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ALthough political militants have been the most prominent among recent victims of the violence in El Salvador, the struggle going on in that country today is essentially a struggle over the character and direction of the new civil society that has arisen in the wake of the war and the Jan 1992 Peace Accords.
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THE armed conflict that wracked El Salvador January 1992 began 1980 to the signing of the Peace Accords in January 1992 began and ended in a struggle over civil society: over what expression civil unresolved struggle over civil society would be allowed to take, over its influence in public debat expression civil society would control it, and how. If the Right fought to take, over its influence in public debate, over who would economic power, it, and how. If the Right fought first of all on the ground of civil society, own economic power, it fought first of all means available to subordinate, or subdue, the ground of civil society, unleashed via the wave of organizing by church groups, unions, all means available to subordinate, or subdue, the forces unleashed via the wave of organizing by church groups, unions, and the the eruption of civil war in the 1960s (Baloyra, 1982; Lungo U., were preponderantly representatives The targets of the famous "death squads," which emerged well society: union leaders, teachers, community organizers, health workers, catechists. While political mifitants have been the eruption of civil war in 1981, were preponderantly representatives prominent among recent victims of the violence civil society: union leaders, teachers, community organizers, health workers, catechists. While political militants have been the struggle going on in E1 Salvador today is essentially a struggle over the character among recent victims of the violence civil society out by resurgent death squads, the struggle going on in the war and the Peace Accor today is essentially a struggle over the character and direction of the new civil society that has arisen in the wake of the war and the Peace Accords.
This struggle has been scarcely visible in the debates over the reemergence of the death squads,1 over compliance with the recommendations of the Truth Commission or the Accords themselves, or in the posturing of political parties in the wake of the elections of 1994. Nevertheless, it is a struggle that carries profound ramifications, including electoral ones, for the parties of the Right, principally the Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA), and of the Left, principally the Frente Farabundo Martide Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) and the breakaway, "social democratic" faction led by Joaquin Villalobos (now the Partido Democratico). It is a struggle rendered especially visible by a series of battles, initiated well before the end of the war, over the role of community organizations, and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with which they are linked, in the process of reconstruction and reconciliation. The United States Agency for International Development (US-AID) has played a key role in this struggle.2
This article examines the development of the controversial sector of NGOs and its role in post-war reconstruction in an attempt to illuminate both the complex process of accommodation, in which El Salvador is now engaged, and the current question regarding the role of "civil society" in the construction and maintenance of viable democracies. The next section gives a brief account of the whole notion of "civil society," as it has come to be applied to problems of democracy and democratization in the contemporary world. Part III traces the reconstitution of Salvadoran civil society particularly community organizations and NGOs) during the civil war (1981992). Part IV outlines the struggles that have characterized this sector in the post-war setting, and Part V the character of the new organizations. The conclusion draws together some answers to the initial questions about the significance of the new civil society for Salvadoran democracy.
II. THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The collapse of Communist systems in Europe, continuing criticism of the social welfare state in the North Atlantic polities, and the striking emergence of new community organizations and nongovernmental organizations in the developing world have all contributed to a sense that we must look to the texture and quality of civic life, above all to its organized expression in "civil society," for solutions to the problems of governance,participation, and social welfare that confront modern societies.According to the Tocquevillian version of the argument, the denser the web of civic associations, the more vital the democracy will be and, even, the more apt the society to experience rapid and equitable development.3 In Latin America, civil society has been viewed not only as the chief carrier of democratizing forces, but also as a prominent actor in the transitions to democracy which have swept the region since the late 1970s. Despite varying assessments as to the precise role that civil society played in these events (O'Donnell, 1979; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Garreton, 1989; Moreira Alves, 1989; Stepan, 1988; Loveman, 1991), there is broad agreement that a vibrant civil society means a more democratic society. In the process, "civil society" has increasingly come to have been identified with the welter of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots organizations (GROs) that have sprung up over the last 20 years (Fisher, 1993).4
The new optimistic equating of civil society with political democracy demands a more critical look. The current enthusiasm for civil society mirrors an earlier enthusiasm for "pluralism" as the basis for effective democratic governance, without taking into account the numerous critiques of the earlier formulation. As E. Gyimah-Boadi has argued in the case of Ghana, civil associations may play a variety of political roles, not all of which are necessarily constructive for democracy (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). Robert Putnam finds "civil community" to be at the root of the superior performance of Italy's regional governments in its more modern North as compared to that of their counterparts in the South. However, he traces the tradition of civic associations in the North back to the late medieval era: scarcely 50 years of democracy attest to the power of civil society to produce good government (Putnam,1993).5 Moreover, the new rhetoric of civil society tends to assign functions to the latter that not even the pluralists had imagined for, we are told, civil society can (a) replace an incompetent and overburdened state as the guardian of social values, (b) serve as the source of inspiration for civic action, and (c) operate as the provider of social services. In Latin America, not only in rhetoric but in practice, international lending agencies and bilateral development organizations have increasingly insisted on the need to channel funds through NGOs, strengthening their ability to assume functions formerly reserved for state agencies. At the same time, international donors have pushed their new partners to adopt "professional" standards and become "selfsustainable." Nevertheless, large doubts persist about the capability of NGOs and community organizations to play the new roles, to generate funds on their own, or to assume the representative functions which have often been assigned to them or which they may have arrogated to themselves (Smith, 1993; Carroll, 1992).
In El Salvador we are witness to the reconstruction of civil society in the wake of a terrible civil struggle, one which began with an attempt to eradicate the most vital elements of that society in the name of "anticommunism." The new civil society now emerging is marked by that struggle. As civil organizations attempt to adjust to the new situation, they face important questions about their autonomy from political forces, their ability to advance the interests of their constituents, or clients, under ever-tightening economic circumstances, and the possibilities for reconciliation in a thoroughly divided polity. Under such circumstances, the warnings of John Keane are appropriate: "civil society can also degenerate into a battlefield ... Under extreme conditions, civil society could even hemorrhage to death" (Keane,1988: 22). Though El Salvador has not yet reached such extremity, the continuing struggle for civil society now going on there should alert us to the difficult process of construction which new democracies face and help us to reconsider some of the claims made for, and about, civil society, democracy, and democratization. Because NGOs have played a central role in this process, both as civil associations per se and as promoters of civil association, the account that follows looks closely at their development during the civil war, and then at the challenges they face in the subsequent peace.
Three questions will occupy our attention here: First, what has been the effect on the peace process of the resurgence of civil society since 1984? Has a resurgent civil society moved El Salvador closer to reconciliation and democracy, or has it simply recapitulated, and reinforced, the polarization which contributed to civil war? Second, what is the character of the civil society which has emerged? Are we witnessing a "democratization" of society (Garreton,1989) or a continuation of the vertical patterns that characterized both wartime and prewar El Salvador? Finally, what is the role of outside actors, and of the United States in particular, in the construction of a new civil society? What has been constructive, and what destructive, in the work of US and European agencies and NGOs?
III. CIVIL SOCIETY AND CIVIL WAR
The wave of terror that engulfed El Salvador just before, and for several years following, the coup of 1979 obliterated the "popular front" organizations of campesinos, trade unionists, students, women, and non-governmental organizations that had emerged during the 1970s to confront an increasingly repressive state. Many of the constituent organizations were similarly obliterated, "decapitated," or driven increasingly repressive state. Many of the constituent organizations were similarly obliterated, "decapitated," or Gonzalez, who had been in one time, themselves.6 The late Victor Gonzalez, who had been, at of the ecumenical coalition Diaconia, recounted the dark days director of the ecumenical coalition Diaconia, reocunted the dark days of 1986 when the organization, created to serve the hundreds of thousands of internal refugees displaced by the war, could count on only two staff members, with the rest too afraid to come to the office for fear of being detained by a government which viewed such efforts as "subversive" (Gonzalez, 1993).7 The US State Department aided in such persecutions, carrying out public relations campaigns among internaitonal donors against such organizations as Tutela Legal, the human rights arm of the Archdiocease of San Salvador, The Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (a non-governmental agency), and Diaconia (Gonzalez, 1993; Blanco, 1993; Americas Watch, 1991). Few individuals thought it worth their while to organize themselves into civil associations of any kind during the first years of the war.8 Only the international spotlight, plus considerable financial support from abroad, allowed organizations associated with the churches and the Left to begin building in 1984.
