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Abstract
In November 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held its first summit with India in Cambodia. This article examines whether the ASEAN-India Summit could be considered as a successful outcome of India's engagement strategy with Southeast Asia through its "Look East" policy. The diplomatic overtures and actions by India to cultivate the Southeast Asian region were clearly visible when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the Southeast Asian region several times in 2001. The article argues that India's "Look East" policy has been mainly reinvigorated by China's interests in ASEAN's riparian states along the Mekong River, namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. With the inclusion of Myanmar in ASEAN in 1997, India has come to share a common land border with an ASEAN member state and this has increased India's potential influence in the region. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Full text
In November 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held its first summit with India in Cambodia. This article examines whether the ASEAN-India Summit could be considered as a successful outcome of India's engagement strategy with Southeast Asia through its "Look East" policy. The diplomatic overtures and actions by India to cultivate the Southeast Asian region were clearly visible when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the Southeast Asian region several times in 2001. The article argues that India's "Look East" policy has been mainly reinvigorated by China's interests in ASEAN's riparian states along the Mekong River, namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. With the inclusion of Myanmar in ASEAN in 1997, India has come to share a common land border with an ASEAN member state and this has increased India's potential influence in the region.
Introduction: Post-Cold War Globalization
The end of the Cold War, the globalization of national economies, and the Asian financial crisis were some of the key factors that have established an ecologically conducive environment for India to enhance its linkages with the Southeast Asian region. The demise of the Soviet Union, India's main trading partner, and India's economic crisis of 1991 and subsequent economic reforms created a momentum for India to strengthen its trading links with Southeast Asia. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said that "the Cold War moulds have been broken and this has enabled us to strengthen our links without ideological barrier".1 India's engagement with Southeast Asia has spanned two millennia, based on trade, migration, language, culture, and religion.2 India has also been observing with concern that China's influence in Southeast Asia has grown. China's growing role in Southeast Asia contrasts with India's inability to strengthen its economic relations with the countries of South Asia despite the creation of the South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC).3 China's strategic links with Pakistan also irks India because of China's indirect interference in South Asia.
This article will differ from previous works on India and ASEAN by focusing on India's relations with the later entrants of the regional grouping, namely, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam (CMLV). These newer ASEAN states are strategically very important to India because of their proximity not only to India but also to the other Asian giant, China. In this context, the article will also examine India's economic ties with Thailand, which has closer bilateral interests to the CMLV states than the other ASEAN member states. These five ASEAN members are also noted as riparian states of the Mekong and are involved in the framework of the Mekong-Ganga Co-operation (MGC). The MGC ministers in the Vientiane Declaration had identified several areas for co-operation; they include culture, education, tourism, transport, and communications.4
India's focus on Thailand and the CMLV states highlights the fact that geographical proximity has a large influence in India's "Look East" policy because the Southeast Asian states, in particular those along the Mekong River, are also strategically important to China. When Myanmar became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997, India came to share a 1,500-kilometre contiguous border with ASEAN. In this context, India's engagement with the ASEAN states has assumed a different strategic perspective. At the onset of India's 1991 economic reforms, engagement with ASEAN was to accelerate the expansion and modernization of Indian infrastructure in the form of communications, roads, ports, and power.5 This meant attracting foreign investments and collaboration with the more advanced ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Singapore. Though still very important, the engagement policy of India with the ASEAN states has assumed an added strategic dimension in the form of the riparian states along the Mekong River.
From a regional perspective, the "Look East" policy also demonstrated that India has little faith in the development of its own South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation. According to Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha, "the development of ASEAN, during the last three decades, is the only successful experiment in regionalism".6 India believes that enhancing the level of its economic partnership with ASEAN is an important part of its strategy to increase its share in world trade which stands at a mere 0.4 per cent at the end of 2001.7 The ASEAN region encompasses about 500 million people, with a combined total of US$737 billion in income and US$720 billion in external trade. India and the ASEAN states are located in a geographically contiguous market that has 1.5 billion people with 300 million middle-class consumers in India alone.8
India's Look East Policy
India's strategy of engagement with Southeast Asia started before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.9 In the late 1980s, India began to initiate peaceful overtures to ASEAN and had called this process "Look East Destiny".10 In this regard, Singapore facilitated the elevation of India to full dialogue status by becoming India's Country Co-ordinator,11 and supported India's elevation to Full Dialogue Partner (Singapore has since relinquished its Indian Country Co-ordinator role to Malaysia). The visit by U.S. President Bill Clinton to India in March 2000, the first by an American President in twenty-two years marked a significant realignment in India's geostrategic and foreign economic relations. After decades of neglect as a result of the Cold War, the thawing of India-U.S. relations has the potential for positive spillovers for India in the Southeast Asian region. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee has renewed interest in India's "Look East" policy, and this was manifested when he visited several Southeast Asian countries between 2001 and 2002.
India's renewed interest in its "Look East" policy was reciprocated by the visit of the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Rudolfo Severino, to New Delhi in January 2001.12 In New Delhi, Severino had discussions with the Indian Commerce Ministry on ways to boost trade and economic co-operation between India and ASEAN. ASEAN is also interested in exploring co-operation with India's information technology sector. In this regard, Severino visited Bangalore (India's information technology [IT] hub) and had meetings with India's software industry representatives. Following Severino's visit to India, the third ASEAN-India Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) was convened. This was a follow-up to the first SOM held in 1998, and the second SOM in 1999.
