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The prospect of a pacified planet, without rulers and ruled, of a planetary society devoted to production and consumption only, to the production and consumption of spiritual as well as material merchandise, was positively horrifying to quite a few very intelligent and very decent, if very young, Germans.15 To prove that these young Germans were both "very intelligent and very decent," he emphasizes that they were above selfish motives (therefore "very decent") and completely without illusions (hence "very intelligent"). Nor did they object to it for religious reasons; for, as one of their spokesmen (E. Jünger) said, they knew that they were the sons and grandsons and great-grandsons of godless men.16 Strauss then alludes to the influence of Nietzsche ("there is no other philosopher whose influence on postwar German thought is comparable to that of Nietzsche, of the atheist Nietzsche"):17 What they hated, was the very prospect of a world in which everyone would be happy and satisfied, in which everyone would have his little pleasure by day and his little pleasure by night, a world in which no great heart could beat and no great soul could breathe, a world without real, unmetaphoric, sacrifice, i.e. a world without blood, sweat, and tears.18 This is Strauss's lyrical bid to gain sympathy for these young nihilists: he weaves together allusions19 to the proto-Nazi Nietzsche ("the relation of Nietzsche to the German Nazi revolution is comparable to the relation of Rousseau to the French revolution")20 and Winston Churchill,21 the greatest anti-Nazi authority in 1941.
In February 1941, Irwin Rommel took command of the Afrika Korps and began his daring drive on Suez. Neither the U.S.A. nor the U.S. S. R. had been added to the list of the Reich's enemies: Britain stood alone. Meanwhile, in neutral New York, an intellectual encounter between two German émigrés proved likewise fateful. One of these was the former Nazi Hermann Rauschning, author of The Revolution of Nihilism: A Warning to the West.1 The other was Leo Strauss, who offered his colleagues at the New School an analysis of Rauschning's book in a lecture delivered on February 26, 1941. A contextualized analysis of the lecture "German Nihilism"-unpublished until 19992-itself constitutes a warning the West would be prudent to heed.
The lecture is divided into three parts. The first is entitled "The ultimate, non-nihilistic motive under-lying German nihilism." Here Strauss contrasts open and closed societies and shows that a non-nihilistic "moral protest" is the basis of German Nihilism.3 In the second part, "The situation in which that non-nihilistic motive led to nihilism," Strauss describes the dilemma confronting "the young nihilists" during the Weimar years. Finally, in his analysis of Rauschning in part three, "What is nihilism? And how far can nihilism be said to be specifically German?" Strauss connects German Nihilism (via German militarism) to its non-nihilistic origin in German philosophy. Important though both the beginning and the end of "German Nihilism" unquestionably are for understanding what Strauss is doing, it is characteristically the middle part that is decisive.4
Strauss divides Part II into three sections. The first is called: "German nihilism is the reaction of a certain type of young atheist to the communist ideal or prediction." Along with the second, this section offers an interesting glimpse of the intellectual milieu of the young Strauss before he left Germany in 1932. 5 In the second section, "On the affinity of youth to nihilism, and the nihilistic consequences of the emancipation of youth," Strauss indirectly blames an older generation of progressives for the fact that a more honorable and less vulgar type of nihilism, embraced by youths inspired by Nietzsche, was transformed into the Nazi "Revolution of Nihilism." Although undoubtedly important, these two sections are comparatively straightforward from an exegetical perspective in comparison with the last.6 Here Strauss makes his case for what I will call "the secret teaching" of "German Nihilism." Strauss's success in concealing this teach-teaching-and thereby escaping "persecution" even after revealing it-demonstrates the limited extent to which he had mastered "the art of writing" in 1941.
"German Nihilism" must therefore be situated in relation to Strauss's "Persecution and the Art of Writing." Strauss published that seminal article in September 194 1,7 and, in retrospect, it sheds light on its unpublished counterpart. Although one recent apologia for Strauss8 denied that Strauss himself practiced exotericism-i.e. hid from the careless reader a secret teaching "between the lines"9-while another10 merely suggested that he did not, "German Nihilism," especially the third section of Part II, provides evidence that he did. "German Nihilism" is in fact a particularly revealing instance of exotericism because Strauss himself-by choosing not to publish it - tacitly admitted that he was still learning "the art of writing." As what Alfons Söllner has called "an ultraconservative thinker,"11 Strauss had compelling grounds for thinking that "German Nihilism" would subject him to "persecution" in a liberal democracy.
Strauss offers a chronologically nuanced answer to the question, What is German Nihilism?, by distinguishing the later development of National Socialism from its Nietzschean origins in "post-War Germany."12 In fact, Strauss makes a double distinction: National Socialism is both a late and a vulgar development of "German Nihilism."
It must however be understood from the outset that National Socialism is only the most famous form of German nihilism-its lowest, most provincial, most unenlightened and most dishonourable form.13
Strauss can thus attack it while defending a more honorable and earlier form of German Nihilism: the intellectual orientation of "the young nihilists."14 A central element in Strauss's attempt to make these young nihilists attractive is their anti-Communism:
The prospect of a pacified planet, without rulers and ruled, of a planetary society devoted to production and consumption only, to the production and consumption of spiritual as well as material merchandise, was positively horrifying to quite a few very intelligent and very decent, if very young, Germans.15
To prove that these young Germans were both "very intelligent and very decent," he emphasizes that they were above selfish motives (therefore "very decent") and completely without illusions (hence "very intelligent").