The "Private Sector Initiative"
Starting in 1983, however, a new sort of organization began to arrive on the scene. The Fundacion Salvadorena para el Desarrollo Economico y Social (FUSADES) was created in 1983 by a group of wealthy Salvadoran business people. The United States Agency for International Development (US-AID), driven by the Reagan administration's enthusiasm for private enterprise and committed to creating a string of business organizations throughout Central America to support export-oriented policies, played an inportant role in FUSADES' rapid growth.9 The modest sums put up by its wealthy sponsors(about $1,600 apiece) were quickly supplemented by AID largesse. In its first year, FUDADES obtained a $185,000 contact from AID to promote the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). In 1984, the year following, it received the first disbursement of what was eventually to be a contract of $50.46 million as part of AID's "Industrial Stabilization and Recovery Program." Though AID still considers this program its "lead vehicle for facilitating non-traditional exports and investment" (US-AID, 1991: 19), the government share of the contract was only $2.56 million. Over the next 10 years, FUSADES became the main outlet for AID monies in the civil sector. By 1992, the disbursements planned reached as high as $156,849,000 (Rosa, 1993). Though AID would cease to fund the operating expenses of FUSADES in 1994, a scheme worked out in 1991 provided FUSADES with a minimum income of $5 million a year, from 1994 onwards, in interest earned from credit programs funded by the AID (US-AID, 1991: 45-6).
FUSADES grew rapidly, becoming the most influential think-tank in El Salvador. The organization's Department of Economic and Social Studies drafted the structural adjustment plan which became the basis for the economic program of the new ARENA government in 1989. Former President Alfredo Cristiani and several of his cabinet members were among the founding members of the organization. FUSADES also spawned a whole family of new organizations with major encouragement and help from AID. In 1986, FUSADES spun off the Fundacion Industrial para la Prevencion de Riesgos Ocupacionales (FIPRO, or Industrial Foundation for Prevention of Occupational Hazards), the Fundacion HABITAT (no relation to Habitat International), and the Fundacion Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo (FEPADE or Business Foundation for Educational Development), the latter with funds from the AID program called Fortalecimiento de Asociaciones (FORTAS or Strengthening Associations). All three organizations rapidly became major recipients of AID funds, and all three have continued to be major channels through which AID provides funds for national reconstruction. Other AID-funded organizations in the private sector include Junior Achievement, Fundacion Antidrogas de El Salvador (FUNDASALVA, El Salvador's Antidrug Foundation), the Comite Coordinador para el Desarrollo Economico de Oriente (COMCORDE or Coordinating Committee for the Economic Development of Eastern El Salvador), and the Centro de Apoyo a la Microempresa (CAM), an organization to help small business (Rosa, 1993).
The explicit aim, particularly in creating FUSADES, was to promote a package of economic policies that the administration in the United States felt was needed to foster political stability and economic growth. While the AID had the support of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Develop ment Bank (IDB) in this project, it lacked that of the Duarte government, then in the early stages of its administration (see Rosa, 1993). The most remarkable aspect of the AID strategy is the extent to which it involved itself in building the political power and influence of a segment of the Salvadoran business class to accomplish its purposes. It was almost as if AID officials had decided to take seriously the claims of dependency theory about the "weakness of the domestic bourgeoisie" in Latin America, turning those claims into prescriptions for action. In fact, however, AID appeared to pursue a dual strategy: on the one hand, it supported the government in its attacks on organizations that it associated, whether rightly or wrongly, with the Leftist opposition; on the other hand, it was able to dominate those elements of the Salvadoran business elite that it viewed as "progressive" by building up a new type of organization, heavily financed by the United States.
Whether AID officials worked out of a coherent vision of the sort of civil society El Salvador required or acted on implicit assumptions about the kinds of organizations most likely to serve US purposes remains unclear.10 Still, interviews conducted with AID officials suggest there was an implicit vision behind the massive effort of the 1980s, and into the early 1990s, that was designed to influence the character of Salvadoran society. When asked why AID insisted on building and supporting organizations led by the wealthiest members of a classdivided society, one official close to the Private Sector Initiative (as AID calls the program) replied matter-of-factly that these are the sorts of people most capable of keeping civic organizations afloat: they can raise money, they have "good business sense," and they wield influence. In this model, economic power should be wedded to social activism in creating a nonprofit sector capable of "getting the job done," whatever that job might be. Not only do those who wield the greatest economic power have an obligation to serve society through such organizations, but they are also uniquely qualified to lead and manage an "independent sector" (as the US nonprofit world would have it) that mirrors, in personnel and practice, the standards of recruitment and efficiency of the business world from which boards of directors and managers alike are drawn.ll In wartime El Salvador, this model - which is not entirely a caricature of the worldview of the major US nonprofits (see Hall, 1992, particularly chapter 4; Ware, 1989) - was probably all the more attractive because it provided a base from which it would be possible to fill a social space that would otherwise be occupied by community activists identified with the political Left. The FUSADES group of organizations, however, were scarcely capable of reaching the levels of society to which the FMLN, its allies and sympathizers, and other elements of the opposition appealed. As new political spaces opened up under the Duarte administration, so organizations from the "popular sector" quickly emerged to take advantage of the new opportunities.
The Rebirth of the "Popular Sector"
At the time that FUSADES came into being, few civic organizations were alive and operating. Thanks to the demands of the war, the Red Cross had sprung to life after years of serving as little more than a ladies auxiliary to the hospitals of San Salvador, work that was soon supplemented by the arrival of a "Blue Cross" and a "Green Cross." Also responding to the war situation, a small group of churches and older NGOs came together to form a consortium called Diaconia to manage relief funds for the thousands of refugees who, fleeing the war, had crowded into San Salvador. Nevertheless, Diaconia found itself the target of a fierce repression which stemmed from the fact that it lent visibility to a problem which both the Salvadoran and US governments wished to downplay, i.e., the fact that the military's campaign in the countryside was having a devastating effect on the country's rural population. Diaconia was also vulnerable because most of the population it served had roots in rebel territory, and many were identified, in one way or another, with the rebels. Some of those displaced were, in fact, members of the FMLN, and their work within Diaconfa made the organization vulnerable to both political manipulation by the Frente on the one hand and to repression by the government on the other. In 1983, representatives of what was then the Ecumenical Committee for Humanitarian Assistance, the Archdiocese of San Salvador, and the Episcopal, Lutheran, and Baptist churches met secretly with leaders of the FMLN in Mexico City to forge an agreement that succeeded in ending interference by the FMLN, at least for a time; but it did not end the repression (Gonzalez, 1993).
By 1985, however, Diacona and the few international NGOs that remained to aid refugees displaced by war were gradually being replaced by a new set of organizations, many with ties to the FMLN, but all dedicated to protecting the civilian populations affected by the war. The new organizations - community organizations in the war zones and among the slum dwellers of San Salvador; confederations of these as well as of cooperatives, both old and new, in the countryside; and NGOs set up to provide services (development assistance, health care, and education) for local populations and aid in the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and those displaced by the war - arose in response to local needs and tactical considerations. In both territory held by the FMLN as well as in the "transition zones" marked by hard fighting, civilian populations were under enormous pressure. In some areas, from which the bulk of the population had fled, those who stayed behind had to sustain a living in the face of the government's attempt to "empty the ocean to catch the fish." In other areas, civilians organized themselves in an effort to preserve their right to remain, to provide themselves with the basic necessities of life, and in an attempt to better their precarious lives, either on the land or at the margins of San Salvador. The uniting to form confederations arose as a way to coordinate the efforts of communities that were otherwise isolated and scattered and to serve as advocates on behalf of their members.l2 The NGOs acted as domestic counterparts to those international agencies, mostly European, who were still willing to try to reach this population, and they channeled funds, material goods, and technical assistance to the communities to the best of their ability.13
This was also the era of AID-sponsored "civic action" programs and the US Military Advisers Group, which were aimed, in an attempt that was only partially successful, at (1) putting an end to the sort of Salvadoran military operations that produced the massacre at El Mozote (in 1981) and (2) *winning the hearts and minds" of the rural population. The FMLN viewed the efforts at civic action, as well as the new Municipalities in Action (MIA) program (designed to coordinate and give a "civilian face" to the project), as a threat to its own political control of, and expansion in, the contested regions.l4 Thus, some of the new community organizations assumed the tactical jobs of staving off government efforts at "development" and muting the effects of civic action campaigns, while the new NGOs provided the resources necessary to give community organizations and organizers credibility in the face of government initiatives.