With the renewed process of engagement with ASEAN, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Vietnam in July 2000, Malaysia in May 2001, Thailand in July 2001, Singapore in April 2002, and Laos and Cambodia in November 2002. In addition, India's Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh visited Myanmar in February 2001, while Indian Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani visited Singapore in February 2003. In an address to the Institute of Diplomatic and Foreign Relations, entitled "India and ASEAN - Shared Perspectives" in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Prime Minister Vajpayee said, "We are conscious that in the first few decades after our independence, we did not attain the full promise of our relationship...the full scope of our partnership was constrained by divergences in economic ideology, political outlook and security assumptions, which the Cold War imposed on us."13 Prime Minister Vajpayee, emphasized India's interest in ASEAN by saying that as India was developing its "Look East" policy, ASEAN had moved west by drawing Myanmar into its regional grouping, creating an opportunity for enhanced convergence.14
India's renewed interest in its "Look East" policy is related to its desire to accelerate its economic development further through reforms and liberalization. While India was not adversely affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, it also realized that it emerged relatively unscathed from the crisis because of its insular economy. In contrast, the ASEAN member states received the full brunt of the financial crisis but their economies are recovering, which reflects their resilience and dynamism. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee noted that the ASEAN countries have begun to develop regional dominance in certain areas of technologies and wishes India and ASEAN to exploit their respective synergies.15 As a market, ASEAN is attractive for Indian exporters because of its geographical proximity, resulting in shorter delivery schedules and lower freight costs. With a sizeable population of people of Indian origin (PIO) and a shared sense of historical, cultural and religious commonalities, the emerging economic linkages between ASEAN and India will be multifaceted and in-depth. Moreover, the new breed of Indian migrants to Southeast Asia are likely to be software engineers, financial analysts, and management professionals who will increasingly play an influential role in connecting South and Southeast Asia.
The post-Cold War environment from a geostrategic perspective has also drawn the ASEAN member states closer to India. This scenario was made possible because of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, India has perceived that there would be greater willingness on the part of the ASEAN members to judge Indian economic policy based on its merits without linkages to its Cold War doctrines.16 Although some doubts remain among the ASEAN members about India's strategic intentions, it was felt that ASEAN as a regional organization would look favourably upon Indian intentions of extending an "olive branch" after being encamped on the opposite side of the Cold War ideological divide. Moreover, engaging India as a regional power is a wise strategic response by ASEAN as it would curb China's regional ambitions.17 China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), its ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and its political influence in the region are some of the main motivations for India to engage the Southeast Asian region.
The motivation for ASEAN to welcome India as one of its partners is connected to how ASEAN is increasingly perceived by its main trading partners in the Western developed world. Since the Asian financial crisis and now the threat of terrorism in the region, especially since the bomb blast in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, Western investors are generally scrutinizing potential investments in the region more carefully. In addition, in terms of economic strategy, what is more alarming for ASEAN is that the European Commission (EC), in its strategy paper on EU-Asia enhanced partnership, has urged the EU to forge stronger ties with China and India.18 Apart from this new Asian focus by the EU strategy, existing strains in bilateral relationship between ASEAN and the EU, which includes human rights, transparency, and good governance will add to friction in ties between the two regions. For example, the enlargement of ASEAN to include Myanmar caused some consternation with certain European states. Given these developments, ASEAN is also keen to have India as another major Asian power to counter the growing influence of China and the decline of superpower interest in the region.
The ASEAN-India economic partnership is as much influenced by respective national interests to promote greater trade and business linkages as their concern over the growing influence of China in the region. Early signs of China's huge impact on ASEAN can be seen by its ability to draw away investments from the region. At the end of November 2002, overseas investments in China reached US$48 billion, an increase of 14.6 per cent over the same period in 2000.19 Concurrently, the inflow to ASEAN members, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines fell from US$27 billion in 1997 to US$11.4 billion in 2001. China has a much larger domestic market with lower labour costs and is also seen as a relatively safer option compared with some Southeast Asian states. To counter the growing economic might of China, policy-makers in ASEAN believe that it is imperative that ASEAN become China's partner in economic development.20 China's continuing strategic engagement with Pakistan from the Indian point of view also needs to be countered to prevent India from being "locked" into the South Asian region. Through its engagement with ASEAN, India is able to counter China's influence in the ASEAN region and break out from the South Asian region.
Strategic Trade
From a strategic perspective, enhancing trade and economic linkages with Southeast Asia after the demise of superpower rivalry in the region is of paramount importance if India is to curtail the influence of its main rival and neighbour, China, in the region. Without cultivating the ASEAN member states and extending its influence into the Southeast Asian region, India risks being marginalized and outflanked by the strategic partnership between China and Pakistan. While the motivation by India to foster closer links with ASEAN may be motivated by strategic considerations, India's trading and economic links with the region has been ongoing throughout centuries. According to Prime Minister Vajpayee, "ASEAN has always been very close to us in terms of history, geography and cultural association. The Ganga-Mekong Cooperation Programme, India's dialogue partnership with ASEAN and our ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) partnership all underlie our linkages". Prime Minister Vajpayee added, "We would like to see these linkages flourish in the future in the interest of our collective security."21
One of the clearest indications that India intends to overcome hurdles in fostering closer ties with ASEAN can be seen from its handling of the nuclear disarmament issue. Although India refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Prime Minister Vajpayee said that India as a nuclear weapons state was willing to respect the nuclear-free status of Southeast Asia by converting this recognition into a de jure commitment.22 This stand on India's part is significant because, given the nuclear capabilities of China and now Pakistan, India is willing to compromise on its overall strategic considerations for better relations with its ASEAN neighbours. Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Vajpayee, commented that, "ASEAN is a very important entity to us. Trade-wise, economic cooperation-wise. Don't forget that the sea lanes here are as important to us as they are to any other country. Our trade through the sea-lanes to Japan etc...is an important factor".23
Economic Collaboration
India's economic involvement with the ASEAN member states ranges across several issues and levels of industrial development.
The newer members of ASEAN, such as Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia, have economies that are more dependent on primary industries than the more developed countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Table 1 indicates the export trends of a selected group of ASEAN countries with India. The exports from ASEAN to India show an overall increasing trend. The largest increase in terms of exports to India among the ASEAN members are with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Brunei Darussalam has relatively less exports to India, but Cambodia and Myanmar have the weakest figures as newcomers to ASEAN. Philippine exports to India had declined drastically in the mid-1990s but have started to increase. Thailand's exports to India appear to have fluctuated the most with a large decrease in 2001. In this regard, India and Thailand have examined several bilateral and regional initiatives to reduce this wide fluctuation in their bilateral trade.
