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Abstract
Part One of this essay considered familiar ways of characterizing deontology, which focus on the notions of the good and the right. Here alternative approaches are taken up, which stress the type of reasons for actions that are generated by deontological theories. Although some of these alternative conceptualizations of deontology also employ a distinction between the good and the right, all mark the basic contrast between deontology and teleology in terms of reasons to act. Teleology, it will be recalled, is commonly defined as a theory in which the only right-making properties are good-promoting properties, while deontology is characterized by any other theory. Underlying the teleologist's puzzlement about the rationality of deontology is an instrumentalist theory of reason. Developed by Hobbes and later British empiricists, this theory has given rise to a variety of specifications. Deontological rule-following involves no more irrationality than speaking a language, playing a game, or having good manners; it is to let actions be guided by rules and principles rather than solely by outcomes.