14 Malcom, White Tigers, 83-107.
15 Malcom, White Tigers, 106-07.
16 The code name for clandestine airborne operations was Aviary. Douglas C. Dillard, Operation Aviary: Airborne Special Operations-Korea 1950-1953 (Victoria, Canada: Trafford, 2003), 4.
17 The first insertion of an intelligence team by the CIA was on 9 December 1950. Stevens, et al., Intelligence Information by Partisans for Armor, 1:10; Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 50-51; Robert W. Black, Rangers in Korea (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 85; John W. Thornton, Believed to Be Alive (Middlebury, Vt.: Paul S. Eriksson, 1981), 70-80, 100, 255; Michael E. Haas, Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations During the Cold War (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 44; Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 52, 94; Lawrence V. Schuetta, Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950-53 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1964), 146-49. Some sources say 19 partisans went on Operation Virginia.
18 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 32, 41, 82, 114, 117, 132, 158. In July 1951, 1st Lieutenant Joseph Ulatoski replaced Harrison as commander of Kirkland Forward when Harrison returned to the United States. Major A.J. Coccumelli became commander of the entire Kirkland area of operations.
19 Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, Table of Distribution 80-8086, Miscellaneous Group, 8086 Army Unit, undated, Record Group 319, National Archives, as quoted in Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 104.
20 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 34-37.
21 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 37-39.
22 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 39.
23 Schuetta, Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 73-74, 77-78. The 581st also had H-19 helicopters that were used to insert agents. B Flight, 6167th Operations Squadron eventually assumed the UW support missions of the Special Air Mission Detachment. Haas, Apollo's Warriors, 66-75.
24 "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273; Michael E. Haas, In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000), ix, 40, 177-79; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 106.
25 Malcom, White Tigers, 27; Haas, In the Devil's Shadow, 41-42.
26 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 62-64, 66, 156, 162-65.
27 Haas, In the Devil's Shadow, 42; Headquarters and Service Command, FEC, General Order 21, 3 October 1952; Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 67-68, 155-56; "United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea, 8240th AU (FEC/LD) Partisan Operations," http://www.koreanwar.com/SpecOpsRosters/UNPIKPART.htm.
28 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 112, 157; Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 112.
29 Field Manual 31-20, Operations Against Guerilla Forces (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, February 1951), 1; FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 1951), 1.
30 Malcom, White Tigers, 40-41.
31 Armed Forces Far East Military History Detachment 8086 Army Unit, UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 1951-1952: A Study of Their Characteristics and Operations (Tokyo: 8086 Army Unit, 1954), 66-67.
32 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 65.
33 Haas, In the Devil's Shadow, 37, 62-63, 65.
34 Stevens, et al., Intelligence Information by Partisans for Armor, 1:13; Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 16. In 1985, retired Colonel Glenn Muggleberg, former commander of UN. Partisan Infantry Korea, commented on the partisan reports. "The partisan reports were about as accurate as our own," he said. U.S. Army Military History Institute Oral History Project 85-S, 15 November 1985.
35 Public Law 99-661 created the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict), established the unified United States Special Operations Command, and dramatically increased funding for special operations. On Dec. 1, 1989, the Army activated the Army Special Operations Command as a major Army command that would command all Army special-operations forces in the continental United States and train all Army special-operations soldiers.
Dr. Kiper's article is part of a larger research project on special operations during the Korean War that he is producing for publication under contract to the USASOC Historian's Office. - Editor
Dr. Richard L. Kiper earned his Ph.D. in history at the University of Kansas. He served as an officer in Special Forces, airborne and Infantry units, served on the Army Staff, and was an instructor at West Point and at the Army Command and General Staff College. He earned his Combat Infantryman Badge and Purple Heart in Vietnam, where he served as an Infantry company commander and in the 5th Special Forces Group. He is the author of Major General John Alexander McClernand: Politician in Uniform, which received the Fletcher Pratt Award for best nonfiction Civil War book in 1999. He also edited Dear Catharine, Dear Taylor: The Civil War Letters of a Union Soldier and His Wife, which was published in 2002. He co-authored Weapon of Choice: Army Special Operations in Afghanistan, to be published in 2003. Dr. Kiper teaches history at Kansas City Kansas Community College.
Copyright John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Aug 2003