Table 2 indicates that the ASEAN countries do not import as much as it exports to India. While ASEAN imports from India has generally increased, the figures indicate that, proportionally, ASEAN exports to India more than doubled. Malaysia and Singapore are the largest importers from India, while Thailand is third. The secretary-general of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI),24 Dr Amit Mitra, predicted that trade between India and ASEAN is likely to rise from approximately US$10 billion in 2001 to US$20 billion by 2005. Despite the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, trade between India and ASEAN grew by 30 per cent from US$7.6 billion in 1999 to US$10 billion in 2001.25 According to Mitra, Southeast Asia accounted for 12 per cent of India's total foreign trade and India would like to raise this figure to 25 per cent in the shortest possible time.26
Though bright, the outlook for trade between ASEAN and India pales by comparison with ASEAN and China trade figures. In 2001, total trade between ASEAN and China stood at more than US$55 billion, an increase from US$9 billion in 1993. India's inability to capitalize on its geographical proximity to ASEAN and its historical and socio-cultural linkages with the Southeast Asian region was largely due to its slow pace of reforms to liberalize the Indian economy. The perception of the ASEAN countries is that India has not been serious about implementing its reforms and the process of governance in India appears complicated, unlike the situation in China. The Indian Government is anxious to change this perception and has pledged to cut its import tariffs from 30 to 20 per cent.27 Prime Minister Vajpayee has also tried to reassure investors and potential business partners from ASEAN that India wishes to be investor friendly. For example, India will be resorting to using e-governance to tackle laborious paperwork and the bureaucracy.28 Prime Minister Vajpayee has also pointed out that India or Indian-origin entrepreneurs owns the world's largest palm oil refinery in Malaysia, the largest carbon-black manufacturing units in Thailand, and a large number of textile factories in Indonesia. This indicates that the investment flows between India and ASEAN have been in both directions.29
With China's entry to the WTO, ASEAN member-state officials, such as the Indonesian State Minister of Foreign Investment, Laksamana Sukardi, believes that both China and India are serious competitors of ASEAN in terms of foreign investments.30 Sukardi opined that both China and India have large cheap pools of labour and huge potential markets. Both countries have also acquired significant technological capabilities. In particular, China is now able to produce sophisticated hardware and components, including semiconductors as well as research and development (R & D) services.31 It is also pertinent to note that as China expands its manufacturing capacity, it has started to increase its overseas investments in natural resource-rich countries. For example, Chinese investments in those ASEAN member-states that are endowed with natural resources increased from around US$54 million in 1998 to US$108 million in 2000.32 Interdependence in trade and investments, and not tariffs, seems to be the pragmatic approach to dealing with potential Chinese and Indian dominance in regional trade and investments.
Increasing interdependence between China, India, and ASEAN in terms of trade and investments in a market of 2.5 billion consumers, or half of the world's population, is not to be taken lightly. While China is concerned about the influence that it is having on the region by attracting foreign investments away from ASEAN, India is also concerned about the ability of the ASEAN region to recover from internal and external economic shocks. For example, when the ASEAN countries were hit by the 1997-98 financial crisis, their imports from India declined substantially from US$4.4 billion in 1997 to US$1.7 billion in 1998 (Table 2). However, ASEAN exports to India during the same period increased US$4.5 billion to US$5.2 billion (Table 1). During the crisis, India pledged solidarity with ASEAN to boost trade and investment flows to support the grouping's efforts to overcome the crisis.33 During the second India-ASEAN Joint Co-operation Committee meeting in Singapore in April 1998, India offered to allow the use of its EXIM Bank credit for two-way investment flows with ASEAN. Noting the sharp increase in ASEAN imports by India, Indian officials commented that the Indian Government, despite pressures, had resisted a competitive devaluation of the rupee.34 In 1996, before the financial crisis, ASEAN and India had become major investors in each other's economies. Two-thirds of Indian investments were targetted at ASEAN economies, while ASEAN as a group had invested US$1.8 billion in India, making ASEAN a major investor in India.35
The economic co-operation between India and ASEAN extends beyond trade and investments and into the area of technological co-operation and human resource development. India has built an impressive standing as an information technology and, in particular, software development centre. In this context, in 2000 India had organized a six-week training programme for ninety-four ASEAN candidates in advanced software techniques at the National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT].36 India has suggested that, given the positive feedback that it has received from the IT programme, it might be useful to allocate half of the one hundred scholarships that India has offered to ASEAN on a yearly basis to be used for IT purposes. In particular, India is keen to promote the use of IT among Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam for the purposes of e-governance and for use in the rural areas.37 While the CLMV states are not factored into the trade statistics on the ASEAN web because of their nascent bilateral trade with India, the latter is keen to promote ties with these states because of their proximity and relationship with China.
Maritime Security
Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Vajpayee, has commented that if India wants to import crude oil from Vietnam, India would want security of the sea-lanes in ASEAN for the crude oil to reach India. According to Mishra, this is part of India's security strategy. It was reported that 469 piracy cases occurred in the waters of Southeast Asia in 2000, an increase of 57 per cent from the previous year, and nearly 40 per cent of those attacks occurred in the seas around Indonesia and the Malacca Straits.38 Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes has mentioned that the Indian Navy has an interest in the ocean space extending from the North of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.39 Apart from geostrategic considerations, the safety of the sea-lanes of the one of the world's busiest waterways has clear commercial implications. The sea-lanes in the region, because of their commercial value, have increasingly been subject to acts of piracy.
