ON THE USES OF MILITARY POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Abstract

While, according to Dr. [Klaus Knorr], there are a number of nations currently credited with the ability to develop nuclear weapons, the incentives and disincentives acting on governments pondering whether or not to "go nuclear" are complex and vary from country to country.

ON THE USES OF MILITARY POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By Klaus Knorr. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, pp. 185.)

Dr. Knorr is Professor of Economics and Director of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. He is the author of The War Potential of Nations (1956) and NATO and American Security (1959).

This book examines trends discernible in the nature of military conflict, in political attitudes toward war as a method for settling disputes, and also trends affecting the place of military power in international relations and the utility of war and armed forces. The author believes that these conditions, and the changes they display, have a major bearing on the structure and functioning of the international systems. In exploring some of the recent changes in the nature, function, and value of military power in international relations, Professor Knorr discusses trends in the value which nations derive, in their international relationships, from the possession and use of military forces, both nuclear and non-nuclear. From this point, he suggests that territorial conquest and the furtherance of economic benefits by military means have generally diminished in appeal. He then examines the various costs and disadvantages that now attend the use of military power.

The writer does not offer a general theory of military power, as he believes that such a theory is not yet within our reach. Military power results, according to the author, in large part from military force. Knorr then separates the two as completely different phenomena. He suggests that regiments, ships, rockets, etc., are concrete things that generate military power. He then states that military power and influence is relational, Thus, Dr. Knorr believes that national military power exists only in relation to particular other nations and regarding particular conflict situations. This, then, is "actual military power."

Nations may also have "latent" or "potential" military power in the sense that political leaders and military staffs speculate about hypothetical power relationships. In other words, they are aware of likely power relationships that would obtain if particular countries were pitted against each other under particular circumstances.

The author's thesis is more of a conclusion. He proposes that since WWII, there has been a major, if not a dramatic, change in the conception of international war and in the utility of national military power. The usability and utility of military force have undergone a vast transformation. The writer feels that with the advent of nuclear weaponry and its associated sophisticated paraphrenalia, a revolutionary impact on the face of war and the usability of military power as an instrument of national policy has been realized.

Knorr believes that even though national military power now imposes on mankind the nightmarish possibility of catastrophic destruction, it continues to act as an indispensable mainstay of international order as we know it.

In an examination of nuclear power, Knorr cites that it is probable that more national nuclear powers will appear on the scene during the next ten or twenty years. In support of this theory, the author believes that the technology of manufacturing nuclear bombs is becoming simpler and cheaper, and the relevant technological knowledge has become widely diffused. Scientific education and engineering training are progressing everywhere, and programs for the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy seem to spread familiarity with nuclear processes and their control. In summary, Knorr says it is getting easier to become a nuclear power of-sorts.

While, according to Dr. Knorr, there are a number of nations currently credited with the ability to develop nuclear weapons, the incentives and disincentives acting on governments pondering whether or not to "go nuclear" are complex and vary from country to country. Such disincentives include economic and moral concerns, political inconvenience for nations that have for years denounced the wickedness of nuclear weaponry, and nearly all nations are party to the agreement prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere. On the other hand, Knorr points out that the development of military nuclear systems is favorable, if not indispensable, to modern industrial development, as a symbol of international status and within nations, as a source of prestige.

Knorr states finally that as long as the world is organized politically as it is, and as long as nation-states dispose of the instruments of military force, national military power remains important. Thus, he feels that it would be a great error to believe that, in the present world, the possession of military strength is useless, and that the achievement of vital foreign policy goals can be left entirely to the employment of diplomatic, economic and moral resources. Knorr's premise is that the main value of national military power is now its "latent" usability.

Professor Knorr concludes that until international disarmament takes place, the enormously destructive power of modern weaponry is not going to diminish, and is likely to increase.

This reviewer finds the book well organized, thorough and documented. It is difficult to take exception with Dr. Knorr's thoughts on military power. The book is somewhat difficult to read and for a complete understanding, some re-reading was required. Professor Knorr's analysis of military power in the nuclear age exhibits a great deal of research and thought.