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In 2009, I published an article for Military Review recommending the end of the human terrain system (HTS). In "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustained Cultural Competence," I argued that the deployment of nonorganic cultural teams to Afghanistan and Iraq was unnecessary and counterproductive. I wrote, "When do the quick-fix solutions give way to long-term, doctrinally sound programs? It is time for HTS to give way"1
In my view, the logical alternative was to sharpen the skills of the soldiers and marines already tasked with advising the commander-foreign area, civil affairs, and intelligence experts-and put them in a position to help think through the maddening complexities of irregular war, meanwhile providing sufficient cultural training to deploying troops. Instead, HTS became the program of record for cultural capability. Five years and over $700 million later, HTS was effectively killed.2 Plans to embed permanently human terrain teams (HTTs) with every infantry brigade and regiment were shelved. Promises of an integratedjoint cultural database faded. As the smoke clears, it is time to revisit fundamental problems and to take inventory of remaining culture programs. It is equally important to think about an HTS redux: If we do this again, why and how do we do it?
Forget the he-said, she-said swirl of accusations, counteraccusations, and recriminations that dragged the debate over HTS into the muck. A sober retrospective suggests that everyone involved, from Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro to the most fervent anti-HTS anthropologists, had good intentions.3 As Christopher Sims argues in his scholarly assessment of the program, there are bigger issues at stake than the individual failures and success stories that have co-opted our attention.4 The U.S. military needs to make some fundamental decisions about culture. If it fails to take action now, it will-as many experts have argued since at least 2003-see its capabilities fade as they did after the Vietnam War. I argue that despite some real progress, the fade is already well underway.
HTS and the Fundamental Split: Organic or External?
HTS came about primarily as a response to the improvised explosive device (IED) problem in Iraq. Tactical commanders were frustrated that they could not get into the heads of tribal leaders and insurgent foot soldiers...