Table 3 illustrates the number of piracy attacks worldwide from 1995 to 2000, compared with the cases occurring in Southeast Asia. In the first six months of 2001, 165 actual and attempted attacks and incidents of piracy were recorded in the world. Of this, 101 cases, or 61 per cent, of acts of piracy were recorded in the waters of Indonesia, Malacca Straits, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and India.40 According to the International Maritime Bureau (1MB) based in Malaysia, in 2001, besides Southeast Asia, especially the Indonesian waters and the Straits of Malacca, India, Bangladesh and the southern part of the Red Sea were also named as hotspots for sea piracy.41
Table 4 illustrates the location of actual piracy attacks in various Southeast Asian countries' maritime borders in 2000. While Vietnam is not featured in the table, its waters around the area of Vung Tau is known to be especially notorious for pirate attacks.42 ASEAN members, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, are able to counter piracy attacks with modern equipment, weaponry, and trained personnel but the CMLV states such as Vietnam suffer from a scarcity of resources in this area. The interest that India has shown in the sea-lanes of Southeast Asia and its collaboration with its Vietnamese counterparts to fight piracy in the waters of the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, should be seen in a positive light. While the piracy attacks in Vietnamese waters were mostly targetted at defenceless fisherman, there is growing concern that the attacks are widening to include oil and gas tankers, and cargo vessels.43
TABLE 3Piracy Attacks in Southeast Asia vs. World Total (1995-2000)TABLE 4Location of Pirate Attacks in Southeast Asian Maritime Boundaries in 2000
Apart from piracy, the expanding threat of terrorism has heightened the concern among the international maritime community for the safety of cargo vessels, and oil and gas tankers. In early October 2002, Yemeni officials reported that the explosion which crippled the French tanker Limburgin the Gulf of Aden was the work of terrorists.44 While shipping and oil executives reported that the tankers had taken the necessary precautions, the threat from hazardous areas such as the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia remains.45 Pirates may find it difficult to attack tankers with crude weapons but they represent a big and easy target for terrorists with more sophisticated weaponry. While attacks and hijackings on tankers continue in Southeast Asia, the 1MB Reporting Centre in Malaysia has also reported the success in recovering some of the hijacked tankers. For example, on 28 June 2001, the Indonesian navy recovered the hijacked tanker MT Selayang, which was reportedly carrying 3,500 tons of gas-oil at the time of its hijacking on 19 June 2001. In this context, the co-operation of regional navies, such as that between India and Vietnam, should be encouraged. If successful, this type of co-operation with the Indian navy could be enlarged to merge with ongoing naval operations between ASEAN members in the more dangerous waters off Indonesia's coast and the Straits of Malacca.
India's security co-operation with ASEAN member-states such as Vietnam also extends beyond co-operation on the high seas. India has signed a bilateral agreement with Vietnam to provide the latter with weaponry and military training. Growing defence links between India and Vietnam have witnessed an agreement signed by both countries for Vietnam to train Indian troops in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency operations.46 This agreement was reached during the visit of former Indian External Affairs Minister George Fernandes to Vietnam in March 2000. In return, India is to repair and overhaul MIG aircrafts belonging to the Vietnamese air force, train its pilots, and assist Vietnam to establish its defence industry to manufacture weapons. In addition, Vietnamese naval officers are also to receive training at the National Defence College in India and at the army's Pachmarhi language training facility.47 India also stands ready to supply Vietnam with Petia-class boats for its navy.
The economic and scientific collaboration between India and Vietnam reflects a multifaceted approach to the bilateral relationship between both countries. India has also offered Vietnam assistance to develop its physical infrastructure. According to Prime Minister Vajpayee, India would be ready to assist with requisite capital to develop transportation, telecommunications, railways, water supply, and power generation in Vietnam.48 Prime Minister Vajpayee added that Vietnam is a "critical element" in India's plans to forge stronger ties with ASEAN, and pivotal for India's "Look East" policy. During Vajpayee's official visit to Vietnam in January 2001, several agreements were signed between Indian and Vietnamese companies. It was also announced that India would be establishing a US$10 million pharmaceutical plant in Vietnam. Another major business venture involved the Indian company, ONGC Videsh, and Petrovietnam in gas and oil production. ONGC Videsh would invest US$238 million (the largest Indian investment abroad to date) in the joint venture.
Vietnam's interest in developing its energy resources with assistance from foreign investors has materialized in a commercial agreement signed between BP Amoco and Petrovietnam on the transportation of gas from its offshore fields in the Nam Con Son basin off southern Vietnam.49 Vietnam has included India's ONGC Videsh in the deal, and the other signatories include Norway's Statoil, who are owners of the US$580 million pipeline as well as the gas fields. In this deal worth a reported US$1.1 billion, ONGC Videsh's stake is 45 per cent while Petrovietnam has a 15 per cent stake. The other partners are BP, with a 26.67 per cent stake, and Statoil, with a 13.33 per cent stake.
Vietnam is also keen to develop its nuclear research industry to support its nuclear energy sector. Vietnam envisages that it would have to depend on nuclear power as its main energy source by 2050 because its fossil fuel resources would be depleted by that time. Vietnam plans to have its first nuclear reactor supplying electricity by 2017. India has agreed to supply Vietnam with laboratory equipment for its nuclear research institute in Dalat (southern Vietnam) and to train up to thirty Vietnamese nuclear scientists at Indian facilities dealing with various aspects of nuclear energy.50 Prime Minister Vajpayee said that, "science and technology, including frontier sciences, are the backbone of a modernizing society and India is pleased to assist Vietnam in this direction". A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between India's Department of Atomic Energy and the Vietnamese Science Ministry.
Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai said, "Over the past years, India has recorded important achievements in the course of reform and economic development and thus enhanced people's living standards."51 Echoing the need to improve living standards, Vajpayee announced that apart from a US$5 million credit offered to Vietnam in December 1999 to establish two centres for software and human resource development, India would add a further US$12-15 million grant for a software and training centre.52 Vietnam, a leading fisheries exporter in Southeast Asia, is also interested in co-operating with China and India to establish an ASEAN Plus Two alliance in a bid to boost fisheries exports. Thailand's fisheries exporters and the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Processors explained that ASEAN, India, and China combined, accounted for 85 per cent of fisheries exports in the world. The potential alliance will provide added weight in negotiating with importers over such concerns as technical trade barriers and food safety standards.53
India-Myanmar Relations
India's linkages with Myanmar reflect a similar geostrategic outlook to its linkages with Vietnam. When Myanmar was admitted to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in july 1996, and subsequently as a full ASEAN member in july 1997, India came to share a common land border with an ASEAN member state.54 Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, during a visit to Myanmar in February 2001, said that India needed an eastward access and that India could not have this if it stood apart from Myanmar.55 Jaswant Singh was the first important Indian Minister to visit Yangon, Myanmar, since 1987 when the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited that country. India's emphasis on developing its eastward trade access to Myanmar illustrates the Indian Government's resolve to mend and enhance historic ties with Myanmar. The Indian Government is aware of the potential for developing trade ties with Myanmar, an economy that only opened its market in the late 1990s.