They did not object to that prospect because they were worrying about their own economic and social position; for certainly in that respect they had no longer anything to lose. Nor did they object to it for religious reasons; for, as one of their spokesmen (E. Jünger) said, they knew that they were the sons and grandsons and great-grandsons of godless men.16
Strauss then alludes to the influence of Nietzsche ("there is no other philosopher whose influence on postwar German thought is comparable to that of Nietzsche, of the atheist Nietzsche"):17
What they hated, was the very prospect of a world in which everyone would be happy and satisfied, in which everyone would have his little pleasure by day and his little pleasure by night, a world in which no great heart could beat and no great soul could breathe, a world without real, unmetaphoric, sacrifice, i.e. a world without blood, sweat, and tears.18
This is Strauss's lyrical bid to gain sympathy for these young nihilists: he weaves together allusions19 to the proto-Nazi Nietzsche ("the relation of Nietzsche to the German Nazi revolution is comparable to the relation of Rousseau to the French revolution")20 and Winston Churchill,21 the greatest anti-Nazi authority in 1941. The significance of the Churchill allusion will be discussed later. For now, the point is that Strauss has whitewashed the young Nietzschean nihilists, of which we know he was one ("I can only say that Nietzsche so dominated and enchanted me between my 22nd and 30th years [sc. until 1929], that I granted him everything that I understood of him").22 Although he admits that they were inarticulate23 and subject to a serious delusion,24 he suggests that these "young Germans" and not National Socialism have revealed what "German Nihilism" is.
Their Yes was inarticulate: they were unable to say more than: No! This No proved however sufficient as the preface to action, to the action of destruction. This is the phenomenon which occurs to me first whenever I hear the expression German nihilism.25
At the beginning of the lecture, Strauss said something quite different: "When we hear at the present time the expression 'German nihilism,' most of us naturally think about National Socialism."26 He therefore hopes to have distinguished the honorable "young nihilists" from the vulgar Nazis and now intends to change what "most of us" think. In fact, Strauss provides a generational or chronological alternative to the distinction between elite and masses-to which "Persecution and the Art of Writing" gives hermeneutic dimension-27 essential to Rauschning's portrait of National Socialism:
The doctrine was meant for the masses. It is not a part of the real motive forces of the revolution. It is an instrument for the control of the masses. The élite, the leaders, stand above the doctrine. They make use of it for the furtherance of their purposes [sc. "the very deliberate, utterly cold and calculating pursuit of power and dominance by the controlling group."]28
Strauss claims that "the young nihilists"-as distinct from the vulgar Nazis who followed them but apparently only in a chronological sense-had a "No" but not a "Yes" (i.e. "the young nihilists" had no program). Thus he attempts to conceal the fact that their "No"-an affirmative negation that, as he admits, "proved . . . sufficient as the preface . . . to the action of destruction"-is precisely what Rauschning claimed was the aim of National Socialism's elite: the practical application of their "Will to Power."29
Strauss ignores the possibility that these youthful nihilists became adult Nazis: it is indeed precisely this connection that he suppresses. But because this connection is so obvious, Strauss invents an apologia for a crime he refuses to say was committed. Even if these young Germans ultimately turned to Hitler (which he nowhere admits), it was not their fault. Instead, Strauss discusses those who taught "the young nihilists":
The adolescents I am speaking of, were in need of teachers who could explain to them in articulate language the positive, and not merely destructive, meaning of their aspirations. They believed to have found such teachers in that group of professors and writers who knowingly or ignorantly paved the way for Hitler (Spengler, Möller van den Brück, Carl Schmitt, Bäumler, Ernst Jünger, Heidegger).30
It was to these teachers that "the young nihilists" (Ernst Jünger-whose emphasis on courage influenced "German Nihilism" decisively31-was six years older than Strauss) fatefully turned. This is the only passage in Strauss's writings where any connection between Carl Schmitt-whose impact on Strauss's life and intellectual development has been presented both critically32 and as benign33-and Hitler34 is even hinted; it is also the only mention of Heidegger in "German Nihilism" (Strauss had concealed Heidegger's influence in 1940).35 But rather than examine exactly how they "paved the way for Hitler" (or, since Bäumler, Schmitt, and Heidegger all joined the Party, how they could have done so "ignorantly"), Strauss chooses to blame another type of teacher: the liberals who opposed aggressive nihilism with a defensive nineteenth-century faith in progress.
If we want to understand the singular success, not of Hitler, but of those writers, we must cast a quick glance at their opponents who were at the same time the opponents of the young nihilists.36
Strauss does not directly blame these "pedagogues of progress" for Hitler: their inadequate pedagogy is to blame only for the success of men like Heidegger and Schmitt in "knowingly or ignorantly" paving the way for Hitler. In fact, Strauss is offering us a first-hand account of what Rauschning called "the Conservative Revolution,"37 a subject that has received considerable attention.38 Strauss suggests there was no alternative: along with his contemporaries,39 Strauss was compelled to endorse Heidegger, not his Doktorvater Ernst Cassirer, at Davos in 1929,40 the pivotal year in Strauss's transition-indications of which survive in his letters41-from Nietzsche's follower to Heidegger's.
They [sc. the pedagogues of progress] made the impression of being loaded with the heavy burden of a tradition hoary with age and somewhat dusty, whereas the young nihilists, not hampered by any tradition, had complete freedom of movement-and in the wars of the mind no less than in real wars, freedom of action spells victory.42
The sensitive reader would do well to remember yesterday's Desert Fox along with today's "rear-guard battle"43 in defense of "the real Leo Strauss."44 In any case, this passage constitutes a complete breakdown in the distinctions Strauss introduced between "the young nihilists," their radical right-wing teachers, and National Socialists: Heidegger has characteristics of all three.45 But Strauss's point is that it is not Heidegger's fault that he opposed the conservateurs of tradition46 so persuasively in 1929; the blame attaches to men like Cassirer.