However, the most dramatic manifestation of the new "popular sector" civil society was the repopulation movement, which commenced in 1985 with resettlement of 187 internal refugees at Tenancingo and reached its culmination, from 1987 onwards, with organizing the massive resettlement from the Mesa Grande and Colomoncagua refugee camps in Honduras. Although this effort received widespread support, from the Archdiocese of San Salvador across a broad array of civic organizations and international donors, it had to overcome serious resistance from the Salvadoran government, which viewed resettlement as an effort to restore to the FMLN a population base in areas which government forces had previously "cleansed," via saturation bombing and terrifying military sweeps, over the preceding 5 years.
Still, resettlement went forward, with groups of refugees and displaced persons reclaiming villages and towns that had been abandoned years before or squatting on private land whose owners had long since fled (Edwards and Siebentritt, 1990). Each group had its community organization; most organizations were tied to one of the parties of the FMLN (though the FMLN itself was not initially supportive of the repopulation effort); and each organization was linked to an NGO that could provide logistical support and a small, but vital, flow of international assistance in the years that lay ahead. The logic of organization, especially once communities were reestablished in what were still combat zones, was "vertical", approximating a "war communism" in which community decision making, though founded on participatory principles, was subordinated to the exigencies of the war effort (Pearce, 1986; Montoya, 1994; Thompson, 1995).
These, then, were the actors who emerged to reconstitute civil society in El Salvador during the course of the war. Most such organizations were born, to one degree or another, out of the logic of war. With the winding down of the war, community organizations and NGOs of both the Right and the Left began to make plans for the peace. However, and despite the hopes of many, the peace has often appeared to be little but "war by other means."
IV. MAKING PEACE: THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR SOCIETY
The peace that culminated in the signing of the last of the Peace Accords (16 January 1992)was made by politicos, not by Salvadorn society as a whole.15 It was negotiated behind closed doors, and its terms responded to the demands of the participants and their immediate constituencies: the Army High Command and the Salvadorn elite, in the case of the Salvadorn government, and its soldiers-in-arms, in the case of the FMLN. Deals were struck with other politicos to achieve election reform,an agreement on land distribution (for ex-combatants of the FMLN and the civilian population in its zones of influence, including, espicially, the repopulation movement), and new mechanisms for negotiating social and economic reforms. But the core institutions of the Salvadoran government remained untouched, and the core interests of the FUSADES wing of the ARENA party were guaranteed, at least until the next election. The organizations of civil society played no role in the negotiations, and almost no role in the deliberations of the rival parties, except to remind all sides that peace was a necessity. If this was a "negotiated revolution," it was a very limited revolution indeed.16
Civil Society and the Private Sector
Virtually invisible in the political maneuvering of those who were party to the Accords, however, was the tremendous ferment in Salvadoran civil society and a continuing struggle for its control. US-AID continued to fund FUSADES lavishly, along with its offspring, incorporating them into programs aimed at the "reinsertion" of the former combatants and reconstruction of the wartorn parts of the country despite their scant experience with this population. Up through 1993, AID also supported efforts of the Salvadoran government to prevent the channelling of reconstruction funds through the largest, most experienced of the FMLN-related NGOs, using a variety of excuses which were belied by the continuing confidence which the European donors, including the European Community (EC), displayed in those same NGOs.17 AID continued to create "private sector" NGOs, with its $10 million investment in the Centro de Apoyo a la Microempresa (CAM) being the most recent example (Castellanos, 1993). Despite severe cutbacks in funding, those AID officials to whom I spoke referred wistfully to the possibility of helping to create an organization that would be dedicated to "civic education," somewhat along the lines of the League of Women Voters and, presumably, with the same reliance on the richest, brightest segment of Salvadoran civil society which has characterized all their efforts to date.
Meanwhile, FUSADES has struck out on its own. In the latter part of the 1980s, AID had attempted to push FUSADES into organizing FORTAS, originally funded to promote the development of business associations, its "social arm." When it appeared that FUSADES was moving too slowly in this matter, AID cut off funding (as of 1991). Nevertheless, the former director of FUSADES, Eduardo Nunez, pushed ahead, creating a series of mini-foundations to institute and carry out social services in rural areas. Each foundation is headed by 3-4 local coffee barons, with the participation of other wealthy property owners or business people in the area. Although the actual work of the foundation is confined to the environs of a rural town, the address of its headquarters is located, almost invariably, in one of the wealthier San Salvador suburbs, where the coffee barons have their permanent homes. Each foundation starts with a small endowment raised from its members. It then seeks to establish local projects of benefit to the area: e.g., a dispensary in an isolated community, a school building where people have had to do without schooling, perhaps a basketball court or soccer field. The foundation uses the influence of its founders to bring in funds from the government and only more rarely seeks external funding; finally, the project is donated to the community.
Nunez himself was personally committed to the project and convinced, as he put it, that this is why we had this terrible war," because those with money had never done anything for "their" people. He started by going to an area and calling upon the "people with influence," the richest property owners and business people in the area, lecturing about the consequences of neglecting "their" people. He then offered the full support of FUSADES and Project FORTAS in getting their foundation off the ground (Nunez, 1993). Unlike the foundations and NGOs created by others, the foundations that come under the aegis of Project FORTAS sail through the process of official registration. What Nunez failed to mention was that these foundations have been established throughout the best coffee-growing region of the country, where they supplement the traditional (and traditionally effective) political repression which kept the area relatively tranquil during most of the war - and safely within the ARENA camp through what has now been 6 elections. Nor did he allude to the favors which government officials have begun to bestow in the form of providing international donors with highly partisan lists of "eligible" NGOs, including the new foundations, for projects in the area.
Although AID has not provided any assistance to Project FORTAS since 1991, when the new effort began, the AID officials who were interviewed looked upon the initiative with favor. One official who was closely associated with the Private Sector Initiative, described above, observed that he had initially been skeptical of what even he viewed as a paternalistic approach. Nevertheless, he reported, he had gradually "come around" because the foundations served to "open the eyes" of their members, who, in many cases, had previously had no idea of the seriousness of the needs around them. Furthermore, he went on to say, these groups don't have a passing interest in the area: they grew up there, have roots there. While a development agency may have only a finite interest in the area, the foundation members are there for the long term. In the end, he noted, it also comes down to a matter of who has the power to get things done.18 Indeed, it is also a matter of who has, and keeps, the power in the local communities. Civil society, FORTAS-style, reproduces and reinforces the top-down structure of political and economic power in the communities where the foundations are located, including the very individuals who have always wielded that power. It is true that such institutions have their counterparts in the nonprofit worlds of the United States and Europe (see Hall, 1992: chap. 4), but, in the Salvadoran context, and from a political point of view, Project FORTAS is designed to maintain past power alignments and ensure continuance of the power status quo. The pious hope, as expressed by the AID official quoted above, that the "middle class" would gain access, sooner or later, to the governing boards of these institutions suggests a remarkable naivete. What is even more remarkable is that it took the Salvadoran ruling elite 500 years and a civil war to discover paternalism.
