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Unconventional warfare has been an integral part of the United States' national-security strategy in the post-World War II era, yet the topic remains shrouded in myth and misunderstanding. For more than 50 years, this valuable operational capability has remained hampered by unclear doctrine, a lack of common understanding and education, and interservice and interagency rivalry and bias.
The U.S. Army, and more specifically, Army Special Forces, uses the term "unconventional warfare," or UW, to denote a type of special operation - specifically, support to indigenous irregular forces, such as resistance forces or insurgents - in the conduct of operations against an occupying force or hostile government. The Army's most recent UW field manual states:
"The intent of U.S. Unconventional Warfare operations is to exploit a hostile power's political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic goals."1
Although the doctrine has reflected this same meaning since the 1950s, the topic has received little acknowledgment in conventional Army doctrine or formal military education.2 Despite the remarkable contributions of UW operations to the opening phases of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army's newest operations field manual makes little mention of UW operations. It's not hard to understand why senior Army leaders might show a reluctance or an unwillingness to authorize or even entertain the concept of UW operations, with which they are completely unfamiliar.
The issue is further confused by the fact that the military and the civilian academic community often use the same term to convey two very different meanings. The civilian academic community commonly uses the term "unconventional warfare" to describe conflicts considered to be outside the realm of conventional or "maneuver" warfare, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. For that reason, the civilian academic community often uses UW synonymously with irregular warfare and asymmetric warfare.
A blending of the civilian and military versions has led to UW being unofficially defined as an operational environment or as a technique - "working with indigenous or foreign personnel." Cloaking UW in generalities only conceals the specific knowledge and skills required to effectively support insurgencies and resistance forces. Generalizations provide little assistance to military decision-makers: Operations are not developed and conducted because of a need to work in a...