But one cannot refute what one has not thoroughly understood. And many opponents did not even try to understand the ardent passion underlying the negation of the present world and its potentialities. As a consequence, the very refutations confirmed the nihilists in their belief; all these refutations seemed to beg the question; most of the refutations seemed to consist of pueris decantata ["the things that are chanted to boys again and again"], of repetitions of things which the young people knew already by heart.47
The striking expression "the negation of the present world and its potentialities" connects Strauss's description of a philosophical movement among Germany's post-War youth with what he calls "the Anglo-German War."48 What makes his sympathetic treatment of "the young nihilists" so liable to liberal persecution is the fact that he has already written that "German Nihilism" plays a role in the contemporary conflict: "The fact of the matter is that German nihilism is not absolute nihilism but a desire for the destruction of something specific: of modern civilisation."49 Strauss has already made it clear that "modern civilization" (i.e. "the present world and its potentialities") means Britain ("the modern ideal is of English origin: the German tradition is a tradition of criticism of the modern ideal").50
That moral meaning of modern civilisation to which the German nihilists object; is expressed in formulations such as these: to relieve man's estate; or: to safeguard the rights of man; or: the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number. What is the motive underlying the protest against modern civilisation, against the spirit of the West, and in particular of the Anglo-Saxon West? The answer must be: it is a moral protest.51
It is one thing to point out that young men in post-war Germany had honorable motives for embracing an anti-Communist Nietzscheanism; it is another to characterize "German Nihilism" as "a moral protest" against the French Revolution and English Utilitarianism. In which camp is Strauss to be found? "The present Anglo-German war is then of symbolic significance. In defending modern civilization against German nihilism, the English are defending the eternal principles of civilization."52 By rhetorically elevating "modern civilization" into "the eternal principles of civilization," Strauss now sounds like one of the pedagogues of progress.53 But this appearance is momentary: "Against that debasement of morality, and against the concomitant decline of a truly philosophic spirit, the thought of Germany stood up, to the lasting honor of Germany."54 But in framing the War in these terms, Strauss risks appearing as a German Nihilist (at best) unless he can persuade his audience that he is an Anglophile who is defending "modern civilization" against nihilism. This, however, he seems unwilling to do: "The ideal of modern civilisation is of English and French origin; it is not of German origin. What the meaning of that ideal is, is, of course, a highly controversial question."55
Strauss frames the political difference between Germany and Britain in relation to Bergson's distinction between open and closed societies.56 German nihilism, according to Strauss, is a moral protest against the former:
That protest proceeds from the conviction that the internationalism inherent in modern civilisation, or, more precisely, that the establishment of a perfectly open society which is as it were the goal of modern civilisation, and therefore all aspirations directed toward that goal, are irreconcilable with the basic demands of moral life.57
By emphasizing its "internationalism" (the word suggests the Bolshevik bogey), Strauss is calling into question the open society. But he must now choose: if he intends to refute the nihilist position, he must abandon the radical critique of liberalism that had caused Carl Schmitt to write him a letter of recommendation for a Rockefeller Foundation Grant to study Hobbes in Paris.58
The critique of liberalism that Schmitt has initiated can therefore be completed only when we succeed in gaining a horizon beyond liberalism. Within such a horizon Hobbes achieved the foundation of liberalism. A radical critique of liberalism is therefore possible only on the basis of an adequate understanding of Hobbes. Tb show what is to be learned from Schmitt for the execution of this urgent task was therefore the main concern of our comments.59
But instead of rejecting Schmitt, he takes-with a triumphant rhetorical flourish-the irresistible (and possibly self-destructive)60 step:
That protest proceeds from the conviction that the root of all moral life is essentially and therefore eternally the closed society; from the conviction that the open society is bound to be, if not immoral, at least amoral: the meeting ground of seekers of pleasure, of gain, of irresponsible power, indeed of any kind of irresponsibility and lack of seriousness.61
Strauss is not just defending a theoretical position: he is boldly putting into practice the post-Modern courage discovered by Nietzsche (and extended by Heidegger or Strauss)62 but alien to the open societies of the West.
Only life in such a tense atmosphere, only a life which is based on constant awareness of the sacrifices to which it owes its existence, and of the necessity, the duty of sacrifice of life and all worldly goods, is truly human: The sublime is unknown to the open society.63
Strauss has not only defined "the Anglo-German War" in terms that suggest loyalty to Germany-as well as to two less vulgar Nazis (Heidegger and Schmitt)-he also invokes the authority of Nietzsche to bolster the Anglophobe position. After quoting two Anglophobe passages from Beyond Good and Evil,64 Strauss concludes: "I believe that Nietzsche is substantially correct in asserting that the German tradition is very critical of the ideals of modern civilisation, and those ideals are of English origin."65
Strauss doesn't leave himself completely exposed, however: he balances an anti-English Nietzsche with the more timely anti-German authority of Churchill. But the context of the lecture's only direct reference to Churchill does not imply that Strauss supports England's fight for "the eternal principles of civilization." Paradoxically, Strauss presents Churchill as the kind of leader young German nihilists would have followed.