The "Popular Sector" and Reconstruction
On the other hand, when it comes to the NGOs with links to the FMLN, it would appear that AID is far less willfully blind to the political consequences of development assistance. According to the terms of the Peace Accords, the "National Plan of Reconstruction" was to have been drawn up through consultation among representatives of government, the NGOs, and community leaders and financed through a fund administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Instead, government bureaucrats, with the support of AID, drew up a plan that placed heavy emphasis on rebuilding infrastructure, with the bulk of the funds, both for local relief and redevelopment, being channeled through the municipalities (still largely in the hands of ARENA mayors). It also put administration of the program into the hands of the Comision Nacional de Restauracion de Areas (CONARA), an agency that had originally been established to strengthen the government's control over the contested areas. However, the European donors balked at this plan due to CONARA's history of counter-insurgency. When the government responded by creating a new agency to implement the National Plan (the Secretariat for National Reconstruction), not only did the Secretariat take over CONARA's offices and equipment, but it also hired CONARA's former staff and was headed up by CONARA's last director (Sollis, 1993). In the face of pressure from the United States, combined with the intransigence of the Salvadoran government, the UNDP was excluded from overseeing disposition of the funds. In fact, the efforts of the UNDP to coordinate the work of the various United Nations agencies with the work of the opposition NGOs almost led to a diplomatic break with the Cristiani government (Lawrence, 1992). Up until late 1993, the European donors boycotted the Secretariat, which left AID as its principal source of funds. Even recent grants by the European Community and others have been more on the order of joint ventures and have carried the stipulation that a significant portion of the funds be channeled through NGOs (Murray, Coletti, and Spence, 1994).
In the first year of the Secretariat's existence, what funding that did go to NGOs went, almost invariably, to those considered "safe," i.e., NGOs with ties either to AID or to some FUSADES-affiliated group. Excluded were the federations of cooperatives, whether associated with the FMLN or the Christian Democrats; traditional NGOs, like the Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarrollo y Vivienda Minima (FUNDASAL), which the administration considered too wedded to community organizers;19 and NGOs with links to the FMLN. The grand exceptions were "umbrella" projects run by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which works through a wide range of local NGOs and community organizations, many of whom have ties to the FMLN. Officials at AID were quick to point to the CRS projects as evidence of the Agency's willingness to work with the FMLN, though the projects are supposed to be under the direction of the Secretariat, not of AID. No matter who takes credit for the liberality of the official reconstruction effort, it seems clear that CRS is the exception that proves the rule. None of the 5 older, national-level NGOs with ties to the FMLN have obtained more than minuscule sums from the Secretariat.20 Both AID and the Secretariat responded by raising doubts about the "capacidad" of the organizations to handle the funds, a reservation which prompted one adviser of a European-funded project to observe:
When an organization has been handling competently some millions of dollars annually for 7 or 8 years, you have to conclude that they have the capacity to handle at least that much in the future (Karlslund, 1994).
Even the smallest of the "big 5" manage $1-2 million in project monies yearly; and all have adopted professional accounting procedures over the last few years. Former UNDP liaison for NGOs, Carlos Locares, has similarly argued that these NGOs were particularly wellsuited to work with the populations targeted by the National Plan of Reconstruction:
They are the ones who have the mystique necessary to do the sort of field work required with this population. Of course they have deficiencies, but these are deficiencies which could and should be worked with (Locares, 1994).21
The enthusiasm of AID for the Municipalities in Action component of the reconstruction program had abated somewhat by the time of my interviews, as it became clear (1) that municipal authorities were illequipped to handle much more than small, straightforward projects, and (2) that municipal institutions hardly allowed for the sorts of community participation that government and AID propaganda had been touting. Conflicts between municipal authorities, NGOs, and community groups over priorities and policies were written off to politically motivated incidents (which, in many cases, they were), without any serious efforts being made to develop new approaches for resolving disagreements or new institutions to enlarge participation. Indeed, when the mayor of Suchitoto (a member of ARENA) joined in one such effort, he was attacked by officials of his own party when the central government, apparently with the support of AID, balked at NGO members with ties to the opposition taking any extensive part in the municipal planning (Murray, Coletti, and Spence, 1994).
Alternative Visions
By contrast, several European donors, including the European Community (EC), have promoted innovative schemes for the governance of regional development projects that provide for a broad range of participation on the boards of directors of new regional authorities: municipal officials, heads of government agencies, representatives of NGOs, and community leaders. In one case, the European Community has created a large-scale development corporation to administer regional projects; the corporation will be governed by a board made up of representatives of the EC, the communities involved, government officials, and investors (Van der Zee, 1993; Programa Ala, 1993). Although this project has been criticized for its top-down approach (Murray, Coletti, and Spence, 1994), efforts have been made to coordinate the work of NGOs in the area and to incorporate all interested parties in the governance of the corporation. In placing technical personnel in the communities, the program's director was careful to choose individuals who shared the political affiliation of the communities and went well beyond his mandate to include populations not formally covered by the EC commitment, a flexibility notably lacking in AID projects. In Suchitoto, Nejapa, parts of Chalatenango and San Vicente departments, and elsewhere, local officials (including ARENA mayors) have made efforts, supported by US and European NGOs or party-based networks of NGOs, to bring together community leaders, NGO personnel, and officials from both local and central government to plan for, and coordinate, local development initiatives (Murray, Coletti, and Spence, 1994; Santacruz Domingo, 1993; Hasbun, 1994).
When Director Charles Costello assumed direction of the AID Mission in Fall 1993, AID's familiar complaint that NGOs and community organizations in the "popular sector" were "over-politicized" began to moderate. In this, they had not been far wrong. However, what the judgment was missing was any appreciation of the enormous vitality, and variation, that exists among these organizations, from the grassroots on up through the hierarchy. The wartime chain of command - which assigned each FMLN party its own territory of operation, each territory its community organizations, and each organization its NGOs - is coming apart in bits and pieces as these constituent parts have begun to pursue their own interests, following their own individual logic (Lungo U., 1995). The major NGOs with ties to one or another of the five FMLN parties display considerable variation in the closeness of that continued association, though all have striven for greater professionalism and greater transparency, even where party connections remain strong. The political structures built by the parties, the so-called gremios, are also in turmoil. Those with deep roots in the communities they represent appear to be more stable than those whose representation" was more fictive than real, more a product of tactical consider ations than of responding to any felt need within the community itself.
Moreover, the NGOs and gremios alike face increasing independence on the part of communities who demand control over their own affairs, including the freedom to choose their own benefactors and allies. Although complaints abound regarding the overbearing nature of political structures that still control some funding, many only reflect the restructuring that is taking place. A European development worker pointed up the difference between two communities that were once tied to the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores de Centroamerica (PRTC) or Revolutionary Workers Party of El Salvador: Sisiguayo as opposed to Las Marias II and Los Molinos. Sisiguayo is a community made up of former FMLN combatants and hacienda workers who settled on two former haciendas on the Bay of Jiquilisco, in Usulutan.
Sisiguayo had the luck to be organized. They say who can come and who can't. An NGO approaches them, they say, "What can you do for us?" If they like the project, they talk terms. What are your rules of operation? These are ours. How much are you going to spend? How long are you going to be here?" Sisiguayo was originally organized by the PRTC. They had the luck that the PRTC used a model of organization in which the theology of liberation had played a big role; they had read some books of Freire, and participation was important. So eventually, people told the PRTC, "Look, you're fine as politicians, but we want to run our own affairs." And the PRTC, to its credit in this case, withdrew. They've gained politically from it; they gained credibility in the area. They're doing quite well, as are the Communists, who have also known how to let the communities decide for themselves. The PRTC failed in the north, in Las Marias II and Los Molinos, where the local comandante decided he was judge and jury and ended up killing a couple of people. He was withdrawn, but he was never sanctioned, and people there say that, as long as the PRTC isn't going to give them justice, they want nothing to do with them (Van der Zee, 1993).
By and large, the parties and the "popular sector" NGOs are having to accommodate to the communities. In the polarized atmosphere at war's end, and with clear evidence that the government's intentions were still hostile, the organizations tied to the FMLN took the attitude that no one would be allowed to enter "their" communities without their approval. Some people still speak this way. Nevertheless, throughout El Salvador today, government and AID projects can be found operating alongside those sponsored by the gremios and cooperative associations and the NGOs to which they are tied. Communities that still feel the need to check with their gremio or NGO before agreeing to anything are told to "Go for it." And NGOs linked to the FMLN work under AID and government contracts.