India's plan to draw on its historic links and develop its common land border with Myanmar to alleviate the poverty and under-development in the region is a subtle move to enhance its linkages with Myanmar. Jaswant Singh said that, "historically, these areas have suffered on account of inaccessibility and inadequate infrastructure. We believe that the development of these border regions would be faster and more effective if our two countries joined hands in this endeavour."56 Included in Jaswant Singh's delegation were ministerial representatives from the states of Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh in India. These last four Indian states share a common land border with Myanmar. Jaswant Singh said that, "When we inaugurated the Tamu-Kalemyo-Kalewa road (along the Myanmar northwest border with India) ..., we wanted to convey the message that land joins us and we cannot be separate."57 Jaswant Singh also pointed out that by providing a link from the Indian border to central Myanmar, the road could promote exchanges in trade, travel, and tourism, and only then would the full potential of the border trading point at Tamu-Moreh be realized.58 More importantly for India's aspirations with ASEAN, the Tamu-Kalemyo-Kalewa road will eventually form a section of the Asian highway from Singapore to Istanbul.
As India's External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh has effectively stepped up economic and trade interests with his visit to Myanmar in February 2001. As a signal to foster closer trading and economic links, Myanmar and India have agreed to open four border check-points, and Myanmar would also consider the re-opening of the Indian consulate in Mandalay.59 Jaswant Singh added that it was also agreed between both sides to develop banking services, and immigration and customs facilities at the border trade check-points. The two sides also signed a treaty to combat cross-border drug trafficking and separatist insurgencies. As a gesture of India's commitment to cross-border problems, Jaswant Singh, on behalf of the Indian Government, handed over vehicles and construction equipment to Myanmar Ministers Lieutenant General Tin Oo, First Secretary Khin Nyunt, and Foreign Minister Win Aung of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
Aware of the lack of infrastructure facilities in Myanmar, apart from collaborating on constructing land links, in the short-term, India will also co-operate with Myanmar to construct a bridge that would link the Indian province of Mizoram with the bordering region of Myanmar.60 Myanmar Foreign Minister U Wing Aung considers this a historic development in Indo-Myanmar relations.61 In the long-term, India is also willing to co-operate with Myanmar in the construction of the Yeywa Hydroelectric Project near Mandalay.62 India would be dispatching a team from its Ministry of Power to Myanmar to discuss the proposed collaboration and conduct a preliminary on-site survey. India is also co-operating with Myanmar authorities to exploit hydropower projects along the India-Myanmar border.
India's efforts at repairing ties with Myanmar were greatly influenced by the gains that China has made to develop its own ties with Myanmar. China has been assisting Myanmar to upgrade the latter's naval facilities. This includes at least four listening posts along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea: Man-Aung, an island off the coast of Western Arakan, Hainggyi Island in the Irrawady Delta, St. Mathew Island, north of the entrance to the Malacca Straits, and Coco Island north of India's own Andaman Islands.63 To counter the Chinese threat, India has started to establish new military bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. According to senior Indian military officials, the bases would be used to monitor military and terrorist activities against India.64 From a strategic point of view, China is far ahead of India in developing its ties with Myanmar. While it may not be feasible for India to engage China in a strategic competition over Myanmar, India has approached the potential threat in a pragmatic fashion through its efforts to have a cordial relationship with Myanmar at all levels.65
India's Relations with Laos, and Cambodia
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Cambodia and Laos in November 2002 before the start of the ASEAN Summit. Besides discussing security concerns in view of the global threat of terrorism, India also held substantive economic talks with Laos and Cambodia. Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Cambodia was the first for an Indian Premier since late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Cambodia in 1954.66 Three agreements were signed by both countries covering the conservation and restoration of the Ta Prohm temple near Angkor Wat, an air services pact, and visa exemption for diplomatic and official passport holders. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) and the FICCI as part of the Indian delegation also signed separate Memoranda of Understanding with the Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce.67 Under the MoUs, the CII has agreed to assist the Phnom Pehn Chamber to run a chamber of commerce, and under the Mekong-Ganga Co-operation (MGC) programme, India will provide US$1 million in seed money to establish a traditional textiles museum in Siem Reap.
Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Laos also centred on textiles as India made moves to promote Indian textiles and paintings to garment exporting Laos. Vajpayee inaugurated the first exhibition of Indian Madhubani paintings from the Indian state of Bihar in Laos.68 The exhibition was organized by the Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) and Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha said that the paintings were done on paper in their original form. Apart from textiles, India also offered to assist Laos in human resource development by training its air force pilots. Similar to India, Laos has a fleet of Russian MIG-21 planes, and India also has the capability to provide technical assistance in terms of maintenance and upgrading of these Russianmade MIG aircrafts.69
India-Thailand Relations
India's bilateral relations with Thailand has been transformed from being ideological opposites during the Cold War to convergence, characterized by Thailand's "Look West" policy that coincides with India's "Look East" policy. The Thai Government in 1996 added a new element in its foreign policy, called a "Look West" policy, that consciously hoped to accord priority to the development of relations with countries on the Indian sub-continent, in particular India.70 This has been most readily seen in the exchanges of high-level official visits between the two countries. For example, India's Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha made a visit to Thailand in May 2000 to participate in an Asian Development Bank (ADB) conference in the province of Chiangmai.71
When former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan visited New Delhi in July 2000, he discussed five economic sectors with Indian officials that had good potential for future growth.72 These are the computer industry, IT and e-commerce, agriculture, construction, and tourism. Minister Pitsuwan also commented that in the computer and software industry, India had highly-skilled personnel in software development, while Thailand excelled in hardware production. On the part of the private sector, the Confederation of Indian Industries made efforts to strengthen economic ties with its Thai business counterparts. Statistics from the CII indicate that trade between India and Thailand has grown from US$406 million in 1992 to US$893 million in 1997.73 India's exports to Thailand were US$598 million in 1997, while India's imports from Thailand amounted to US$295 million.