Only one answer was given which was adequate and which would have impressed the young nihilists if they had heard it. It was not however given by a German and it was given in the year 1940 only. Those young men who refused to believe that the period following the jump into liberty, following the communist world revolution, would be the finest hour of mankind in general and of Germany in particular, would have been impressed as much as we were, by what Winston Churchill said after the defeat in Flanders about Britain's finest hour.66
Unlike the pedagogues of progress whose answers offered nothing to "the young nihilists," Churchill spoke of manly virtue in the face of defeat.67 This "would have impressed the young nihilists if they had heard it." Indeed, claims Strauss, "they would have been impressed as much as we were" (my emphasis). This is as close as Strauss comes to making explicit his identification with "the young nihilists." It is also the only time that Strauss makes his audience's sympathies explicit: they admire Churchill. Strauss tells them that he does too. But he tells them this by claiming that Germany's youthful nihilists would have supported Churchill, and in the same anti-Communist context Strauss had used earlier (antipathy to "the communist world revolution") to make those nihilists appear less vulgar and more honorable than the Nazis. As his earlier indirect reference to another of Churchill's speeches suggested (see page 590 above), Strauss's Churchill is conflated with Nietzsche: he is an anti-Communist leader who speaks of self-sacrifice. In other words, Strauss praises Churchill from the perspective of "German Nihilism": he is silent about Churchill's defense of "the open society" or "the eternal principles of civilization."
Strauss strategically presents himself as a supporter of England in the lecture's conclusion. But even when he reassures his audience that it is Britain and not Germany that deserves to win this War, it is not because either represents "the open society."
But this much is clear beyond any doubt: by choosing Hitler for their leader in the crucial moment, in which the question of who is to exercise planetary rule became the order of the day, the Germans ceased to have any rightful claim to be more than a provincial nation; it is the English, and not the Germans, who deserve to be, and to remain, an imperial nation: whatever may be the outcome of this war, it is the English, and not the Germans, who deserve to have an empire. For only the English, and not the Germans, have understood that in order to deserve to exercise imperial rule, regere imperio populos, one must have learned for a very long time to spare the vanquished and to crush the arrogant: parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.68
It is not qua liberal democracy but as analogue to Virgil's Imperial Rome ("May you remember, Roman, to rule the peoples with an empire. These will be your arts: to impose the custom of peace, to spare the subjected and war down the proud")69 that Britain deserves to crush Hitler. Strauss's imperialist orientation serves to reemphasize the point: it is precisely Hitler' s Germany-as opposed to an imperialist or even a National Socialist Germany-that deserves to lose. Presumably because he was "a prisoner" to anti-Semitism, "that great fool" (as Strauss later called Hitler) has made Germany merely "provincial"70:
The fact that anti-Semitism is the socialism of fools is an argument not against, but for, anti-Semitism; given the fact that there is such an abundance of fools, why should one not steal that very profitable thunder. Of course, one must not become a prisoner of this like that great fool Hitler, who believed in his racial theories; that is absurd.71
The nation that deserves to win, on the other hand, is "an imperial nation"; Churchill is conflated with the Romans.72 What "the young nihilists" would have admired in Churchill is identical to what Strauss tells the audience that he admires in England today. In fact, Strauss had used this Roman imagery before.
Consider Strauss's response to Hitler's Machtergreifung in a May 19, 1933 letter to Karl Löwith:
I am reading Caesar's Commentaries with deeper understanding, and I think about Virgil: Tu regere imperio . . . parcere subjectis et debellare superbos. There exists no reason to crawl to the cross, to liberalism's cross as well, as long as somewhere in the world there yet glimmers a spark of the Roman idea.73
Writing from Paris, Strauss attempts to persuade Löwith (who was also of Jewish background) that despite its persecution of "our kind," a National Socialist Germany, unlike any liberal regime, retains "a spark of the Roman idea."
And, as to the substance of the matter: i.e. that Germany having turned to the right does not tolerate us, that proves absolutely nothing against right-wing principles. On the contrary: only on the basis of right-wing principles-on the basis of fascistic, authoritar- ian, imperial principles-is it possible with integrity, without the ridiculous and pitiful appeal to the droits imprescriptables de l'homme, to protest against the repulsive monster [das meskine Unwesen].74
Eight years later in New York, Strauss's loyalty had not changed. Although he now believed (or professed to believe) that "the Roman idea" has migrated from Germany to England, Strauss remains loyal to the "fascistic, authoritarian, imperial principles" underlying that idea. "The reading of such a passage causes pain."75 But Strauss's 1941 New York audience knew nothing more of this than Werner Dannhauser did before the letter's publication in 2001. 76
Although Strauss ended the lecture with praise for Britain as "an imperial nation," it is not the only quality for which he praises her. Between presenting England as the New Rome and the two Anglophobe passages from Beyond Good and Evil, Strauss offers this criticism of Nietzsche.
He forgets however to add that the English almost always had the very un-German prudence and moderation not to throw out the baby with the bath, i.e. the prudence to conceive of the modern ideals as a reasonable adaptation of the old and eternal ideal of decency, of rule of law, and of that liberty which is not license, to changed circumstances.77
In addition to their imperial skill, the English possess "prudence and moderation" precisely where the Germans lack it: while German Nihilism constitutes a rejection of modern civilization, the more practical English have devised a reasonable synthesis between old and new. Here, if anywhere, Strauss presents Britain-and himself as well-as defending "the eternal principles of civilization" ("the old and eternal ideal of decency"). Moreover, he does so with rhetorical vigor while remaining English in tone.