This does not mean, however, that conflict is at an end. On the contrary, both the style of development assistance and the character of civil organization associated with the so-called "popular sector" differ markedly from the model created by AID and the Salvadoran elite; and those differences have been exacerbated and politicized even more by the continuing polarization of El Salvador. Warning! OCR inputs differ greatlylong historical development in the United States has served MEANS: COMpVG MODELS OF identify nonprofit organizations with the twin characteristics of long historical development in the United States hasanship and public service (Hall, 1992). For a variety of reasons, similar notions shape the debate over the new organizations with the twin characteristics of El Salvador. In both countrict nonpartisanship and public service (Hall,1992). For a variety of course, the reality is more complex, reasons, political polar notions shape the debate over the new organizations in El Salvador has sharpened the political El Salvador. In both countries, of an organization and how reality is more complex, but political what NGO or civil group in El Salvador has sharpened the political import political connotation, even when the organization and how it is perceived. Thus, who works with what NGO or civil group in El Salvador conveys avoiding political entanglements. As we have stinct political connotation, even when the very configuration of the NGOs spun question FUSADES, under the tutelage of AID, bespeaks a concept of civil successful in avoiding political entanglements. As we have seen, the very configuration omic elites play the leading role. Even though traditions FUSADES, under the tutelage of philanthropy and nonprofit giving are very weak a concept of civil society elite, the NGOs created under AID auspices draw on which economic elites play the leading role. Even though traditions almost exclusively for their board members and executive personprofit giving are very weak among Salvador's Not only do these arrangements make use of the NGOs created under talent auspices draw on business elites influence of such individuals, but they also reinforce their board members and executive personnel. political only do these arrangements make use of FUSADES members in the considerable talent and administration is once of such individuals, but they also reinforce example. Board membership gives elitheir social and access to political position. The and US officials, FUSADES well as control overs in the Cristiani administration is only one example. Board membership gives chosen to endow the new institutions. Such power, which should be familiar enough to politicians and US officials, as well as control over the considerable sums of US foundations, with which AID has chosen to end by the presence of elected officials and representatives of the community institutions. Such power, which should be familiar enough to observers of Community Chest, is not balanced by occur in the presence of elected States. Nor is it officials and repree from the temptations of corruption. The community in overarching bodies, microenterprise lending project established byAID in 1992, the Community Chest, as may occur in the United States. Nor is it free from the temptations of corruption. The multi-million dollar corruption scandals involving project established by AID its directors, so carefully chosen 1992, the Centro de Apoyo a la Microempresa (CAM), has twice business wracked by The starkness of the politicization scandals involving its directors, so carefully chosen from perhaps best illustrated by the small handful of organizations that have Those deliberately, to of the politicization in Salvadoran route. Nearly all society boards of directors who are made up of professionals from the upper mall handful of organizations that have chosen, deliberately, to go the none is partisan route. Nearly well-endowed. Some have been able to use their connectors who are made up of professionals from the Right, or with AID, to garner government class. None is particularly well-endowed. Some have been able to use their connections on the Right, or with AID, to garner government funds; yet all maintain their right to select their projects independently. One example is El Buen Ciudadano (The Good Citizen), a relatively new organization that is identified with ARENA by outsiders. However, the board of directors of El Buen Ciudadano is made up, almost exclusively, of professionals. One of its founders made clear the organization's distance from the group sponsored by FUSADES: as far as he was concerned, FUSADES was established to promote the recuperation of *big capital." As he put it: if you look at the directors of their projects, all are children of the economic elite; as for their training programs for workers, whom did they train, if not workers for their own factories?22
El Buen Ciudadano was founded to promote democracy and acceptance of democratic institutions by encouraging people to share in democratic values. To date, their biggest project has been the voter registration program that was funded by US-AID through the Southwest Voter's Research Institute. El Buen Ciudadano and other civic organizations were able to see up close the foot-dragging and inefficiency with which the ARENA-controlled Tribuno Supremo Electoral (TSE) approached the process and were witness to the magnitude of the problems that beset the elections. When they protested the way in which the TSE handled UNDP monies designated for transporting voters to the polls, the TSE summarily banned them from taking part in any further cooperative efforts. Even organizations that make a special effort to remain "neutral" must walk a fine line or risk banishment from government channels that provide access to projects and funding. Another "middle-of-the-road" NGO is the ComitE de Integraci6n y Reconstrucci6n para El Salvador (CIRES), which was generated out of the staff and infrastructure left behind by the International Rescue Committee when it departed El Salvador at the end of the war. Perceiv ing it as a "safe" NGO, the government approached CIRES even before the Secretariat for National Reconstruction was created to draw up a proposal for funding under the National Plan for Reconstruction. Though dependent on funding from both the Secretariat and AID, CIRES has tried to steer a non-partisan course, siding with NGOs of the Left on most refugee issues and attempting to deal with all communities regardless of political affiliation. Eileen Rosin, formerly Executive Director of CIRES, recounted their first year: At the time the first proposal was formulated, we had named a number of communities with which our technical people had contacts. By the time we got the money and got back to those communities, they had all been organized by the FMLN. There was a good deal of suspicion of us, of what we wanted, of who we stood with. We gradually worked out a relationship with each of the gremios involved. Each was different. In the north of San Miguel, where we were working on a PROSAMI project [an AID-sponsored maternal and infant health program], we dealt with the local gremio, which was controlled by one of the factions of the ERP [then a party of the FMLN, but also coordinated with FASTRAS, the national-level development NGO linked to the ERP] . FASTRAS was very helpful and basically left it with the gremio, with which we worked out a relationship: they helped find promotores for each community ... In Usulatan it was another story... Relations varied tremendously. In one community we ended up not working because nothing we could do would satisfy the suspicion of the gremio. One community was part of COMUS [agremtol, which was linked to FENACOA [a cooperative association], so we had talks with them. It wasn't just a matter of asking "permission"; we are also concerned not to duplicate efforts or compete (Rosin, 1993). Nevertheless, CIRES' staff concluded that they would not work through the gremios in the future but would go to the communities directly: We have no intention of competing with the gremios, we're not interested in community organization, except to strengthen existing structures, help with the formation of the committees necessary for the program, etc. But we don't want to be in a position of having the gremio drain off the money we bring in, or filter it back to the party (Rosin, 1993). Torn between the need for coordination and the knowledge that political manipulation often accompanies organization, aRES has chosen an uncomfortable, technically defined middle way, delivering projects with as much community participation as possible, but leaving community organization to others.
If the handful of nonpartisan civil organizations represented by El Buen Ciudadano and CIRES illustrate possibilities that were largely foregone by the efforts of AID to strengthen civil society, the organizations of the so-called popular sector are the polar opposite of the FUSADES model, at least in theory. Hundreds of community organizations have grown upin El Salvador as a result of the war. They range from community fora for thousands of rural settlements and urban barrios to informal cooperatives to more formal, local arms of political parties. Most are members, in one form or another, of largergremios or regional political organizations. Ranged alongside the community organizations are NGOs of one degree of professionalism or another. Some are simply gremios that have assumed the task of generating funds and projects for constituent communities, while others operate at the national level with professional staffs and manage millions of dollars of aid annually. In contrast to both the FUSADES and the Buen Ciudadano models, the more formally organized NGOs in the popular sector generally are governed by a board of directors or general assembly composed of representatives of the communities served, of the cooperative associations, of the unions, and of the smaller NGOs. All depend upon external funding, though some generate money-making projects of their own, drawing on government contracts to cover operating expenses, or finding work on the side as commercial consultants. Many of the community organizations and most of the NGOs can confidently be associated with one or another of the original five parties of the FMLN, though such political ties are weakening.
