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Abstract
This dissertation project explains variation in state cooperation with International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations and prosecutions across cases and over time. The idea motivating this study stems from the observation of the mixed record of state cooperation with ICC operations. For legal professionals and scholars this observation is puzzling, since states falling within the ICC 3territorial jurisdiction are legally bound to provide full judicial assistance to the Court. Why do some countries entertain collaborative relations with the ICC while others display hostility towards it? I argue that state leaders’ perceptions of potential ICC indictment best explain variation in state behavior. The academic payoff of this project is a better understanding of how state attitudes form and to what extent external actors, spearheaded by the ICC Prosecutor’s Office (OTP) can change them. Preliminary findings suggest: First, formal state consent (e.g. ratification) is not a reliable predictor of state cooperation; Second, democracies are more likely than non-democracies to cooperate initially, yet regime type does not play a role in enhancing judicial cooperation when this is not forthcoming; Third, state leaders’ perceptions of potential ICC indictment correctly predict state behavior in all the situations investigated by the OTP; Fourth, the OTP’s signaling strategy—including the timing of ICC intervention—affects state leaders’ perceptions of future ICC indictment and, in turn, the prospects of state cooperation; Finally, when state authorities deny cooperation, regime change provides a one-time opportunity to start ICC-relations anew. My theoretical framework is linked to empirical analysis through a comparative study of three country cases: Colombia, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire. I complement the aforesaid study with in-person interviews of Court officials and state authorities as well as an original survey of diplomats posted at the UN headquarters in New York City. The evidence from these interviews, official documents and detailed analysis of the inner workings of these governments lend support to the hypothesis that the OTP’s mismanagement of its relations with state authorities can jeopardize prospects of state cooperation right from the outset.