This taking things easy, this muddling through, this crossing the bridge when one comes to it, may have done some harm to the radicalism of English thought; but it proved to be a blessing to English life; the English never indulged in those radical breaks with traditions which played such a role on the continent.78
Strauss continues to blend rhetoric with impressive mastery of colloquial Anglicisms as he points out the contrast between English moderation and German radicalism. But it is difficult to determine how forthright Strauss is being here. To begin with, he refuses simply to embrace "the modern ideal" in the service of which the English have invented their efficacious "prudence and moderation."79 Nor is it characteristic of the later Strauss to defend moderation on utilitarian grounds when it comes to "the radicalism of . . . thought." ("For moderation is not a virtue of thought: Plato likens philosophy to madness, the very opposite of sobriety or moderation; thought must not be moderate, but fearless, not to say shameless. But moderation is a virtue controlling the philosopher's speech.")80 Finally, and most importantly, the very qualities he appears to praise at the end of the lecture have been described in far less flattering terms at its beginning while presenting the position of "the young Nihilists" on "the open society."
With this context in mind, it is time to turn to the third section of Part II, where Strauss presents his "secret teaching." The content of this teaching had been announced at the start and need not be withheld for dramatic effect: "Yet the defeat of National Socialism will not necessarily mean the end of German nihilism."81 But what had seemed like a warning to those who oppose Germany becomes a secret message of hope in the sixth section of Part II. This section will now receive a methodical exegesis and will be quoted without omissions. In reading Strauss, it is always important to remember the principle "that one writes as one reads."82
Section five has already described the failure of the pedagogues of progress to restore "the young nihilists" to faith in "modern civilization."
6. I have tried to circumscribe the intellectual and moral situation in which nihilism emerged which was not in all cases based in its origin. Moreover, I take it for granted that not everything to which the young nihilists objected, was unobjectionable, and that not every writer or speaker whom they despised, was respectable.83
In the light of what follows, this is a mild statement of Strauss's attempt to secure acceptance for his portrait of "the young nihilists": they were not all wrong nor were the pedagogues of progress beyond reproach. Naturally, Strauss has not overtly embraced the young nihilist position in his description of it in sections four and five. But he now goes further:
Let us beware of a sense of solidarity which is not limited by discretion. And let us not forget that the highest duty of the scholar, truthfulness or justice, acknowledges no limits.84
Strauss is making the danger he faces explicit: his audience is inclined to solidarity with the pedagogues of progress; they will be resistant to his portrait of "the young nihilists." Only if that audience demonstrates "discretion" and keeps in mind "the highest duty of the scholar" will they accept Strauss's analysis: ". . . that not everything to which the young nihilists objected, was unobjectionable, and that not every writer or speaker whom they despised, was respectable." He asks for the liberal's commitment to "truthfulness" as he attempts to secure "justice" (by which he really means indulgence if not support) for "the young nihilists" whose opposition to liberalism has already been described. In short, Strauss is invoking liberal values to persuade a liberal audience to give a sympathetic hearing to those who reject liberalism.
Let us then not hesitate to look for one moment at the phenomenon which I called nihilism, from the point of view of the nihilists themselves.85
This is easy enough for Strauss himself to do: he has been doing so although this is the closest he comes to admitting it openly. But now he has even higher aspirations: he wants to present the nihilist position to an audience unrestrained by scruples ("not hesitate . . . for one moment") that would otherwise prevent them from themselves adopting this "point of view." And by allowing the nihilists to speak for themselves, Strauss next unleashes the whirlwind:
"Nihilism," they would say, is a slogan used by those who do not understand the new, who see merely the rejection of their cherished ideals, the destruction of their spiritual property who judge the new by its first words and deeds, which are, of necessity, a caricature rather than an adequate expression.86
From the perspective of the nihilists themselves, "nihilism" is a word used by the intellectual ruling class to spread terror among those who still cling to the cherished ideals of progress and civilization. Fearful of losing their spiritual capital to an "intellectual proletarian,"87 they denounce "the new." Speaking for the first time as an open nihilist, Strauss invokes the rhetoric of both Bolshevik and Liberal Democrat. Progress is invoked to protect nihilism's "first words and deeds," which must be given time in which to evolve from "caricature" to "adequate expression." To paraphrase, Strauss is saying: You liberals are soft on communism yet you are intellectual capitalists; you liberals claim to believe in progress but you refuse to acknowledge that nihilism is only taking its first baby steps. Here is Strauss's distinction between vulgar and honorable nihilism: Hitler ("of necessity, a caricature") on the one hand and those who are National Socialism's (or Nihilism's?) "adequate expression" on the other. Perhaps Heidegger constitutes, or better, will provide the latter. But possibly that task awaits some future Hegel among "the young nihilists."
How can a reasonable man expect an adequate expression of the ideal of a new epoch at its beginning, considering that the owl of Minerva starts its flight when the sun is setting?88
Having adopted the persona of a nihilist, Strauss hails National Socialism as "a new epoch at its beginning." He blames it only to the extent that the Nazis have thus far been unable to provide "an adequate expression of the ideal" of nihilism. It is the conflation of idealism and nihilism that marks the secret teaching of "German Nihilism" and what follow are ". . . three or four sentences in that terse and lively style which is apt to arrest the attention of young men who love to think."89 Strauss had proclaimed: "Yet the defeat of National Socialism will not necessarily mean the end of German nihilism." National Socialism under Hitler90 may well lose this War: but that doesn't mean the end of German Nihilism. Strauss claims that the final product ("the ideal of a new epoch") justifies its vulgar beginnings. Strauss knows this end in a conceptual rather than in a chronological sense: the telos justifies the means that end must use to actualize itself. By no accident does Strauss invoke Minerva's Owl: his argument is Hegelian. National Socialism under Hitler is doubtless a caricature, an inadequate expression-a one-sided moment, as it were, in the full realization-of that ideal. Patience is therefore required. As Strauss, after learning the art of writing, would put it in his most disturbing book: "Even if a man who begins to corrupt a republic could live long enough to finish his work, he would necessarily lack the required patience and thus be ruined."91
A conscious Hegelianism is thus reflected in Strauss's rhetorical question. The obvious answer (given, that is, a full acceptance of Hegelianism) is (to paraphrase): No! No reasonable man could possibly expect an adequate expression of the ideal of a new epoch at its beginning! Strauss does not supply this answer: it is understood. Instead, he follows this question with two others.