To the extent that political ties remain strong, they carry divisions among NGOs with them, not to mention the occasional infighting. For example, the dismissal of the respected director of FASTRAS, Andres Gregori, in early 1994 was a direct result of the reorganization that took place within the Expresi6n Renovadora del Pueblo (ERP), the faction of the FMLN led by Joaquin Villalobos. With this political blow, the European sponsor (DanChurch Aid) withdrew support and FASTRAS' innovative Programa Ecol6gico de Tecnologia Apropriada folded. Among the highly organized communities of the Fuerzas Popular de Liberaci6n (FPL), complaints continued to be heard in late 1994 regarding the party's imposition" of political leaders. The end of the campaign season in 1994 reportedly brought a flood of personnel into the NGOs, securing employment for dubiously qualified activists after months of political work. Nevertheless, principles of community selfgovernment and popular participation are well-entrenched in both the rhetoric and the philosophic outlook of many community members, NGOs, and political leaders. Meanwhile, and paradoxically, "professionalization" has given NGO staffs greater autonomy vis--vis boards, parties, and the communities they serve. In theory and, to a large degree, in practice, the "popular sector" is quite organized in sharp contrast to the exclusive organizations sponsored by AID and the business elite. However, this sector's vision of development is also in sharp contrast to that of the government and the FUSADES circle. The most common denominator among these organizations is their explicit advocacy of the principle of community participation in the design, development, and implementation of their projects. Beyond this demand, by now a commonplace of international development rhetoric (if more rarely of practice, see Smith, 1990), many of the popular organizations share a vision of establishing networks of economic enterprises among poor communities to provide the basis for genuine economic power and sustainability in the "new popular economy* model, as it is called (Montoya, 1993 and 1994). This vision, which is shared to one degree or another by most of the Left and many of their allies in the churches, certainly represents a challenge to the economic program advocated by FUSADES and by the patrons of FUSADES in Washington. Whether it genuinely subverts the "gains" of the latter's program for the Salvadoran economy, as the Salvadoran elite evidently feel, is another question. From an objective point of view, those gains appear more illusory than real. The expansion of non-traditional exports, into which AID poured so much money and effort, has scarcely made up for the collapse of coffee, still the country's chief export. What sustains the economy today are the nearly $1 billion in remissions from Salvadorans living abroad, mostly in the United States. Now the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the rush to win terms of trade similar to that of NAFTA for Central America as a whole threaten the viability of much of El Salvador's industry. The privatized banking system has already seen its first failure. With official US investment in rapid decline, and other sources of foreign aid apt to follow suit in the near future, there are few signs that the economic model embraced by the government will sustain the shock of greater integration into the world market. These realities put in question any Salvadoran project, whether driven by notions of "subsidiarity* and the free market, or by the alternative of solidarity and "market socialism." VI. CONCLUSIONS HIS inquiry began with three questions: (1) what has been the effect on the peace process of the resurgence of civil society since 1985, and, in particular, has a resurgent civil society moved El Salvador toward reconciliation and democracy, or has it recapitulated and reinforced the polarization which contributed to civil war? (2) What is the character of the civil society which has emerged? Are we witnessing a "democratization* of society (Garreton, 1989) or a continuation of the vertical patterns that characterized bothwartime and pre-war Salvador? Finally, (3) what has been the role of outside actors, particularly the United States, in the construction of a new civil society?
The answers are mixed on all three questions. Though the organizations of the new civil society have learned to work together at times, past and continuing politicization has rendered minimal the effects of that cooperation which does exist. The government continues to direct its resources, almost overwhelmingly, to inefficient and, at times, corrupt government agencies, ARENA party mayors, and the "private sector" NGOs. On the other hand, NGOs in the "popular sector" continue to harbor jealousies of their party rivals, not only between the Left and Right but also within the Left as well. In general, the "dense web of civil associations" that has emerged in the new El Salvador has not been notable either for reducing tension or promoting reconciliation. At times, indeed, the very fact of organization has tended to heighten tension and lead to conflict. This is not altogether bad; in any society, genuine grievances must find organized expression before they can be addressed constructively.
The "optimistic equation" is not so much wrong about the virtues of association as it is mistaken about the mechanisms for democratic amity. While the organizations of civil society might serve as vehicles for self-help in resolving problems and promoting cooperation, they must also do battle with the state, from time to time, on behalf of their members, as well as with other forces that stand in the way of solutions. The simple truth is that "civil associations" are important to people not only for the cooperative solutions they offer, but also for their ability to serve as advocates and combatants in behalf of their constituents. Whether they make a positive contribution to democracies in the process of development depends more on the larger context and, in particular, on the response of the political system than it does on the reach, or nature, of the organizations themselves. The second question can be answered in a more positive vein, though with similar qualifications. To the extent that the people of El Salvador have organized representatives, intermediaries, and interlocutors to represent their interests, so will they be able to get their voices heard which will, in and of itself, help to further democracy. It may well be that what they have to say will be stifled or suffer distortion at every level, but only through organization will it be possible for individual sentiments to be multiplied, reinforced, and strategically launched. In this sense, then, democratic forums have multiplied, particularly in the former combat zones, where the FMLN approach to local organization has carried over into communal assemblies, communal decision making, and some, apparently increasing, degree of accountability. The multiplication of NGOs has given people and communities choices and has helped to break down, at least in some cases, the party monopolies imposed by the war. The NGOs themselves have been forced to confront demands for accountability from a number of quarters, thereby reinforcing the participatory philosophies they espouse, if not always practice.
At the same time, not all NGOs advocate community development, democratization, and accountability as central values; and not all that do profess such commitments carry them out. The mini-foundations of FUSADES' Project FORTAS are notably paternalistic, and there is no reason to think that a democratic civil society will quickly emerge out of them. Many of the "middle-of-road" NGOs also practice a top-down approach that places more of a premium on bringing projects to fruition than to community development and "democratic participation." The work they do, their ability to remain politically neutral in a highly polarized setting, as well as their professional approach are all important, but their overall contribution to the democratization of Salvadoran society is primarily indirect. The community organizations and NGOs of the Left continue to be plagued by partisanship and political manipulation. While circumstances and political philosophy push them to exhibit greater professionalism and respect for the autonomy of the communities and individuals with whom they work, political polarization between, and within, both Left and Right continues to feed the demand for control. In short, while civil society in El Salvador today displays some vigorously democratic shoots, of equal vigor are those elements that reinforce the power, privilege, and control of the few, whether it be the economic elite of the Right or the political elite of the Left. That the "dense web" of Salvadoran civil society consists of anti-democratic, as well as democratic, strands should come as no surprise. The equating of associational life with democracy, made by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1840, was premised on the existence of a political system that was already democratic; it was also notably free of economic or political polarization. However, if de Tocqueville naively oversimplified the egalitarianism inherent in early US society, he also underestimated the forces that would lead to civil war in just a few short years. The truth is that associations may serve a variety of purposes. Though they arise from societal needs and aspirations, associations can quickly take on a life of their own, one that may be characterized by specialization and strict accountability or by opportunistic expansion and unresponsiveness, by independence and autonomy from political forces or by tight integration into ongoing political struggles. Moreover, the character of a society's associations may reflect the character of the rest of the society, so that their contribution to democracy will be only as strong or weak as the democracy itself. For Salvadoran civil society to be democratic, Salvadoran parties and the Salvadoran state will have to become more democratic. Democratization of El Salvador cannot depend solely on the democratization of civil society: parties, state, and civil society must all be democratized together. The democratic forces in civil society may contribute to that process but, ultimately, must be carried forward and ratified at the political level.23 These answers anticipate the answer to the third query: what have foreigners contributed to the emergence of civil society in El Salvador? The evidence suggests a clear distinction must be made between the contribution of European donors and international NGOs on the one hand, and that of the United States government on the other. Whereas, throughout the war and afterwards, the European states and European Community helped support the community organizations and NGOs of the Left through a variety of channels, the United States, along with the Salvadoran government, waged war on them, even after peace was established. While Europe used its influence on the ground, in the United Nations, and in such organizations as the United Nations Development Programme to promote an inclusive model of reconstruction and reconciliation, the United States preferred to deal exclusively with the Salvadoran government, a small band of US-sponsored NGOs and consulting firms, and those NGOs which US-AID had helped to create and nurture. While the European donors took an active part in developing pluralistic models for municipal and regional reconstruction, USAID refrained from doing so, preferring to endorse the Municipalities in Action program, operated by the ruling party, and backing the government in its hostility to multi-party participation. If AID did begin to soften its approach after 1993, this was clearly a case of too little, too late;" meanwhile, FUSADES and its NGO satellites have continued to be the favored recipients of AID largesse.