Table 5 illustrates the bilateral trade figures between India and Thailand. The share of Thailand's trade with India in terms of Thailand's total global trade is 0.7 per cent. While imports from India account for 0.9 per cent of Thailand's overall exports, Thailand's exports to India make up only 0.5 per cent of its global exports, but Thailand was ranked 13th as India's largest export markets in 1995-96. Trade between India and Thailand declined after the Asian currency crisis in 1997. Trade between the two countries stood at US$375 million in 2001, representing a loss of 14.1 per cent over the same period in 2000.74
To increase its trade with India, Thailand has launched a series of trade shows in India to be held in leading cities, including Bangalore. The Thai and Indian governments have set a target of US$2 billion of trade between them, to be achieved by 2005. The trade exhibitions in Bangalore, called "Thailand Exhibition - 2001", was a three-day event that saw ninety-six companies participating to market nineteen product categories. This effort would help to facilitate trade between India and Thailand by increasing the awareness and opportunities for Indian and Thai businessmen to network with each other.
Thai Ambassador to India Bandhit Sotipalait said that to facilitate bilateral trade, both the Indian and Thai Prime Ministers have agreed to study the possibility of establishing a bilateral free trade area. While acknowledging that easing the transport of goods and people across borders will facilitate bilateral trade, both countries are also aware that a bilateral free trade agreement could stimulate their trade dynamics. This is because both countries could collaborate across a wide range of areas, including information technology, education, tourism, textiles, clothing, automobiles, gems, and jewellery.75 Prime Minister Vajpayee, on his visit to Thailand in November 2002, had also agreed with Thai Prime Minister Thaksin to expand air routes between the two countries to facilitate trade and tourism. As of the end of 2002, Thai Airways has been operating one flight a week from Bangkok to Kolkata, Delhi, and Mumbai, while Air India operates ten flights a week to Bangkok.76
A further enhancement of bilateral linkages includes the likely establishment of a bilateral free trade area between India and Thailand because both countries have signed a number of agreements to strengthen economic co-operation. In February 2002, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee signed two agreements in Delhi. One agreement involved co-operation in space exploration while the other involved scientific, technological, and environmental co-operation and the transfer of technology.77 India and Thailand have also agreed to establish a study group to examine the possibility of tax reduction and exemption on certain products.
Free Trade Area
The proposed India-Thailand free trade area to a large extent echoes the sentiments of India and ASEAN to work towards a free trade pact. Preparations for a proposed free trade area between India and ASEAN began with the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) meeting in September 2002 when Brunei hosted the first meeting between trade ministers from India and ASEAN.78 The proposed free trade area is strongly supported by the FICCI, which envisages a wide range of investment and collaboration opportunities for India and ASEAN. The economic ministers at the AEM decided to establish an ASEAN-India Economic Linkages Task Force comprising senior officials and business leaders from both sides. The Task Force was mandated to pursue the recommendations made by a joint study on the expansion of ASEAN-India economic ties which had proposed forming an India-AFTA Regional Trade and Investment Area.79 The Task Force will submit its recommendations, including a draft framework agreement to enhance economic co-operation and trade, at the next AEM meeting in 2003.
At the first India-ASEAN Business Summit in Delhi in October 2002, the FICCI Secretary-General Dr Amit Mitra said that strong India-ASEAN relations could be realized because of the geographical proximity, cultural affinity, and economic complementarity that have already existed for many years.80 During the first India-ASEAN Summit in November 2002 in Phnom Penh, India offered to start free trade talks and to have a working free trade agreement (FTA) by 2012. The Indian offer came a day after ASEAN and China signed an agreement to have an FTA by 2010, and an agreement with Japan to have closer economic relations.81 Trade analysts believe that the potential for greater trade expansion between India and ASEAN is great, given the bilateral trade flows of US$10 billion at the end of 2002. The FTA will be an ideal channel for India to trade with Northeast Asia while for ASEAN it is a useful counterweight to the might of the Northeast Asian economies. Prime Minister Vajpayee is keen that the Indo-ASEAN Task Force should explore the possibility of the FTA and submit its report at the next ASEAN Summit in Bali in October 2003.82 ASEAN and Indian ministers at the end of the Summit agreed to consolidate and enhance their close economic relations by promoting trade and investment, facilitating reciprocal market access, and improving the flow of technology transfer and access to trade and investment-related information.
The result of the ASEAN-India Summit is that such summits will be held on an annual basis, with the next proposed to be held in Bali, Indonesia, but the Indians have predicted that New Delhi will still remain outside the ASEAN-plus caucus. This caucus keeps ASEAN actively engaged with the trilateral states of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and South Korea).83 While Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha dismissed suggestions that India was concerned over China's influence in Southeast Asia, New Delhi did try to match China and Japan with the move towards creating an FTA.84 The strategic dimension of India's move towards proposing an FTA could not be more clear when Yashwant Sinha said, "The economic linkages that exist today are inadequate and do not reflect the strength of India and ASEAN..., this is a region which is in our neighbourhood and we are interested in building linkages with our region".85 In a similar move to that of Beijing, New Delhi is also willing to extend special concessions to ASEAN's newest and most economically fragile members. These concessions could come in the form of an "early harvest" that would see quick reductions in tariffs and selected goods.86 India had pledged to decrease its tariffs on imports from 30 to 20 per cent by 2005. According to international consulting firm McKinsey & Co, India has the potential to increase its bilateral trade with ASEAN at an annual rate of 15-18 per cent.87
Conclusion
India's initiatives aimed at strengthening its relations with Southeast Asian countries need to be organized on a long-term and sustained basis. Economically, Myanmar and Vietnam are emerging to embrace the principles of free trade after decades of insular trade practices. India, because of its historical and cultural links to the region, is ideally placed to assume the role of an economic and strategic partner to the emerging ASEAN member economies, such as Myanmar and Vietnam. With its experience and capabilities in science and technology, India is also able to advise and guide these emerging economies. The engagement of India in this region for economic and strategic reasons is more than merely to counteract the influence of China in this region. India's presence and interest in the Southeast Asian region provides a balanced profile of engagement with the region, with the major Asian powers having a significant economic stake in its well-being. India's increased involvement in the region would further spur the momentum of economic development in the region and provide greater economic and strategic security. India, with its relatively more developed infrastructure and expertise, provides a "role model" for countries such as Vietnam and Myanmar. India's decision to engage countries such as Myanmar, with whom it shares a common land border, should be seen in a positive sense, as its intention to co-operate with regional states to ensure the safety of commercial shipping in the region.