The Nazis? Hitler? The less is said about him the better. He will soon be forgotten. He is merely the rather contemptible tool of "History": the midwife who assists at the birth of the new epoch, of a new spirit; and a midwife usually understands nothing of the genius at whose birth she assists; she is not even supposed to be a competent gynecologist.92
Strauss begins his discussion of Hitler with the words "the less said of Hitler the better"; this comment is followed by two sentences about Hitler. Apparently Strauss was exaggerating: there are some things that must be said "about him." To put it another way, Strauss attaches great importance to attaching no importance to Hitler. Rather than pay attention to him, Strauss lays emphasis on her: Strauss (qua Hegelian) anthropomorphizes History in order to reiterate the point that, from her perspective (properly understood through concepts, not facts), Hitler constitutes only "the birth of a new epoch." If his audience doubts that "History" is showing much cunning, the same cannot be said of Strauss himself: although he admits her ignorance ("a midwife usually understands nothing"), this ignorant mid-wife could plausibly be Hitler himself. But in accord with Strauss's "the less said of Hitler the better," it could also have been the young nihilists, not Hitler, who constituted the new epoch's caricature. "Nazis? Hitler?" By asking these equally rhetorical questions, Strauss's point is that "no reasonable man" could possibly expect from an ignorant midwife (whoever that midwife may be) that these first fruits-whether the "contemptible tools" in question are Nazis, young nihilists, or both - are anything like "an adequate expression of the ideal of a new epoch." The less said about them, the better.
Except that he does not write "them"; instead, he writes: "The less said about him the better." Strauss is already practicing the art of writing in order to escape persecution. Although he in fact had something very important to say about Hitler (i.e. that Hitler is unimportant), he clearly believes that in the case of the Nazis "the less said . . . the better." And therefore he says nothing about them whatsoever. As the text makes plain, the Nazis truly are "soon forgotten" while Strauss is rendering Hitler contemptible. Strauss is explicitly arguing that Hitler vanishes alongside "the new epoch" of which he is merely a contemptible harbinger. But in the text, the Nazis implicitly vanish alongside Hitler: thanks to the art of writing, Strauss simply makes them disappear. But just because they become invisible in the text, they scarcely cease to exist in fact. They are, to begin with, legion. They include - in addition to the vulgar, deluded, and humiliated masses-the likes of Schmitt and Heidegger. Not all of them, therefore, are contemptible. Nor will all of them "soon be forgotten." Strauss makes the Nazis vanish in the shadow of Hitler and Hitler vanish in the shadow of "the new epoch." The two feats of magic suggest three different objects but that is a literary illusion. The "new epoch" in whose shadow Hitler disappears exists only in the minds of the true Nazis; in the minds of the vulgar (i.e. careless readers), it is these who disappear in the shadow of Hitler. And only one of them-the elite that understands the "inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism93- could denounce Hitler for being a contemptible harbinger. It is the future that matters:
A new reality is in the making; it is transforming the whole world; in the meantime there is: nothing, but - a fertile nothing.94
Here then, is the secret teaching of "German Nihilism." Strauss has now courageously traded his veil of vigilance for rhetorical recklessness. Earlier he had said: "Yet the defeat of National Socialism will not necessarily mean the end of German nihilism." No longer a warning, the message has become a clarion call of hope. The contemporary manifestation of what Rauschning has called "the revolution of nihilism" may well be defeated. But the "nothing" that is the root of nihilism-and Strauss never denies Rauschning's highly significant thesis that National Socialism is nihilism-this nothing will transform the world. Hitler is doubtless a "nothing" in the vulgar sense. But the nihilist "nothing" at the core of National Socialism is something different: it is "a fertile nothing." Strauss now speaks not only as a nihilist: he speaks as if he were activating-a sleeper cell of his fellow nihilists. Consider the audience to whom this clarion call of hope is addressed:
The Nazis are as unsubstantial as clouds; the sky is hidden at present by those clouds which announce a devastating storm, but at the same time the long-needed rain which will bring new life to the dried up soil; and (here I am almost quoting) do not lose hope; what appears to you the end of the world, is merely the end of an epoch, of the epoch which began in 1517 or so.95
Here, at last, the vanished Nazis reappear in at least three forms: as the subject matter under discussion, as the only audience to whom "do not lose hope" is addressed, and as the writer's temporary persona. Are there any Nazis at the New School? Is a Nazi, Hitler for example, a "contemptible tool" that is "soon to be forgotten"? Yes and no. Strauss compares the Nazis to clouds: this suggests that they are "nothing" ("as insubstantial as clouds.") But clouds not only announce a storm: they bring "the long-needed rain which will bring new life to the dried up soil." Their effects will therefore not soon be forgotten. To be sure they are "insubstantial": the very same operation that brings the refreshing rain annihilates the cloud as cloud. But when did a true Nazi cling to his or her own life when it is a question of sacrifice for the Thousand Year Reich? Authentic Dasein knows how to die: it resolutely runs forward into death. "Vorlaufende Entschlossenheit" was Heidegger's reformulation of Nietzsche's great discovery: a horizon beyond Christianity.96 It is the Christian epoch-restored to life ("Luther restored the church: he attacked it")97 on German soil in 1517 ("The Ninety-Five Theses")-that is ending. No matter how vulgar our leader, no matter how evanescent we ourselves may be, do not lose hope! The tomorrow for which we destroy ourselves (as the clouds that we are become fructifying rain) is our post-Christian eternity. As if to emphasize the contrast, Strauss now almost quotes the Bible to bring his nihilist sermon to a properly obscene conclusion. It is difficult to be certain of the source of this quotation (Tanguay and Janssens offer no suggestions) since Strauss is admittedly not being precise. But Proverbs 23:18 reads in Luther's German: "denn das Ende kommt noch, und dann wird deine Hoffnung nicht zuschanden" (lit. "For the end yet comes, and then your hope will not be vain").