United States policy toward Salvadoran civil society was, by its very nature, designed to exclude: AID financed the development of an important segment of civil society, controlled and directed by elements of the business elite, with no provision for, or intent to include, any other elements of that society. It was also, by its very nature, a politicized policy: initially conceived as a counterweight to the economic policies of the Duarte government, it quickly served to bring business supporters of ARENA more into line with the views of the United States on a number of issues; however, it was carried out at the expense of the Left, through systematic isolation and harassment, and of those in the political center who supported alternative policies. It was a polarizing policy as well: confident of US approbation, Salvadoran government and business leaders alike continued to exclude the Left from all development efforts (both government-affiliated and private), while they moved, at the same time, to consolidate their power over significant social institutions at both the national and local levels. Indeed, the wave of assassinations which followed the elections of March 1994 might lead one to give credence to the (privately expressed) view of one European development official, to the effect that "In El Salvador, what AID is doing is laying the groundwork for the next civil war, which I would guess we'll see in five or six years." Such an evaluation may be extreme, both in its prediction for the future and in its assessment of AID's role in the process, but it points up the very real dangers inherent in the policy that the United States chose to pursue. If the AID approach did encompass a long-term vision, it was undoubtedly mistaken. A healthy civil society cannot be created via institutions designed to serve only one segment of society, nor through policies which operate to exclude, systematically, other significant sectors. Any choice of partners by external donors implies, ipso facto, a certain selectivity regarding the sorts of organizations and efforts that ought to be supported. There is no doubt that, for peace to be sustainable in El Salvador, the privileged classes had to feel wellrepresented, if not secure, in the new postwar world. For peace to continue, they must continue to be represented. "Civil society" is, and should be, an enormous catch-all, where interests of every kind are free to come together, to organize, and to make their voices heard (if not felt). In that sense, the AID strategy served an important purpose. It did not, however, serve well the process of reconciliation, which depends on isolating intransigent elements on both sides, privileging cooperation, and creating channels that resist political manipulation by any party. In choosing the weaker side, European donors and NGOs also helped to maintain the bases for polarizing organization in civil society. But polarization depended (and depends) overwhelmingly on the way in which the state and the parties manage power. The Europeans have striven to find ways to bring the parties together and ameliorate conflict, at least at the local level. Ultimately, however, as our answers to the first two questions have already suggested, democracy in El Salvador depends on making a commitment to democracy at every level of society: at the state level, in its decision making and use of state resources; at the national political level, in the electoral arena and in the relations not only among parties, but between the parties and civil society; and, finally, at the local level, within civil society itself. Though foreign actors may continue to play a limited role, the requisite commitments to democratic principles can only arise from practice - from conflict, contestation, and cooperation in multiple arenas, over multiple issues large and small, and over much time. El Salvador's civil society will be an important protagonist in such experiences, but, reinvigorated though it may be, it cannot carry the whole burden of political change in what is still a much-divided society.
Michael W. Foley is Associate Professor of Politics at the the Catholic University of America in Washington (DC). His article, with Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society and Social Change, will appear in the July edition of Journal of Democracy, with a reply by Robert Putnam. He is currently working on a book on the "new peasant movement in Mexico.
This article is based on interviews with development workers, directors of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in El Salvador, government and AID officials, and observers, carried out principally in El Salvador from January 1993 through October 1994. The research was made possible through a grant from the United States Institute of Peace. Thanks to Cheryl Morden and Peter Sollis for my introduction to the world of NGOs in El Salvador, to the many Salvadorans who agreed to talk to me, to AID-EI Salvador, and particularly to former Deputy Director John Lovaas for cooperation in providing documents and interviews, and to Peter Sollis, Joy Olson, and Deborah Barry for critical comments on a preliminary draft of this article. Thanks also to the editors and anonymous reviewers for the JOURNAL for very helpful direction in revising the article.
Warning! OCR inputs differ greatlyl. Independent Salvadoran human rights groups maintained that the 1. Independent Sacks on civilian human rights groups maintained that took place throughout 1992 and 1993 pattern of attacks on civilians that took place death squads did not disappear with throughout 1992 and of the war nor suggested that the death squads did not disappear with the dissolution of some of the most notorious units of the security forces. However, the United Nations Mission of so E1 Salvador tended to minimize of the most notorious units of the security forces. However, the United Nations Mission to El Salvador tended to minimize thts assessments up until November of 1993, when 2 highreports in its human rights assessments up until November of the FMLN where killed by unknown 2 highran early 1995, a group calling members of the FMLN were killed by unknown assailants Martinez Brigade In early 1995, a group calling itself the squad) claimed responsibility for at least one killing and threatened the civilian mayors of San infamous death squad) Department who had responsibility for at least one killing to attend an event sponsored by the civilian mayor of San Vicente Department who had planned 2. Other attend an event sponsored by the FMLN mayor of civil society merit attention, most notably Other assertion, from the mid-1980s onward, of the emergence of civil society merit attention, to form notably the reassertion, from the mid-1980s and labor unions of the movement to reconstitute themselves as cooperatives with government and business in the Economic and their efforts to reconstitute themselves as interlocutors with government and business in the Economic and Social Fords (see Lungo,1995; Ramos,1993). 3. The argument has perhaps gained its greatest currency through the Peace Accords (see Lungo, 1995; Ramos, 1993). work of Robert Putnam on The development of Italian perhaps gained its greatest currency through the work of Robert Putnam and the development of the multiple sources and conal governments which and 1995). For a survey of the multiple shaped contemporary interest in civil society, see Cohen and concerns which have issue was raised contemporary interest in civil society, see Cohen and most forcibly, in "post-Marxist" circles in (1992). The issue was raised first, and Latin America before it was taken up in the "post-Marxist" circles in Poland, Framework represented by Putnam (Cohen and Latin America before it was taken up in the neo-plurato,1992:17; see also Keane, 1988). For a thoughtful represented by Putnam the notion of civil society and Arato,1992::17; see also Keane, 1988). For a thoughtful assessment of the notion of argument, society and of key elements of the prevailing argument, see Walzer (1992).
4. The tendency to identify civil society with the NGOs has its parallel in the literature on nonprofits in the North Atlantic societies, which treats nonprofits as a distinct (and distinctly "independent") "sector", neither state nor market but somewhere between the two, which effectively represents the "voluntary spirit" and the aspirations of society vts-a-vis the impersonal forces of the market on the one hand, and the politicized, or bureaucratized, behavior of the state on the other. For a much needed corrective to this approach, see Ware (1989). The present article takes a broader approach, including both representative ("membership") organizations and service organizations (NGOs) in its purview. Unless otherwise indicated, "NGOs" refers to El Salvador's nongovernmental organizations.
