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One of the central debates in the philosophy of science is the concept of “value-free ideal” (Churchman, 1948; Douglas, 2009; Levi, 1960; Reichenbach, 1951). Its basic premise is that scientific work should be guided only by internal scientific values (e.g. reliability, validity, explanatory power) and should be free from the influence of social values (e.g. justice, ethics) that are not an inherent part of the scientific process. The scientist’s role is to discover knowledge with objectivity, unbiased by any contextual factor. Scientists are accountable only to other scientists and not to people outside the scientific fields (Kaplan, 1964). Therefore, the isolation of scientists from worries and social ethos is desirable and necessary to maintain scientists’ autonomy of inquiry and independence of thought. This isolation “permits the individual scientist to concentrate his attention upon problems that he has good reason to believe that he can solve” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 164). Kuhn considers this autonomy to be largely responsible for success in the natural sciences.
Opponents of value-free ideal, on the other hand, view science as a value-laden activity, since the major purpose of science is to address human needs (Dewey, 1927). Therefore, a full account of scientific knowledge could not exclude values. Merton’s (1942) famous “ethos of science” points out that the proper functioning of the norms internal to science depends on the values in the broader society. Recognizing the uncertainty inherent in scientific reasoning and inference, Rudner (1953) argues that social and ethical values are essential in judging the sufficiency of evidence when looking to accept or reject a hypothesis and to consider the risk of wrongful conclusions. At a very basic level, there are simple ethical demands on the scientist such as honesty, openness and integrity. Science “cannot succeed unless result are honestly reported, unless every reasonable precaution be taken to avoid experimental error, unless evidence running counter one’s own view is fairly handled, and so on” (McMullin, 1982, p. 7).
After several decades of debate, the general conclusion today among philosophers of science (although some still hold out, e.g. Lacey, 1999) is that the value-free ideal is not only impossible; it is also undesirable (Douglas, 2009). Value-free science is not possible because values show up in every step of the scientific process, from...