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Public Choice (2007) 133: 231251 DOI 10.1007/s11127-007-9187-4
Kyoto Protocol cooperation: Does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying?
Per G. Fredriksson Eric Neumayer Gergely Ujhelyi
Received: 23 April 2007 / Accepted: 16 May 2007 / Published online: 14 June 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007
Abstract Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratication? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying? In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratied hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratication to test this hypothesis. We nd that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratication, and the effect rises with the degree of corruption.
Keywords Corruption Political economy Agreements Ratication Environmentalism
1 Introduction
The ratication stage of an international environmental agreement (IEA) is a crucial part of cooperation on global pollution problems. Relatively little is known about which factors contribute to IEA ratication (or the absence of it), although domestic politics and the degree of democracy are often viewed as important.1 In this paper, we explore the roles of govern-
1Murdoch et al. (2003 p. 360) argue that The Kyoto Protocol also indicates that lobbying interests may also inuence the ratication stage. On the role of democracy, see for example Congleton (1992), Murdoch and Sandler (1997), Fredriksson and Gaston (2000), Neumayer (2002a, 2002b), and Beron et al. (2003). In a study of the Helsinki Protocol on sulphur emissions, Murdoch et al. (2003) study both the participation decision and the degree of participation, and nd a weaker effect of democracy than many other studies. See Congleton (2001) for a useful survey of the literature on the political economy of environmental treaties.
P.G. FredrikssonUniversity of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, USA e-mail: [email protected]
E. Neumayer ( )
London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, UK e-mail: [email protected]
G. UjhelyiHarvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA e-mail: [email protected]
232 Public Choice (2007) 133: 231251
ment corruption and environmental lobby groups for IEA ratication, with a particular focus on the Kyoto Protocol. Ratication was clearly a pivotal stage of the Kyoto process, with the Russian Federation ratifying only in late...