5. To be fair to Putnam, his research question is not "What brings about democracy?" But "whether the success of a democratic government depends on the degree to which its surroundings approximate the ideal of a `civic community'" (Putnam, 1993: 87). His conclusion is that civic associations are powerfully associated with effective public institutions.... [S]ocial capital, as embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy ... : Strong society, strong economy; strong society, strong state (Putnam,1993: 176). Even this weaker claim, however, must confront the long, troubled political history of Italy before the installation of a relatively "successful" democracy at the end of World War II. For a more fully elaborated critique of the civil society argument employed by Putnam and others, see Foley and Edwards (forthcoming). 6. The Federaci6n Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreros, for example, founded by the Christian Democratic Party in the 1960s and later a participant in the broad popular front called the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR), disappeared during this period. But the most notorious example was the Union Comunal Salvadoreia, an affiliate of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) which was involved in the land reform efforts of the postcoup junta, whose director, Rudolfo Viera, was assassinated along with two US advisers to the AIFLD, Michael Hammer and Mark Pearlman, in January 1981 (see Pearce, 1986; Diskin and Sharpe, 1986). 7. Originally called the Asociaci6n Salvadorera de Ayuda Ecumnnica, the organizations were brought together in 1981 in response to a call from Archbishop Oscar Romero to a number of organizations with religious affiliations: the Federaci6n de Colegios Cat6licos, the Centro de la Archidi6cesis de Promoci6n de la Salud, the Movimiento Estudiantil Cristiano of the Lutheran church, and the Episcopal and Emmanuel Baptist churches. These organizations were later joined by two older Catholic organizations active in the cooperative movement: the Fundaci6n Promotora de Cooperativas (FUNPROCOOP) and the Federacidn de Asociaciones Cooperativas de
Produccidn Agropecuaria de El Salvador (FEDECOPADES). Funding came from Catholic Relief Service and European churches and NGOs, including MISEREOR (Gonzalez, 1993; Sollis, 1992). 8. Though an artificial measure, the official register of asociaciones ctvicas" shows a remarkable S-curve, with a gradual growth in organizations in the 1960s and '70s, flattening in the early 1980s (a mere 10 organizations were registered in 1980), only to evince sudden growth spurts in 1985 and, again, in 1989. Whereas fewer than 20 organizations per year registered under this juridical form from 1980 to 1984, the numbers hovered closer to 30 per year from 1985 to 1988, while almost 60 organizations were registered in 1990 (this despite considerable government resistance to recognizing the new, "popular sector" NGOs associated with the FMLN). Starting in 1987, "foundations" began to be created in ever-increasing numbers, with an average of 10 per year registered from 1987 to 1991, then jumping to 25 in 1992 and up to 27 in 1993 (UNDP,1992: based on Interior Ministry statistics; El Salvador/Ministerio,1993: figures for 1992 and 1993). NGOs have adopted both forms, with the foundation" having more prestige, at least in name.
9. AID's enthusiastic promotion of the corresponding organization in Costa Rica, the Coaltci6n Costarricense de Infctattvas de Desarrollo (CINDE), led to a debate over CINDE's role as a"parallel government" in the structural adjustment debates of the 1980s (Honey, 1994). For more on role of AID in encouraging the growth and diversification of exports in Central America during the 1980s, including the creation of private sector institutions in Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras, see De la Ossa and Alonso (1990). 10. Both the Municipalities in Action program described below and Project FORTAS were financed through the "domestic currency" portion of the AID portfolio. Thus, according to former Deputy Director of Mission John Lovaas, no "project papers" were developed on these efforts (personal communication to the author from the Deputy Director of Mission, Santa Elena, El Salvador, 16 November, 1993.) 11. These organizations are notably top-heavy. Virtually alone among the newer organizations (i.e., post-1980), the organizations that were either created or nurtured by AID all boast big staffs: the UNDP Directory lists a staff of 100 or more each for FUSADES, FEPADE, and CAM, compared to an average staff size of 32, while 85% of the NGOs have staffs that number less than 50 (UNPD, 1992). They also boast high salaries and high overhead: FUSADES' overhead for its share of the program to carry out the postwar reinsertion of former combatants was 22%, whereas the UNDP norm was just 10% (Murray, Coletti, and Spence, 1994: 35). 12. The Comtt4 Cristiano Por Desplazados de El Salvador (CRIPDES) was formed in June 1984 to provide technical and financial assistance, organizing more than 40 efforts at repopulation in Chalatenango, Usulutan, La Libertad,
and Cuscatlan, as well as the earliest repatriations of refugees, in 1987 and 1988. Associated with CRIPDES are regional confederations of communities, such as the Coordinadora de Comunidades y Repoblactones de Chalatenango (CCR), now known as the Coordinadora de Comunidades para la Reconstrucci6n, the Corporaci6n de Desarrollo Rural (CDR) in San Vicente and La Paz departments, and the Comitd de Desplazados y Marginados de La Libertad (CODESMA). In 1988, a similar umbrella organization for San Miguel and Morazan departments, the Patronato para el Desarrollo de las Comunidades de Morazan y San Miguel (PADECOMSM) was created (see Sollis, 1992). 13. Working alongside CRIPDES was the Fundact6npara la Cooperaci6n y el Desarrollo Comunal de El Salvador (CORDES), one of the most important of the national-level NGOs associated with the parties of the FMLN. PADECOMSM and similar organizations came to make up the base of a broader coalition, with pretensions to NGO status, the Patronato para el Desarrollo de las Comunidades de El Salvador (PADECOES), and this, in turn, found links to donors through another national-level NGO: Fundact6n para la Autogestt6n y Solidaridad de los Trabajadores Salvadorefos (FASTRAS). While CORDES/ CRIPDES put together an impressive string of "sister parishes" and communities from the United States and Canada to support their populations (along with aid from the European and Canadian governments and NGOs), PADECOES generated aid from Holland, Dfakonfa Sweden, Belgium, England, and Medicos sin Fronteras, as well as from PASTRAS (Sollis, 1992; PRODEPAS-PACT, 1993).
14. The Municipalities in Action program (MIA) adapted the Duarte government's legislation designed to strengthen municipalities to meet the needs of counterinsurgency and, later, to aid the government's efforts for reconstruction. On the side of the municipalities, municipal mayors and councils were to decide on reconstruction and development priorities through an "open town meeting" (cabildo abierto). Throughout the war, and even afterwards, commanders of local garrisons frequently made it a practice to attend such meetings, thereby introducing an element of intimidation into the proceeding for those who might have found themselves out of sympathy with the thinking of the mayors and their advisers. The Comisi6n Nacional de Restauraci6n de Areas (CONARA), or National Commission for Reconstruction of Affected Areas, , was headed, throughout most of the war, by a military officer on active duty who would review requests and take care of the government's management (CONARA, n.d.). 15. See Ramos Gonzalez (1993) for an eloquent presentation of the important role that civil society has played in bringing both sides to the bargaining table. However, Ramos' conclusion - that "social forces", represented by the ComitE Permanente del Debate Nacional por la Paz in particular, had established themselves as unavoidable interlocutors in the peace process (p. 200) - has proven illusory.
16. The term was coined by Alvaro de Soto, chief UN mediator in the negotiations, and subsequently taken up by Terry Karl in the title of her otherwise fine account of the making of the Accords (Karl, 1992). 17. The "big 5,' each of which is identified with one of the 5 parties of the FMLN, are: (1) the Fundaci6n para la Cooperaci6n y el Desarrollo Comunal de El Salvador(CORDES); (2) the Fundaci6npara la Autogesti6ny Solidaridad de los Trabajadores Salvadoreros (FASTRAS); (3) the Fundac(6n Salvadorera para la Reconstrucct6ny el Desarrollo (REDES); (4) the Asoctac6n Salvadore*a de Desarrollo Integral (ASDl); and (5) the Fundaci6n Salvadorefa para la Promoci6n del Desarrollo Social y Econ6mico (FUNSALPRODESE). 18. Author's interview with official of US-AID, Santa Elena (El Salvador); 4 November 1993. 19. FUNDASAL, founded in 1968, was the first Salvadoran NGO to win World Bank funding (in the 1970s) and had a worldwide reputation as an innovator in providing decent housing for the urban poor. Both the Duarte and the Cristiani administrations boycotted it during the rebuilding effort that took place in the aftermath of the 1986 earthquake on grounds that it was too closely tied to groups in the "popular sector.' The organization has also been criticized by the Left for its efforts to steer clear of entanglements with the FMLN (Martinez, 1993; Edwards and Siebentritt, 1990). FUNDASAL has now received funds from the German government to help in constructing housing for excombatants of the FMLN. 20. See note 16, above. 21. Locares also noted the difficulties that FUSADES encountered when it attempted to carry out the "reinsertion" program for mid-level commanders of the FMLN: To reach these people, you often had to go to the countryside. You'd find so-and-so had gone to find work here or there and so-and-so was not available for some other reason. You'd have to sleep in the countryside, get to know people - all of which takes a certain 'mystique', which if you don't have it you can't do the work (Locares, 1994). FUSADES, whose participation in the contract was insisted upon by AID (the donor), had no experience or prior contact with this population and, according to Locares, brought to the training and credit program "technical criteria that were simply inappropriate" (Locares, 1994; see also UNDP, 1994).
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