How will Strauss return from these oratorical heights? How will he restore the audience's faith that he isn't Nazi? Without denying the persuasive power of what he has said (indeed he emphasizes that power) Strauss continues this discussion of nihilism "from the point of view of the nihilists themselves" (he marks his return to an apparently non-nihilist persona with the pronoun "I") by distinguishing arguments by which nihilism cannot be refuted from a single one from which it can.
-I frankly confess, I do not see how those can resist the voice of that siren who expect the answer to the first and the last question from "History," from the future as such, who mistake analysis of the present or past or future for philosophy and who believe in a progress toward a goal which is itself progressive and therefore undefinable; who are not guided by a known and stable standard: by a standard which is stable and not changeable, and which is known and not merely believed.98
Who can resist the siren's song of nihilism? Strauss challenges those whose approach to philosophical problems is historical to acknowledge that the nihilist's use of a category like "the ideal of a new epoch at its beginning" has performed a reductio ad Hitlerum (not yet rejected as fallacious)99 on the idea of progress. Justifying the present "from the future as such" as "Strauss the Siren"-i.e. the persona who preaches the secret teaching of "German Nihilism"-has just done is what the pedagogues of progress usually do: Strauss suggests that he has merely assumed the persona of a neo- Hegelian nihilist (Strauss cited Hegel's "Owl of Minerva" in his own voice earlier in "German Nihilism")100 to show historicists the evil uses to which their premises can be put. Those who imagine that any historicist notion of philosophy is adequate to deafen the ears of a modern Odysseus to historicist arguments from a persuasive nihilist are wrong: it is their own reliance on history101 that has rendered Strauss the Siren irresistible. This, he now reassuringly suggests, has been his point all along.
Moreover, it is only by embracing a timeless, absolute, and unchanging standard that the nihilist can be refuted. Strauss seems to be calling for a revival of a Platonic conception of Philosophy ("the Ancients") or even possibly actual knowledge-rather than mere belief-in the Living God ("Jerusalem"). In order to conceal the fact that he has just revealed his secret teaching, Strauss now offers-is indeed compelled to offer-an unusually strong statement of his exoteric teaching. At the moment when even the dullest were beginning to suspect that they were listening to a postHitler National Socialist, it comes as a tremendous relief to realize that we are witnessing the rebirth of classical political rationalism! But can we be sure that this-as opposed to Strauss the Siren-is the real Strauss? He clearly expects that we will believe that it is, but can we actually know?
In order to settle this question, it is necessary to take a closer look at the exact words Strauss uses to describe the only nihilism-proof position: all are at the mercy of Strauss the Siren ". . . who are not guided by a known and stable standard: by a standard which is stable and not changeable, and which is known and not merely believed." The most striking thing about this description is that it is highly repetitive. It appears to say one thing in three different ways. The impression of repetition is emphasized by the fact that all three elements in the first version ("known," "stable," and "standard") are used twice. Why does Strauss repeat himself? Naturally "a stable standard" is "a standard which is stable." This then is simply redundant. Even the addition of "not changeable" adds nothing to the repeated adjective "stable." But if the meaning of the words "stable standard" is itself "stable" and "unchangeable," the same is not true of the adjective "known," the third repeated word: in this case, the same word has two different meanings. The first time, the word "known" means: "well-" or "widely known" or perhaps even "universally recognized" (or at least "recognizable."). The second time (in the third formulation) it means "known" as opposed to "believed"; it is a standard that is the object of knowledge rather than of belief. This repetition, therefore, is not a repetition: it is an addition disguised as repetition. Indeed, it is a highly significant addition.
Consider the best-known example of one thing in three: the Holy Trinity. Those who are guided by the Trinity are surely immune to nihilism: the Trinity is "a known and stable standard" that is "stable and not changeable." But the Trinity is precisely not "known and not merely believed." Strauss has defined the only position that is resistant to nihilism in such a way as to make it difficult or impossible to find any such position. And even mere difficulty is lethal to this particular search: by Strauss's definition, we are searching for a standard that is known (and not just "believed") that must also be well-known. A standard of which philosophers alone are aware does not constitute an adequate bulwark but an unchanging standard that is known and not believed would necessarily be the preserve of the few. But the further qualification (working, as it were, backwards) that this be "a known . . . standard," Strauss uses the ignorant multitude against the philosophers. Indeed the many will be persuaded by Strauss's palinode but not the few. As he will later write:
One must also consider "the customary mildness of the common people," a good naturedness which fairly soon shrinks from, or is shocked by, the inquisitorial brutality and recklessness that is required for extorting his serious views from an able writer who tries to conceal them from all but a few.102
It is only between the lines, then, that Strauss suggests that because there is no such standard, nihilism is irresistible. The realization that he has already rejected Faith helps us to understand what Strauss does next: he identifies "the known and stable standard" in question as Reason.