Whether India manages to dilute some of China's influence in Southeast Asia remains to be seen but China's efforts to enhance ties with the region is greatly assisted by its relations with Japan and South Korea. These three East Asian nations are proceeding to form a trilateral forum to explore the possiblity of an ASEAN Plus Three free trade economic bloc.88 While relations between the three East Asian nations are not exactly cordial, given their history and lingering suspicions of each other's motives, it is far better than India's relations with Pakistan, and perhaps Bangladesh. In this context, India's alternative regional economic integration through BIMSTEC to enhance ties between South and Southeast Asia is at best a distant possibility. In the near future, India's efforts to enhance ties with ASEAN member states, and in particular the Mekong riparian states, seem to be through strengthening economic co-operation.
Arguably, ASEAN may view India as a potential counterweight to China's influence in the region, or simply widening its options, but this allows India a role in the region. For India, this is real progress from being "bottled up" with purely strategic preoccupations in South Asia. India's economic engagement in Southeast Asia has both geostrategic and trade implications. For example, the bilateral co-operation between India's infrastructure sector in road, bridge and railway development among the CMLV states has strategic significance, but also earns India kudos from fellow Asian developing countries. Considering India's own development experience and ideological past, perhaps India's engagement with the CMLV states could be forged more easily across a wide range of economic sectors compared with the more advanced ASEAN states. While India's economic linkages with Thailand are different from the CMLV states, Thailand's proximity and ties with the CMLV also have strategic value for India. In the final analysis, India's engagement with the region extends its own options and increases the complexity of any geostrategic calculations for potential aggressors.
NOTES
1. "India and ASEAN - Shared Perspectives", Speech by Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 16 May 2001.
2. "India and ASEAN: Security Paradigm AD 2000", Speech by the Indian External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, Singapore, 2 June 2002.
3. Amy Kazmin, "India seeks free trade with ASEAN inside 10 years", Financial Times (London), 6 November 2002.
4. "ASEAN-India Summit Partnership: Challenges and Prospects", Speech by Senior Minister and Foreign Minister Hor Namhong of Cambodia, New Delhi, India, 14 March 2002.
5. "India and ASEAN - Shared Perspectives", Speech by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Kuala Lumpur, 16 March 2001.
6. "India and ASEAN: Security Paradigm AD 2000", Speech by India's External Affairs Minister, Singapore, 2 June 2000.
7. S.D. Naik, "India and Asean: Towards enhancing economic partnership", Business Line, India, 16 October 2002.
8. Ibid.
9. "India and ASEAN - Shared Perspectives", Speech by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Kuala Lumpur, 16 March 2001.
10. Tatyana L. Shaumian, "India's Foreign Policy: Interaction of Global and Regional Aspects", Asian Survey 27, no. 11 (November 1988): 1167.
11. "India-ASEAN: Vistas of Co-operation", Statement by Indian External Affairs Minister LK. Gujral at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, Jakarta, Indonesia, 27 July 1996.
12. Abdullah Ahmad, "KL-Delhi ties set for resurgence", New Straits Times (Malaysia), 30 January 2001.
13. "Prime Minister in Malaysia", Statesman (India), 19 May 2001.
14. Ibid.
15. "India and ASEAN - Shared Perspectives", Speech by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, Kuala Lumpur, 16 May 2001.
16. Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994).
17. Tatyana L. Shaumian, "India's Foreign Policy: Interaction of Global and Regional Aspects", Asian Survey 27, no. 11 (November 1988): 1168.
18. Shada Islam, "ASEAN set to lose centre stage in EU's Asian agenda", Business Times (Singapore), 6 September 2001.
19. Goh Sui Noi, "China gobbles up $87 billion in investments", Straits Times (Singapore), 28 December 2002.
20. Audra Ang, "China's Zhu to Present Asian Free-Trade Deal at ASEAN Meeting", Associated Press (Beijing), 28 October 2002.
21. Amit Baruah, "India to assist Vietnam in nuclear research", Hindu (India), 9 January 2001.
22. This could take the form of India becoming party to an ASEAN agreement on keeping Southeast Asia free of nuclear weapons, a commitment none of the P-5 nations have so far given. The writer was informed by a senior Indian Foreign Ministry official that India would not sign a CTBT because it was an unfair agreement that would leave India handicapped vis-a-vis the other nuclear capable states, especially the emerging nuclear powers in Asia.
23. Amit Baruah, "Consensus in ASEAN for summit with India", Hindu (India), 10 January 2001.
24. The FICCI represents 300,000 businesses in India, which employ more than two million people.
25. Narendra Aggarwal, "ASEAN's trade with India to double...", Straits Times (Singapore), 26 September 2002.
26. Ibid.
27. "India plans to lower tariffs on goods and services to boost trade with Southeast Asian countries", Business Weekly (India), 29 October 2002.
28. Mahesh Prasad, "Vajpayee Says India will use E-governance to Eliminate Red Tape", Malaysia Economic News, 17 October 2002.
29. Ibid.
30. "ASEAN seen facing lower growth as China, India attract investment", Agence France Presse, 22 March 2000.
31. "India: To Attract Investments, ASEAN-4 Has Its Work Cut Out", Business Line (India), 9 February 2001.
32. "Meeting the Chinese Challenge, ASEAN Way", Business Line (India), 27 June 2002.
33. "India Pledges to Boost Trade and Investment with ASEAN", Bernama, Malaysian National News Agency, 29 April 1998.
34. Dinesh Sharma, "Regional Economy India Seeks More Counter Trade with ASEAN: Financial Squeeze has dampened investment sentiment on both sides", Bangkok Post (Thailand), 11 May 1998.
35. N. Gunalan, "Big Investment flow between ASEAN and India", Straits Times (Singapore), 29 April 1998.
36. Amit Baruah, "India for Increased Technological Co-operation with ASEAN", Hindu (India), 28 July 2002.
37. Ibid.
38. "Japan to begin Asian piracy patrols," CNN News, 6 June 2001.
39. Atul Aneja, "India, Vietnam partners in safeguarding sea-lanes", Hindu (India),
15 April 2000.
40. Shipping Times (Singapore), 7 August 2001.
41. "Sea piracy attacks on the rise", BBC News, 24 July 2002.
42. International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Services, Weekly Piracy Report, IMB, Piracy Reporting Centre, 4-10 February 2003.
43. John J. Brandon, "Piracy on High Seas Is Big Business", International Herald Tribune (Washington D.C.), 28 December 2000.
44. Neela Banerjee and Keith Bradsher, "A Vulnerable Time to Be Moving Oil By Sea", New York Times, 19 October 2002.
45. Ibid.
46. Amit Baruah, "Consensus in ASEAN for summit with India", Hindu (India), 10 January 2001.
47. Amit Baruah, "Vajpayee offers to develop Vietnam's infrastructure", Hindu (India), 10 January 2001.
48. Ibid.
49. "Transport deal signed in major Vietnam gas project", Economic Times (India), 13 February 2001
50. Amit Baruah, "India to assist Vietnam in nuclear research", Hindu (India), 9 January 2001.
51. Amit Baruah, "Vajpayee offer to develop Vietnam's infrastructure", Hindu (India), 10 January 2001.
52. Amit Baruah, "India to assist Vietnam in nuclear research", Hindu (India), 9 January 2001.
53. Hong Van, "ASEAN Fisheries Exporters Want Ally With India, China", Saigon Times Daily (Vietnam), 1 July 2002.
54. Frederic Grare and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., India and ASEAN: The Politics of India's Look East Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS], 2001).
55. Rakesh Sinha, "World's biggest democracy gives a Valentine's Day gift to Myanmar junta", Indian Express (India), 15 February 2001.
56. Amit Baruah, "India, Myanmar road opened", Hindu (India), 14 February 2001.
57. Rakesh Sinha, "World's biggest democracy gives a Valentine's Day gift to Myanmar junta", Indian Express (India), 15 February 2001.
58. Amit Baruah, "Important milestone, says Jaswant", Hindu (India), 14 February 2001.
59. Amit Baruah, "A rewarding visit, says Jaswant", Hindu (India), 16 February 2001.
60. Ibid.
61. "Reaching out to a neighbour", Hindu (India), 17 February 2001.
62. Amit Baruah, "A rewarding visit, says Jaswant", Hindu (India), 16 February 2001.
63. Amit Baruah, "India for gaining foothold in Myanmar to counter China", Hindu. (India), 13 February 2001.
64. T. V. Parasuram, "India to build military bases in Andaman and Nicobar: Report", Hindustan Times (India), 1 August 2001.
65. Amit Baruah, "India for gaining foothold in Myanmar to counter China", Hindu (India), 13 February 2001.
66. Amit Baruah, "India, Cambodia signs pacts", Hindu (India), 10 April 2002.
67. Amit Baruah, "India to help restore temple at Angkor Wat", Hindu (India), 11 April 2002.
68. "India, Laos to cooperate in fight against terrorism", Hindu (India), 8 November 2002.
69. Ibid.
70. Press Statement, Embassy of India, Bangkok, Thailand, 2001.
71. V. Jayanth, "Revitalising India-East Asia Ties", Hindu (India), 16 May 2000.
72. "Thailand backs India's bid for U.N. seat", Hindu (India), 11 July 2000.
73. Press Statement, Embassy of India, Thailand, 2001.
74. "Thailand to host trade meets in India", Economic Times (India), 25 July 2001.
75. Dinesh Sharma, "Thailand and India Move Ahead on Bilateral Pact", Bangkok Post (Thailand), 20 June 2002.
76. "India for Free Trade Area withThailand", Hindu (India), 9 November 2002.
77. "Thailand's proposal for India to Join the Asia Co-operation Dialogue", Global News Wire, Press Reports, 13 February 2002.
78. Hamisah Hamid, "Indian-ASEAN summit to further define ties", Business Times (Malaysia), 24 September 2002.
79. AFTA-ASEAN Free Trade Area, Martin Abbugao, "ASEAN, India hold landmark meeting on trade", Agence France Presse, 15 September 2002.
80. R. Ravichandran, "India-ASEAN Business Summit to Boost Trade and Investment Tie", Malaysia Economic News, 16 October 2002.
81. Chua Lee Hoong, "India makes trade offer to ASEAN", Straits Times (Singapore), 6 November 2002.
82. "India, ASEAN countries to combat terrorism", Press Trust of India, 5 November 2002.
83. P.S. Suryanarayana, "PM for ASEAN-India free trade area", Hindu (India), 6 November 2002.
84. Ibid.
85. Amy Kazmin, "India seeks free trade with ASEAN inside 10 years", Financial Times (London), 6 November 2002.
86. Ibid.
87. "India to promote trade with Southeast Asia", Business Weekly (India), 29 October 2002.
88. Anthony Rowley, "New trilateral forum among East Asian nations in the works", Business Times (Singapore), 5 November 2001.
FAIZAL YAHYA is an Assistant Professor in the South Asian Studies Programme, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore.
Copyright Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Apr 2003