In other words, the lack of resistance to nihilism seems to be due ultimately to the depreciation and the contempt of reason, which is one and unchangeable or it is not, and of science. For if reason is changeable, it is dependent on those forces which cause its changes; it is a servant or slave of the emotions; and it will be hard to make a distinction which is not arbitrary, between noble and base emotions, once one has denied the rulership of reason.103
Strauss's identification of his "standard" seems compelling: Reason is a well-known standard and the opposite of something that is merely "believed." But problems remain. Tb begin with, Reason is not something known: it is, rather, that by virtue of which other things are known. The unstated assumption, given that we were searching for "a known and stable standard" was that we were seeking an object of knowledge: different though the two senses of "known" proved to be upon examination, they were both objects ("known" is passive). Reason (active) is on the side of the subject: it is by virtue of Reason that the known is known. Strauss must have reasoned that few among his listeners would recognize the fallacy caused by ignoring these distinctions. In short, we cannot know what Strauss believed, but there is no reason to believe that Strauss knows what he claims a non-nihilist must. Moreover, he is simply wrong on the essential point: immunity to nihilism does not require that an unchanging standard be known: belief in such a standard is sufficient.
But even for those who prefer politics to logic, "Reason" is notoriously not "one and unchangeable" even within the confines of Strauss's "German Nihilism," a domain over which Strauss exercises exclusive mastery. What does Strauss mean by reason? The flexible intellectual moderation of the unprincipled English utilitarians! In order to distance himself from the German pole in "the Anglo-German War," Strauss is going to suggest precisely this at the end: he will praise the English for ". . . the prudence to conceive of the modern ideals as a reasonable adaptation of the old and eternal ideal of decency, of rule of law, and of that liberty which is not license, to changed circumstances."104 "Reason" is that which enables the English to adapt "something one and unchangeable" ("decency . . . rule of law . . . liberty") as changed circumstances demand. As Lord Palmerston said, England's interests alone are eternal: "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and these interests it is our duty to follow."105 There is thus a huge gulf between being reasonable in the English sense and the austere ideal earlier espoused by Strauss in his response to the Siren. If reason involves only the adaptation of means to fulfill self-interested ends, then it is as irrational (in the austere sense) as Nietzsche's "Will to Power." Rigid adherence to science (Strauss is careful to distinguish this from "modern science")106 is (on the one hand) the only thing that can save us-theoretically speaking-from Strauss the Siren's defense of German Nihilism. But on the other hand, the only power that can reasonably be expected to defeat German Nihilism in the War is the ever-flexible, purely self-interested but eminently practical debasement of that austere Reason that guides the imperial English to repeated success. Few, however, will think along these lines, although those who do will find more evidence in "German Nihilism" that Strauss rejects this austere sense of reason when he admits that the "rational argument" of "the young nihilists" was in error.107 Moreover, even if Strauss seems to be putting the case a little too radically in the palinode ("reason . . . is one and unchangeable or it is not"), there is still more than enough here to persuade most readers that he is in fact defending "the eternal principles of civilization." But he concludes his palinode with a twist that reminds the others of the longer and more passionate sermon of Strauss the Siren: just as the nihilist ended by quoting Scripture, the harmless rationalist now quotes the Devil.
A German who could boast of a life-long intimate intercourse with the superhuman father of all nihilism, has informed us as reliably, as we were ever informed by any inspired author, that the originator of all nihilism admitted: "Just despise reason and science, the very highest power of man, and I have got you completely."108
These, then, are the last words in section 6. By quoting Mephistopheles,109 Strauss can further distance himself from the evil character he himself has just created. He leads his audience to believe that he is as immune to nihilism (despite Strauss the Siren) as they know that Goethe was when he spoke as Mephistopheles.
Despite the skill demonstrated by Strauss in section six-first to reveal, then to conceal his secret teaching-he had good reason not to publish "German Nihilism" in 1941 or at any later time. But the article he did publish offers the reader a hermeneutic framework for deciphering "German Nihilism."110 Once Strauss's intentions in "German Nihilism" become clear, it is possible to see the seminal "Persecution and the Art of Writing" in a new light. The great joke of the latter is that liberals assume Strauss is describing authoritarian persecution of liberals.111 "German Nihilism" constitutes Strauss's practical response to the liberal persecution of authori- tarianism that he then describes theoretically (and considerably more safely) in "Persecution and the Art of Writing." I am not claiming that Strauss discovered the techniques described in that article while writing "German Nihilism"; this had happened long before.112 But I do believe that his decision to publish this article in 1941 cannot be fully understood without "German Nihilism." It was in writing the latter that Strauss discovered the urgent need for him to learn the art of writing; his brilliant answers113 to the question "What is Political Philosophy?" will prove he eventually did so. It would be through the strictly "political" use of exotericism that Strauss was able to keep the Conservative Revolution alive and-even in the belly of the whale-not only to pursue a theoretical "radikale Kritik am Liberalismus"114 but also, ever so patiently, to put it into practice.
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina.
Copyright University of Pennsylvania Press Oct 2007